Kashmiris are not new to peace processes: it comes and goes like the tourists do in the valley. It is often difficult to keep track of the many peace processes we have had so far. Peace processes in Kashmir can be described as piecemeal approaches bereft of any grand political vision for peace. The latest one too started off with a lot of fanfare and symbolism. But what has happened to it? Has the establishment in Delhi and the various tack-two ‘walas’ forgotten about the frozen valley? Whatever happened to all those Round Table (RT) reports and the various recommendations therein? Have they also been put away in to the dustbins of Kashmiri history like many other reports, recommendations and rhetoric ( a la ‘sky is the limit’ promise by Narasimha Rao) of this kind? No one seems to have any answers. That said, this seems to be nothing new but in line with the same old Indian strategy on Kashmir that it has practiced over the last many years. Approach Kashmir and the politics there with a feudal mindset: hold talks, meetings and conferences in fits and starts. New Delhi starts the dialogue process when it feels like, it invites participants it feels like, it holds such meetings at an interval that is suitable to it, and unilaterally sets the agenda that it is comfortable with. Then the grand finale takes place with some dignitary releasing the reports etc. Sadly then, the meetings, participants, agenda and the recommendations are all forgotten even before one is able to gauge what is happening. This is followed by a long sarkari silence on the issue, like the present one, before dissidents, militants and ‘external pressures’ force the government to start the process all over again. The process begins, but it’s altogether a new process. The bureaucrats, politicians and the intelligence walas have all forgotten what happened up until now: it’s now about forgetting and forgiving whatever has happened and looking at the future, they will tell you. The above description perhaps best suits the off-and-on peace process that New Delhi has undertaken vis-à-vis the Kashmir issue. One would argue that the political turmoil (first the woes of Pervez Musharraf and then the assassination of Benazir Bhutto) in Pakistan has compelled the government of India to go slow on the peace process and the reports produced by the working groups. But of the five working groups (CBMs, Cross-LoC relations, Economic Development, Governance and, Centre-State relations) just one concerns Pakistan, the one on Cross-LoC relations. The other groups and their recommendations are about New Delhi and Srinagar. New Delhi does not need to get a go-ahead from Islamabad to talk to its own citizens in J&K. More importantly, let us be clear about the fact that the Kashmir issue is not one between India and Pakistan, it is about New Delhi and J&K, even as it is possible to argue that India is giving the attention that it does to Kashmir only because of the Pakistan dimension. A cursory glance at New Delhi’s attitude towards Northeast would make that amply clear. Here lies the critical and alarming distance between those who govern and those who are governed. Problems in Jammu and Kashmir are as much (or more) internal as much (or lees) they are external. Let us not befool ourselves by claiming that the problems in Kashmir are merely due to Pakistan. New Delhi’s feudal policies are as much part of the problem: Pakistan only took advantage of our follies. If one accepts that historical fact, then it also needs to be accepted that the solution should first of all be worked out between New Delhi and the people of Jammu and Kashmir. For that, we do not need to wait for things to settle down in Pakistan: that is neither clever strategy nor responsible statecraft. If one says that since the India-Pakistan dialogue on Kashmir is put on the backburner, we can not do much with Kashmir, I would argue that we need to do more in Kashmir precisely for that reason. There is an emerging peace constituency in and on Kashmir which we cannot afford to lose. Reconciliatory strategies should be adopted now especially because much has changed in Kashmir, not just the number of causalities or infiltration of militants from across the broder: I have never understood the logic and civility behind measuring peace with the number of causalities. Consider this. Today’s context seems to be special and unprecedented for Kashmir as well as for New Delhi-Srinagar rapprochement. There is general agreement today that the ongoing peace process in Kashmir and between India and Pakistan and the results it has produced are there to stay despite the political turmoil in Pakistan and the uncertainty it has created for the Kashmir peace process. This confusion has not really adversely affected the peace process in and on Kashmir which seems to have taken a life of its own. This is because there is a new lease of hope among the people of J&K that peace and its fruits are not very far away. Contemporary politics in and on Kashmir is charecterised by two important and unprecedented features: one, the Pakistani leadership and most serious Kashmiri leaders have now gone back on their demand for altering the borders between the two countries; two, most of the leaders have now enunciated what they would like to achieve in terms of a settlement of the Kashmir issue. Responsible statecraft and clever strategic thinking, therefore, would require that New Delhi revives the now frozen process of peace in Kashmir making use of the twin advantages pointed out above before the assembly elections in J&K (later this year), parliamentary elections (next year) and continuation of uncertainty in Pakistan hamper the positive momentum for peace in J&K. How long should peace in Kashmir be sacrificed at the alter of electoral calculations and bilateral concerns?
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