Monday, May 23, 2011

Reclaiming Kashmir’s Centrality

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB


Kashmir conflict is increasingly becoming a multi-layered and complicated one. Apart from the indigenous anti-India uprising that Kashmir has witnessed for the last many decades, more noticeably in the last two decades, there is an equally important external – read Pakistan – dimension to the conflict. While these, in my opinion, constitute the core of the Kashmir conflict, other minor conflicts/issues have been added to these two primary dimensions of the conflict from time to time by various interested parties. Jammu, for example, many observers, politicians and a lot of Jammuites say, have a problem with Kashmir, so do various other regions of the state, i.e., Ladakh, Kargil etc. It is often said that the developmental and other related problems of these regions and the genuine aspirations of the inhabitants therein have often been ignored and neglected in the larger context of the Kashmir conflict. In other words, the aspirations of the people of Jammu, Kargil and Ladakh etc. have traditionally been sacrificed at the alter of the conflict in Kashmir.

On the face of it this seems to be a perfectly valid argument and it has therefore gained much sympathy in official circles, New Delhi-based think tanks, and mainstream Indian media in general. Most government-sponsored studies and scholarly analysis churned out by research institutes in New Delhi have almost always tried to create a vast canvas of issues when analyzing the contours of the Kashmir issue. While this has certainly brought out the nuanced and complex nature of the (Jammu and) Kashmir problem and has, to a great extent, positively complicated the issue, such analysis also serves to deflect the attention that is due to the core conflict in Kashmir thereby interfering with the process of meaningful conflict resolution in Kashmir. The trouble with this kind of an otherwise genuine all-in-one broad-based argument, couched in democratic terms, is that it ends up becoming a reactionary sentiment.

In order to further explain my point I wish to differentiate between the core conflict in Kashmir and the other issues that have now become part and parcel of the Kashmir conflict. The core conflict in Kashmir is two-fold as pointed out above: the territorial conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and the internal insurgency in Kashmir against the Indian government. The basic nature of this two-pronged conflict is characteristically different from the other ‘add-on’ aspects of the Kashmir conflict. The problems in Jammu, Ladakh or Kargil which are often expressed in terms of malgovernance, lack of infrastructure, lack of devolution of powers, or administrative neglect do not, by any stretch of imagination, belong to the category of the core conflict(s) in Kashmir. They are administrative or governance issues, at best. On the other hand, let us face it, the Kashmir conflict is not about good governance or infrastructure development. Governance or economic issues are neither unique to J&K nor are they of any unique or special nature. These problems are found in all parts of the country and are dealt with by the various levels of government. They are of course important issues but should not be seen on par with the core issues relating to the Kashmir conflict.
While most of the ‘add-on’ aspects of the Kashmir conflict are contemporary in nature, the core conflict in Kashmir has its clearly identifiable historical roots. This is often traced back to the circumstances surrounding the accession of J&K state into India, failed promise of a plebiscite in the state, watering down of Article 370, imprisonment of Sheikh Abdullah, installing of puppet regimes in Srinagar by New Delhi, rigged elections and most importantly rampant violations of human rights of the Kashmiris. Indeed most of these issues are not the concerns of the people of Jammu or Ladakh and yet these very issues form the core conflict in Kashmir.

The team of interlocutors and various other committees appointed by New Delhi in order to address the employment, infrastructure and development situation in the state are mandated to look at not just Kashmir but also other regions and not just the political issues but also the developmental and other grievances of the entire state. And yet these committees are in existence because there is a problem ‘in Kashmir’. But the very purpose of these committees – resolution of the Kashmir conflict - stands defeated right from the start because their attention is divided since their mandate is to look at each and every issue in the state of which the Kashmir conflict is just one of them.

I am unprepared to accept that this conflation of issues is a spontaneous outcome of the natural evolution of the conflict in Kashmir. There is a clear line of thinking or at least an increasing tendency in New Delhi to pass of the problem in Kashmir as a result of malgovernance and lack of economic and infrastructure development. The tendency to ‘crowd out’ the core conflict in Kashmir needs to be seen as part of that well-conceived agenda. Once the Kashmir conflict is reduced to the questions of good governance and economic development, it becomes akin to any other problem in any other part of the country. And questions of development are neither new nor news in a country like India and they will take a long time to be resolved. Let us understand that once the Kashmir conflict is made out to be a complicated and multilayered one, New Delhi can always argue that resolving Kashmir is a very complex and time-consuming process. Moreover, when more and more issues are included in what is understood to be the Kashmir conflict, there will be many more voices, concerns, complaints and considerations competing for attention and resolution and in all that confusion the core issues of Kashmir will be submerged and eventually forgotten.

Osama Killing and South Asian Geopolitics

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB


One of the questions that seems to be puzzling strategic pundits around the world is regarding the nature of planning that has gone into the recent killing of Osama Bin Laden in Abottabad by the US Special Forces. Was it a unilateral American operation or was the top brass of the Pakistani Army/ISI aware of operation ‘Geronimo’? Those who argue that the Pakistanis had prior information about the operation and that they had given their consent to the operation believe that the Pakistani establishment indeed gave up one of their strategic assets as he was found to be no more useful to Pakistan’s long-term interests in Afghanistan as well as for Pak-US relations. Moreover, if Pakistan’s Afghan grand strategy is indeed becoming successful with the blessings of the Americans – exemplified by the impending re-induction of ‘moderate Taliban’ elements into the Afghan establishment and the manner in which Americans are increasingly giving into the Pakistani plan for a post-American Afghanistan – it suits the Pakistanis fine, just as it does the Americans, to get rid of Osama Bin Laden, the face of international terrorism today. Recall that one of the major reasons why the Americans started becoming uncomfortable with the Taliban regime in the first place was the asylum given to Bin Laden by the then Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Hence ‘moderate Taliban’ minus the al Qaeda influence is something that the Pakistanis have been aggressively supporting and the Americans increasingly accepting.

However, on the other hand, if the killing of Bin Laden was done by the US without consulting the Pakistani establishment, we in India should be very worried. Going by the reports that the Pakistanis, learning about the midnight attack in Abottabad, scrambled their fighter jets to prepare for counter-attacks, if necessary, we have no option but to believe that it would have crossed the minds of the Pakistani military leaders, even if briefly, that the Indians were behind the surprise attack. For the two geographically adjacent nuclear-capable enemies whose nuclear weapons are largely meant for targets in each other’s territory with hardly any jointly agreed upon nuclear risk reduction measures in place, a surprise attack on one of the countries, so close to the national capital, by a third country could potentially trigger a dangerous nuclear stand-off between them. Moreover, Pakistan does not have a no-first-use policy of nuclear weapons which simply means that Pakistan could, doctrinally speaking, respond to a conventional attack with nuclear weapons. Isn’t it strange that, in spite of being in ‘close strategic alliance’ with both India and Pakistan, the United States of America did not bother to inform either of the countries about operation ‘Geronimo’ in advance even as it has obvious nuclear implications for the South Asian region?

In fact, even if we assume that the Americans had not informed the Pakistani establishment about the operation in Abottabad, Bin Laden’s death nonetheless suits the Pakistani grand Strategy for Afghanistan, i.e., ‘moderate Taliban’ elements, closely allied with Pakistan, in power in Afghanistan without the undesirable influence of al Qaeda and Bin Laden. The Bin Laden killing will certainly have domestic consequences within Pakistan, as is already being witnessed, and the country will be pushed to a corner by the international community, but in the longer run, Pakistan will surely be placed right in the middle of the American/Western strategy for Afghanistan and the country will be in the driving seat as far as the internal affairs of Afghanistan is concerned.

What does it mean for Indo-Pak relations?
Even though the killing of Bin Laden itself may not have much of an impact on Indo-Pak relations, it would have to be seen in the larger context of the evolving Afghan geopolitics and its implications for the region. Now that New Delhi has revived the dialogue process with Islamabad, Indian strategists should focus on employing a multi-pronged, multi-faceted and differentiated strategy to engage with the Pakistani state. Considering the fact that today’s Pakistani state is a deeply divided one, there is all the more reason to develop creative strategies to engage the multiple actors and power centres within Pakistan rather than waiting for elite and social cohesion to take root there. Hence one hopes that the recent denial by New Delhi that it was in secret negotiations with the Pakistan army in the recent past was nothing but a ‘politically correct’ statement. Why not engage the Pakistan army? Today’s Pakistan is not a typical state, in the modern Westphalian sense of the term, and dealing with an atypical state requires the use of non-traditional diplomatic and strategic initiatives as well as out-of-the-box strategic imagination.

Adopting such a strategy, India should now push for resolving the outstanding conflicts that it has with Pakistan. This is perhaps the most opportune time to strike deals with Pakistan on Kashmir and other issues. Post-Osama, Islamabad’s focus will be on the Afghan border and the endgame in Kabul and will therefore be willing to reduce tensions with India and is likely to agree to less-then-perfect solutions to the conflicts that it has with India. Moreover, with the international community unwilling to accept any more excuses from Pakistan on terrorism, India should push for the resolution of Kashmir and other Indo-Pak conflicts.

Now that the Pakistani focus is on the Afghan endgame, New Delhi should make it clear to Pakistan that it has no direct strategic interests in Afghanistan. Afghanistan may be considered as part of India’s strategically important extended neighbourhood by the Indian strategists and may indeed be significant for us given the manner in which the erstwhile Taliban regime had helped Pakistani designs against India. And yet, Indian gains will be indubitably limited and genuine Indian interests will be severely harmed if India follows a course of competitive relationship with Pakistan in Afghanistan.