The Valley livens up

The Valley livens up

I
f normalcy is understood as pas-
sivity and calm then one might
say there is no semblance of
normalcy in the militancy-hit
state of Jammu and Kashmir.

However, if the state is today witnes...read more...

A Tale of Three Visits

STATE CRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB
Pranab Mukherjee’s visit to Pakistan.

Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s visit to Pakistan last week was a much needed one and should have been made much earlier. The high profile visit was badly timed and the visiting foreign minister was caught in the midst of Pakistan’s internal political uncertainty and didn’t know who he should talk to or rather who all he should talk to. The content, the format and the outcome of the meetings were modest but, one should admit, it was impossible to expect more radical outcomes under the political circumstances prevailing in Islamabad. The visit ended with both the countries signing an agreement to grant consular access to prisoners from either country held across the border. The other positive outcome of the visit was Pakistan’s statement that it wants to have a ‘grand reconciliation’ with India through dialogue to resolve all outstanding issues “with self-respect and dignity.” While the Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi who coined the term ‘grand reconciliation’ did not explain what it meant, this is one way of telling that India-Pakistan relations will not be held hostage to the issue of Jammu and Kashmir and that there needs to be a comprehensive approach to peaceful existence between the two countries – piecemeal approaches to peace are not desirable and would not work. The emphasis on “with self-respect and dignity” is also significant here as Pakistan is clearly hinting that a zero-sum end to conflicts between the two countries is unacceptable to Pakistan – it is not enough that conflicts should end but that Pakistan can not be seen as having lost out on its claims and interests. It is in this context that the Indian policy makers and security ‘think tanks’ have to keep in mind the fact that India can not make sustainable peace in the subcontinent by defeating Pakistan: peace between the two countries can only be sustainable by accommodating each other. The much talked about Iran-Pakistan-India ‘peace pipeline’ also found reference in the Pakistan Prime Minister’s statement wherein he suggested that two countries are committed to take it forward. The importance of the visit has to be seen in the context of the recent statements by Pakistan on Kashmir and the increase in cross border infiltration and the bomb attacks in Jaipur. If India were to respond to Pakistan Prime Minister’s statement that whatever has been achieved by Manmohan Singh and Musharraf for J&K is “half-baked”, the talks would have failed and the peace process stalled. In other words, India could have sounded jingoistic and lost the peace process. Fortunately, better sense prevailed and the peace process is safe. One only hopes that the peace process goes ahead full steam and regains its lost momentum as and when political certainty returns to Pakistan.

Presidential visit to Kashmir

President Pratibha Patil’s five day visit to Kashmir, still in the process as I write this, and concluded by the time it appears in print, has already attracted a lot of criticism though not for any political reasons. The President has been criticized for brandishing an AK-47 - apparently captured by the troops from the militants – which critics find aggressive, amusing and not befitting the stature of the President in a conflict ridden state. That said, the visit is to be seen as part of New Delhi’s attempts to give increased political attention to J&K and the state’s problems. The president has claimed that “New Delhi and State governments are making all efforts to put Jammu and Kashmir on the fast track of development and progress”. One doesn’t distrust that. New Delhi is arguably giving more attention to the state of Jammu and Kashmir than any other state in the federation: no arguments with that. But there seems to be an apparent lack of well thought-out political strategies and policies for the state. The economic and developmental measures, well-meaning they may be, lack a consistent and logical political vision for the state. In other words, New Delhi’s Kashmir policies seem to be designed and executed in ‘fits and starts’ with no grand vision for political reconciliation behind it. More importantly, wise statecraft demands that if you do something, you should be seen as doing it with commitment and a vision behind it.

Concert for Peace

The third important visit of the week was by the Pakistani Junoon rock band to Kashmir. The famous Pakistani band came to the Dal Lake with a message – a message of peace, reconciliation and change. Cultural CBMs like this is will go a long way in bringing peace not just to Kashmir but to the two countries as well. Junoon’s lead singer Salman Ahmad’s words to an excited audience on the banks of the Dal Lake were symbolic of the changing times and moods of the common man in the state: “We are all one. Beware of the people who divide”. How long will the two countries be able to resist and discard the surge of emotions that the bonds of culture, music and films can evoke in the minds of ordinary citizens in the two countries? The two governments can not stop this spontaneous outpouring of emotions by the people who they represent. The earlier we realize this the better it is for our countries and our societies.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, May 28. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=28_5_2008&ItemID=30&cat=11 )

Impact of HIV/AIDS on Governance in Manipur and Nagaland

The paper is the product of a six-month study that I completed early this year. The study was aimed at understanding the linkages between HIV/AIDS and governance in India's militancy hit north east region. The paper was commissioned and published by AIDS, Security and Conflict Initiative (ASCI – www.asci.ssrc.org), a joint programme of Social Science Research Council (SSRC), New York and the Netherlands Institute of International Relations.

Introduction
Northeast India is to the rest of India what Africa is to the World – far away and forgotten. Both in the cases of Africa and the Northeast, inhabitants of the ‘core’ witness these peripheral regions sliding into underdevelopment, uncertainty and anarchy. Since nothing much can be done to save them, safeguard the status-quo, they believe, so that things don’t go out of control.[1] While it may be comparing the incomparable, the message is loud and clear that parts of Northeast India is close to near total collapse – from the points of view of governance, law and order, and development - and still the government policies have not gone beyond ad hoc measures aimed at maintaining the status-quo. Even as the governability of the state and governance therein are severely damaged, the powerful parties - the Central government, state governments, politicians, the many Underground Organisations (UGs) and the narcotics mafia - seem safe in their comfort zones.

The objective of this study is to assess the impact that HIV/AIDS has had on governance in Nagaland and Manipur. More specifically, the questions that this study seeks to answers for are the following:

- What has been the impact of the disease on the health and education sectors of the two states under study?
- What has been the impact of the disease on elected bodies of the local and regional government structures?
- What has been the impact of HIV/AIDS on the local police and the military in Nagaland and Manipur?

The study has, as the questions above reveal, focused on four aspects of governance: law enforcement, education, health, and democratic processes. These aspects of a state, the study argues, are indicative of the state of governance there. Therefore, if these aspects are adversely affected by HIV/AIDS, the state’s ability to deliver governance to people can be understood to be severely affected, this study argues. In other words, a state’s ability to carry out its governance related functions will be seriously hampered if the above mentioned four sectors of a government are severely affected by HIV/AIDS.

Additionally, the study also considers that legitimacy of the state among the population, violent rivalries among the various ethnic groups in the state and nexus between parts of the state apparatus and criminal gangs can additionally weaken the state. But does HIV/AIDS have anything to do with these? Not directly. However, the disease and its impact are aggravated due to these very factors. Armed insurgency, narcotics trade, corruption, underdevelopment, nexus between Underground Organizations (UGs) and the political/bureaucratic elite can act as force multipliers in a situation wherein HIV/AIDS is rapidly weakening the governance apparatus of the state.
[1] In an interview with the author the Deputy Commissioner of the Churchandpur District, Manipur, Mr. Sumant Singh pointed out, “The administration is fighting to maintain status-quo. Where are the machinery, time and money for other initiatives like combating HIV/AIDS?”

** The complete reportcan be accessed at: http://asci.researchhub.ssrc.org/impact-of-hiv-aids-on-governance-in-manipur-and-nagaland/attachment

What happened to the Peace Process?

Kashmiris are not new to peace processes: it comes and goes like the tourists do in the valley. It is often difficult to keep track of the many peace processes we have had so far. Peace processes in Kashmir can be described as piecemeal approaches bereft of any grand political vision for peace. The latest one too started off with a lot of fanfare and symbolism. But what has happened to it? Has the establishment in Delhi and the various tack-two ‘walas’ forgotten about the frozen valley? Whatever happened to all those Round Table (RT) reports and the various recommendations therein? Have they also been put away in to the dustbins of Kashmiri history like many other reports, recommendations and rhetoric ( a la ‘sky is the limit’ promise by Narasimha Rao) of this kind? No one seems to have any answers. That said, this seems to be nothing new but in line with the same old Indian strategy on Kashmir that it has practiced over the last many years. Approach Kashmir and the politics there with a feudal mindset: hold talks, meetings and conferences in fits and starts. New Delhi starts the dialogue process when it feels like, it invites participants it feels like, it holds such meetings at an interval that is suitable to it, and unilaterally sets the agenda that it is comfortable with. Then the grand finale takes place with some dignitary releasing the reports etc. Sadly then, the meetings, participants, agenda and the recommendations are all forgotten even before one is able to gauge what is happening. This is followed by a long sarkari silence on the issue, like the present one, before dissidents, militants and ‘external pressures’ force the government to start the process all over again. The process begins, but it’s altogether a new process. The bureaucrats, politicians and the intelligence walas have all forgotten what happened up until now: it’s now about forgetting and forgiving whatever has happened and looking at the future, they will tell you. The above description perhaps best suits the off-and-on peace process that New Delhi has undertaken vis-à-vis the Kashmir issue. One would argue that the political turmoil (first the woes of Pervez Musharraf and then the assassination of Benazir Bhutto) in Pakistan has compelled the government of India to go slow on the peace process and the reports produced by the working groups. But of the five working groups (CBMs, Cross-LoC relations, Economic Development, Governance and, Centre-State relations) just one concerns Pakistan, the one on Cross-LoC relations. The other groups and their recommendations are about New Delhi and Srinagar. New Delhi does not need to get a go-ahead from Islamabad to talk to its own citizens in J&K. More importantly, let us be clear about the fact that the Kashmir issue is not one between India and Pakistan, it is about New Delhi and J&K, even as it is possible to argue that India is giving the attention that it does to Kashmir only because of the Pakistan dimension. A cursory glance at New Delhi’s attitude towards Northeast would make that amply clear. Here lies the critical and alarming distance between those who govern and those who are governed. Problems in Jammu and Kashmir are as much (or more) internal as much (or lees) they are external. Let us not befool ourselves by claiming that the problems in Kashmir are merely due to Pakistan. New Delhi’s feudal policies are as much part of the problem: Pakistan only took advantage of our follies. If one accepts that historical fact, then it also needs to be accepted that the solution should first of all be worked out between New Delhi and the people of Jammu and Kashmir. For that, we do not need to wait for things to settle down in Pakistan: that is neither clever strategy nor responsible statecraft. If one says that since the India-Pakistan dialogue on Kashmir is put on the backburner, we can not do much with Kashmir, I would argue that we need to do more in Kashmir precisely for that reason. There is an emerging peace constituency in and on Kashmir which we cannot afford to lose. Reconciliatory strategies should be adopted now especially because much has changed in Kashmir, not just the number of causalities or infiltration of militants from across the broder: I have never understood the logic and civility behind measuring peace with the number of causalities. Consider this. Today’s context seems to be special and unprecedented for Kashmir as well as for New Delhi-Srinagar rapprochement. There is general agreement today that the ongoing peace process in Kashmir and between India and Pakistan and the results it has produced are there to stay despite the political turmoil in Pakistan and the uncertainty it has created for the Kashmir peace process. This confusion has not really adversely affected the peace process in and on Kashmir which seems to have taken a life of its own. This is because there is a new lease of hope among the people of J&K that peace and its fruits are not very far away. Contemporary politics in and on Kashmir is charecterised by two important and unprecedented features: one, the Pakistani leadership and most serious Kashmiri leaders have now gone back on their demand for altering the borders between the two countries; two, most of the leaders have now enunciated what they would like to achieve in terms of a settlement of the Kashmir issue. Responsible statecraft and clever strategic thinking, therefore, would require that New Delhi revives the now frozen process of peace in Kashmir making use of the twin advantages pointed out above before the assembly elections in J&K (later this year), parliamentary elections (next year) and continuation of uncertainty in Pakistan hamper the positive momentum for peace in J&K. How long should peace in Kashmir be sacrificed at the alter of electoral calculations and bilateral concerns?

Kashmir resolution: Do we have a consensus?

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB
One of the major reasons, among a host of many others, why we are unable to resolve the Jammu and Kashmir conflict is because there are too many plans, proposals, formulas and ‘solutions’ put forward for its resolution. This multiplicity of proposals is explained by the fact that there isn’t just one conflict in Kashmir: there are many conflicts within the one conflict in J&K. The important question, however, is that while we have scores of proposals for resolution, do we have some sort of consensus among them? Not yet, or perhaps we haven’t done enough exercise in building one. Precisely because there are many actors and players in J&K with divergent views and stakes, politics and proposals, it is impossible to accept one of them as the ‘mater plan’ to resolve the Kashmir conflict, however good, sensible and accommodative that one plan may be. Accepting one proposal over the others will only further vitiate the political atmosphere, let alone contribute towards resolving it. If we are not waiting for a ‘master proposal’ to come down to us, what the different stakeholders in J&K need to logically do is to create a consensual roadmap from among the existing proposals. Creation of such a consensual document may ideally go through the following phases: 1) look for commonalities and differences in the existing proposals; 2) devise a mechanism/fora for discussing and resolving the outstanding differences, and; 3) propose to implement the most common denominators among the them. This is oversimplification, some might argue. But complicated processes of conflict resolution have to pass through various stages of simplifying the issues at hand so that the general public and even the actors themselves understand what the others are talking about and how to start negotiating with them. While identifying the commonalities is extremely important, no less important is understanding the differences among them. There are and will be differences. Obvious differences and contradictory positions should not stop us from understanding the significance and import of flushing out the common themes running through the various proposals for therein lies the solution for many ills of the state. But which are those important proposals we are talking about here? The most important ones that one might want to consider are: 1) JKLF Roadmap for J&K, 2) Musharraff Proposals, 3) Article 370 of the Indian Constitution and the Delhi Agreement, 4) KSG Proposals, 5) The United States of Kashmir Proposal by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, 6) Peoples Democratic Party proposal, 7) People’s Conference (Sajad Lone) proposal, 8) J&K State Autonomy Committee Report (National Conference), 9) Balwaristan National Front proposal, and 10) Manmohan Singh’s ideas. And what are those commonalities? As a starting point, I would like to point out five common themes among them for further discussion. The most important theme running through all of these proposals is the issue of Self-Rule and autonomy. While some of the proposals delve at length into these two related yet different issues, some do not. But all of these proposals do realize the need to give greater autonomy short of independence to Jammu and Kashmir (except perhaps in the case of JKLF which demands no less than complete independence). The other key agreement among these proposals is that all of them realize the need for cross-border mechanisms for deliberating, consulting and deciding on a variety of issues concerning both sides of J&K. Even as there has been a heated debate on the issue of joint management of resources and certain mutually agreed upon sectors of governance and what it entails among other things (whether this means joint control or joint management etc.), what is pertinent to note is that the key stakeholders have realized that this is one possible way ahead in a world that is quickly going past the confines of borders not just for peace but also for benefits of a great variety. Interestingly, let us remember that both Manmohan Singh and Pervez Musharraf apart from Sajad Lone, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and PDP have endorsed this idea. Despite such huge high-level support for this proposal, this truly great idea is lies mired in obscure details. The third important, if not entirely common, factor in these proposals is the emphasis given to sub-regional problems and aspirations. Valley politics and discourse, by default or design, tends to dominate over most other pressing problems in the whole of J&K state, including on the Pakistani side of the border: issues relating to Jammu and Kashmir have come to identify solely with what happens in the Kashmir valley. It is necessary, therefore, to address and attend to such regional aspirations and problems be it regional autonomy, highlighting their differences with the valley or addressing governance related issues in the peripheral regions. The fourth issue addressed by most of these proposals is also the much debated issue of demilitarization in J&K. While many actors are chary of addressing the issue, some have looked at it openly with a willingness to discuss it. Despite the differences in this regard due to its politico-strategic sensitivity, there seems to be some agreement on phased demilitarization. Demilitarization when adequately phased and timed well with a reduction in terrorist violence, even the hawks within the government of India would be fine with it. Another equally important common factor seems to be the need to accord the state a lot more autonomy regarding financial matters, recruitments into civil services etc. While much of this is easy to do, this involves a great deal of trust and flexibility apart from political will from the part of the government in Delhi. Implementing the common themes pointed out above would require a lot of political will, courage, wisdom, flexibility and deliberations. The primary responsibility in this regard lies with the separatist leadership who has to think together to put up a common set of demands for J&K. Let us not forget that it is easy to rule when the opposition is divided. New Delhi would also need to bring itself to accept the need to think out of the box on Jammu and Kashmir.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, February 6, 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=6_2_2008&ItemID=6&cat=11)

The Ideal versus the Achievable

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

After all Kashmiris have to think within the limits of achievability onflicts tend to go through certain phases, so do pro cesses of conflict resolution. Whether or not the stakeholders and observers like it, the phases of a conflict are linear, dynamic and irreversible. The road from conflict to reconciliation typically goes through initial romanticism, hard-line posturing and armed struggle to conflict fatigue, erosion of leadership and lessening popular support, and then to the setting in of realism and the willingness to negotiate with the opposition (unless and until the conflict itself benefits the stakeholders). Therein lies the difference between the ideal and the achievable. For the parties to the conflict, each of these various phases would call for different strategies: strategies usually used in the initial phase are inappropriate in the third phase. The political maturity and relevance of any party to the conflict lies as much in identifying the phase of the conflict as is in understanding what strategies to adopt during the various phases of the conflict. The story of Kashmir is no different. The conflict, say observers and most parties to the conflict alike, has now reached a defining point, a point of no return. The option in Kashmir is no more between independence or no independence, with India or with Pakistan, rather it is about identifying the optimum outcome for all the parties to the conflict. Most parties to the Kashmir conflict seem to have understood this point. Some who haven’t understood this moral and mood of the milieu continue to talk about winning a bloody war in Kashmir or becoming an independent nation, only to be cast away by the radical transformation that the region is currently going through. More importantly, positioning or repositioning one’s options according to the mood of the milieu and the nature of the conflict dictated by the respective phase of the conflict is no opportunism: that shows the prudence and fortitude of a responsible leader. So, what is that one element of wisdom that most of the responsible parties to the Kashmir conflict seem to have realized? From the elected leadership in India and Pakistan to the separatist leadership in J&K, most of them seem to have realized the need to surpass the borders in J&K in order to achieve peace. It is in this context that the set of proposals put forward by J&K People’s Conference needs to be looked at seriously and with an open mind. The very fact that People’s Conference Chairman Sajad Gani Lone talks about ‘achievable’ nationhood makes his argument a serious one, despite the flows it has. ‘Achievable Nationhood’ (title of the document) talks about shared sovereignty between India and J&K and Pakistan and PoK. The following are the most important aspects of this plan. First of all, Indian and Pakistani governments will have jurisdiction over defence, foreign affairs and currency in J&K and PoK respectively. Secondly, both sides of the J&K state (the erstwhile princely state) will have independent relationships with each other making it “a neutral, peace zone”. Thirdly, and very significantly, there will be a J & K Economic Union, Joint Immigration Control for Movement of Residents the whole state within the state, Joint Management of Natural Resources, and Sector Specific Cooperation, Coordination and Consultation. Finally, new institutions will be created to coordinate affairs among the four entities (India, Pakistan, J&K and PoK). ‘Achievable Nationhood’ has been criticized for a variety of reasons most important of them being its emphasis on ‘Muslim Kashmir’. While this regional and religious emphasis is not one of the document’s key assertions, the communal ‘after-politics’ of this otherwise serious document deserves to be criticized. That said, there are many compelling reasons why this document deserves critical acclaim which a lot of serious-minded experts are giving it already. First of all, Sajad Lone represents the new vision and courage that the Kashmiri leadership has started showing in bringing peace to Kashmir. His party’s courage in bringing out this document even as many other leaders in the valley are still unwilling to specify their preferred path to peace needs to be appreciated. Secondly, ‘Achievable Nationhood’ fits in well with the mood of the milieu and aspirations of a large section of the people of the erstwhile J&K state. At a juncture in history when the discussion is about inclusiveness, co-existence, and common destinies for the region, it would be out of place to talk about exclusivity, separation and carving out new states. When the statesmen of the region are busy strategizing how to surpass borders to chart out common destinies for their people, it would be no prudent politics to talk about creating new ones. Thirdly, ‘Achievable Nationhood’ not only links the critical gap between the ideal and the achievable, but also manages to chalk out definite proposals to achieve ‘what is achievable’. Finally, it is important to note that that one of the core arguments made by ‘Achievable Nationhood’ is in sync with article 370 of the Indian Constitution (that Indian Parliament’s legislative power over the State be restricted to three subjects - defence, external affairs and communications). Instead of communications, Sajad talks about currency. His idea of common institutions and joint mechanisms is another aspect that is gaining currency in the Kashmir discourse in the two countries. The emerging Kashmir politics and discourse is no more characterized or defined by outdated stances of irrelevant ideological imaginations, but by ideas that can travel the critical distance linking the achievable with the ideal. ‘Achievable Nationhood’ should be complimented for being the first committed separatist voice that is willing to take this road less traveled.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, February 20, 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=20_2_2008&ItemID=6&cat=11 )

India Needs a New Regional Grand Strategy

Foreign policy making in ‘New Delhi’ has often been accused of being rooted in mere ad hocism, and bereft of any clear strategic thinking. Lack of political cohesion and will, bureaucratic inertia and institutional problems have often been held responsible for this. Even as it is possible to identify and define some strands of strategic thinking running through post-independent India’s foreign policy formation, they are more of an exception than a pattern. India’s policies towards Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan and Afghanistan (strategy towards northwest) have often been ill-conceived, ill-timed and ill-managed. Can India make good its past mistakes and tread a new path of foreign policy formation towards its northwest? Does its leadership have the statesmanship and willingness to tread this path less traveled? It is crystal clear to even the most cursory observer of the North Western region of India that it is at a historic juncture and is undergoing unprecedented geopolitical transformations. The region could go either way: it could either become the epicenter of peace or that of conflict. In other words, a historic moment in making peace in the region has presented itself before us: if we miss it this time, we miss peace in the region for long years to come. The good news, however, is that there seems to be elements of a new grand strategy formation in India towards the region which of course needs a lot more refinement, political will, articulation, consistency and wisdom. What should the major pillars of this nascent grand strategy formation in India towards the northwestern region? Such a strategy should, ideally, comprise the following four pillars. Economic interdependence should be the primary pillar of this strategy. Even as I am no die-hard believer in the neo-liberal peace thesis, the theory has some significance for the new politics of the region. Trade to avoid wars, and let your enemies have stakes in your existence so that economic interdependence leads to security spillovers. Between the two sides of J&K, India and Pakistan and Afghanistan, regional trade linkages and stakes should be promoted and built. The bold and unprecedented move by the J&K Bank to propose to open branches in Pakistan should be considered to be just a forerunner to a long list of things to follow. Secondly, it is important that India takes the initiative to build on the already existing regional efforts at connectivity and linkages such as reinventing the Silk Route to revive the ancient trade links and access to the Central Asian region, actively promote the proposed Asian Highway network, pursue access to Afghanistan and to Central Asia through Pakistan apart from being steadfast in the efforts to promote more linkages between India and Pakistan. This also brings up the concept of ‘cultural and religious’ Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). CBMs in the South Asian context have almost always been ‘non-Asian’ in its essence and approach. One of the reasons why many standard and archetypical confidence building initiatives by the governments and other non-governmental organisations in the region have not produced the desired results so far is because such initiatives, as a rule, are conceptualized, designed and implemented in a ‘non-South Asian’ manner, that is, without taking into the regional realities of South Asia into consideration. CBMs shouldn’t merely consist of hotlines, flag meetings, and early warnings but should reflect the religious and cultural ethos and realities of the region be it Punjabiyat, Kashmiriyat, Islam or Hinduism. Thirdly, India should ‘assist’ (however like a ‘regional big brother’ it may sound) Pakistan catch up with democracy and help it realize the vision of its founding father Mohammad Ali Jinnah to create a modern, tolerant and democratic Pakistan. Pakistan today is finding itself at the receiving end of a flawed grand strategy, and is in a desperate need to resurrect itself from this situation of near total collapse. Any effort by India to make use of this situation by pushing Pakistan further into chaos will do no good for regional security and for future India-Pakistan relations. On the contrary, if Indian policy makers can have the sensibility and statesmanship to stand by Pakistan its search for democracy and peace like a good neighbour, the strategic dividends of such an approach would be far reaching. Policy makers in New Delhi should not miss the woods for the trees. Finally, all the policy initiatives pointed put above depend upon a key regional grand strategic approach that India needs to adopt: strategic altruism. India should be willing to show a high level of ‘enlightened and self-interested strategic altruism’ in its dealings with its neighbors. But why India of all the countries in the region? Has India not been a target of hatred and violence for such a long time? So why bother when other countries are in trouble? First of all, whether or not India intends to be the regional hegemon, India is the preponderant power in the region by default and that has traditionally instilled fear, suspicion and even hatred in the minds of its neighbors. India should make use of this opportunity to dispel such fears and demonstrate to its neighbors that it is a well-meaning country. More importantly, it is in India’s interest to invest in peace in the region. India’s internal stability, rise to great power status and economic growth depend a great deal in stable peace in the region.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, March 5, 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=5_3_2008&ItemID=8&cat=11 )