STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB
To me, the key message that the J&K State Assembly election results announce is that the Kashmiris have overcome their fear of courting opposites, or apparent opposites. The politics of the state over the coming days will be marked by some interesting twists and turns. The people of Kashmir are learning to speak two contrasting languages at once: one of dissidence and anti-India sentiments, and the other of good governance and mainstream issues. Anyone therefore, who interprets the 2008 election result as the last nail in the coffin of separatist politics and azadi sentiments in J&K is mistaken. To reiterate an oft-repeated (yet essential) point, the overwhelming participation in the recent elections has been an expression of the popular desire for good governance in the state, not a verdict on the political problem that exists in Jammu and Kashmir. The politics of J&K will thus, in the days to come, be characterized by continued calls for the resolution of the Kashmir issue, and focused and detailed roadmaps for doing so, with increased support from a cross-section of actors. Srinagar-based separatists may be temporarily overshadowed and silenced in their demands for azadi (with its varying meanings), but they will bounce back to prominence sooner rather than later.
Mainstreaming of political dissent
The other important political implication of this election is that it has demonstrated a mainstreaming of Kashmir’s separatist politics, at least to some extent. Gone are the days when the Kashmiri separatists were an untouchable lot and azadi meant (at least in the popular parlance) total separation from the Indian Union. Today, separatist politics and azadi sentiments are more nuanced, more complex, and take many forms, ranging from the Hurriyat Conference to the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). In order to accurately interpret the internal politics of J&K, the entire spectrum of understandings and the blurred shades of opinion about azadi that exist between these two actors, must be correctly understood. The PDP would object to being called ‘pro-azadi’, ‘separatist’ or even ‘soft-separatist’, yet the fact remains that it walks a very fine line. While on one hand the self-rule proposal put forward by them is about more than what the constitution of India guarantees J&K and is closer to the platform proposed by self-proclaimed separatist leaders (such as Sajad Lone), on the other hand, the PDP has a political constituency that speaks the language of both separatism and azadi. This explains why the very same people who were shouting slogans against India two months ago decided to cast their votes in the recent elections. Their votes did not signal an acceptance, even a tacit one, of the situation in the region; but rather an extremely nuanced form of protest, and an extremely mature one.
What of the National Conference (NC), the ruling party of the state for the next six years? Has the Omar Abdullah-led NC spoken the language of self-rule and tried to address the azadi sentiment? Omar has made it clear that this election is about electing a government that can efficiently and successfully govern, in every sense of the word. It is not about resolving the Kashmir issue. In other words, in the new politics of J&K some of this staunchly pro-India party’s political positions will need to be viewed as catering to the pro-azadi sentiments, even if indirectly. The NC has, after all, traditionally held that New Delhi should give J&K greater autonomy as well as regional autonomy. Therefore, if the PDP and NC, to a lesser extent, are willing to negotiate their way through the maze of the ‘separatist politics of Kashmir’, this ‘separatist politics’ will soon start mainstreaming itself.
If this occurs, moderates such as Sajad Lone and even Mirwaiz Umar Farooq will be forced to reconsider their options about the kind of politics they will choose to engage in over the coming days. Do they desire to forever represent themselves as political dissidents, making dissent a career rather than merely a necessary sortie, or do they someday wish to transcend this somewhat inhibiting tag to enter into the newly-emerging ‘soft-separatist’ fold? To do so they will need to rethink their habitual positions about political processes in J&K and consider toning down their anti-India rhetoric. If they try this course of action, which I believe they are likely to, we will see the creation of a new political space in the state which will be populated by parties that ask for more political, administrative and financial concessions from New Delhi, and demand increased linkages with PAK. This ‘mainstreaming of political dissent’ will have implications for the Kashmir issue as we know it, as well as for relations between India and Pakistan in the longer term. Any attempts by New Delhi to ignore and undermine this dissident space will prove disastrous for J&K.
‘Good governance plus’
If the argument is that this election was about the desire for good governance in the state and not about resolution of the Kashmir issue per se, then the question remains as to what is really at the heart of the issue? If the Kashmir problem is not all about good governance, and the lack of it, it must inherently be about something much deeper. In other words, will the azadi sentiments in the state cease to exist if the elected government there ensures bijli, sadak, pani? Quite succinctly: No. The Kashmir issue is about more than merely good governance; it must be understood as a political problem. But can good governance go some way toward resolving the nagging political problems? Unfortunately ensuring bijli, sadak, pani will not resolve the political aspects under dispute here. Rather, there needs to evolve an all-embracing ‘good governance plus’ package that addresses both Kashmir’s material and its political troubles. This package must engage expansively with all the actors of this new ‘soft-separatist’ political fold, if it is to comprehensively address their various demands.
This election, therefore, also acts as a wake-up call for both the Valley-based dissidents as well as for the government of India. While the dissidents need to engage in some serious introspection over how to increase their relevance in these changing times and how to shed their anachronistic political rigidities, New Delhi must likewise devise some improved policies to effectively engage the new political forces and developments in the state. The status-quo option becomes increasingly archaic with every day that passes. It is time for change.
Source: Greater Kashmir, December 31, 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=31_12_2008&ItemID=23&cat=11
