Between Iran and the US

Between Iran and the US
Where lies the choice for India
STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB
Days of India fine-balancing between the United States and Iran are over: India has chosen the US over Iran. Despite the recent visit of the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to New Delhi and all the talks he and his delegation had in the national capital, a careful reading between the lines would make it clear that the UPA regime’s policies towards Iran will be dictated by its larger pro-US foreign policy shift. The visit of Iranian president to New Delhi on April 29 was watched with unprecedented interest by many foreign policy analysts. Many thought it would give a litmus test of the direction of India’s new foreign policy. This not-so-eventful visit was not to the liking of the US government which a week prior to his visit had asked India to tell Iran to meet the requirements of the UN Security Council on its nuclear programme. India was quick to respond with disapproval. Despite the strongly worded reply to the US, why was Ahmadinejad’s visit so uneventful? In order to understand this, we need to see the India-Iran-United States diplomatic conundrum in perspective. Making new allies and giving up old ones is part of clever statecraft, but doing so without adequate thought, wise consideration and a higher and better purpose is certainly not in the national interest of any country. UPA’s Iran policy is a case in point. India’s votes in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) against Iran in late 2005 and early 2006 were the turning point in the relations between the two countries. Indian-Iranian relations until then were smooth, beneficial and accommodative. The UPA government’s willingness to give in to Washington’s demands led India choose the US over Iran, a traditional ally of the country in the West Asian region. It would be imprudent to say that one should not engage the United States of America, the sole superpower of the day. A strategic partnership with the United States is desirable and important, but it is imprudent to put all foreign policy eggs in the US basket. The problem here is letting the superpower dictate the country’s foreign policy choices through the backdoor. Let us face it, one of the negative fallouts of the yet-to-be-signed Indo-US nuclear deal that many Indians have been so gung-ho about is the Hyde Act passed by the US Congress that requires India to cooperate with the US to isolate Iran. India’s contemporary relationship with Iran revolves around many considerations. First of all, there are the strategic aspects. For India, through Iran lies the road to Afghanistan and Central Asia and this access is important for economic and strategic reasons. During the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Iran and India along with Russia had extended credible support to the Northern Alliance which partly explains India’s influence in Afghanistan today. Even as India is seeking a transit route to Afghanistan and Central Asia through Pakistan, no one is under the illusion that this is going to materialise anytime soon. The emerging great power competition in the West Asian region is the other strategic aspect that India needs to keep in mind. The hydrocarbon resources, roots of religious extremism and its strategic location have made the region important and this has attracted a lot of competition in the region from the great powers: United States, Russia, China, India and others. While the Indian engagement in the region has been strong and multilateral, Iran, by all means, is a key partner in India’s West Asian strategy. Energy is another important consideration. India is a growing economy and would need large amounts of hydrocarbon resources for its growth. India signed a deal with Iran in 2005 for the annual supply of 5 million tons of liquefied natural gas which is scheduled to commence in 2009. Secondly, the talk of a “peace-pipeline” between the two countries through Pakistan has gone through a lot of ups and downs. There were a lot of hopes raised prior to the recent visit of the Iranian president that the pipeline might actually take off: it doesn’t look like it. Thirdly, at a time when the great powers are competing with each other to gain energy fields abroad, Indian companies were given the Farsi offshore block in the Persian Gulf by Iran. The issue of diplomatic tension between the two countries is Iran’s nuclear ambition. Does Iran have a right to develop nuclear weapons? Is it in India’s interests to let Iran develop nuclear weapons? Many argue that Iran should not make nuclear weapons because it has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and India repeats it. But has the Indian government forgotten that it has always considered the international non-proliferation regime to be uneven and called it nuclear apartheid? More importantly, how can a nuclear capable country tell another country that it does not have the right to develop nuclear weapons? You are talking morality and strategy in the same breath. You can not have both ways. Moreover, India is a secular country with a large Muslim population. It is necessary to have strong cultural and diplomatic ties with Islamic countries also to dispel the feeling that the Indian state has of late started promoting the Hindu nationalist ideology. Let us not forget the very vibrant relationship that India has had in the past with countries in the West Asian region especially Iran. Engaging the United States is necessary and important but defining one’s foreign policy choices and engagements on the basis of that relationship is foolhardily. Let us not be blind to the US strategy of making and breaking alliances as it pleases; there is the American diplomatic history that we can learn from.

(Source: Greater KAshmir, MAy 14, 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=14_5_2008&ItemID=16&cat=11 (