Impact of HIV/AIDS on Governance in Manipur and Nagaland

The paper is the product of a six-month study that I completed early this year. The study was aimed at understanding the linkages between HIV/AIDS and governance in India's militancy hit north east region. The paper was commissioned and published by AIDS, Security and Conflict Initiative (ASCI – www.asci.ssrc.org), a joint programme of Social Science Research Council (SSRC), New York and the Netherlands Institute of International Relations.

Introduction
Northeast India is to the rest of India what Africa is to the World – far away and forgotten. Both in the cases of Africa and the Northeast, inhabitants of the ‘core’ witness these peripheral regions sliding into underdevelopment, uncertainty and anarchy. Since nothing much can be done to save them, safeguard the status-quo, they believe, so that things don’t go out of control.[1] While it may be comparing the incomparable, the message is loud and clear that parts of Northeast India is close to near total collapse – from the points of view of governance, law and order, and development - and still the government policies have not gone beyond ad hoc measures aimed at maintaining the status-quo. Even as the governability of the state and governance therein are severely damaged, the powerful parties - the Central government, state governments, politicians, the many Underground Organisations (UGs) and the narcotics mafia - seem safe in their comfort zones.

The objective of this study is to assess the impact that HIV/AIDS has had on governance in Nagaland and Manipur. More specifically, the questions that this study seeks to answers for are the following:

- What has been the impact of the disease on the health and education sectors of the two states under study?
- What has been the impact of the disease on elected bodies of the local and regional government structures?
- What has been the impact of HIV/AIDS on the local police and the military in Nagaland and Manipur?

The study has, as the questions above reveal, focused on four aspects of governance: law enforcement, education, health, and democratic processes. These aspects of a state, the study argues, are indicative of the state of governance there. Therefore, if these aspects are adversely affected by HIV/AIDS, the state’s ability to deliver governance to people can be understood to be severely affected, this study argues. In other words, a state’s ability to carry out its governance related functions will be seriously hampered if the above mentioned four sectors of a government are severely affected by HIV/AIDS.

Additionally, the study also considers that legitimacy of the state among the population, violent rivalries among the various ethnic groups in the state and nexus between parts of the state apparatus and criminal gangs can additionally weaken the state. But does HIV/AIDS have anything to do with these? Not directly. However, the disease and its impact are aggravated due to these very factors. Armed insurgency, narcotics trade, corruption, underdevelopment, nexus between Underground Organizations (UGs) and the political/bureaucratic elite can act as force multipliers in a situation wherein HIV/AIDS is rapidly weakening the governance apparatus of the state.
[1] In an interview with the author the Deputy Commissioner of the Churchandpur District, Manipur, Mr. Sumant Singh pointed out, “The administration is fighting to maintain status-quo. Where are the machinery, time and money for other initiatives like combating HIV/AIDS?”

** The complete reportcan be accessed at: http://asci.researchhub.ssrc.org/impact-of-hiv-aids-on-governance-in-manipur-and-nagaland/attachment

What happened to the Peace Process?

Kashmiris are not new to peace processes: it comes and goes like the tourists do in the valley. It is often difficult to keep track of the many peace processes we have had so far. Peace processes in Kashmir can be described as piecemeal approaches bereft of any grand political vision for peace. The latest one too started off with a lot of fanfare and symbolism. But what has happened to it? Has the establishment in Delhi and the various tack-two ‘walas’ forgotten about the frozen valley? Whatever happened to all those Round Table (RT) reports and the various recommendations therein? Have they also been put away in to the dustbins of Kashmiri history like many other reports, recommendations and rhetoric ( a la ‘sky is the limit’ promise by Narasimha Rao) of this kind? No one seems to have any answers. That said, this seems to be nothing new but in line with the same old Indian strategy on Kashmir that it has practiced over the last many years. Approach Kashmir and the politics there with a feudal mindset: hold talks, meetings and conferences in fits and starts. New Delhi starts the dialogue process when it feels like, it invites participants it feels like, it holds such meetings at an interval that is suitable to it, and unilaterally sets the agenda that it is comfortable with. Then the grand finale takes place with some dignitary releasing the reports etc. Sadly then, the meetings, participants, agenda and the recommendations are all forgotten even before one is able to gauge what is happening. This is followed by a long sarkari silence on the issue, like the present one, before dissidents, militants and ‘external pressures’ force the government to start the process all over again. The process begins, but it’s altogether a new process. The bureaucrats, politicians and the intelligence walas have all forgotten what happened up until now: it’s now about forgetting and forgiving whatever has happened and looking at the future, they will tell you. The above description perhaps best suits the off-and-on peace process that New Delhi has undertaken vis-à-vis the Kashmir issue. One would argue that the political turmoil (first the woes of Pervez Musharraf and then the assassination of Benazir Bhutto) in Pakistan has compelled the government of India to go slow on the peace process and the reports produced by the working groups. But of the five working groups (CBMs, Cross-LoC relations, Economic Development, Governance and, Centre-State relations) just one concerns Pakistan, the one on Cross-LoC relations. The other groups and their recommendations are about New Delhi and Srinagar. New Delhi does not need to get a go-ahead from Islamabad to talk to its own citizens in J&K. More importantly, let us be clear about the fact that the Kashmir issue is not one between India and Pakistan, it is about New Delhi and J&K, even as it is possible to argue that India is giving the attention that it does to Kashmir only because of the Pakistan dimension. A cursory glance at New Delhi’s attitude towards Northeast would make that amply clear. Here lies the critical and alarming distance between those who govern and those who are governed. Problems in Jammu and Kashmir are as much (or more) internal as much (or lees) they are external. Let us not befool ourselves by claiming that the problems in Kashmir are merely due to Pakistan. New Delhi’s feudal policies are as much part of the problem: Pakistan only took advantage of our follies. If one accepts that historical fact, then it also needs to be accepted that the solution should first of all be worked out between New Delhi and the people of Jammu and Kashmir. For that, we do not need to wait for things to settle down in Pakistan: that is neither clever strategy nor responsible statecraft. If one says that since the India-Pakistan dialogue on Kashmir is put on the backburner, we can not do much with Kashmir, I would argue that we need to do more in Kashmir precisely for that reason. There is an emerging peace constituency in and on Kashmir which we cannot afford to lose. Reconciliatory strategies should be adopted now especially because much has changed in Kashmir, not just the number of causalities or infiltration of militants from across the broder: I have never understood the logic and civility behind measuring peace with the number of causalities. Consider this. Today’s context seems to be special and unprecedented for Kashmir as well as for New Delhi-Srinagar rapprochement. There is general agreement today that the ongoing peace process in Kashmir and between India and Pakistan and the results it has produced are there to stay despite the political turmoil in Pakistan and the uncertainty it has created for the Kashmir peace process. This confusion has not really adversely affected the peace process in and on Kashmir which seems to have taken a life of its own. This is because there is a new lease of hope among the people of J&K that peace and its fruits are not very far away. Contemporary politics in and on Kashmir is charecterised by two important and unprecedented features: one, the Pakistani leadership and most serious Kashmiri leaders have now gone back on their demand for altering the borders between the two countries; two, most of the leaders have now enunciated what they would like to achieve in terms of a settlement of the Kashmir issue. Responsible statecraft and clever strategic thinking, therefore, would require that New Delhi revives the now frozen process of peace in Kashmir making use of the twin advantages pointed out above before the assembly elections in J&K (later this year), parliamentary elections (next year) and continuation of uncertainty in Pakistan hamper the positive momentum for peace in J&K. How long should peace in Kashmir be sacrificed at the alter of electoral calculations and bilateral concerns?

Kashmir resolution: Do we have a consensus?

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB
One of the major reasons, among a host of many others, why we are unable to resolve the Jammu and Kashmir conflict is because there are too many plans, proposals, formulas and ‘solutions’ put forward for its resolution. This multiplicity of proposals is explained by the fact that there isn’t just one conflict in Kashmir: there are many conflicts within the one conflict in J&K. The important question, however, is that while we have scores of proposals for resolution, do we have some sort of consensus among them? Not yet, or perhaps we haven’t done enough exercise in building one. Precisely because there are many actors and players in J&K with divergent views and stakes, politics and proposals, it is impossible to accept one of them as the ‘mater plan’ to resolve the Kashmir conflict, however good, sensible and accommodative that one plan may be. Accepting one proposal over the others will only further vitiate the political atmosphere, let alone contribute towards resolving it. If we are not waiting for a ‘master proposal’ to come down to us, what the different stakeholders in J&K need to logically do is to create a consensual roadmap from among the existing proposals. Creation of such a consensual document may ideally go through the following phases: 1) look for commonalities and differences in the existing proposals; 2) devise a mechanism/fora for discussing and resolving the outstanding differences, and; 3) propose to implement the most common denominators among the them. This is oversimplification, some might argue. But complicated processes of conflict resolution have to pass through various stages of simplifying the issues at hand so that the general public and even the actors themselves understand what the others are talking about and how to start negotiating with them. While identifying the commonalities is extremely important, no less important is understanding the differences among them. There are and will be differences. Obvious differences and contradictory positions should not stop us from understanding the significance and import of flushing out the common themes running through the various proposals for therein lies the solution for many ills of the state. But which are those important proposals we are talking about here? The most important ones that one might want to consider are: 1) JKLF Roadmap for J&K, 2) Musharraff Proposals, 3) Article 370 of the Indian Constitution and the Delhi Agreement, 4) KSG Proposals, 5) The United States of Kashmir Proposal by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, 6) Peoples Democratic Party proposal, 7) People’s Conference (Sajad Lone) proposal, 8) J&K State Autonomy Committee Report (National Conference), 9) Balwaristan National Front proposal, and 10) Manmohan Singh’s ideas. And what are those commonalities? As a starting point, I would like to point out five common themes among them for further discussion. The most important theme running through all of these proposals is the issue of Self-Rule and autonomy. While some of the proposals delve at length into these two related yet different issues, some do not. But all of these proposals do realize the need to give greater autonomy short of independence to Jammu and Kashmir (except perhaps in the case of JKLF which demands no less than complete independence). The other key agreement among these proposals is that all of them realize the need for cross-border mechanisms for deliberating, consulting and deciding on a variety of issues concerning both sides of J&K. Even as there has been a heated debate on the issue of joint management of resources and certain mutually agreed upon sectors of governance and what it entails among other things (whether this means joint control or joint management etc.), what is pertinent to note is that the key stakeholders have realized that this is one possible way ahead in a world that is quickly going past the confines of borders not just for peace but also for benefits of a great variety. Interestingly, let us remember that both Manmohan Singh and Pervez Musharraf apart from Sajad Lone, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and PDP have endorsed this idea. Despite such huge high-level support for this proposal, this truly great idea is lies mired in obscure details. The third important, if not entirely common, factor in these proposals is the emphasis given to sub-regional problems and aspirations. Valley politics and discourse, by default or design, tends to dominate over most other pressing problems in the whole of J&K state, including on the Pakistani side of the border: issues relating to Jammu and Kashmir have come to identify solely with what happens in the Kashmir valley. It is necessary, therefore, to address and attend to such regional aspirations and problems be it regional autonomy, highlighting their differences with the valley or addressing governance related issues in the peripheral regions. The fourth issue addressed by most of these proposals is also the much debated issue of demilitarization in J&K. While many actors are chary of addressing the issue, some have looked at it openly with a willingness to discuss it. Despite the differences in this regard due to its politico-strategic sensitivity, there seems to be some agreement on phased demilitarization. Demilitarization when adequately phased and timed well with a reduction in terrorist violence, even the hawks within the government of India would be fine with it. Another equally important common factor seems to be the need to accord the state a lot more autonomy regarding financial matters, recruitments into civil services etc. While much of this is easy to do, this involves a great deal of trust and flexibility apart from political will from the part of the government in Delhi. Implementing the common themes pointed out above would require a lot of political will, courage, wisdom, flexibility and deliberations. The primary responsibility in this regard lies with the separatist leadership who has to think together to put up a common set of demands for J&K. Let us not forget that it is easy to rule when the opposition is divided. New Delhi would also need to bring itself to accept the need to think out of the box on Jammu and Kashmir.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, February 6, 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=6_2_2008&ItemID=6&cat=11)

The Ideal versus the Achievable

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

After all Kashmiris have to think within the limits of achievability onflicts tend to go through certain phases, so do pro cesses of conflict resolution. Whether or not the stakeholders and observers like it, the phases of a conflict are linear, dynamic and irreversible. The road from conflict to reconciliation typically goes through initial romanticism, hard-line posturing and armed struggle to conflict fatigue, erosion of leadership and lessening popular support, and then to the setting in of realism and the willingness to negotiate with the opposition (unless and until the conflict itself benefits the stakeholders). Therein lies the difference between the ideal and the achievable. For the parties to the conflict, each of these various phases would call for different strategies: strategies usually used in the initial phase are inappropriate in the third phase. The political maturity and relevance of any party to the conflict lies as much in identifying the phase of the conflict as is in understanding what strategies to adopt during the various phases of the conflict. The story of Kashmir is no different. The conflict, say observers and most parties to the conflict alike, has now reached a defining point, a point of no return. The option in Kashmir is no more between independence or no independence, with India or with Pakistan, rather it is about identifying the optimum outcome for all the parties to the conflict. Most parties to the Kashmir conflict seem to have understood this point. Some who haven’t understood this moral and mood of the milieu continue to talk about winning a bloody war in Kashmir or becoming an independent nation, only to be cast away by the radical transformation that the region is currently going through. More importantly, positioning or repositioning one’s options according to the mood of the milieu and the nature of the conflict dictated by the respective phase of the conflict is no opportunism: that shows the prudence and fortitude of a responsible leader. So, what is that one element of wisdom that most of the responsible parties to the Kashmir conflict seem to have realized? From the elected leadership in India and Pakistan to the separatist leadership in J&K, most of them seem to have realized the need to surpass the borders in J&K in order to achieve peace. It is in this context that the set of proposals put forward by J&K People’s Conference needs to be looked at seriously and with an open mind. The very fact that People’s Conference Chairman Sajad Gani Lone talks about ‘achievable’ nationhood makes his argument a serious one, despite the flows it has. ‘Achievable Nationhood’ (title of the document) talks about shared sovereignty between India and J&K and Pakistan and PoK. The following are the most important aspects of this plan. First of all, Indian and Pakistani governments will have jurisdiction over defence, foreign affairs and currency in J&K and PoK respectively. Secondly, both sides of the J&K state (the erstwhile princely state) will have independent relationships with each other making it “a neutral, peace zone”. Thirdly, and very significantly, there will be a J & K Economic Union, Joint Immigration Control for Movement of Residents the whole state within the state, Joint Management of Natural Resources, and Sector Specific Cooperation, Coordination and Consultation. Finally, new institutions will be created to coordinate affairs among the four entities (India, Pakistan, J&K and PoK). ‘Achievable Nationhood’ has been criticized for a variety of reasons most important of them being its emphasis on ‘Muslim Kashmir’. While this regional and religious emphasis is not one of the document’s key assertions, the communal ‘after-politics’ of this otherwise serious document deserves to be criticized. That said, there are many compelling reasons why this document deserves critical acclaim which a lot of serious-minded experts are giving it already. First of all, Sajad Lone represents the new vision and courage that the Kashmiri leadership has started showing in bringing peace to Kashmir. His party’s courage in bringing out this document even as many other leaders in the valley are still unwilling to specify their preferred path to peace needs to be appreciated. Secondly, ‘Achievable Nationhood’ fits in well with the mood of the milieu and aspirations of a large section of the people of the erstwhile J&K state. At a juncture in history when the discussion is about inclusiveness, co-existence, and common destinies for the region, it would be out of place to talk about exclusivity, separation and carving out new states. When the statesmen of the region are busy strategizing how to surpass borders to chart out common destinies for their people, it would be no prudent politics to talk about creating new ones. Thirdly, ‘Achievable Nationhood’ not only links the critical gap between the ideal and the achievable, but also manages to chalk out definite proposals to achieve ‘what is achievable’. Finally, it is important to note that that one of the core arguments made by ‘Achievable Nationhood’ is in sync with article 370 of the Indian Constitution (that Indian Parliament’s legislative power over the State be restricted to three subjects - defence, external affairs and communications). Instead of communications, Sajad talks about currency. His idea of common institutions and joint mechanisms is another aspect that is gaining currency in the Kashmir discourse in the two countries. The emerging Kashmir politics and discourse is no more characterized or defined by outdated stances of irrelevant ideological imaginations, but by ideas that can travel the critical distance linking the achievable with the ideal. ‘Achievable Nationhood’ should be complimented for being the first committed separatist voice that is willing to take this road less traveled.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, February 20, 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=20_2_2008&ItemID=6&cat=11 )

India Needs a New Regional Grand Strategy

Foreign policy making in ‘New Delhi’ has often been accused of being rooted in mere ad hocism, and bereft of any clear strategic thinking. Lack of political cohesion and will, bureaucratic inertia and institutional problems have often been held responsible for this. Even as it is possible to identify and define some strands of strategic thinking running through post-independent India’s foreign policy formation, they are more of an exception than a pattern. India’s policies towards Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan and Afghanistan (strategy towards northwest) have often been ill-conceived, ill-timed and ill-managed. Can India make good its past mistakes and tread a new path of foreign policy formation towards its northwest? Does its leadership have the statesmanship and willingness to tread this path less traveled? It is crystal clear to even the most cursory observer of the North Western region of India that it is at a historic juncture and is undergoing unprecedented geopolitical transformations. The region could go either way: it could either become the epicenter of peace or that of conflict. In other words, a historic moment in making peace in the region has presented itself before us: if we miss it this time, we miss peace in the region for long years to come. The good news, however, is that there seems to be elements of a new grand strategy formation in India towards the region which of course needs a lot more refinement, political will, articulation, consistency and wisdom. What should the major pillars of this nascent grand strategy formation in India towards the northwestern region? Such a strategy should, ideally, comprise the following four pillars. Economic interdependence should be the primary pillar of this strategy. Even as I am no die-hard believer in the neo-liberal peace thesis, the theory has some significance for the new politics of the region. Trade to avoid wars, and let your enemies have stakes in your existence so that economic interdependence leads to security spillovers. Between the two sides of J&K, India and Pakistan and Afghanistan, regional trade linkages and stakes should be promoted and built. The bold and unprecedented move by the J&K Bank to propose to open branches in Pakistan should be considered to be just a forerunner to a long list of things to follow. Secondly, it is important that India takes the initiative to build on the already existing regional efforts at connectivity and linkages such as reinventing the Silk Route to revive the ancient trade links and access to the Central Asian region, actively promote the proposed Asian Highway network, pursue access to Afghanistan and to Central Asia through Pakistan apart from being steadfast in the efforts to promote more linkages between India and Pakistan. This also brings up the concept of ‘cultural and religious’ Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). CBMs in the South Asian context have almost always been ‘non-Asian’ in its essence and approach. One of the reasons why many standard and archetypical confidence building initiatives by the governments and other non-governmental organisations in the region have not produced the desired results so far is because such initiatives, as a rule, are conceptualized, designed and implemented in a ‘non-South Asian’ manner, that is, without taking into the regional realities of South Asia into consideration. CBMs shouldn’t merely consist of hotlines, flag meetings, and early warnings but should reflect the religious and cultural ethos and realities of the region be it Punjabiyat, Kashmiriyat, Islam or Hinduism. Thirdly, India should ‘assist’ (however like a ‘regional big brother’ it may sound) Pakistan catch up with democracy and help it realize the vision of its founding father Mohammad Ali Jinnah to create a modern, tolerant and democratic Pakistan. Pakistan today is finding itself at the receiving end of a flawed grand strategy, and is in a desperate need to resurrect itself from this situation of near total collapse. Any effort by India to make use of this situation by pushing Pakistan further into chaos will do no good for regional security and for future India-Pakistan relations. On the contrary, if Indian policy makers can have the sensibility and statesmanship to stand by Pakistan its search for democracy and peace like a good neighbour, the strategic dividends of such an approach would be far reaching. Policy makers in New Delhi should not miss the woods for the trees. Finally, all the policy initiatives pointed put above depend upon a key regional grand strategic approach that India needs to adopt: strategic altruism. India should be willing to show a high level of ‘enlightened and self-interested strategic altruism’ in its dealings with its neighbors. But why India of all the countries in the region? Has India not been a target of hatred and violence for such a long time? So why bother when other countries are in trouble? First of all, whether or not India intends to be the regional hegemon, India is the preponderant power in the region by default and that has traditionally instilled fear, suspicion and even hatred in the minds of its neighbors. India should make use of this opportunity to dispel such fears and demonstrate to its neighbors that it is a well-meaning country. More importantly, it is in India’s interest to invest in peace in the region. India’s internal stability, rise to great power status and economic growth depend a great deal in stable peace in the region.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, March 5, 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=5_3_2008&ItemID=8&cat=11 )

Undoing J&K’s Artificial Existence

Undoing J&K’s Artificial Existence - STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

Working towards creative interdependence is one of the fundamental steps to conflict resolution. Economic, cultural and emotional interdependence among conflicting regions will undoubtedly go a long way in resolving their problems and history is witness to this fact. One might argue that creating interdependence in J&K (the erstwhile J&K) isn’t any political solution rather a way of avoiding the real problem. There is some merit in such an argument but one could also argue that Jammu and Kashmir suffers less from a lack of territorial readjustment than from a host of other problems which are related to economy, resources, violence and alienation etc which can best be addressed by the creative tools of interdependence. As this author has pointed out in one of the earlier articles, even the political climate in J&K and in New Delhi and Islamabad both among the mainstream politicians and dissident camp is also very much in favour of pushing for more and more linkages between the two sides of the erstwhile princely state. Linkages among the two sides of J&K, all of them realize, can not be avoided and it is a matter of time that their respective constituencies would hold them responsible if they don’t push for it. More importantly, the logic behind the demand for increased collaboration and cooperation between the two sides is that the state is currently in a state of artificial existence: the natural links have been frozen in time. So what is this interdependence and collaboration that we are talking about? Item number one in a possible laundry list of mutual collaboration would be trade. From establishing LoC markets to trading in handicrafts and local goods to establishing contacts among the four chambers of commerce and industries in the state, the possible initiatives could be long. The next item would be promotion of tourism on both sides of the state and implementing collaborative approaches to that. While on the one hand, MoUs could be signed among tourism associations and hotel industries, religious and cultural tourism for the people of the state is one something that could be undertaken right away. The first step in this direction would be easing of visa restrictions. The third important item would be the great potential of collaboration among educational institutions. Both universities and vocational training institutes on both sides of the state could initiate exchange programmes for students and faculty besides signing MoUs among institutions for such purposes, holding joint conferences and workshops on issues of mutual concern (why do Kashmiris, and Indians and Pakistanis have to meet in a neutral territory all the time?) and most importantly establishing scholarships and reserving seats from students from the other side. Wouldn’t it be a good idea if the Islamic University of Science and Technology in Awantipur holds a conference on Islam with scholars from the South Asian region especially from the other side of J&K? Partial efforts are already being taken in this regard: University of Jammu’s Business School is in the process of signing an MOU with the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS). The fourth issue of crucial importance here is the necessary collaboration by he two sides on disaster management, considering the fact that the region is understood to be disaster prone. It would prove to be a prudent step if there could be initiatives towards establishing coordinated efforts at disaster management and relief. The past example of Pakistan refusing to accept India’s offer to help at the time of the earthquake in Kashmir should prompt the two countries to look for establishing a modus operandi for collective action at the time of such disasters. Another issue of crucial importance is collective efforts at natural resources management in J&K. Setting up consultative mechanisms for this purpose would be the first step in this direction. External funding agencies could be included in environmental rehabilitation and promotion of sustainable development. The Indus Waters Treaty that has stood the test of time is an example that should be emulated when dealing with water, forest, ecological and other such resources. Reopening the roads and thereby facilitating transport between the two sides is the sixth issue that needs urgent consideration. Some roads are opened but hardly anyone can travel through them thanks to the many restrictions. Permission to travel should be extended more people than those from the divided families. Many roads still remain closed and they need to be reopened. Train and air connections between the two sides are some options which could be explored. A related issue is that of establishing communication between the two sides. Telephone connection between the two sides needs to be reinstated and one could even think on the lines of setting up common TV and radio programmes apart from a common website for common purposes. The last but not the least in this list would be the financial and economic linkages such as opening of branches of the J&K Bank on the other side and vice versa. Even though this many not achieve so much in the beginning, the symbolic significance this would have for people in the state is tremendous. But do we have the political will to initiate such measures in the state? This seems to be lacking in both the countries. What the mainstream and dissident leadership in the state as well as in India and Pakistan should realize is that if they do not learn to read the writing on the wall, people will hold them accountable for ignoring their aspirations.
(Source: Greater Kashmir, March 19, 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=19_3_2008&ItemID=7&cat=11 )

Islamabad Diary

Islamabad Diary

Thus breaks a new dawn in Pakistan

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB
Pakistan is changing, primarily due to its latest experiment with democracy. The change is also the result of a variety of other related factors: the global war on terror and its impact on Pakistan and Afghanistan, the rising economic, political and social costs of a grand strategy – against India and Afghanistan – gone astray, the burning North West Frontier Province, and a host of other factors. Pressing regional security concerns, fear of an internal breakdown of law and order, international suspicions, disturbing levels of American interference, pangs of political transition: Pakistan has its hands full. What we will witness in Pakistan in the next few months is a radical policy shift, all over again. The direction of that shift is likely to be guided by enlightened moderation and demands of necessity. What does this shift mean to Kashmir and India? Will the new political dispensation in Pakistan review and reverse all that was done by Pervez Musharraf? It is bad news, if it happens. Review they will the Musharraf policies but are unlikely to reverse them, at least those pertaining to India and Kashmir. Musharraf’s Kashmir policy is not only popular but also seems to have taken a life of its own. Instead of abandoning the new policy and the peace process in general, the patrons of the new dispensation are likely to own them up claiming it as their own. My visit to Islamabad for the Pugwash meeting during the last weekend did coincide with the emergence of a new Pakistan with a new set of leaders and policies. Our meetings with the political leadership, retired officials, journalists and academics strengthened our understanding that the new course that Pakistan is taking today will not only determine Pakistan’s future but will also have lasting impact on the region as a whole. The Pakistani state and nation is rattled from many fronts today – Afghanistan, NWFP, Kashmir policy and relationship with India, Balochistan, religious extremism, and political uncertainty. Pakistan needs to find solutions to all of them, and find them really soon.
Zardari the Businessman Asif Ali Zardari, the husband of the late Benazir Bhuttoo, is arguably the most powerful politician in Pakistan today, and he knows it. From being dismissed as a mere ten percent of Pakistani politics to being the kingmaker in Pakistan, Zardari has come a long way: today he refers to Pakistanis as ‘my people’. Even as he is fast learning the art of politics, he remains to be a ruthless and dispassionate businessman by instincts and temperament. He understands ‘profit’ and ‘benefit’ and is willing to do business in and on Kashmir with India. Impulsive though he is as Musharraf, it was evident to me when I called on him at the Zardari House in Islamabad that his business instincts will serve him well in weighing Pakistan’s foreign policy options in the days to come. One can confidently bet on the fact that Zardari will not act on the basis of mere emotions, rhetoric, and ideological baggage for he doesn’t understand them and wouldn’t abide by them if he ever understands them. This needs to be seen as a welcome sign for India and Kashmir.
Attique the Visionary? Sardar Attique Ahmed Khan has changed a lot ever since he became the Prime Minister of Pakistani Kashmir. The reserved and quiet Attique has become a much more forthcoming, engaging and decisive statesman today. He seems to have a vision for Kashmir and was willing to stick his neck out when he was asked about his opinion on Musharraf’s policies on Kashmir. He not only said that whatever good has been achieved between India and Pakistan on Kashmir will remain in place but also said that the peace process will be taken to its logical conclusion. The willingness and the realization of the need to do business on Kashmir were evident to us during our conversation with him at his Islamabad office. One only hopes that this enthusiasm and political will last through the years to come.
The Way Ahead While the exact contents of ‘new’ Pakistan’s new Kashmir policy are yet to be formed, as is the case with political dynamics itself there, there is nothing to be unnecessarily cautious about it either. Indian government should now get out of its over-cautious wait and watch (ad nausium) approach and reach out to Pakistan’s new political masters. Any delay in doing so will only make things worse between the two countries. Manmohan Singh and his government should now stop wasting their time on the Indo-US nuclear deal and reach out to its extremely important neighbor.
The Wildcard The Pakistan army is unlikely to rock the political boat in Pakistan for at least some time to come. Musharraff is the most disliked man in today’s Pakistan and is on his way out. From the politicians to academics to the cab drivers, everyone dislikes him in Pakistan. This will give more leverage to the political forces in the country. What remains to be seen is the conduct of the ISI which depends upon whoever controls it. One question that no one seems to have an answer to is who is going to be in control of the ISI: is it the Army Chief, the President or the Prime Minister? A lot of what might happen in the future depends on this crucial factor.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, April 2, 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=2_4_2008&ItemID=57&cat=11 )

Lessons for Molvi Umar

Mirwaiz should learn from Prachanda

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

What it takes to become the mainstream leader of a country from being an outlawed rebel in the dense forests is not the might of the guns, rather the legitimacy of the people. The recent National Assembly election in Nepal has made it abundantly clear that the path from rebellion against the state to being part of the state need not be bloody and divisive: it can well be democratic, inclusive and in the interests of all sections of the country. Till a few years ago, it was next to impossible to imagine that Nepal’s battle-hardened Maoist rebels would give up their weapons, help demolish monarchy (through bloodless means), fight elections, and win enough seats to form a government. That too in a country where the monarchy, military, elite and the landed gentry were vehemently against the Maoist program. While the 2006 decision of the Maoists to join the interim government with the Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist-UML) was seen as a bold move by the rebels, the recent victory by the rebels was unexpected. The people have given their mandate to the rebel force for their past sacrifices and promises of deliverance. The ten year old war came to a stop in 2006 but it was far from completely over. Had the Maoists lost the Constituent Assembly elections last week, many believe that they would have probably gone back to their rebel days. This may or may not be true but the fact is that they are today the rulers of a state that they fought for 10 long years. While the ten year fight was bloody, the fight that got them power was not. What implications does it have for the various struggles in the region? The Maoist victory in Nepal has two implications: 1) that violence is no solution to any problem (let us face it, the Nepali citizenry did not vote for the Maoists due to fear) and, 2) the real path to power is through democracy and the mandate of the people. This realization has a great deal of salience in a world where violence is increasingly considered to be an option only to be discarded, and where economic and material progress is what people need at the end of the day. What does this Maoist ‘revolution’ mean for Kashmir and especially the Mirwaiz-led Hurriyat Conference? This bloodless revolution holds many lessons for the APHC and its leader. The APHC is different from the other non-mainstream political parties in Kashmir: unlike the Yaseen Malik-led Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) which seeks complete separation from the Indian Union, Mirwaiz does not ask for complete independence. He has a political programme (the United States of Kashmir formula), leads a number of respectable parties in Kashimr, and is willing to negotiate with the Indian government. Jamaat-e-Islami led by Syed Ali Shah Geelani also does not fall into the category that Mirwaiz and APHC falls in as the former is avowedly pro-Pakistan. In other words, Mirwaiz is closer to the mainstream and is willing to negotiate with the mainstream and indeed can join the mainstream at some point of time. In fact, apart from Sajad Lone, no other major dissident party in Kashmir can or is able to do it. Thus Mirwaiz Omar Farooq is better placed in his political maneuverability than anybody else. There are around six months to go for the assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir. If the APHC has to make an entry into the political arena, it has to begin to do so now. How long can the APHC and its leader talk about the aspirations of the people, without actually testing their political acceptability through popular political processes? This is where the Maoists in Nepal took a reasonable risk: they were willing to turn their well-oiled military machine into a machine for political campaign; they were willing to come out of the ‘comfort’ of the forests and test the acceptability of their political programme. One understands that the APHC needs an entry point and needs to be sure that the risk it takes is a reasonable one. It needs time, yes, but it also needs efforts. Why would the Mirwaiz not hold meetings with his people in Kashmir to seek their opinions, to begin with? As a political ideology the APHC falls between, as pointed out above, the mainstream and the extreme. This position has many disadvantages. First of all, they can’t use the definitive language of the mainstream and the extremist language of the extremists: the language of the moderate is always handicapped and has to sound moderate and in-between. This will contribute towards eroding their acceptability especially when political passions rise. Secondly, in a fast changing polity, political polarization is a constant possibility: moderates tend to lose out under conditions of political polarization. Thirdly, in the specific context of Kashmir where mainstream parties like the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) is bridging the gap between the traditional mainstream and the orthodox rebels, it is the moderate elements like the APHC who will lose out. Therefore, the moderate Kashmiri leader has to soon make up his mind about his party’s political programme. The comparison between the Hurriyat and the Maoists stems from the fact that as the latter came to power without dividing the country, without bloodshed and without extremist measures, so can the APHC think on those lines. No other political organization in today’s Kashmir has that political space. Thus there is a lot the moderate rebel of Kashmir can learn from the Maoist leader of Nepal Prachanda.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, April 16, 2008. RUL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=16_4_2008&ItemID=18&cat=11 )

UPA’s Kashmir Debacles

UPA’s Kashmir Debacles

Where lies the hope for Kashmir?

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

United Progressive Alliance’s (UPA) Kashmir policy has been a miserable failure, to say the least. That the Prime Minister did not even visit Kashmir during his recent visit to J&K is indicative of the fact that the government headed by him does not have anything to say and offer for the Kashmiris, let alone making a bold initiative in resolving the Kashmir issue. Indeed, UPA’s foreign policy in general has been a litany of failures; but then that is a different matter altogether. So the failure of its Pakistan policy and J&K policy (the latter is of course not a foreign policy issue, but certainly not a mere internal issue: it is an internal issue with foreign policy implications) should not come as a rude shock to anyone. There is an unfortunate consistency in the failures of the UPA regime. Given my political inclinations, I hate to say that the rightist BJP had a more sensible, flexible and goal-oriented policy towards Kashmir as well as to Pakistan. But then that’s the truth and one has to admit it. It was A B Vajpayee who set the peace process going between the two countries, and again it was he who struck a cord with the people of Kashmir in April 2003 after having conducted a historic free and fair election in J&K, something the Congress party could not manage to do. The UPA government is merely following the policy initiated by the NDA government, and has not made any success even in mere follow-up action. Let’s take stock. What has the UPA government achieved on Kashmir and Indo-Pak relations? The Prime Minister’s speeches at various places have been laden with a lot of rhetoric and promises, but that was about it. He spoke about making borders irrelevant; what did his government do to achieve that? He spoke about connectivity, trade and people-to-people cooperation; what steps were taken by his government to make it a reality? The government has not even been able to make the Srinagar-Muzzaffarabad road more people-friendly. What has happened to the working group reports? The government has indeed realized the fact that its Kashmir policy has been a flop show and that it can’t deliver on its promises. In sum, UPA’s Kashmir policy was a lot of “sound and fury, signifying nothing”. Many in Delhi, both officials and others, say that the UPA’s Kashmir policy has been an utter failure and that this is the end of the road for it on Kashmir. The next government, perhaps, can do more about it, they add. Let’s take the recent visit of the Prime Minister to J&K. First of all, what was the purpose of this two-day visit to the state which is perceived to be ill-conceived, ill-planned and bereft of any vision? No significant statements, no semblance of any vision for conflict resolution, nor were there anything that one would expect from a Prime Minister. More importantly, by avoiding the whole of Kashmir province from his itinerary the government has managed to push the political process on Kashmir to the backburner. This apparent lack of confidence and statesmanship shown by the PM would send wrong signals to all initiatives for peace in the state. While the Kashmiris did not benefit out of PM’s visit to the state, who did? Going by reactions from Jammu, a lot of people in Jammu are not very happy about the fact that the PM made a visit to the state only to show some kindness to the Kashmiri Pandits, a gesture that would not benefit anyone else in the Jammu region. Displaced families from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and West Pakistan were offered 50 crores by the PM and this gesture was immediately termed as a cruel joke by many observers as what they had been asking for was much more than this pittance. Does the Congress Chief Minister of the state gain from the PM visit barely months before the state goes to elections? Unlikely. How does the Chief Minister gain from a high profile visit which is perceived to have benefited no one but have only managed to infuriate people in Srinagar and Jammu at the same time? Ironically, prior to his recent visit to the state the people and opposition politicians were convinced that the Central government only makes promises but does not deliver on its promises, now they are convinced that the central government has even run out of promises! So what holds for the future? Have we lost all that we have achieved on Kashmir so far? That the central government lacks vision for Kashmir is bad news, but the good news is that the progress made on Kashmir and Indo-Pak relations is likely to remain intact. The willingness to admit that there is an issue in Kashmir, that Kahsmiris have to be brought to the negotiating table, that the future of Kashmir lies in making it a bridge between India and Pakistan, that the local politics in J&K cannot and should not be remote-controlled from New Delhi are, if I may say so, the achievements we have made so far. Practical steps may not have been taken to make these achievements more concrete thanks to bureaucratic cussedness and vision deficit, but the achievements won’t be lost. The most important sign of this emerging and progressive discourse on Kashmir is that if somebody said five years ago that the Pakistani currency should be accepted in Kashmir and that the militants from PAK should be given free passage to come back home and live respectful lives here, he or she would be termed anti-national and brought to task by the establishment: today, partners in the government in J&K are saying the same thing with confidence and conviction. Therein lies hope for Kashmir.

(Source: Greater KAshmir, April 30, 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=30_4_2008&ItemID=24&cat=11 )

J&K and the Indian Left

J&K and the Indian Left

How does Indian Left perceive the problem of J&K

STATE CRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB
The recently concluded 19th Party Congress of the Communist Party of India - Marxist (CPI-M) went on to make some specific and significant references to Jammu and Kashmir which have unfortunately gone unnoticed. Among a host of resolutions on the issue, the party which has only marginal presence in the state has demanded the restoration of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution in its original form. Recognizing the existence of regional aspirations in the state, the highest decision making body of the party also resolved that there should be regional autonomy in the state. What the Party Congress has resolved is not particularly out-of-the-box or unprecedented but needs some serious reflection to stress the point that it is not just the regional parties in J&K who are talking about resolving the Jammu and Kashmir issue by restoring Article 370, increasing cross-LoC linkages and granting regional autonomy among other things, but also national parties such as the CPI-M that presently has a definitive say in the running of the ruling regime in New Delhi. The Communist Party of India (CPI) has also stressed the need for granting maximum autonomy to J&K, implementing regional autonomy within J&K, and increasing the Indo-Pak CBMs. While the CPI does not seem to have done enough thinking on Kashmir, it has generally tended to follow the line taken by the CPI-M on it. But how does demanding the restoration of Article 370 become radical in any way when the article is very much part of the Indian constitution? That the CPI-M’s positions are radical, even if not to the extent of People’s Democratic Party’s (PDP) recent demands, can be gauged from the earlier positions taken by the state branch of the party headed by M. Y. Tarigami on a variety of occasions, ranging from press releases to representations at various national and international conferences. Let us examine some of these past pronouncements by the party and its functionaries. Apart from the restoration of Article 370 and granting regional autonomy, the party has taken radical positions on cross-LoC linkages, withdrawal of troops from the state and how to deal with the youth who have taken up arms and crossed over to the other side besides issues such as human rights, participation of Kashmiris in the peace process, trifurcation of the state etc. On the very important and controversial issue of cross-LoC linkages, state secretary of the party has made it clear that “the two parts of the state and the two countries can be mutually benefited if joint management of the water resources, disaster-management system, the environment, tourism and the trade and commerce between the two is undertaken”. Note that the party advocates more than ‘consultative mechanisms’ to be established between the two sides of J&K – the Indian and Pakistani parts of the erstwhile princely state. The party talks about immensely contentious issues such as self-governance but has apparently not done enough homework to flesh the details out: in such issues, the devil always is in the details. Secondly, the party has also not minced any words in demanding that the government should facilitate the “return of Kashmiri youth, who for various reasons, crossed over to the other part of LOC during the turmoil years and are desirous to return to their homes to lead peaceful lives.” This is an issue that has kicked up quite a few controversies in J&K and the rest of India with the over-zealous nationalists claiming that this is a demand in betrayal of the country. What the critics of this demand forget is that at this stage of rapprochement between the two countries and ‘between Kashmir and India’ it is necessary to engage the militants and show them the path of peace and reconciliation. One cannot wish away those who left the state to take up arms for a variety of reasons including genuine ones. The PDP and National Conference have also aired the same demand in the past. Let us remember, no conflict anywhere in the world has ended without engaging the armed factions. The leftists have also made demands for ‘demilitarization of excessive forces’ from the state: “With the gradual improvement in the situation, which is now universally accepted, the government can identify certain areas, from where central forces can be withdrawn and the charge of administration handed over to the local police. Such areas could be characterized as peace zones, where situation could be monitored for a reasonable period.” This is in line with the demands put forward by the mainstream political parties in J&K, PDP and NC. These are responsible, laudable and considered political positions of the Indian Left, no doubt. The question is how far have the leaders of the Indian Left influenced the national policy making in this regard or at least tried to make a national intellectual consensus on this. The Indian intelligentsia in the universities, research institutions and media houses where the Left has an undeniable presence and influence is still averse to talk about Kashmir. This lack of proactive politics from the part of the Left on Kashmir is not due to any lack of understanding, or positions, but due to a lack of political willingness if not commitment. It is ironical that the Left, in a sense, has fallen into the foreign and domestic policy trap laid by the Congress-led UPA regime in New Delhi. While the Congress party concentrated all its energies in pushing the Indo-US Nuclear Deal through, the Left concentrated all its energies in criticizing it and forgot to talk about other issues. That said, it is imperative that the Left makes more concerted efforts to push their positions on the J&K issue forward which are immensely in sync with the aspirations of the people of the state.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, May 7, 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=7_5_2008&ItemID=29&cat=11 )

Between Iran and the US

Between Iran and the US
Where lies the choice for India
STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB
Days of India fine-balancing between the United States and Iran are over: India has chosen the US over Iran. Despite the recent visit of the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to New Delhi and all the talks he and his delegation had in the national capital, a careful reading between the lines would make it clear that the UPA regime’s policies towards Iran will be dictated by its larger pro-US foreign policy shift. The visit of Iranian president to New Delhi on April 29 was watched with unprecedented interest by many foreign policy analysts. Many thought it would give a litmus test of the direction of India’s new foreign policy. This not-so-eventful visit was not to the liking of the US government which a week prior to his visit had asked India to tell Iran to meet the requirements of the UN Security Council on its nuclear programme. India was quick to respond with disapproval. Despite the strongly worded reply to the US, why was Ahmadinejad’s visit so uneventful? In order to understand this, we need to see the India-Iran-United States diplomatic conundrum in perspective. Making new allies and giving up old ones is part of clever statecraft, but doing so without adequate thought, wise consideration and a higher and better purpose is certainly not in the national interest of any country. UPA’s Iran policy is a case in point. India’s votes in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) against Iran in late 2005 and early 2006 were the turning point in the relations between the two countries. Indian-Iranian relations until then were smooth, beneficial and accommodative. The UPA government’s willingness to give in to Washington’s demands led India choose the US over Iran, a traditional ally of the country in the West Asian region. It would be imprudent to say that one should not engage the United States of America, the sole superpower of the day. A strategic partnership with the United States is desirable and important, but it is imprudent to put all foreign policy eggs in the US basket. The problem here is letting the superpower dictate the country’s foreign policy choices through the backdoor. Let us face it, one of the negative fallouts of the yet-to-be-signed Indo-US nuclear deal that many Indians have been so gung-ho about is the Hyde Act passed by the US Congress that requires India to cooperate with the US to isolate Iran. India’s contemporary relationship with Iran revolves around many considerations. First of all, there are the strategic aspects. For India, through Iran lies the road to Afghanistan and Central Asia and this access is important for economic and strategic reasons. During the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Iran and India along with Russia had extended credible support to the Northern Alliance which partly explains India’s influence in Afghanistan today. Even as India is seeking a transit route to Afghanistan and Central Asia through Pakistan, no one is under the illusion that this is going to materialise anytime soon. The emerging great power competition in the West Asian region is the other strategic aspect that India needs to keep in mind. The hydrocarbon resources, roots of religious extremism and its strategic location have made the region important and this has attracted a lot of competition in the region from the great powers: United States, Russia, China, India and others. While the Indian engagement in the region has been strong and multilateral, Iran, by all means, is a key partner in India’s West Asian strategy. Energy is another important consideration. India is a growing economy and would need large amounts of hydrocarbon resources for its growth. India signed a deal with Iran in 2005 for the annual supply of 5 million tons of liquefied natural gas which is scheduled to commence in 2009. Secondly, the talk of a “peace-pipeline” between the two countries through Pakistan has gone through a lot of ups and downs. There were a lot of hopes raised prior to the recent visit of the Iranian president that the pipeline might actually take off: it doesn’t look like it. Thirdly, at a time when the great powers are competing with each other to gain energy fields abroad, Indian companies were given the Farsi offshore block in the Persian Gulf by Iran. The issue of diplomatic tension between the two countries is Iran’s nuclear ambition. Does Iran have a right to develop nuclear weapons? Is it in India’s interests to let Iran develop nuclear weapons? Many argue that Iran should not make nuclear weapons because it has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and India repeats it. But has the Indian government forgotten that it has always considered the international non-proliferation regime to be uneven and called it nuclear apartheid? More importantly, how can a nuclear capable country tell another country that it does not have the right to develop nuclear weapons? You are talking morality and strategy in the same breath. You can not have both ways. Moreover, India is a secular country with a large Muslim population. It is necessary to have strong cultural and diplomatic ties with Islamic countries also to dispel the feeling that the Indian state has of late started promoting the Hindu nationalist ideology. Let us not forget the very vibrant relationship that India has had in the past with countries in the West Asian region especially Iran. Engaging the United States is necessary and important but defining one’s foreign policy choices and engagements on the basis of that relationship is foolhardily. Let us not be blind to the US strategy of making and breaking alliances as it pleases; there is the American diplomatic history that we can learn from.

(Source: Greater KAshmir, MAy 14, 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=14_5_2008&ItemID=16&cat=11 (

Pakistan and Kashmir prospects

Pakistan and Kashmir prospects
The policies that Pervez Musharraf initiated with respect to Pakistan’s position on Kashmir may be reviewed but they are unlikely to be reversed.
That the new political leadership in Pakistan will review many of the retired General Pervez Musharraf’s actions and policies is almost certain, be it his dismissal of the Chief Justice, or the intimate relationship his regime had with the United States, or the federal government’s relationship with various troubled provinces of the country.
What about Kashmir and India-Pakistan relations? Will the approach to these be reviewed as well? A recent visit to Pakistan and meetings with some leading members of the new political leadership, academics and former officials have convinced this writer that even as General Musharraf’s policies towards India and Kashmir will be reviewed, they are unlikely to be reversed.
There are several reasons for this. First of all, the peace process between the two countries and the emerging Kashmir discourse have taken a life of their own. Having passed through ups and downs over the years, the peace process has now matured, enough to withstand the change of regime in Pakistan and any changes of regime in New Delhi and Srinagar. Since the peace process has started showing results on the ground — such as in Pakistan doing away with its insistence on U.N. resolutions, the reduction of militant violence in Jammu & Kashmir, and the popular acceptance of the People’s Democratic Party’s ‘healing touch,’ among others — it has also begun to get more and more supporters. It will not be out of place to say that the peace process has become a people’s movement today in both India and Pakistan. A popular government in Pakistan is unlikely to ignore the popular sentiment.
Secondly, it was interesting to note that the various parties in Pakistan were competing with one another to own up the peace process. Asif Ali Zardari made it clear to some of us who met him that it was Benazir Bhutto who had started the peace process with India in the early 1990s and that she championed peaceful co-existence with India. This was echoed by another PPP leader, Sherry Rehman. On the other hand, members of the PML(N) were of the opinion that it was indeed Nawaz Sharif who started the peace process with Atal Bihari Vajpayee. However, it is widely accepted that it was the Musharraf regime that set off the ongoing peace process and so there will be some soul-searching about it by the new political dispensation.
Sardar Attique Ahmed Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, put forward a number of suggestions that he hoped would help institutionalise peace between the two countries. One of his out-of-the-box suggestions was to let any citizen of Jammu and Kashmir (from either side) to travel to the other side with a state subject certificate (at present, travel is limited to divided families). His party, he said, has been at the forefront of promoting peace with India and his state’s connectivity with the Indian side of Jammu & Kashmir. Political parties competing to own up the peace process point out that they are aware of the importance of sustaining it. This is good news.
Thirdly, whether or not Pakistan likes to make up with India, today it finds itself in a position in which it cannot afford to have continued enmity with India. Pakistan today faces a multiple-front security situation, and easing even one front would be a great relief for it. Many in Pakistan believe that the Kashmir issue has lived out its life and that Pakistan cannot afford to continue with it in the days to come.
Consider, for example, the fact that there was hardly any mention of Kashmir or India during the recent elections in Pakistan. This is unprecedented. Mr. Zardari candidly accepted that Pakistan would not be interested in any more bloodshed in the name of Kashmir and that the issue had to be resolved in a non-zero-sum manner. The war on terror, rising fundamentalism in the country, the troubled Afghan border, the uncontrollable tribal regions, insurgency in Balochistan, and more important, the ongoing formation of political institutions and associated power struggles, are proving to be too much for Pakistan to handle. For once, the biggest concern for Pakistan is itself, not India. Elite cohesion
Finally, for successful grand strategy-making, it is necessary for a country to have elite cohesion. Today’s Pakistan lacks any semblance of it. The Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) are unlikely to see any merit in doing business with India which the political masters will push for in the days to come. The honeymoon of the two kingmakers — Mr. Zardari and Mr. Sharif — is unlikely to last long and this will be exploited by General Musharraf to secure his position. The civilian elite is divided between the aspiration for democracy and the associated need to review General Musharraf’s policies, and a realisation of the merit in the President’s policies regarding Kashmir and India. In such a sharply divided country, it will be next to impossible to formulate a grand strategy against India, considering the fact that it has realised that its past strategy vis-À-vis India has been faulty and counter-productive.
However, it is necessary to keep in mind that the ISI could play the spoilsport with respect to the civilian leadership’s policy towards India in the days to come. The conduct of the ISI depends a lot on whoever controls it. One question that no one seems to have an answer to is, who is going to be in control of the ISI: will it be the Army chief, the President, or the Prime Minister? A lot of what might happen between India and Pakistan, and in Kashmir, depends on this crucial factor. India needs to be vigilant because it is also possible that the new leadership in Pakistan could use the India card to divert public attention from the internal troubles so that it gets some breathing space.

(Source: The Hindu, April 10, 2008. URL: http://www.thehindu.com/2008/04/10/stories/2008041053531100.htm )

Why Hurriyat should fight elections

Why Hurriyat should fight elections: Thus do I defend my argument countered by critics
STATE CRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB
I would like to write this week’s column in answer those who responded to my article entitled “Mirwaiz Should learn from Prachanda” which appeared in Greater Kashmir (April 16, 2008). Apart from the responses published in this newspaper, many responses were emailed to me as well. Needless to say, I found the responses deeply engaging and indicative of a commendable spirit of political discourse and intellectual inquiry that exists on Jammu and Kashmir. Having said that let me respond to some of the points that have been raised by my critics. The argument that received most attention was that the Hurriyat Conference Chief should learn from Prachanda and fight elections in the coming assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir. It was pointed out by many that there is no comparison between the two because their political contexts are entirely different from each other. In answer, let me say, that first of all, when analyzing societies and the politics and life therein, there can be no true comparison at all – no two circumstances are the same. That’s a mere methodological point: but far from it, my argument in the above-mentioned article only said that lessons need to be drawn from the Maoists’ experiment with democracy and peaceful transition in Nepal. In order to evaluate that argument, let us, for a moment, look at the objectives of the politics of resistance in Nepal and Kashmir. They are both subaltern in nature and the deliverance of the oppressed people is the aim. The question is: what is the method to achieve that? My argument is that the method of violence is infeasible in today’s circumstances, and also because the Indian state will easily sustain the pangs of militancy in Kashmir for many more years. It has done so in the past and things are only better today. Hurriyat, of course, shuns violence as well as mainstream politics. Is non-participation in mainstream politics by the Hurriyat the way ahead to bring peace to Kashmir? How long can the Hurriyat continue to stay away from it? I argue that shunning mainstream politics will further shrink the political space of the Hurriyat as mainstream parties such as the PDP are already encroaching on the traditional dissident space. This leads me to the next question whether the Hurriyat actually wants to ‘capture state power’? Is the Hurriyat political in nature? Is it a political organization with policy prescriptions about how to run the state, and vision for the Kashmiri society? The Hurriyat Conference does have a political vision for Jammu and Kashmir which the Mirwaiz Umar Farooq calls “The United States of Kashmir” formula, which does not ask for independence from India. More significantly, the Hurriyat has now started raising issues such as power shortage and other related governance issues. If this is not about politics and governance, what is it about? Call it ‘capturing of state power’ or serving the people, what it makes the Hurriyat is an organization that the Kashmiris have a lot of faith and hope in, which they think will one day rise to the political occasion. The third important argument raised by many readers has been whether the Kashmiris can actually trust the Indian government with elections in the state. That is an important question given the not-so-clean history of elections in J&K. The history tells us that many an election in the state was manipulated by the Congress government in Delhi in collusion with the ruling regime in J&K: no arguments with that. Having said that one must also admit that the 2002 elections to the J&K state assembly was free and fair - freer and fairer than elections in many constituencies in mainland India even if that is no yardstick to go by. More importantly, even though the BJP and the National Conference by virtue of being in control of the Central and state governments respectively could have manipulated the results to their favor, did not chose to do so. And the people of the state did not listen to the boycott calls by the militants when the municipal elections in the state were conducted in 2005. These are reflective of the changes in views on elections in the state by the Central government and the people of J&K. This new and welcome change in the attitude of the Central government vis-à-vis elections in J&K has also to do with the end of ‘Congressism’ in Delhi and the rise of coalition politics. One party rule can bring in arrogance and obstinacy, and that was precisely what the Congress led governments of the yester years were suffering from. Political realities have changed in Delhi ever since and this is good news for Kashmir. The fourth criticism was the following: what if the Hurriyat win elections? What next? Will things improve after that? Will they not be puppets in the hands of the Central government? This is a legitimate fear, given, again, by past experiences. There are two aspects to it. One is the fear of political interference from Delhi and the other is by the bureaucracy including the intelligence agencies. The former fear should now be taken lightly. That the Central government led by the Congress party in the past wanted to install its own people in state governments is not a story in J&K alone, this has been true in many Indian states. This was followed by both Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi. This is no more the case, even if not out of volition but out of compulsion. There is enough merit in the argument that the bureaucracy, which unfortunately seems to have distrust for the politicians of Kashmir, will not let it happen. This is something that will need to be dealt with political will and vision and the bureaucracy will have to fall in line. Coming back to the question as to whether the Hurriyat will be able to do anything if and when they come to power in Srinagar, I am doubtless in my mind that they will be able to pave the way for a Naya Kashmir.
(Appeared in Greater Kashmir, May 21, 2008. URL - http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=21_5_2008&ItemID=8&cat=11