Defining normalcy in Kashmir

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

December 31st is an appropriate day to take stock of the year that went by – so why not critically examine the claim that Kashmir has had a peaceful year? To me, the argument that 2011 has been a peaceful year for Kashmir is an oxymoron, demonstrates ignorance, and generally defeats the purpose of meaningful and incisive political analysis. But why not consider 2011 to be a peaceful year? After all, this year has witnessed massive reduction in militant infiltration from across the border, highest number of tourists visiting Kashmir in many years, no massive demonstrations on the streets of Kashmir, and no pulverizing bomb blasts as used to be case earlier. That, indeed, is the official version of normalcy and peace in Kashmir. This statist analysis is not completely off the mark because the state always bases its interpretation of normalcy and violence on the basis of a definition that suits its purposes and privileges itself. The problem arises when this statist definition is posited against other definitions of violence and normalcy which privilege human beings and societies rather than the state. In other words, your definition colors your analysis. Let’s examine this further.

What was normal about 2011?
2011 ended with Kashmiris shivering in their homes due to acute power shortages. The state government has been unable to provide a basic necessity such as electricity to the people of Kashmir in sub-zero temperatures. What is even more appalling is that the state bureaucracy and the political class have ‘royally’ (and may I say shamelessly) abdicated their responsibility and shifted base to Jammu where the weather is better, leaving Kashmiris at the mercy of extreme temperatures with no electricity. If the state administrative machinery were to continue to be based in Srinagar, they would at least have tired to make the power situation better.

There has not been any great surge in the development of the state in any sphere in 2011: no new infrastructure development worth mentioning, no sufficient employment generation, and no significant external investment. The dreaded AFSPA has neither been lifted nor amended despite the ruling party’s high-pitched arguments for it and futile grand-standing. Not even once did Kashmir’s ruling party threaten to pull out of the UPA coalition in New Delhi to put pressure on the latter to remove AFSPA from Kashmir. There have been a number of custodial killings and high-handedness by the security forces. Even in 2011 Kashmiris faced the humiliation of having to go through multiple identity checks and unfriendly body frisking by security forces in their own neighbourhood. 2011 also witnessed the still-unraveling story of 2000 odd unmarked graves in Kashmir whose unfortunate occupants and their grief-stricken families still await any form of justice. The Kashmir interlocutors went around in the state talking to various people (excluding, of course, those who matter), wrote an exhaustive report and submitted to New Delhi: not many believe that any action will be taken on the basis of that even as some of the interlocutors claim from time to time that their recommendations are being followed by the government!

Why at least some people tend to call 2011 a peaceful (which literally means ‘full of peace’!) year is because a) as I pointed out above the focus is on what happens to the state and not to the people and, b) because of the problem in the definition of its opposite, violence. When the state defines violence, it takes extra care to address only direct forms of violence and not those indirect and structural forms of violence. Structural violence is widely defined as the “avoidable disparity between the potential ability to fulfill basic needs and their actual fulfillment”. To understand structural violence, one needs t look at mundane things such as availability of electricity, jobs, quality higher education, respect for human rights, ability to live with dignity etc. I don’t need to repeat here the ‘quality’ of human rights protection in the valley! Take another example: Greater Kashmir reported recently that J&K contributes 32% of energy to National Hydroelectric Power Corporation as against 68% by all the other Indian states. And yet, Kashmir seems to suffer from power shortages every winter. Now that’s a form of structural violence, isn’t it?

Normalcy for whom?
Who does the “Kashmir is normal” argument benefit? The ruling dispensation, the Chief Minister and, of course, New Delhi. Claims about Kashmir’s return to normalcy increase the star power of the Chief Minister and makes him even more of a darling of the elite English media in Delhi, it sells New Delhi’s pet story of “Kashmir’s normalization” which it has been choreographing for some time now, and of course the Indian army which can now take pride in the fact that they have ‘defeated’ terrorism! But does this normalcy story of 2011 make any difference to the average Kashmiri or, at the macro level, does it help resolve the political problem in Kashmir? No. Indeed it is true that there was a reduction in the instances of direct violence against Kashmiris in 2011. This opportunity, however, should have been used by the powers that be to address the other entrenched forms of violence rather than busying themselves in fantasizing about the imagined return of normalcy into the Kashmir valley. In short, 2011 will be remembered as a year that was wasted due to the lack of credible, courageous and visionary political leadership.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 1 January 2012. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/Jan/1/defining-normalcy-in-kashmir-8.asp )

Hypocrisy of Kashmir’s alcohol debate

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

Whether or not alcohol and cinema should be allowed in Kashmir is asking the wrong question. The appropriate question to ask, to my mind, is how Kashmiris define themselves and their struggle, and the inter-relationship between the availability of alcohol and films, and their struggle.

However, let me begin by saying that it does not take a great deal of intelligence to understand that Farooq Abdullah is clearly engaging in a customized version of ‘diversionary war tactic’ to divert the undue attention from his party’s failure at removing AFSPA from J&K in spite of being a partner of the ruling coalition in New Delhi. Moreover, liquor and cinema are not the burning problems of today’s Kashmir; there are surely other more pressing issues to be dealt with in Kashmir which his party and government have surely failed in dealing with.

And yet, I maintain that those opposing the ‘re-introduction’ of films and alcohol into the Kashmir valley are fundamentally wrong in their arguments. I realize that this is unlikely to be a popular argument in Kashmir but I believe that my job as a columnist and a University professor is to tell my readers what I think is right and why. So here it is.

Why opponents of cinema and alcohol are wrong

Some critics of the proposed re-introduction of films and liquor in Kashmir have suggested that it is a ploy of the government to push the normalcy argument about Kashmir, i.e., that popular forms of entertainment and free availability of commodities such as liquor will help create an image of Kashmir as a normal place which, consequently, will encourage the government to forget about the political resolution of the Kashmir conflict. This is a flawed argument. Consider this. After the 2008 elections, in which Kashmiris voted in large numbers, many in Srinagar and New Delhi tired to paint a picture of normalcy but the massive uprisings in Kashmir thereafter rendered such arguments about election-induced normalcy in Kashmir completely wrong. This means that trappings of externally-induced normalcy are unlikely to work in Kashmir unless and until the deep political questions are addressed. Same applies to popular forms of entertainment and availability of alcohol. The logical extension of this argument about alcohol and mass entertainment would be that they will somehow interfere with Kashmir’s struggle for azadi. That, in turn, means that the struggle for azadi stands on a very weak foundation. Hence making such arguments will give a bad name to the struggle for azadi.

When Dukhtaran-e-Millat, Hurriyat Conference (G) and Jamaat-e-Islami toe a particular political line, there is every reason to be suspicious. Look at the core argument that they seem to be making: “Kashmir is a Muslim majority state (sic), alcohol and films will hurt Muslim sentiments, encourage unislamic activities and that this is an example of cultural aggression against a muslim majority state.” Let’s face it: these are blatantly communal and majoritarian assertions. This is exactly the kind of arguments that the Hindutwa fascists use in the rest of India against minorities like Muslims since the advocates of Hindutwa speak from a majoritarian standpoint and that, by definition, is a communal position and hence reprehensible. Put simply, should the Indian Muslims accept the Bhagvad-Gita as the official document of the Indian state and Manusmriti as their rule book just because India happens to be a Hindu majority state and the Hindu fundamentalists insist so? No, I guess. In the same way, why would the non-Muslims of Kashmir be asked to abide by Islamic morals?

More so, indeed paradoxically, the Hindu communalists and upholders of the Islamic state in Kashmir are both talking about the need to create a theocratic state as well as the need to purify the society by banning bars, interaction between sexes etc. It would be engaging in plain double-speak when Kashmiri leaders to speak up against Hindu majoritarianism in India and engage in majoritarianism of a different kind in Kashmir.

More importantly, it is necessary to remember that Kashmir’s struggle for azadi is not a religious one; it is a secular, inclusive and political struggle. Hence allowing religious parties and puritan arguments to take over Kashmir’s azadi struggle would be doing a great disservice to the cause of azadi. Indeed, by coloring the struggle for azadi with Islamic formulations Kashmiris will only strengthen those who argue that Kashmir’s struggle is after all a communal one, which, to mind, it is not.

When the sale of alcohol was allowed in Kashmir during the earlier periods, there were kilometers-long queues outside alcohol shops. Were those queues formed by people coming from outside Kashmir? Of course not. That simply means that there are people who want to consume alcohol in Kashmir. Moreover, during all these years when alcohol was not sold in Kashmir, it was never impossible for anyone to get alcohol in the valley. Why deny that reality? Hence, arguing that Kashmiris would not want to have alcohol amounts to hypocrisy and by insisting on an alcohol ban we are helping in the construction of a society of hypocrites.

Moreover, in a liberal society it is impossible and undesirable to decide choices for everyone by using religious arguments or even secular arguments. All that we should do is to educate our children and instill good values in them rather than trying to make choices for them all their lives.

Finally, is it not a ridiculous argument that films represent and promote vulgarity? Some might, but most of them do not. Did 'Inshallah, football' represent vulgarity? Does interaction among sexes promote social degradation? Does the use of facebook/twitter/orkut and internet in general negatively influence people and promote vulgarity in society? They may, or may not. And at the end of the day how a medium is used, for vulgar or decent purposes, depends upon the attitudes of the person.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 18 December, 2011. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/Dec/18/hypocrisy-of-kashmir-s-alcohol-debate-18.asp)

India’s New Kashmir Narrative

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

I am increasingly of the opinion that the Indian – not necessarily New Delhi’s - perception on Kashmir has undergone considerable transformation in the recent past. This new Indian approach to Kashmir can only be comprehensively understood and explained by looking at the various domestic social, political, economic and other related developments within India. Today, my intention is not to explain what this ‘new approach’ is, but analyse, only briefly though due to space constraints, the larger social, political, economic and ideational context which has made the new Indian approach to Kashmir possible. I will try and flag a few ideas regarding the ‘new actors’ and ‘new identities’ in India that have prompted the creation of a new Indian discourse on Kashmir.

New Actors

The first new actor that I would like to identify as having acted as a catalyst, in more ways than one, in transforming the Indian approach to Kashmir is the proactive media in the country. The Indian media has clearly acted as an agent of change by way of flagging newer issues and adopting non-traditional approaches to understanding issues concerning the Indian nation in general and the Kashmir issue in particular. This is primarily achieved by the media by being a mediator and communicator of the multiple narratives on various aspects of the nation’s day today existence, over and above the existing state narrative. This generation and promotion of multivocality by the media has helped the Indian re-imagination of the Kashmir conflict.

Diversified reportage of the Kashmir issue, using varied sources and providing contrasting viewpoints, has led to more politicization, less securitization and further nuancing of the Kashmir issue in India. Free media creates debates, debates create disagreements, disagreements encourage and legitimise differing shades of opinions and that is what was lacking in India’s Kashmir discourse for a long time.

The rise of a bold, new and outspoken, and yet mostly nationalistic, civil society in India has consistently challenged the Indian state on issues ranging from the construction of nuclear reactors in inhabited areas to police excesses to draconian laws such as the MOCACA, AFSPA to human rights violations in Kashmir. Criticism of the government is increasingly seen as healthy and legitimate, and much required for a better India. This has invariably helped the Kashmir cause for those speaking out against human rights excesses in Kashmir are not seen as being unpatriotic. There have been exceptions, I admit.

New Identities

India aspires to be a great power and a chunk of the international community thinks that India could well become one. Has India exhibited appropriate behaviour patterns befitting a rising (great) power? Has its new approach towards Kashmir shown the great power-like behaviour and attitudes of the country?

Great power aspirations of the Indian middle class and the strategic elite have, to some extent, led sections within the country look at Kashmir in a non-traditional manner. One aspect of this argument is an emerging thinking in India that if it has to rise to the status of a great power it should be able to resolve its internal problems.

The other strand of this thinking is that the Kashmir conflict is hurting India and hence it needs to devise new ways of addressing the Kashmir conflict. Vir Sanghvi, former editor of the Hindustan Times, an influential English daily in India, argued that Kashmir is a liability for India and India should let Kashmir go away if it wants to. There are also others, such as Swaminathan Anklesaria Aiyar, who think that Kashmir deserves to have a chance to decide its own destiny. Mind you, these are not the so-called bleeding heart liberals!

Aspirational identity of a great power has also prompted India to constantly look for feedback and reassurance from the international community. It looks out for words that confirm the Indian greatness and more so engages in actions vis-à-vis Kashmir to confirm to the international and great power standards to showcase to the world that it is doing the right things in Kashmir. The open invite India extended to international election observers to come and witness the ‘free and fair’ state assembly elections in 2008 is an example of this.

The constant search for the aspirational great power identity also manifests in the creation of an image of India that is reasonable, caring, and willing to accommodate legitimate Kashmiri demands. Both the leaders and the analysts in India have tried to portray such an image to the Kashmiris in the last one decade or so. Even as India is peeved at the western criticism of its human rights record, it realizes the need to reconcile to the western human rights standards in order to justify its new-found place in the high table of nations that manage the international system.

looked at Bollywood films to understand the portrayal of Kashmir. While in the 1960s and 1970s films mostly focused on the beauty of Kashmir, we see the portrayal of Kashmir as a terrorist-infested and Pakistan-supporting state in Bollywood films in the 1990s. This is now starting to change with more and more films becoming bold enough to challenge the state version of things in Kashmir by depicting human rights violations committed by the Indian security forces there and the plight of the Kashmiris in general. Bollywood films are indicative of the nuances of the popular culture and popular perceptions in India.

For instance, while films such as Barsaat (1994) and Kashmir ki Kali (1964) are set against the beauty of Kashmir valley, films such as Roja (1994), Dil Se (1998) talk about militancy in Kashmir from a statist point of view. Since 2000 or so, some films have been made in the backdrop of Kashmir such as Mission Kashmir (2000), Pukar (2004) Yahaan (2005) Shaurya (2008) Lamhaa: the untold story of Kashmir (2010) and Inshallah football (2010) have tried to depict human rights issues or at least talked about the human face of the insurgency in Kashmir.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 27 November, 2011. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/Nov/27/india-s-new-kashmir-narrative-4.asp)

In the name of AFSPA

Of a political establishment that does not have the courage to make up its mind on such a crucial issue!

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

Theatre of the Absurd

The various claims, counterclaims, half-truths, and thoughtless pronouncements on the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in Jammu and Kashmir remind one of the parodical scenes straight out of the Theatre of the Absurd. Or do they remind us of the story of blind men trying to describe the elephant, ending up describing only the partial truths? Perhaps yes, except that the men talking about AFSPA in J&K are not blind – they are just not courageous enough.

Omar’s hide and seek

Chief Minister Omar Abdullah recently claimed that AFSPA would be lifted partially from Srinagar, Budgam, Jammu and Samba prior to the Durbar move to Jammu. His statement was objected to by the army and the J&K state Congress leadership. Under fire from the coalition partner for his dictatorial and unilateral ways, Omar eventually said that the decision on AFSPA would be taken after the Durbar moves to Jammu. There seems to be nothing amiss here except that herein lies the well-known tendency of the Chief Minister to shoot his mouth off without considerable thinking about policy issues. He has made a number of revolutionary statements in the past including the one on setting up a truth and reconciliation commission in J&K. They continue to retain their existence as mere statements without being translated into any concrete action. Saifuddin Soz is not wrong in asking him: why talk about only AFSPA? Why not remove the Disturbed Areas Act and the Public Safety Act which are no less draconian and abused and perhaps easier to remove? Hence if he is serious about removing draconian laws, why not do something that’s easily doable?

Games the Congress Plays

The Congress Chief in the state, Saifuddin Soz, is outraged that Omar had not consulted anyone prior to stating that AFSPA would be withdrawn from parts of the state. Soz accused Omar of promoting sectarian interests and not consulting the state cabinet or the NC-Congress Coordination Committee on the issue. He is right and yet that is just a half truth. Are we supposed to believe that Saifuddin Soz is unhappy with Omar Abdullah for not consulting his party regarding the withdrawal of AFSPA? That would be absurd. The real endgame behind the ongoing war of words is the Congress’ desire to take over the Chief Ministership of the state from Omar as they did so in 2005 after dethroning Mufti Mohammad Sayeed. Since Ghulam Nabi Azad has had his stint as the Chief Minister of the state and seemingly not focused on the state at the moment, it’s the turn for Soz to try his luck. Hence his talk about ASFPA aims to, a) pit Omar Abdullah against the security establishment in New Delhi, and b) portray himself as the custodian of India’s national interests in Kashmir. Will the Congress ever learn from its historical blunders in Kashmir and restrain from grabbing power in the state at any given opportunity?

Defiance of the underdog

The military in India is ordinarily not known to have a say in policy matters and yet when it comes to AFSPA, easily one of the most significant aspects of India’s Kashmir policy, the Army seems to have laid down the rules of the game. They have clearly said that they cannot operate in J&K without the aid of the AFSPA. The army argues that the time to remove the AFSPA has not come. Who is the Indian army to tell us what is a good time to take a political decision? Really, it’s not their business. Remember, the Indian army has already blocked the potential resolution of the Siachen Glacier even as the political establishment is willing to resolve it.

I can not but agree with the wise words of M. M Ansari, the low-profile Kashmir interlocutor, regarding Operation Sadbhavana conducted in J&K by the army. He argued in a recent interview with the Hindustan Times that "It is simply not their job to provide education, health and other facilities… the objective was to carve an operating space for the armed forces but they have ended up narrowing the scope of the local bodies,". The fact is that this kind of “militarization of governance processes” in Kashmir by the Indian army will weaken the already fragile and deeply corrupt J&K administrative apparatus and institutions. The Indian army should be immediately relieved of its governance duties and the self-assumed burden of policy commentary. The army should be stripped of its special powers over the citizens of the state and be asked to man the borders and not civilian areas.

Anarchy at the helm

Apparently the Prime Minister, the Union Home Minister, the J&K Chief Minister and the J&K opposition leader are all in favour of withdrawing AFSPA, partly or fully, from Kashmir. And yet they are not able to make up their mind because the Indian army is not in its favour. These political leaders, at least those in power, have unfortunately fallen victim to the army’s blackmail that it is willing to withdraw from there but will not be responsible if anything goes wrong thereafter. Given the recent tendency of the army to speak out on policy issues, the politicians are scared that they will have to take the blame in case something goes wrong. Shame on a political establishment that does not have the courage to make up its mind on such a crucial issue!

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 06 NOVEMBER 2011. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/Nov/6/in-the-name-of-afspa-3.asp )

Pakistan’s New Kashmir Policy

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

Those of us who attended the 6th and 7th Chaophraya track-two Dialogues on Indo-Pak relations (October 16-19, 2011) in Bangkok were in for a surprise when leading strategic thinkers and media representatives from India and Pakistan started discussing the ever so contentious ‘K’ issue. One retired senior official from the Pakistan military asked the Indians present at the dialogue bluntly: “Why do you Indians want to discuss Kashmir? We are not keen on a discussion on Kashmir. There are other more important things to be discussed”

This was not a lone view coming from a retired Pakistani official; others from the Pakistani contingent seemed to be either toeing a very moderate line on Kashmir (in comparison to Pakistan’s traditional views on the issue) or trying to rank other issues such as Afghanistan and Balochistan much above Kashmir. The Indian stand seemed to be curiously different toot: some spoke about the positive changes underway in Kashmir and some others pointed out the continuing occurrence of human rights violations in J&K. Even this was a departure from the usual Indian defensive stand on Kashmir. There was a certain attitude of accommodation, sincerity and effortlessness to the Indian stand on Kashmir.

The Pakistani climb-down on the core issue of Kashmir was coupled with an increasing focus on Afghanistan and the evolving endgame there. Not only were the Pakistanis emphatic about their accusation that India is trying to contain Pakistanin Afghanistan but were also negative about any potential strategic accommodation or cooperation with India in Afghanistan. Most of them were loud and clear about what Pakistan would want India to do vis-à-vis Afghanistan: Get Out!

Deconstructing the new Pakistani stand on Kashmir

So what do we make of Pakistan’s new stand on Kashmir? What explains this new, nuanced, and yet unprecedented Pakistani lack of interest in determining the direction in which Kashmir heads? Indeed, one would argue that Pakistani leadership does make occasional references to the UN resolutions, human rights violations in Kashmir, need to ascertain the wishes of the Kashmiri people etc. in their policy utterances, world forums and official meetings. An yet as one Pakistani participant pointed out this is how states behave: unless there is an official declaration of the radical change in official policy, states will always make their policy changes known in very subtle ways and ‘without prejudice to their held positions’. Hence Pakistani official statements on Kashmir ‘without prejudice to its held positions’ are not surprising.

Let’s return to the question what explains the new Pakistani policy shift on Kashmir. Is it because the Pakistani establishment has realized that they are increasingly losing legitimacy and ground in Kashmir and that the people of Kashmir are no longer looking towards Pakistan for deliverance? Or is it because Pakistan has realized that it hardly has any international backers on the Kashmir issue and that terrorism as a state policy is increasingly looked down upon by the international community? Is it due to the so-called Indian ‘successes’ in addressing the Kashmir issue with increased political sensitivity? Or is it because Pakistan is bogged down in Afghanistan and hence unable to commit any material, diplomatic, military and political resources for the Kashmir cause? Or is the apparent Pakistani shift a mere tactical measure in the sense that given its isolation in the international community and the precarious situation that it faces domestically, Pakistan has decided to lie low on Kashmir and will revert back to its traditional positions and strategies once it feels more secure and confident? Or is it because Pakistan’s Kashmir policy has indeed positively transformed due to a serious internal change of heart and strategic priorities? And does that change of heart stem from a realization that Pakistan’s Kashmir policy has done more harm to itself than any good?

I don’t think anyone has any obvious answers to these questions. It’s most likely that the perceptible change in Pakistan’sKashmir policy has come about due to all the above factors. Indeed, it would be better if Pakistan’s new Kashmir policy has multiple sources, because if there is only one source for this policy change, there could, at least theoretically, be a reversal of its policy in case there is a change in that source.

On its part, New Delhi should be wise enough to make use of this strategic window of opportunity and try to settle the conflict in Kashmir through an internal political process and the conflict over Kashmir with Pakistan through a sustained bilateral dialogue. If New Delhi thinks that it can afford to ignore Kashmir because Pakistan has lost its interest in the issue, it will lead to disastrous consequences for the people of Kashmir has shown in the past that they will be able to fight their own fight with New Delhi without any external helping hands. If anything, the Pakistani involvement has only given Kashmiris’ indigenous struggle against New Delhi a very bad name.

New Delhi should therefore attempt to implement the various suggestions put forward by the various Kashmiri parties, dissident and mainstream, committee of interlocutors and the reports produced by the Prime Minister’s Round Table conferences.

(Happymon Jacob teaches at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)

"Harud: In Memoriam"

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

The multitude of narratives surrounding the Harud literary festival in Kashmir has exposed the many deep cleavages within the discursive space of Kashmir politics. If the existence of a multitude of divergent opinions and viewpoints can be seen as an indication of the wellbeing of the discursive space within a political community, then Harud, to me at least, has proven again that in spite of what has happened to and done to Kashmir in the past many decades, the Kashmiri knows how to speak his/her mind out and will do so: and hence any attempt to deny them that opportunity would have to be called tragic.
The stupidity of the Organisors
The organisors of ‘Harud-The Autumn Festival of Literature’ displayed utmost ignorance and stupidity – and I do not wish to mince words here – when they declared that the festival would be an apolitical forum and later when they decided to cancel it. First of all, if literature is to do with society, emotions, culture, life, impressions etc., how on earth can it be apolitical? Isn’t ‘apolitical literature’ an oxymoron, to say the least? If the organisors of the Jaipur Literature Festival consider literature to be an apolitical affair, they have no right to engage in anything to do with literature: they are at best corporate event managers of glitzy literary outputs if they think they are engaging in an apolitical act. Hence, if Harud was intended to be organized along the lines of a flashy corporate event, it’s better that we don’t have it because politics lies at the heart of literature.
The norm-setters of the society have told us that educational institutions are and should be apolitical, but are they and should they be? We probably have the finest and most informed political debates happening in our university and college campuses. I have, over the last decade or so, gained more political knowledge from the post-dinner public meetings conducted in JNU’s mess halls than from any clinically written textbooks of politics. They say classrooms are and should be apolitical, but are they and should they be? I teach issues relating to national security at JNU and every lecture I give at JNU’s School of International Studies ends up becoming a discussion/debate about the politics of national security.
The organisors also cited potential protests at the site of the festival as a reason for canceling the event. But what did they expect? Did they expect that Kashmir is as calm as the Dal Lake and that there would be no security threats and protests? Did they think that since the Indian state has tried to silence the Kashmiris for so long, they would be an obedient group of passive individuals who would say no more than what was required of them?

Why the opposition to Harud was misconceived
The organisors of the Harud Festival are stupid, why buy their stupidity? If claiming that a literary festival is an apolitical affair is stupid, then protesting against that stupid comment to the extent to making the organisors to refuse to host the much needed event in Kashmir is not wise either. While political criticism is, for sure, social service, critiquing something for the sake of it and/or then not doing anything alternative or parallel to rectify the mistakes is irresponsibility.
More so, was Harud indeed an attempt by the Indian state’s propaganda machine to paint the picture that all is well in Kashmir? The Indian government has of course tried to “normalize” Kashmir for many decades. It purchased local politicians, pumped thousands of crores of rupees into the state, micromanaged and manipulated politics there, and its policies led to the deaths of thousands of Kashmiris. But have all these attempts by the Indian state managed to stop the dissenting Kashmiris? No. Have these attempts by New Delhi convinced us that all is well in Kashmir? No. Did the misplaced sense of triumphalism in Srinagar and New Delhi regarding the ‘victory of democracy and the defeat of dissent’ in the Valley witnessed after the 2008 State Assembly elections stop the Kashmiris from taking to streets in protest against the killings of innocent Kashmiris in the summer of 2010? No. Did the visit of the Pakistani rock-band Junoon in May 2008 and their performance at the Dal Lake give us a feeling that all is well in Kashmir? No.
Had Harud been organized in Srinagar as per schedule, would it have meant that all is well in Kashmir and moreover would it have been a victory for the Indian state in Kashmir? No. Was the proposal to hold Harud in Kashmir by a non-governmental organization a conspiracy of the Indian state to paint an “all is well” picture of Kashmir? No.

Whose loss is it anyways?
At the end of the day, when the intellectual dust generated by the debates surrounding Harud settles down, we will need to ask ourselves an important question: who has lost most from the cancellation of the Harud festival? For sure, it’s a loss for art, for the young aspiring artistic-minded kashmirs and their youthful dreams, and most importantly, for our levels of tolerance. I wonder why it is that the intellectuals and writers who voiced their opinion loud and clear against holding Harud in Kashmir kept mum when some protesters there threatened that they would do anything to stop a particular person from coming to Kashmir to attend Harud. Don’t they believe in artistic freedom? Didn’t we hear them cry foul when the Hindutwa fundamentalists publicly posed death threats to late M. F. Hussain for his anti-Hindu paintings? Why is there a double standard?

(Source: Greater Kashmir, October 2, 2010. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/Oct/2/harud-in-memoriam-4.asp )

Will, not bill, needed for Kashmir

Nizam-ud-Din Bhat’s statement is ill-timed, ill-conceived and amounts to no more than empty rhetoric

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

The recent bill proposed by the People’s Democratic Party legislator, Nizam-ud-Din Bhat, seeking the deletion of Article 3 of the J&K constitution which links the state with the Indian Union is ill-timed, ill-conceived and amounts to no more than empty rhetoric, to say the least. While the PDP has distanced itself from its legislator’s attention-seeking behaviour, one wonders how a responsible political Party’s legislator is allowed by the party leadership to engage in such irresponsible politics. Either the Party has lost its grip among its second-rung leaders or it is trying to test waters in Srinagar, and by extension in New Delhi, to see how proposals such as these will be responded to. PDP’s self-rule document is a visionary proposal for conflict resolution in J&K but ill-conceived proposals from the likes of Bhat will only erode the credibility of such a well though-out official proposal.

National Conference (NC) leader and state Chief Minister, Omar Abdullah, argued in the state assembly in October 2010 that the state did not merge with the Indian Union but has only acceded to the country. Since it has acceded and not merged with India, there are certain special provisions, as enshrined in the Article 370 of the Indian constitution that the J&K state enjoys today. Unlike Nizam-ud-Din Bhat’s misguided argument, Omar’s argument is sound, logical and accurate. Omar’s argument focusing on accession as opposed to merger is even more significant in today’s context when there seems to be an effort to find a political solution to the Kashmir conflict, rather than a military one. Unlike in the case of the erstwhile Princely states, the state of Jammu and Kashmir never gave up their special status at the time of acceding to India. More so, it is important to remember as well-known Kashmir expert Balraj Puri wrote in his book Kashmir: Insurgency and After “The special constitutional status of Jammu and Kashmir was not granted by the Government of India, but was sanctioned by the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act of 1935, the India Independence Act of 1947, the India (Provisional Constitution) Order of 1947 and the Instrument of Accession.” The point is that J&K is different from other Indian states wherein it is legally empowered to retain a level of distance from the Indian Union.

That said, I find arguments by both Abdullah and Bhat to be nothing but empty rhetoric bereft of political will or a sense of direction, though for different reasons. While Bhat’s argument is illogical, Omar’s argument suffers from a sense of purpose and clarity of vision. Why does the Chief Minister of J&K, who is a coalition partner in the Union government in New Delhi and with the influence he wields in Delhi, especially with the Gandhi family, choose to limit his vision regarding a political solution in Kashmir to his speeches alone? Why can’t the Chief Minister prevail over New Delhi to do for Kashmir what he and his party think should be done? Why wouldn’t he make it a prestige issue for himself and his party? Why can’t the NC and Abdullah insist New Delhi to deliver on what they think should be done for Kashmir? And more so, if New Delhi doesn’t agree to his proposals, why wouldn’t he show the courage and conviction to walk out of the coalition arrangement? Don’t the NC and its leader understand the virtues of coalition politics which enable every coalition partner to wield considerable amount of influence on the federal government especially in matters concerning the state that the coalition partner represents? PDP and its visionary leader, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, not only understood the bargaining power of coalition politics but also had managed to elicit certain benefits from New Delhi in the form of crucial intra-Kashmir CBMs.

In politics, talk is cheap, and actions are rare! The dissident leaders in Kashmir have always talked about the various contours of a political solution for the Kashmir conflict; but they have never delivered anything. They do not have the ability to do what the mainstream parties can do in terms of engaging in concrete political action. But the least they can do is to get their act together in terms of generating a popular debate about what is achievable (a la what Sajad Lone has talked about), what their long term and short term goals are, and identify a common strategy to achieve their goal in a realistic manner within the ambit of the prevailing political and geo-strategic conditions. Instead, all they are able to do is to revel in empty rhetoric.

Political leadership in New Delhi also engages in this empty rhetoric from time to time. Narasimha Rao famously talked about sky being the limit when it comes to conflict resolution in Kashmir, A. B. Vajpayee talked about addressing the conflict in Kashmir within the framework of humanity and Manmohan Singh talked about making borders in Kashmir irrelevant. And yet, Kashmir conflict continuous to exist and no political solution has been found. In the meantime we keep hearing about more and more unmarked graves in Kashmir when thousands of Kashmiris are buried, unsung and unidentified.

The Kashmir ‘hands’ in Sringar and New Delhi, including Srinagar’s mainstream and dissident political parties, are now gearing up for another round of Kashmir talk which will begin with the submission of the final report of the Centre’s interlocutors on Kashmir. While we do not yet know the contents of the report, not many people are convinced that the report will generate anymore than neatly choreographed talk-shows and smartly-written newspaper columns in New Delhi and Srinagar.

(Source: 19 September 2011. Greater Kashmir. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/Sep/18/will-not-bill-needed-for-kashmir-17.asp )

Please don’t call it a revolution

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

Anna Hazare is a courageous man and I admire him for his guts. He has managed to do what a lot of others have not: think of it, a villager from Maharashtra is close to winning an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation against a huge state machinery which is not in a habit of listening to the voice of the people. Before you start thinking that “I Am Anna”, let me clarify: today’s column is a political criticism of the Anna movement. And yet I wish to acknowledge that the “anti-corruption” part of the campaign and team Anna’s courage to take on the state are both laudable. That said, I am extremely skeptical of messiahs, I think they are a dangerous species for modern democracies and, in any case, too much adulation often turn them into tyrants – umpteen examples from history will bear me out on this. In all, I have four major critiques of the Anna movement.
Cult of anti-politics
First of all, I am worried that the Anna movement is the beginning of anti-politics in India. There is a certain understandable cynicism in the minds of the Indian middle class about the political class in India. Popular culture in India (jokes, cinema etc.) and the media in general assert that the root cause of all problems lie with the politicians in the country, be it corruption, crime, poverty or communalism. It is this deep sense of anger and skepticism that the Anna has managed to gather around himself in Delhi’s Ramlila maidan. This campaign seems to be clearly promoting a culture of anti-politics which, together with the impending defeat of the government, will lead to a further erosion of middle class’ faith in the country’s institutions. The Anna movement will prompt many more groups to take law into their own hands. Such tendencies of deinstitutionalization will have far-reaching implications for a pluralistic, diverse, conflict-ridden and developing country such as India. More than anyone else, deinstitutionalization will prove to be disastrous for those living at the economic, political, social and geographical peripheries of the country. Let’s face it, the last refuge of the underprivileged and minorities in India will never be the Indian middle class, but the state - a much better state of course! The rise of the middle class skepticism of institutions in the backdrop of the already receding state portends the beginning of the end of political representation as we know it now.

Many liberal commentators are taken aback by the huge amounts of people on the streets supporting the Anna campaign and hence argue that it is a legitimate campaign because it seems to have a huge amount of support around the country. But then getting people on the streets in a country like India is no formidable task: didn’t the Sangh Parivar manage an even bigger mobilization for the ‘Kar Seva’? Or for that matter, can not the Hindutva right wing in India mobilize such numbers for purely communal objectives? Remember, this is an age when the so called yoga gurus and spiritual gurus seem to take centre-stage in matters of politics and governance!

Politics of the apolitical middle class
Whose protest is it anyway? This protest is choreographed to suit the ‘apolitical’ tendencies of the Indian middle class which is in the habit of critiquing politicians and politics but would not find time to cast their votes when elections come. They are in search of quick solutions and speedy justice, which, they assume, can and should be achieved by circumventing the din and noise of politics. Why corruption? Because corruption is apparently an apolitical issue (or so they think), isn’t it? When Kashmir burned last summer and over a hundred Kashmiris were killed by security forces, the Indian middle class was busy chit-chatting about “Aisha” and “Rajneeti” – none of them were seen protesting in the Ramleela maidan against the atrocities committed on Kashmiris! They would, however, find time to assemble at the India Gate in candle-lit processions to protest against ‘high-profile murders’ (of urban, English speaking ‘one of them’) and when the Indian army fights Pakistan (remember the middle class and media support for the Kargil war?). And yet they prefer to look the other way when Dalit women are raped and killed in hinterland India or thousands of farmers commit suicide in the country or raise their voice against AFSPA, human rights violations and other draconian laws: these issues don’t matter to the middle class because farmers, Dalits, slum-dwellers, Kashmiris, Manipuris etc. are not part of their class. More so, how could the middle class take up those issues – they are ‘political’ in nature, after all (which corruption is not)!!

The rightwing rising
The Anna campaign would not have come at a better time for the Hindutva rightwing in India – they were in the process of losing political direction having run out of ideas, appeal and steam generated by Ram Mandir, nuclear tests and such other issues. What the nationalist, overly-patriotic, feverishly flag-waving Indian middle class led by political puritans like Anna, yoga gurus, and spiritual gurus (with excellent RSS background work) has done are multiple things: they have shown that the Congress is an indecisive and spineless political party which does not have it in it to rule this country; that we need a new ‘national awakening’ in the country and the congress cant lead it; it is alright for the religious figures to be part of the ‘civil society’s’ efforts at nation building, and; that the country needs to unite by blurring the various ‘differences’ (national agenda formulation process) that exist in the country in order to engage in nation building (read the last one as ‘the other issues don’t matter, only corruption does). All this bear good news for the resurrection of the Hindutva rightwing in the country. It is becoming ever so clear that the national struggle against corruption is increasingly becoming a cradle of rightwing ideas and Hindutva organizations.

This is no spontaneous movement
Politics is understood to be dynamic and transformative; Anna campaign is self-serving, condescending and even dictatorial at times. More so, I am unprepared to believe that the Anna movement is a spontaneous countrywide mass uprising against corruption. Notwithstanding the fact their definition does not include all kinds of corruption, it is important to note that this movement is mechanical and result-oriented in a negative manner – as opposed to being organic and transformatory – and is led by technical experts and ex-bureaucrats, and certainly not a campaign led by the downtrodden and oppressed for their better tomorrow. The Anna movement excludes more than it includes.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, August 28, 2011. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/Aug/28/please-don-t-call-it-a-revolution-20.asp).

In defense of track-two dialogues

prejudiced and panic-stricken reactions call for a considered response

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

The recent arrest of Kashmir-born Executive Director of the Washington-based Kashmir American Council, Ghulam Nabi Fai, has generated a fierce debate within the Indian intelligentsia and media about the need, role and nature of track-two engagements between India and Pakistan on outstanding bilateral issues especially Kashmir. Sections of the Indian media and civil society have reacted thoughtlessly and hysterically to what they describe as ‘five star seminar circuit on Kashmir funded by the ISI’. Such prejudiced and panic-stricken reactions call for a considered response in defense of the philosophy behind track-two dialogues between unfriendly countries and the issue of funding for such initiatives.

The ISI connection
Critics have argued that the Indian participants did not care to check the antecedents of the organizer, Ghulam Nabi Fai in this case, and thereby worked against India’s national interest by going to an ISI-sponsored seminar. What they seem to ignore is that if it was after all a covert operation by the ISI and took the FBI, one of the world’s best investigative agencies, to finally unearth the link between Mr. Fai and the ISI, how can one expect the Indian academics, activists and intellectuals to have uncovered this link before they decided to air their views in seminars organized by Mr. Fai? While the criticism against respected Indian intellectuals and activists for participating in allegedly ISI-sponsored conferences on Kashmir in Washington can be dismissed by the simple argument that almost all of them were unaware of the source of Fai’s funding, the larger issue that needs to be addressed is about the importance of Indo-Pak track-two dialogues which many rightwing anchors have termed as a ‘cottage industry of wining and dining’ in the name of Kashmir.

Who funds these dialogues?
One major criticism against many of the ongoing track-two dialogues is regarding their source of funding. Critics say that these dialogues are funded by people with vested interests and because the participants are ‘well-taken care of’ they would happily endorse the hidden agenda of the organizers and will not keep the national interest of the country in mind. Such ‘unintellectual’ criticism needs to be seriously contested before being wholly dismissed. Let us come to the issue of funding first. There are at least four track-two dialogues going on at the moment between India and Pakistan and they had gathered momentum during the period when there was no dialogue between India and Pakistan after the Mumbai terrorist attacks. Almost all of them are funded by well-known and transparent funding agencies based abroad or neutral foreign governments. One of the major reasons why indigenous funding is discouraged for India-Pakistan track-two dialogues is that if it is funded by Indian funders, Pakistani participants would find it difficult to attend the conference and may have to answer uncomfortable questions at home and vice versa. Secondly, the Indian government has always adopted a hands-off policy when it comes to track-two dialogues and has in the past denied visas to Pakistani participants which is why most of these dialogues are held outside India and Pakistan. Holding these conferences outside India and Pakistan also helps participants to share their ideas freely and frankly without being under the constant glare and pressure of various actors back home. Moreover, it is hardly possible to verify the sources of a seminar organizer’s funding before one accepts the invitation to participate in it.
On the question of participants endorsing the hidden agenda of seminar organisors, it may be pointed out that most of the track-two dialogues are locally owned and locally organized even if foreign-funded. In other words, the agenda formation and consensus building are carried out by the Indians and Pakistanis themselves and most track-two meetings have roughly equal number of Indian and Pakistani participants. More significantly, most participants in these meetings are retired high-ranking officers from the bureaucracies and armed forces of India and Pakistan as well as well-known academics and experts from various think tanks and Universities. To claim that they are out there to be purchased by foreign intelligence agencies is making an unreasonably presumptuous argument, to say the least. The narrow minded nationalists and prime-time ‘televangelists’ are indeed indulging in self-flattery when they claim that they understand Indian national interests better than these individuals.

Why track-two engagements?
Since the ongoing campaign seems to be denigrating the very idea behind track-two engagements, it is necessary to put the philosophy behind these dialogues in proper perspective. Track-two dialogues are primarily meant to give an opportunity to senior and informed members of a country’s strategic community to interact with those of the rival state. There are multiple objectives behind such interactions: one, to appreciate the fears, concerns and demands of the other side; two, to understand the redlines and tipping points of the rival state; three, to engage in an unencumbered exchange of perceptions and ideas, and; four, convey the various suggestions and proposals from the other side to the decision-makers in one’s home country. One of the major advantages of track-two settings is that since most of these dialogues are held under Chatham House rules wherein nothing would be attributed to anyone after the meeting, participants are more likely to be frank and candid in their opinions leading to a better discussion of major issues and their potential solutions.

Kashmir and track-two dialogues
Track-two dialogues on Kashmir have in the past proved to be useful in a number of ways. They have helped the track-two interlocutors from the Indian side to clearly understand the positive transformation of the Pakistani approach to the conflict in Kashmir even as there has not been an official admission of it. Indeed, there have been occasions when the Pakistani decision makers made use of the venue provided by these forums to test waters on some of their out-of-the-box ideas on Kashmir. The meeting of an Indian track-two group with the then Pakistan President Pervez Musharraff in 2005 is a good example in this regard. In that meeting Musharraff outlined the various aspects of the so-called ‘Musharraff formula’ for the resolution of the Kashmir conflict and asked the interlocutors from both sides to discuss it further.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 31 July, 2011. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/Jul/31/in-defense-of-track-two-dialogues-33.asp )

Nuclear Confidence-building in South Asia

(Statement adopted by the members of the Ottawa Dialogue at their meeting at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, July 6-8, 2011)

The members of the Ottawa Dialogue are heartened by the fact that high-level official talks on nuclear CBMs have begun once again. We encourage the governments to continue them and to supplement them with regular meetings of high-level officials from the military and intelligence fields in order to broaden the dialogue and establish mechanisms to further understanding and prevent escalation of tension. We also encourage the two countries to continue to observe their respective moratoria on nuclear testing.

It is important to note that nuclear CBMs cannot succeed independent of broader steps to ease the relationship. These must include conventional military CBMs/restraint measures and steps to encourage people-to-people engagements. While these broader matters are not in the purview of the Ottawa Dialogue, we recognize that they are essential to the CBMs we are suggesting here. Thus, we recognize that some of the CBMs we advocate cannot be undertaken in the absence of

measures to stabilize other aspects of the relationship. But we believe that others can be and will

contribute to the creation of a “virtuous cycle;” an atmosphere in which progressively more ambitious steps can be taken in all fields of confidence-building.

Finally, there should be an informed public dialogue on the subject of the implications of a nuclear conflict in South Asia, and of the opportunity costs which attend the continuation of an uncontrolled nuclear rivalry. Such a dialogue should also include discussions of the underlying causes of the dispute.

On the subject of nuclear CBMs, we offer the following list of possible CBMs as ones that we believe could be considered by the governments.

Unilateral and/or Bilateral Declaratory Steps:

• Assurances that missiles will not be tested during periods of tension;

• Assurances that “bolt from the blue” surprise nuclear attacks will not be planned for or undertaken;

• Assurances that measures will be taken to prevent un-authorized and unintended launches (such as a mutual commitment to maintain the practice of the separation of warheads from delivery systems);

• Commitment to inform the other side well in advance of tests of new systems; and

• Building on the agreement not to attack nuclear facilities, assurances that sensitive targets will be avoided in the case of conventional conflict.

Strategic Restraint Measures:

• Agreement to develop and adopt a common terminology on strategic issues;

• Regular discussions on doctrinal issues and strategic stability;

• Agreement to include cruise missiles in the Agreement on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles;

• Agreement that missile flight tests will be notified to each side as early as possible;

• Agreement to test missiles only from notified ranges in notified directions;

• Agreement to enter into a dialogue concerning Ballistic Missile Defence in which views of the impact of such systems on strategic stability will be explored; and

• Agreement to enter into a regular dialogue on the impact of the introduction of new technologies on strategic stability.

Communication Measures:

• Agreement to expeditiously set up nuclear risk reduction centres (though possibly not under this name), through a comprehensive agreement, specifying the staffing, communication and functional aspects;

• Agreement to upgrade the existing hotlines to introduce redundant and assured communications which can be activated at the request of either party;

• Agreement to ensure a daily communication exchange when demanded by either party;

• Agreement to harden each side’s communication lines downwards to provide protected and assured communications; and

• Agreement to establish consultative mechanisms as required to implement these CBMs.

Physical Measures:

• Agreement not to deploy tactical nuclear weapons;

• Agreement to retire the Hatf 1 and Prithvi 1 short-range systems;

• Agreement that the Hatf 2 and Prithvi 2 will be designated as conventional-only systems; and

• Agreement to forego MIRVing of nuclear missiles.

Cooperation between the civilian nuclear establishments:

• Agreement to exchange on a regular basis information relating to the management of nuclear accidents;

• Agreement to share different experiences in creating and running Nuclear Regulatory Authorities;

• Agreement (bilateral or regional) on cooperation and exchange of safety related information of Nuclear Power Plants;

• Agreement to cooperatively develop civilian nuclear techniques in the fields of agriculture and medicine in such areas as:

o Plant strains with characteristics of high yield and resistance to pest, disease, drought, and salinity.

o Animal health through improved vaccines

o Extension of shelf life of perishable foods

o Practices for prevention and early detection of cancer

o Practices for treatment of acute radiation sickness

Participants from South Asia at the Palo Alto meeting of the Ottawa Dialogue:

1. Shamshad Ahmad, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan;

2. RN Ganesh, Vice Admiral, retired, Indian Navy;

3. Mohan Guruswamy, Chairman, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Delhi;

4. Jamshed Hashmi, Chairman Emeritus, Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority;

5. Rifaat Hussain, Professor, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad;

6. Happymon Jacob, Assistant Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi;

7. Aziz Ahmad Khan, Ambassador, retired, Foreign Service of Pakistan (former High Commissioner to India);

8. Feroz Khan, Brigadier General, retired, Pakistan Army, former Director Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs, Strategic Plans Division

9. Riaz Khan, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan;

10. Lalit Mansingh, former Foreign Secretary of India;

11. Talat Masood, Lieutenant General, retired, Pakistan Army;

12. Shuja Nawaz, Director of the South Asia Centre, Atlantic Council of the United States; Washington, DC;

13. TV Paul, Professor, McGill University

14. Ramamurti Rajaraman, Emeritus Professor of Theoretical Physics, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi;

15. Najmuddin Shaikh, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan; and

16. Vijay Shankar, Vice Admiral, retired, Indian Navy (former Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Strategic Forces Command)

Members of the Ottawa Dialogue unable to be present in Palo Alto:

1. Shahzad Chaudhry, Air Vice Marshal, retired, Pakistan Air Force;

2. Tariq Osman Hyder, Former Additional Foreign Secretary, Pakistan;

3. Amitabh Mattoo, Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi;

4. Raja Menon, Rear Admiral, retired, Indian Navy; and

5. Abdul Hameed Nayyar, Senior Research Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute.