Saturday, July 30, 2011

In defense of track-two dialogues

prejudiced and panic-stricken reactions call for a considered response

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB


The recent arrest of Kashmir-born Executive Director of the Washington-based Kashmir American Council, Ghulam Nabi Fai, has generated a fierce debate within the Indian intelligentsia and media about the need, role and nature of track-two engagements between India and Pakistan on outstanding bilateral issues especially Kashmir. Sections of the Indian media and civil society have reacted thoughtlessly and hysterically to what they describe as ‘five star seminar circuit on Kashmir funded by the ISI’. Such prejudiced and panic-stricken reactions call for a considered response in defense of the philosophy behind track-two dialogues between unfriendly countries and the issue of funding for such initiatives.

The ISI connection
Critics have argued that the Indian participants did not care to check the antecedents of the organizer, Ghulam Nabi Fai in this case, and thereby worked against India’s national interest by going to an ISI-sponsored seminar. What they seem to ignore is that if it was after all a covert operation by the ISI and took the FBI, one of the world’s best investigative agencies, to finally unearth the link between Mr. Fai and the ISI, how can one expect the Indian academics, activists and intellectuals to have uncovered this link before they decided to air their views in seminars organized by Mr. Fai? While the criticism against respected Indian intellectuals and activists for participating in allegedly ISI-sponsored conferences on Kashmir in Washington can be dismissed by the simple argument that almost all of them were unaware of the source of Fai’s funding, the larger issue that needs to be addressed is about the importance of Indo-Pak track-two dialogues which many rightwing anchors have termed as a ‘cottage industry of wining and dining’ in the name of Kashmir.

Who funds these dialogues?
One major criticism against many of the ongoing track-two dialogues is regarding their source of funding. Critics say that these dialogues are funded by people with vested interests and because the participants are ‘well-taken care of’ they would happily endorse the hidden agenda of the organizers and will not keep the national interest of the country in mind. Such ‘unintellectual’ criticism needs to be seriously contested before being wholly dismissed. Let us come to the issue of funding first. There are at least four track-two dialogues going on at the moment between India and Pakistan and they had gathered momentum during the period when there was no dialogue between India and Pakistan after the Mumbai terrorist attacks. Almost all of them are funded by well-known and transparent funding agencies based abroad or neutral foreign governments. One of the major reasons why indigenous funding is discouraged for India-Pakistan track-two dialogues is that if it is funded by Indian funders, Pakistani participants would find it difficult to attend the conference and may have to answer uncomfortable questions at home and vice versa. Secondly, the Indian government has always adopted a hands-off policy when it comes to track-two dialogues and has in the past denied visas to Pakistani participants which is why most of these dialogues are held outside India and Pakistan. Holding these conferences outside India and Pakistan also helps participants to share their ideas freely and frankly without being under the constant glare and pressure of various actors back home. Moreover, it is hardly possible to verify the sources of a seminar organizer’s funding before one accepts the invitation to participate in it.

On the question of participants endorsing the hidden agenda of seminar organisors, it may be pointed out that most of the track-two dialogues are locally owned and locally organized even if foreign-funded. In other words, the agenda formation and consensus building are carried out by the Indians and Pakistanis themselves and most track-two meetings have roughly equal number of Indian and Pakistani participants. More significantly, most participants in these meetings are retired high-ranking officers from the bureaucracies and armed forces of India and Pakistan as well as well-known academics and experts from various think tanks and Universities. To claim that they are out there to be purchased by foreign intelligence agencies is making an unreasonably presumptuous argument, to say the least. The narrow minded nationalists and prime-time ‘televangelists’ are indeed indulging in self-flattery when they claim that they understand Indian national interests better than these individuals.

Why track-two engagements?
Since the ongoing campaign seems to be denigrating the very idea behind track-two engagements, it is necessary to put the philosophy behind these dialogues in proper perspective. Track-two dialogues are primarily meant to give an opportunity to senior and informed members of a country’s strategic community to interact with those of the rival state. There are multiple objectives behind such interactions: one, to appreciate the fears, concerns and demands of the other side; two, to understand the redlines and tipping points of the rival state; three, to engage in an unencumbered exchange of perceptions and ideas, and; four, convey the various suggestions and proposals from the other side to the decision-makers in one’s home country. One of the major advantages of track-two settings is that since most of these dialogues are held under Chatham House rules wherein nothing would be attributed to anyone after the meeting, participants are more likely to be frank and candid in their opinions leading to a better discussion of major issues and their potential solutions.

Kashmir and track-two dialogues
Track-two dialogues on Kashmir have in the past proved to be useful in a number of ways. They have helped the track-two interlocutors from the Indian side to clearly understand the positive transformation of the Pakistani approach to the conflict in Kashmir even as there has not been an official admission of it. Indeed, there have been occasions when the Pakistani decision makers made use of the venue provided by these forums to test waters on some of their out-of-the-box ideas on Kashmir. The meeting of an Indian track-two group with the then Pakistan President Pervez Musharraff in 2005 is a good example in this regard. In that meeting Musharraff outlined the various aspects of the so-called ‘Musharraff formula’ for the resolution of the Kashmir conflict and asked the interlocutors from both sides to discuss it further.

Nuclear Confidence-building in South Asia

(Statement adopted by the members of the Ottawa Dialogue at their meeting at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, July 6-8, 2011)

The members of the Ottawa Dialogue are heartened by the fact that high-level official talks on nuclear CBMs have begun once again. We encourage the governments to continue them and to supplement them with regular meetings of high-level officials from the military and intelligence fields in order to broaden the dialogue and establish mechanisms to further understanding and prevent escalation of tension. We also encourage the two countries to continue to observe their respective moratoria on nuclear testing.

It is important to note that nuclear CBMs cannot succeed independent of broader steps to ease the relationship. These must include conventional military CBMs/restraint measures and steps to encourage people-to-people engagements. While these broader matters are not in the purview of the Ottawa Dialogue, we recognize that they are essential to the CBMs we are suggesting here. Thus, we recognize that some of the CBMs we advocate cannot be undertaken in the absence of

measures to stabilize other aspects of the relationship. But we believe that others can be and will

contribute to the creation of a “virtuous cycle;” an atmosphere in which progressively more ambitious steps can be taken in all fields of confidence-building.

Finally, there should be an informed public dialogue on the subject of the implications of a nuclear conflict in South Asia, and of the opportunity costs which attend the continuation of an uncontrolled nuclear rivalry. Such a dialogue should also include discussions of the underlying causes of the dispute.

On the subject of nuclear CBMs, we offer the following list of possible CBMs as ones that we believe could be considered by the governments.

Unilateral and/or Bilateral Declaratory Steps:

• Assurances that missiles will not be tested during periods of tension;

• Assurances that “bolt from the blue” surprise nuclear attacks will not be planned for or undertaken;

• Assurances that measures will be taken to prevent un-authorized and unintended launches (such as a mutual commitment to maintain the practice of the separation of warheads from delivery systems);

• Commitment to inform the other side well in advance of tests of new systems; and

• Building on the agreement not to attack nuclear facilities, assurances that sensitive targets will be avoided in the case of conventional conflict.

Strategic Restraint Measures:

• Agreement to develop and adopt a common terminology on strategic issues;

• Regular discussions on doctrinal issues and strategic stability;

• Agreement to include cruise missiles in the Agreement on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles;

• Agreement that missile flight tests will be notified to each side as early as possible;

• Agreement to test missiles only from notified ranges in notified directions;

• Agreement to enter into a dialogue concerning Ballistic Missile Defence in which views of the impact of such systems on strategic stability will be explored; and

• Agreement to enter into a regular dialogue on the impact of the introduction of new technologies on strategic stability.

Communication Measures:

• Agreement to expeditiously set up nuclear risk reduction centres (though possibly not under this name), through a comprehensive agreement, specifying the staffing, communication and functional aspects;

• Agreement to upgrade the existing hotlines to introduce redundant and assured communications which can be activated at the request of either party;

• Agreement to ensure a daily communication exchange when demanded by either party;

• Agreement to harden each side’s communication lines downwards to provide protected and assured communications; and

• Agreement to establish consultative mechanisms as required to implement these CBMs.

Physical Measures:

• Agreement not to deploy tactical nuclear weapons;

• Agreement to retire the Hatf 1 and Prithvi 1 short-range systems;

• Agreement that the Hatf 2 and Prithvi 2 will be designated as conventional-only systems; and

• Agreement to forego MIRVing of nuclear missiles.

Cooperation between the civilian nuclear establishments:

• Agreement to exchange on a regular basis information relating to the management of nuclear accidents;

• Agreement to share different experiences in creating and running Nuclear Regulatory Authorities;

• Agreement (bilateral or regional) on cooperation and exchange of safety related information of Nuclear Power Plants;

• Agreement to cooperatively develop civilian nuclear techniques in the fields of agriculture and medicine in such areas as:

o Plant strains with characteristics of high yield and resistance to pest, disease, drought, and salinity.

o Animal health through improved vaccines

o Extension of shelf life of perishable foods

o Practices for prevention and early detection of cancer

o Practices for treatment of acute radiation sickness

Participants from South Asia at the Palo Alto meeting of the Ottawa Dialogue:

1. Shamshad Ahmad, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan;

2. RN Ganesh, Vice Admiral, retired, Indian Navy;

3. Mohan Guruswamy, Chairman, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Delhi;

4. Jamshed Hashmi, Chairman Emeritus, Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority;

5. Rifaat Hussain, Professor, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad;

6. Happymon Jacob, Assistant Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi;

7. Aziz Ahmad Khan, Ambassador, retired, Foreign Service of Pakistan (former High Commissioner to India);

8. Feroz Khan, Brigadier General, retired, Pakistan Army, former Director Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs, Strategic Plans Division

9. Riaz Khan, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan;

10. Lalit Mansingh, former Foreign Secretary of India;

11. Talat Masood, Lieutenant General, retired, Pakistan Army;

12. Shuja Nawaz, Director of the South Asia Centre, Atlantic Council of the United States; Washington, DC;

13. TV Paul, Professor, McGill University

14. Ramamurti Rajaraman, Emeritus Professor of Theoretical Physics, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi;

15. Najmuddin Shaikh, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan; and

16. Vijay Shankar, Vice Admiral, retired, Indian Navy (former Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Strategic Forces Command)

Members of the Ottawa Dialogue unable to be present in Palo Alto:

1. Shahzad Chaudhry, Air Vice Marshal, retired, Pakistan Air Force;

2. Tariq Osman Hyder, Former Additional Foreign Secretary, Pakistan;

3. Amitabh Mattoo, Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi;

4. Raja Menon, Rear Admiral, retired, Indian Navy; and

5. Abdul Hameed Nayyar, Senior Research Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute.