Saturday, May 18, 2013

Pakistan Powershift


Will Nawaz Sharif better Indo-Pak ties?

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB


Will the third coming of Nawaz Sharif better or worsen the bilateral ties between India and Pakistan? Will the Nawaz regime in Pakistan make South Asia a tolerably inhabitable region? Political pundits are upbeat about the possibility of Indo-Pak relations normalizing under the new Pakistan government. More so, optimists are also, when analyzing the future of Indo-Pak ties, factoring in the heightened level of enthusiasm about the future of Pakistan in general. Contemporary Pakistan is indeed making history in many ways: democracy seems to be triumphing and taking roots in Pakistan radically altering the landscape of the country’s non-democratic political culture which is alien to democratic power transitions; political institutions seem to be functioning, finally; rule of law is making new strides and the all-powerful Army is becoming a neutral bystander, at least for now. More so, the PM designate of Pakistan has used every opportunity since the recent elections to signal India that he is willing to do business with it and mend their relations. 

But before we conclude or analysis on what the future has in store for Indo-Pak relations, let us do some quick history reading. When the PPP government under Asif Ali Zardari came to power in 2008, the mood was almost the same. It was then praised as the triumph of democracy and Zardari, on his part, clearly wanted to do business with India. Kashmir was relegated to the backburner and the two countries wanted to make peace with each other. And the Indians were only willing to play ball with Zardari. 

Lets go further back into history. Although the mood was not so upbeat about Indo-Pak relations when Musharraff took over the reigns of Pakistan in 1999, the initial hesitation on the Indian side to deal with a military dictator eventually disappeared and  Musharraff and Manmohan Singh steered the most successful peace process ever between the two sides. In other words, every government in Pakistan in the last one and half decades did decide to normalize relations with India even though much was not achieved on that count in the years that followed.

What does this history of dialogue-diplomacy tell us about Indo-Pak relations? To my mind, the fact that every new government in Islamabad tries to send positive signals to New Delhi and show willingness to make peace with India means a number of things. First of all, there is a great deal of public opinion within Pakistan about the urgent need to normalize relations with India. Hence the governments in Islamabad, wanting to cater to this popular perception, attempts to make peace with India even though it may not become successful in doing so eventually. Take the recent elections in Pakistan for instance. India hardly figured in the Pakistani elections speeches or campaign in general. If anything, political leaders publically argued for improving relations with India. This is not something that should surprise us, as this has been the case in Pakistan for sometime now. It is indeed a pity that the changing perceptions of India in Pakistan have not been fully utilized by Islamabad to better its relations with India. 

Secondly, upon assumption of power, every government in Islamabad eventually recognizes the need to make peace with India in its own interest. Continued confrontation with India is not in the best interests of any government in Islamabad especially given the state of Pakistan today. Possibility of economic cooperation with India is an added advantage in this regard. It is another story that the plans to better ties with India lose direction and political commitment in Islamabad when dealing with the daily dilemmas of governing Pakistan. Dealing with the religious rightwing is one such existential dilemma. No government in Pakistan can ignore them even they might want to do away with them. When the choice is between bettering ties with India and being able to continue in power, the establishment in Islamabad is often forced to give into the pressures of the India-hating religious fanatics. 

Thirdly, every government in Islamabad also recognizes that talking peace with India also adds to its normative reservoir especially when dealing with the international community. Given the enormous goodwill that the international community has for India and the latter’s role as an ‘emerging’ and ‘responsible’ power in the region, the international community expects Pakistan to settle its differences with India by, first of all, stopping the export of terrorism into India. When Pakistan does not do so, the international community considers it as irresponsible behavior. “Settle your differences with India in an amicable manner” is the routines advise that every government in Islamabad gets from the world capitals. Thus any Pakistani leadership would recognize that if it wants to be in the good books of the international community it would have to reach out to India, whether or not it is keenly interested in it.
 
In other words, structural and domestic conditions are indeed conducive for the improvement of Indo-Pak ties and yet things seem to go wrong between the two sides every now and then. Why? My earlier GK columns have dealt with most of my answers to these questions at length. I would like to flag just two of them. One, the Indian middle class is clearly disinterested in seeing a sustained dialogue with Pakistan. Their primary aim vis-à-vis Pakistan continues to be shaming the terrorism-infested neighbour. With no interest or pressure from the country’s influential classes, the government in New Delhi would not lose sleep over its volatile relations with Islamabad. Secondly, Pakistan’s false sense of pride prevents it from accepting the fact that its grand strategy to hurt India and wrest Kashmir has gone completely wrong. It does realize it, but is not yet willing to accept it and mend its ways.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, May 19, 2013. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/May/19/pakistan-powershift-8.asp)