After all Kashmiris have to think within the limits of achievability onflicts tend to go through certain phases, so do pro cesses of conflict resolution. Whether or not the stakeholders and observers like it, the phases of a conflict are linear, dynamic and irreversible. The road from conflict to reconciliation typically goes through initial romanticism, hard-line posturing and armed struggle to conflict fatigue, erosion of leadership and lessening popular support, and then to the setting in of realism and the willingness to negotiate with the opposition (unless and until the conflict itself benefits the stakeholders). Therein lies the difference between the ideal and the achievable. For the parties to the conflict, each of these various phases would call for different strategies: strategies usually used in the initial phase are inappropriate in the third phase. The political maturity and relevance of any party to the conflict lies as much in identifying the phase of the conflict as is in understanding what strategies to adopt during the various phases of the conflict. The story of Kashmir is no different. The conflict, say observers and most parties to the conflict alike, has now reached a defining point, a point of no return. The option in Kashmir is no more between independence or no independence, with India or with Pakistan, rather it is about identifying the optimum outcome for all the parties to the conflict. Most parties to the Kashmir conflict seem to have understood this point. Some who haven’t understood this moral and mood of the milieu continue to talk about winning a bloody war in Kashmir or becoming an independent nation, only to be cast away by the radical transformation that the region is currently going through. More importantly, positioning or repositioning one’s options according to the mood of the milieu and the nature of the conflict dictated by the respective phase of the conflict is no opportunism: that shows the prudence and fortitude of a responsible leader. So, what is that one element of wisdom that most of the responsible parties to the Kashmir conflict seem to have realized? From the elected leadership in India and Pakistan to the separatist leadership in J&K, most of them seem to have realized the need to surpass the borders in J&K in order to achieve peace. It is in this context that the set of proposals put forward by J&K People’s Conference needs to be looked at seriously and with an open mind. The very fact that People’s Conference Chairman Sajad Gani Lone talks about ‘achievable’ nationhood makes his argument a serious one, despite the flows it has. ‘Achievable Nationhood’ (title of the document) talks about shared sovereignty between India and J&K and Pakistan and PoK. The following are the most important aspects of this plan. First of all, Indian and Pakistani governments will have jurisdiction over defence, foreign affairs and currency in J&K and PoK respectively. Secondly, both sides of the J&K state (the erstwhile princely state) will have independent relationships with each other making it “a neutral, peace zone”. Thirdly, and very significantly, there will be a J & K Economic Union, Joint Immigration Control for Movement of Residents the whole state within the state, Joint Management of Natural Resources, and Sector Specific Cooperation, Coordination and Consultation. Finally, new institutions will be created to coordinate affairs among the four entities (India, Pakistan, J&K and PoK). ‘Achievable Nationhood’ has been criticized for a variety of reasons most important of them being its emphasis on ‘Muslim Kashmir’. While this regional and religious emphasis is not one of the document’s key assertions, the communal ‘after-politics’ of this otherwise serious document deserves to be criticized. That said, there are many compelling reasons why this document deserves critical acclaim which a lot of serious-minded experts are giving it already. First of all, Sajad Lone represents the new vision and courage that the Kashmiri leadership has started showing in bringing peace to Kashmir. His party’s courage in bringing out this document even as many other leaders in the valley are still unwilling to specify their preferred path to peace needs to be appreciated. Secondly, ‘Achievable Nationhood’ fits in well with the mood of the milieu and aspirations of a large section of the people of the erstwhile J&K state. At a juncture in history when the discussion is about inclusiveness, co-existence, and common destinies for the region, it would be out of place to talk about exclusivity, separation and carving out new states. When the statesmen of the region are busy strategizing how to surpass borders to chart out common destinies for their people, it would be no prudent politics to talk about creating new ones. Thirdly, ‘Achievable Nationhood’ not only links the critical gap between the ideal and the achievable, but also manages to chalk out definite proposals to achieve ‘what is achievable’. Finally, it is important to note that that one of the core arguments made by ‘Achievable Nationhood’ is in sync with article 370 of the Indian Constitution (that Indian Parliament’s legislative power over the State be restricted to three subjects - defence, external affairs and communications). Instead of communications, Sajad talks about currency. His idea of common institutions and joint mechanisms is another aspect that is gaining currency in the Kashmir discourse in the two countries. The emerging Kashmir politics and discourse is no more characterized or defined by outdated stances of irrelevant ideological imaginations, but by ideas that can travel the critical distance linking the achievable with the ideal. ‘Achievable Nationhood’ should be complimented for being the first committed separatist voice that is willing to take this road less traveled.
(Source: Greater Kashmir, February 20, 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=20_2_2008&ItemID=6&cat=11 )
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