Why War is no Solution Against Pakistan
STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB
There seems to be no let up of the war frenzy that is being promoted by sections of the Indian political elite, intelligentsia and the media. The Indian media, especially the many television channels, has been consistently promoting ‘pulp patriotism’ and egging on the government in New Delhi to carry out ‘surgical’, ‘preemptive’ strikes in Pakistan Administered Kashmir (PAK) in order to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure there. Similar arguments have been put forward by the nationalist Indian media after every major militant attack in this country. Thankfully, in the past, wisdom prevailed and the nationalist NDA government did not choose to go to war against Pakistan, even after the 2001 militant attacks on the Indian parliament when passions were running equally high.
That said, aren’t preemptive surgical strikes against terrorist training camps in PAK an option that India can safely exercise? Forget about ethics: isn’t victory that which defines the contours of morality in times of war? After all, many major world leaders have said that the Mumbai attackers were all Pakistanis and were trained in Pakistan. Even US President-elect Obama has gone on record saying that every country has the right to defend itself. So why not make use of this situation and attack the terror networks in Pakistan to get rid of the menace of terrorism once and for all? If India conducts smart, stealthy, successful military raids into PAK, don’t we stand to gain in every respect? Hasn’t Israel ‘successfully’ protected itself against terrorism by using precisely such preemptive tactics?
But beware the rhetorical question: matters of war and peace are never that simple. They are never merely about translating such simplistic nationalistic feelings into blind action. Despite being wounded by what happened in Mumbai and being pained by what continues to be perpetrated in India by Pakistan-based terrorists, it is clear to me that fighting a war against Pakistan in order to bring an end to terrorism against India is not a viable option for Indian policy makers. First of all, to state the glaringly obvious: India is not Israel. The anti-terror strategies that the seven-and-a-bit-million-people strong Israel uses cannot be emulated by India lest it find itself in the situation that Israel finds itself in today: encircled by disgruntled countries whose obvious distaste for the Jewish state fails to permit it any real sense of security. Despite claiming to be a democracy modeled on the western idea of a state, Israel remains without a constitution and with a polity dominated by orthodox religious ideologies. As a result of its constricted and meandering domestic policies and unstable relations with its neighbors, Israel has succeeded in isolating itself within its own region. Little wonder it feels alienated and insecure. India cannot, and should not, try to emulate Israel. Using their technologies to combat terror is one thing, but emulating Israel’s counter-terror policies is another matter entirely.
Having said this, let us examine the feasibility of taking the military option against Pakistan. I am convinced that there will not be a victor, at least in hard military terms, in any Indo-Pak conflict especially under the shadow of nuclear weapons. The conventional superiority that India had vis-à-vis Pakistan became redundant when the two countries became nuclear powers in 1998. Even surgical strikes are unlikely to reap India any clear dividends, primarily because Indian strikes deep inside Pakistani territory will only provoke comparable retaliatory action. In other words, surgical strikes may not remain at the less then limited level, they run the risk of graduating into a limited war, which in turn has the potential of escalating into an all-out war. Let us not forget that at its most basic level, a surgical strike is nothing more than an invitation to war, the military equivalent of a taunt, or an insult. It is an indignity that few states can turn a blind eye to. The 1999 Kargil limited war was not fought on Pakistani territory, but rather in defense of Indian ground. As such we were able to claim that our only desire, our only impetus for battle, was to evict hostile invaders; it was not to invade Pakistani territory. Also importantly, during the war the international community firmly sided with India. It may not be the same this time if India trespasses across the borders of Pakistan. The rules of international solidarity are different for aggressors; it is the invaded, not the invader, that engenders sympathy and support.
Even if India manages to take out key terrorist targets in PAK without igniting all-out nuclear war, what will we gain from it? Indian strikes inside Pakistan will swell the terrorist ranks with even more recruits committed to save the ‘pride of Islam’, they will underscore the necessity of having a ‘true’ Islamic republic of Pakistan and Pakistan will be rendered nothing less than a jihad factory. The Pakistani army, which has temporarily receded into the background, will come back to prominence and the ISI will be given a free hand to do whatever it pleases. The section of Pakistani civil society that has a great deal of admiration for India will turn completely antagonistic and will ask the Pakistani state to answer India in the same coin. Of course, a sustained war with India will prove disastrous for the beleaguered Pakistan, which is already reeling under massive economic, political and social pressures. The Pakistani state would find itself fighting wars both inside and outside of itself, and the various secessionist parts of the country would only contribute to its destabilization. India will eventually have, as Pervez Hoodbhoy once said, a nuclear Somalia for a neighbour. The great irony is that this would only be the beginning of our woes, though it might seem like the culmination of them all. You cannot, as they say, change your neighbours; they will continue to exist by your side in peace or in war.
In the final analysis, can India ‘win’ a war against Pakistan from a grand strategic point of view? No, it cannot. India will lose more than it will gain from a war with Pakistan. From a grand strategic point of view, India’s success lies in sustaining its economic growth, from being a responsible nation considered able to play a leading role in the management of the international security system and from building itself a stable, sympathetic neighborhood. All the diplomatic gains that India has achieved vis-à-vis Pakistan will go down the drain with one surgical strike across the Line of Control. In one fell swoop, India risks erasing years of carefully constructed legitimacy, as well as its (apparently steady) position as a responsible stakeholder in the international system. One reckless decision will mean the end of India’s moral high ground.
It is naïve, and it undermines the greater national interest of the country, to believe and behave as if all is lost on the Pakistan front. India must use more sophisticated and nuanced behind-the-curtain diplomacy to reach out to the people who matter in the Pakistani state, and the various states within that state. Imaginative, targeted and high level diplomacy helps in times of crisis; history has proven it time and again. Sadly however, Indo-Pak relations are littered with mistakes made by hasty and irresponsible, ill-informed and unbalanced, and quite simply ignorant, decisions. India must read the past to understand the future; it must learn the lessons of the history of international relations and behave accordingly.
Source: Greater Kashmir, 17 December 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=17_12_2008&ItemID=13&cat=11
