James Bonds of India and Pakistan

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

The story of India-Pakistan relations can be narrated as a series of incidents, accidents and unfortunate events and their intended or unintended consequences. The normalization process that was taking place between the two sides came to a grinding halt when a number of Indian and Pakistani soldiers were killed by each other along the Line of Control in January this year. Neither Islamabad nor New Delhi planned the LoC incident nor did they want its consequences to thwart the dialogue process. Relations between the two neighbours have since been cold but cordial. Both the capitals were indeed awaiting the election results in Pakistan to rejig their diplomatic toolboxes to restart diplomatic negotiations, till of course the recent frenzy over Sarabjit Singh’s killing begun. 

Impact on Indo-Pak relations
The killing of Indian prisoner Sarabjit Singh in a Lahore Prison and the murderous attack on a Pakistani prisoner, Sanaullah Ranjay, in a Jammu prison, clearly in retaliation, are unlikely to derail the India-Pakistan peace process - only because there is none to be derailed. What the two countries have at the moment is a politically dispirited and diplomatically unpersuasive set of reluctant engagements. That, in a sense, is the good news. The bad news is that this nationalistic hysteria and media frenzy created by these two attacks, mostly in India and much less in Pakistan thanks to the election fever there, will further weaken the already feeble faith that a lot of Indians and Pakistanis have in a peace process. It will highlight the already prevalent feeling that no improvement is possible between the two countries. Status quo ante will be the default wisdom for the two countries in managing their relations in the near future. If stray incidents and unfortunate developments can derail a well-designed dialogue process, why invest so much in such accident-prone processes in the first place? 

Own up your people
India and Pakistan go to absurd levels to achieve deniability about what they do to each other. On this count, Pakistan clearly outsmarts India. During the height of the Kargil war, Pakistan, to the dismay and shock of many well-meaning Pakistani themselves, refused to own up that their soldiers were fighting and dying in hundreds in the killing fields of Kargil as they did when the Pakistani regulars stormed into Kashmir in the guise of Pathan tribals in October 1947. When Surjeet Singh was released from a Pakistani jail in 2012 after 30 years, he came back to India and publically announced: “I was a RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) agent. No one bothered about me after I got arrested. Don't ask me too much...” While in Pakistan, he had claimed, as was to be expected, that he had strayed into Pakistan by mistake. By most accounts, Sarabjeet Singh was also an Indian spy who did what he did in Pakistan. Going by the Indian accounts, Sanaullah Ranjay, who is currently battling for life in Chandigarh hospital, was operating in J&K at the behest of Pakistan based organisations. 

Covertly operating on foreign soil, let us face it, is something that most countries engage in. There is nothing abnormal or new about it even as it could be seen as unacceptable. What is sad about these cases is that both the countries refuse to recognize that they engage in spying on each other and by implication refuse to demand for the release of their operatives from each other’s jails. There must be an honorable ay of dealing with this problem. During the Cold war, the Americans and Soviets had large numbers of spies in each other soil. However, unlike India and Pakistan, they often actively campaigned to secure the release of their agents, mostly through backchannel negotiations and quid-pro-quo offers: sometimes the acknowledgement was indeed public.   

The Central and Punjab governments have now promised financial and other forms of compensation for Sarabjit’s family. If Sarabjit was not working for the government agencies, what makes his family eligible for any compensation? Is it because he was killed in a Pakistani jail? Why would the Indian government award such huge compensation when a common Indian man gets killed in a Pakistan jail? Indeed, the incident has invited a comment even from an otherwise silent Prime Minister who said: “The criminals responsible for the barbaric and murderous attack on him must be brought to justice”. The Indian media, even it huffs and puffs about Sarabjit’s killing, refuses to talk about him being a spy! It is difficult to imagine that the Central and state governments in India are compensating Sarabjit just because he was killed in a Pakistan prison. 

Instead of merely throwing money at his family, government of India should have the guts to acknowledge that he worked for an Indian agency. Indeed, both India and Pakistan should engage each other in a purposeful manner with regard to the release of their operatives languishing in each other’s prisons. 

Indo-Pak Judicial Committee on Prisoners
According to a government of India statement, “there are 535 Indian prisoners (including 483 fishermen) in Pakistani jails and a total of 272 Pakistani prisoners in Indian jails”. The Indo-Pak Judicial Committee on Prisoners, established in 2007, has managed to do some good work in the last few years in securing release of prisoners held in each other’s jails. There is an urgent need to reinvigorate this committee, and the governments on both sides should further strengthen the committee so that at least those prisoners who have completed their sentences and are eagerly awaiting their release should be allowed to go to their respective countries.  

(SOurce: Greater Kashmir, May 5, 2013. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/May/5/james-bonds-of-india-and-pakistan-6.asp )

Procrastination as grand strategy

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

There is something about us as a nation that makes our officials, politicians, and strategic thinkers unwilling to take decisions on major issues of national importance. Be it resolving conflicts, reforming the judiciary or the police force, restructuring the country’s civil services or making well thought out long-term strategies for defending and securing the country. When Pakistan watchers tell me that Pakistan’s grand strategy vis-à-vis India in Kashmir has gone completely wrong, I tell them, in jest, that India’s grand strategy can never go wrong because it simply does not have one. I increasingly realize that there is more than humour in such an argument – we as a country are simply unwilling to take major decisions. Procrastination seems to be the organizing logic of our national grand strategy. But why? 

Before I attempt to understand why, let me look at a few cases. My colleague at JNU, Rajesh Rajagopalan has argued, in his research work on insurgencies in India, that “The Indian state has always seen counter-insurgency as a political rather than a military problem, and it has insisted that the Indian Army accept it as such”. However, even as Rajagopalan focuses on India’s emphasis on the political nature of the solution, he highlights the importance of the time factor: “it is clear from the Indian experience that patience and a long-term perspective are essential attitudinal requirements in fighting counter-insurgency campaigns. What is not so clear is whether New Delhi chose patience from foresight, or whether it simply preferred to ignore difficult situations until, with the fullness of time, they resolved themselves.” I tend to broadly agree with the argument that Rajagopalan makes.

What is interesting to note here is that while the Indian state clearly understands that the solution for resolving insurgencies has to be political and not military, they are still unwilling to make those political concessions to end insurgencies. They, as Rajagopalan puts it, wait for it to resolve themselves in the fullness of time. To my mind, this is a classic case of procrastination, unwilling to take steps to resolve issues even when opportunities present themselves to do so. 

Kashmir, for instance, was ripe for resolution during the 2004-2008 peace process between India and Pakistan: New Delhi developed cold feet by early 2007 for no substantive reason and postponed the decision to finalise the deal on Kashmir with Pakistan, after having drawn up a historic deal, according to insiders’ accounts. In 2010, during the height of the uprising in Kashmir, New Delhi appointed a team of interlocutors who produced an exhaustive report which produced an array of recommendations for resolving the Kashmir issue: the government has since been silent about the report. The Government of India, at the initiative or the Prime Minister, organised a series of Round Table conferences on Kashmir during 2006-2007 and five working groups were formed to look into the various aspects of a resolution of the Kashmir issue: reports have been submitted to the government, but no action taken. 
These were indeed many excellent opportunities for resolving the Kashmir issue and yet no action was taken beyond merely initiating half-baked ‘political steps’ towards the resolution of the country’s most intractable insurgency. Today, faced with impending political uncertainty due to elections in India, Pakistan and Kashmir, and increasing instability in the region thanks to the US-NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan beginning 2014 Indian policy makers are reduced to crystal gazing to understand what might happen to Kashmir in the days to come. 

I do agree that dialogue and political reconciliation lay at the heart of the Indian state’s approach to conflict resolution and problem solving. India’s political culture and its national security policies, despite a large number of aberrations and shortcomings, still exhibit a certain tolerance of diversity and difference, non-violent approaches to dealing with social unrest and a celebration of political debates and disputations on deeply contested issues. That is certainly welcome and should be preserved. In other words, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the Indian state is likely to deal with most problems politically and non-violently. 

Why then do we see such appallingly numerous instances of human rights violations and political unwillingness to resolve political issues around the country especially in Kashmir? Even if the argument is true that at the end of the day the Indian state will resolve political problems politically, why does it take a violent, intolerant and muddled road to that destination? One explanation could be that the government is too busy managing too many day to day problems, and in a huge country like India there are far too many problems and hence it has no time to resolve deeply contested political issues. But that is an excuse, not an explanation. 

I am persuaded to accept a slightly more long-winding explanation. Clearly, as pointed out above, when dealing with problems such as insurgencies, Indian government’s efforts are marked by extreme levels of procrastination in deciding to negotiate a political resolution to resolve the conflict. During this period there is hardly any willingness on the part of the political or bureaucratic elite to take steps to resolve the conflict as creative, out of the box solutions to political problems are systemically disincentivised in our country. If that is the case, how can one make the argument that the insurgencies usually end with the implementation of a political solution? I would argue (and Rajagopalan indirectly refers to it in his writings) that the belief in the need to resolve conflicts using political strategies do not seem to operate at the conscious level of the political and bureaucratic leadership. The willingness to opt for political resolution of insurgencies comes from the country’s political and strategic cultures. Since this operates at the subconscious level, making it the default culturally acceptable solution, this can’t be termed as a strategy: it can at best be referred to as a product of deeply held political and strategic beliefs.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 28 APril, 2013. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Apr/28/procrastination-as-grand-strategy-11.asp )

BMD and South Asian strategic stability

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

he logic of nuclear deterrence, at its simplest form, argues that the possession of nuclear weapons by a country would deter its adversary from using a nuclear weapon against it and if the use of nuclear weapons, the most destructive weapons by far, makes no sense when both the adversaries are nuclear armed, the use of conventional weapons makes even less sense. In other words, possession of nuclear weapons is likely to keep a country safe from enemy attacks. A related understanding with regard to nuclear deterrence is that it is premised on a certain level of mutual vulnerability. That is, for nuclear deterrence to continue to exist, the nuclear weapon countries should not try and become invulnerable to the nuclear weapon capability of the adversary. In other words, if India and Pakistan have to continue in a relationship of nuclear deterrence, there should be no attempt by India or Pakistan to build mechanisms to ensure that the other’s nuclear weapons do not land on its territory. Any attempt to do so by either country will not only destroy nuclear deterrence in South Asia but also ensue an arms race that would go far beyond the level, scope and scale of nuclear weapons themselves. 

India’s proposed BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) programme is in a sense doing precisely that – trying to make Pakistani nuclear weapons ineffective against India. Still at the most initial level (even the United States of America has not been able to develop a fool-proof BMD system despite many decades of efforts), the proponents of the Indian BMD programme claim to have developed the capability to protect two Indian cities against incoming Pakistani nuclear-tipped ballistic (not cruise though) missiles. Let alone the fact that the BMD technology is still and unproven one, what is even more worrying is that India’s BMD developments are spearheaded by its defense scientific establishment, not by the civilian political establishment. 

In a report titled as “Government baffled over DRDO chief’s claim on missile shield”, the India Today wrote sometime ago: “The government of India has been baffled by DRDO chief V.K. Saraswat’s repeated claims that a ballistic missile shield is ready for deployment, and that two locations, presumably New Delhi and Mumbai, will be the first recipients of the BMD system. Speaking on a TV programme in early May, Saraswat said that “this system is now ready for induction”. Nearly two weeks later, the claim was repeated in an interview to Press Trust of India where Saraswat was quoted as saying, “The ballistic missile defence shield is now mature… We are ready to put phase I in place.”
Saraswat also argued that “India is putting together building blocks of technology that could be used to neutralize enemy satellites. We are working to ensure space security and protect our satellites. At the same time we are also working on how to deny the enemy access to its space assets”.

It is interesting that even as there is a consistent effort underway in India to build Ballistic Missile Defence capability, none of the civilian political leaders has ever made any public statement regarding this, nor has this been discussed in the various subcommittees of the Parliament despite the long term and dangerous implications that the introduction of BMD technology can have for Indo-Pak nuclear deterrence. While the defense technocrats of the country, such as Saraswat, gives out details regarding such strategic programmes from time to time, the civilian bureaucracy or the political class also do not make such statements. While it is easy to argue that members of the civilian bureaucracy or the political class do not understand the technical details of this and hence they do not talk about it, the fundamental reason behind this ‘technology-strategy’ divide is the manner in which technological imperatives are driving India’s strategic decision making. Indeed, this divide between the technological imperatives and the political declarations and posturing is not seen for the first time in the Indian strategic decision making scene. The role of the political class in decision-making in the field of strategic technology weapon systems has always been extremely limited.

Be it the Indian nuclear programme or the ongoing BMD programme, the role of the political class has been extremely limited which is the real cause for concern. I am also one of those who think that there is no clear strategic thinking taking place in New Delhi with regard to the future of India’s security, nuclear strategy or the kind of weapon systems the country should have. If there is no such grand strategic thinking taking place in the first place, it is possible that the government does not really appreciate the long-term implications of the country’s ongoing BMD programme. Optimists argue that India’s unwillingness to clearly state’s its security/defense policies is a clearly thought-out ‘policy of ambiguity’. I belong to the pessimists’ group which contends that there is no strategy behind ambiguity, it is confusion and lack of clear thinking at best. I would go one step further. Decades of ambiguous policy making has indeed landed the Indian state in a position wherein clear thinking about strategic affairs does not come naturally to it: being ambiguous has become part of its very mental makeup. 

Whether or not India actually develops the BMD system eventually, the civilian government - defense scientists divide and the high levels of ambiguity with regard to the BMD system in India can lead Pakistan to adopting a variety of countermeasures. Pakistan, in response to India’s BMD plans, is already carrying out a number of tests of its short-range nuclear-capable ballistic missile, Nasr, as it believes that it has the capability to frustrate the BMD capability that India is building. In other words, ‘India’s’ desire to build a BMD system is already witnessing the early stages of a strategic arms race, dangerous and destabilising, in the region. 

(Source: greater Kashmir, 21 APRIL 2013. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Apr/21/bmd-and-south-asian-strategic-stability-10.asp )

NCTC and India’s federal future

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

The Chief Ministers’ Conference scheduled to take place in New Delhi tomorrow is unlikely to be the venue where the issue of setting up a National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) will be finally settled. Most non-Congress CMs are unlikely to attend the meeting, and even if they attend they may not accept the NCTC proposal even in its new watered-down version. The NCTC saga and its eventual fate, to my mind, is an extremely significant test case that could tell us a great deal about the future of Indian federalism. 

The original NCTC proposal, fiercely opposed by the non-Congress ruled states ranging from Bihar to Tamil Nadu to Gujrat to Tripura, had proposed to locate the NCTC inside the Intelligence Bureau under the Union Home Ministry. It would have the powers to arrest terror suspects anywhere in the country, without prior permission from the state police, and prosecute them. Now imagine a clandestine spy agency, working under the shadows without any accountability, with a ‘glorious’ history of doing the errands of the ruling party in New Delhi, being tasked with arresting and persecuting powers through the length and breadth of the country? The proposed intelligence czar is to be provided with a number datasets containing intelligence collected by various other agencies. All of this will undoubtedly be put to service for ‘political intelligence’ gathering by the ruling party. 

Under severe attack and informed critique from the opposition parties and concerned citizens, the government has now proposed a revised NCTC blueprint. As per the new proposal, NCTC will be directly under the MHA and not under the command of the IB and a nodal officer will be appointed in each State, who could be its police chief, for keeping the States informed of any anti-terror operation. Even this is unlikely to pass the coalition test tomorrow. The UPA government is under Manmohan Singh is simply not in a political position to form any sort of national consensus on the NCTC issue. 
My primary problem with proposals such as the NCTC is that they tend to be anti-people and worryingly less accountable. I am perplexed by the argument often made by those who support extraordinary measures to handle terror: “when terrorists attack with most sophisticated weapons, the state should be allowed to put in place extraordinary measures to address it”. It is ridiculous to equate the state and terrorists. State, and the society that lies at the heart of it, is supposed to be more civilized and enlightened than the terrorists and hence their tools and means to counter terror should be people-friendly and fair, and pass the twin tests of natural justice and modern jurisprudence. 

The supporters of draconian laws to tackle terror also remind us from time to time that we should not politicize the fight against terror. But consider this: whenever there is a terror strike in the country, no matter where, the local police and various Central agencies make it a point to pick up a few muslim youth accusing them of being the masterminds behind the attacks. If they are lucky, the arrested – having undergone humiliation, torture and loss of employment, forget about the terrible years in prison - will be let off by the courts years later for lack of evidence. No compensation offered, no apologies tendered nor are those who made false arrests - and secured promotions and awards for their valorous fight against terror - made accountable. If this is not politicization of the fight against terrorism, what is? Hence, discussion on how and with what we should fight terror is politicization in the right way. 
Given this abysmal record of the state and Central governments’ fight against terror, we should have more than some politically-managed consensus on the issue of NCTC but there should also be wide ranging consultations with various civil society and human rights organisations on an important issue such as this before putting in place such drastic measures. 

Indeed, as mentioned above, the ongoing debate about NCTC would also have deeper implications for the country’s foreign/defense/security policies. To a lot of people, the very fact that the Central government is unable to bring together the state governments to enact the necessary legislation to set up the NCTC is indicative of the deeper policy paralysis that the country is witnessing today. Is it? The fact that the state Chief Ministers are speaking up and against NCTC, they argue, shows that the country will no longer be able to have a coherent policy on counter terrorism, security sector reforms, intelligence gathering, national defence, all of which are crucial for the continued existence of the country. How accurate is tis argument? 

I am an advocate of true federalism wherein the constituent units of a country are consulted and effectively participate in all important aspects of policymaking for the country as a whole, especially when it has something to do with the domestic space and politics of the country. Notwithstanding my inherent suspicion about anything that has a centralizing feature, I think the participation of state leaders and local politicians and other concerned parties in the policy making of the country will only lead to more democratization and accountability which will make the Indian state more representative and people-friendly in the longer run.  India is too huge a country to have one single opinion on any given issue and by not consulting the varied constituencies, especially the elected ones at the local level, the Central government would only be thrusting totalitarian solutions down the throats of a deeply divided polity.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 14 APRIL 2013, URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Apr/14/nctc-and-india-s-federal-future-14.asp )

Decoding Delhi

Decoding New Delhi’s UNHRC vote against Colombo

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

New Delhi’s decision to vote in favour of a US-sponsored resolution at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) condemning Sri Lanka for its human rights violations against Tamils during the last phase of Sri Lanka’s civil war needs to be carefully analyzed, as this is symbolic of a new normative turn in India’s foreign policy. India’s anti-Colombo vote might, at first, appear to be no more than UPA government's policy of appeasement towards its coalition partner (DMK) in Tamil Nadu, but an in-depth analysis would suggest that there is a carefully calibrated normative turn in New Delhi’s contemporary foreign policy with clear implications for the country’s future policies, both internal and external.

Domestic political compulsions 
Of course, domestic political compulsions played a major role in determining whether or not India would vote against Colombo for the latter’s violations of the rights of it’s Tamil population. For a lot of analysts, this does not augur well for the future of Indian foreign policy: I disagree with them. I am convinced that the ability of the country’s regional politics (regional leaders, political parties and state governments) to influence the conduct of New Delhi’s foreign/defense/security/diplomatic policies is indeed good for the country, in the longer run. Foreign/security policy making should no longer be a prerogative of the career bureaucrats sitting in New Delhi (politicians are mostly unconcerned about the daily conduct of the country’s foreign and security policy as they are embroiled in bigger domestic political games): states and regions concerned and affected by certain policies should be able to veto the passage of such policies.  New Delhi should consult and seek advice from the country’s peripheries on its external policy and regions should insist on being heard by New Delhi. Such organic mainstreaming of the country’s peripheries will only prove to be good for the country as a whole.

Impact of systemic pressures 
New Delhi’s foreign/diplomatic policies are not just a reaction to domestic politics but also a carefully thought-out response to the various systemic pressures/influences. No country can live in isolation from the international system. India’s status as a rising power would requite it to be more responsive to the international system and the systemic and sub-systemic balances of power therein. India’s recent voting behavior in various global forums on human rights-related issues (Iran, Libya, Syria and now Sri Lanka) shows that India’s strategic partnership with the US and its Western allies does have an impact on its voting decisions. But then, given the multifarious domestic political compulsions, New Delhi cannot afford to be dictated purely by the international system. It will have to play the ‘two-level game’, to use a phrase from the writings of political scientist Robert Putnam, in a sophisticated fashion. Sometimes a country’s domestic opposition/politics actually helps it to ward off the pressures from the international community. 

New Delhi’s Normative turn?
States change their policies not only as a result of strategic calculations but also due to the assimilation of new global norms and increased ‘state socialisation’. I have long argued that India (especially its middle class), not just New Delhi, is on a new learning curve and has been socializing itself with the international system and assimilating global norms and values. What is interesting about this is that for a long time the international community tired to forcefully socialize India and make the latter abide by the former’s norms and values using coercive instruments such as economic sanctions, technology denial and various ‘naming and shaming’ tactics. India rejected such moves with equal force. 

But today, the international community is far more willing to talk to India as an equal partner and has been persuading India using less intrusive instruments such as strategic partnerships, mainstreaming India into the international system at India’s own pace etc. This seems to be working as India is clearly responding to such positive moves by the international community. More importantly, New Delhi’s aspiration to be a great power is also playing a crucial role in determining the contours of its approach to the international community including its voting behavior in multilateral forums. Human rights is a crucial aspect of this global normative order and New Delhi realizes that without assimilating the crucial elements of the existing global normative order, it would find it difficult to mainstream itself or become a great power.

Implications for Kashmir? 
If the above description is an accurate portrayal of India’s new engagement of the international system, then this also has implications for the country’s domestic politics and internal conflict resolution strategies. The opposition from BJP and some other opinion makers to New Delhi’s anti-Colombo vote at the UNHCR is indicative of that. They fear that the Indian vote against Sri Lanka could one day come home to bite India on the question of Kashmir. This fear is not wholly misplaced. Now that New Delhi has opted to make a normative argument on human rights violations favouring the international community’s normative assertions, it is possible that the same standards will apply to India as well. Now that India has talked about human rights violations in other parts of the world and has, as a result, supported the international community’s intervention in the internal affairs of other countries (Libya and Syria are also good examples here), same questions can potentially be asked of India as well. 

Should one be concerned about that? I don’t think so. In a sense, I believe that given the fact that the new normative turn in India’s foreign policy is a result of its increasing assimilation of the global norms and values, it will also have an impact on India’s behavior towards its internal conflicts and will force it to be more accommodative and conciliatory in its internal conflict resolution processes and strategies.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 24 March 2013. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Mar/24/decoding-delhi-5.asp )

Why Modi cannot be my leader

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

The recent decision of the student organisers at the Wharton Business School to disinvite Gujrat Chief Minister Narendra Modi to its India Economic Forum meeting has revived the debate on the desirability of having Modi as India’s next Prime Minister. It does not, of course, surprise me when rabid right-wingers or members of the BJP hail Narendra Modi as the next Prime Minister of India. What does surprise me, and indeed disappoints me, is when liberal, secular Indians who swear by modern liberal values are willing to take a relook at Narendra Modi arguing that “come on, the past is past, let’s give the man a chance”. Increasing number of retired Civil servants, accomplished academics, distinguished journalists and members of the think tank community in Delhi, who once wore Gandhian values and Nehruvian secularism on their sleeves, are now rethinking their attitude to Narendra Modi. 

Modi’s new apostles One of the reasons why there is a newfound sympathy and admiration for Narendra Modi and his brand of politics is because New Delhi’s elites who matter in the country’s opinion formation (members of the strategic, business, think tank and retired elites) have started smelling power! Whenever a new leader or a political ideology is on the ascendance, there are opportunistic elites who necessarily jump on the bandwagon. When the NDA/BJP came to power in New Delhi under the Prime Ministership of A. B. Vajpayee in 1996 for thirteen days, one could see the same overnight ideological transformation of this opportunistic elite in New Delhi. It is interesting to watch the process of transformation of these elites: they coin new phrases to in support of the new leader, sit in fierce criticism of the arguments they were holding dear for years together knowing that a change is inevitable, create sophisticated and rational arguments to tailor the ideological needs of the new regime/leader, create arguments which could potentially align with the supposed stances of the rising leader and start defending the emergent leader in full public view. 

I keep meeting such neo-converts to Moditva from time to time. These yet-to-be-christened apostles of Modi have already started showing an extraordinary amount of zeal and excitement in promoting the ‘gospel according to modi’ to take India towards a new future. This discursive strategy, adopted by the elites is, indeed, an old game practiced by bureaucrats and hangers-on in the corridors of power everywhere. 

The conversions themselves may not be much of a concern, but the discursive effect that it would have on the public sphere is something one must watch very carefully. The well-oiled and extremely effective propaganda campaign run by the traditional supporters of Hindutva and Modi’s new apostles have the ideational power to dominate the this country’s debates and discussions on a wide range of issues from governance to security. 

He is a changed man! So what?
The neo-converts to ‘moditva’ argue that Modi is a changed man today and he is actually ashamed of what happened in 2002. He has made up for his failings in 2002 by forging alliances with Muslim communities in Gujrat and economically developing the state. This, to my mind, is a deeply dangerous line of argument. If this argument is acceptable, then any violator of human rights can be exonerated and be elected to be the Prime Minister of the country provided he is willing to make amends in other fields. That is surely not good enough. Anyone who violates the rights of others or even supports/justifies mass murder should be shunned, and no amount of repentance or ‘making up’ for the misdeeds should make him/her eligible for the country’s top job. Justice should not be measured on the basis of one’s repentance post-facto, but on the basis of whether the doer of the crime has been adequately punished. 

I don’t think Modi regrets the Gujrat riots and his role in it and even if he does, I will continue to maintain that he is not fit enough to the leader of this country. He may be a changed man today. So what? Those perpetrated the mass murder of muslims in Gujrat are yet to be broguth to justice.  If Mr. Modi, even if one goes by the argument that he ‘did not directly participate in the riots’, has not been able to bring justice to the families of those perished in the carnage of 2002, how can anyone expect him to deliver justice and welfare to the whole of India? Consider the fact that a number of cases relating to the Gujrat riots were tried outside the state due to the lack of cooperation from the state administration!  

The ‘larger good’ argument The other argument in support of Modi is that while he may have wronged a certain community, he has ever since been working for the welfare of the state in a committed manner. In other words, the majority has benefitted from Modi’s administration. First of all, I don’t buy the argument that Modi has delivered good governance in Gujrat. To give an example, people in Gandhinagar say that the city has good roads, adequate water supply and no electricity shortage. However, interior Gujrat gives you a completely different picture. In any case, even if the ‘larger good’ argument is correct, the fact remains that caring for the welfare of the majority after having sacrificed the rights of the minority is no noble deed. 

Authoritarians are not good for democracy From what we know of Mr. Modi, he is an authoritarian ruler. He dislikes dissent, has overseen a police force that has carried out a number of extra-judicial killings, uses official machinery for self-image promotion, undemocratic in the manner he runs the administration and equates his political survival with the pride of Gujrat. When a leader starts equating himself with the nation, we must be very careful. More importantly, Modi is a deeply polarizing figure. As it is we have enough polarizing figures in our national politics and the general experience that we have of such figures and their politics is that they are rarely good for democracy in a multi-national country such as India. Messiahs, spiritual or political, have a tendency to turn themselves into tyrants in the course of time. Thanks to the restless efforts of the Sangh propaganda machine, business tycoons with profit motives and New Delhi’s neo-converts to moditva, Modi could emerge as the leader of this country. Even as one hopes that it does not happen, one must be cautious about the spread of moditva and the increasing number of conversions to his ideology and cause.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, March 10, 2013. Url: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Mar/10/why-modi-cannot-be-my-leader-24.asp )

The making of a state of exception

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

Kashmir never runs out of controversies: the Central and State governments are competing with each other to make sure that they find a way to inflame passions in Kashmir, one way or another.  The JK Police Bill-2013 scheduled to be tabled in the next session of the J&K state Legislative Assembly is the latest example. Among many objectionable provisions, the Bill proposes to create Special Security Zones (SSZ) within the state giving police “special powers” to deal with “abnormal” situations. 

Enough has already been said about the appalling specifics of the draft Bill and hence I do not wish to add to the litany of complaints. In short, the Bill envisages converting J&K into a police state where police officers will have the ability to wield unparalleled powers over the lives of ordinary citizens. The Home Minister of the state, who also happens to be the Chief Minister, claims that his government has done a virtuous thing by putting the draft Bill on the Home Ministry’s website for feedback.  Much appreciated, but will the thoughtful Chief Minister please tell us how come such a thoughtless, careless and anti-people Bill was even allowed to be drafted, endorsed by the top brass, and put on the Ministry’s website without even showing it (really?) to the Minister concerned? How on earth can such idiotic laws be contemplated in the first place and then put in black and white right under the watchful eyes of a Chief Minister/Home Minister who demands day in and day out that anti-people legislation such as the AFSPA should be abolished from his state? Either his Babus are taking him for granted or he did not understand the implications of what he was signing on! 

This proposed law is clearly symbolic of an alarming tendency exhibited by the governments in Srinagar and New Delhi to exercise more and more control over the lives of the Kashmiris without being adequately accountable for it. While the proposed law, if enacted, will have special and overarching powers to control Kashmiris and their lives, what it offers in terms of accountability on the part of the J&K police is merely a promise to ‘act in good faith’. Incidentally, AFSPA also offers protection from prosecution for security forces ‘acting in good faith’. Its time that New Delhi and Srinagar realized that Kashmiris have had enough of their ‘acts in good faith’ and what they need now is accountability from those who control their lives. 

The state of exception
Giorgio Agamben, a widely regarded European Philosopher argues, in his book State of Exception, that “the voluntary creation of a permanent state of emergency (though perhaps not declared in the technical sense) has become one of the essential practices of contemporary states, including the so-called democratic ones”. Contemporary Kashmir, which seems to represent a political-legal vacuum where normal laws, rights, constitutional remedies, and governmental accountability applicable to other parts of the country do not seem to apply, fits well with Agamben’s depiction of a ‘state of exception’. While still very much within the Indian sovereign space, Kashmir is a ‘state of exception’, not merely characterized by the application of extraordinary legal provisions but also embedded in the popular political imagination in India. Kashmiris are increasingly condemned to live in a state of exception and emergency by the ever-increasing use of extra-constitutional means of coercion: its citizens are dealt with by special laws, and the local government, under AFSPA, is not empowered to take action against those who violate the rights of its citizens nor can the violators of their rights be tried in civilian courts. The J&K government also has put in place special measures to deal with the people (DAA & PSA), and often refuses to entertain complaints about excesses committed by officials in exercising those special measures. As a result, entire categories of citizens are kept out of ordinarily applicable rights and privileges. 

AFSPA has been in force in many parts of the J&K state for over two decades now.  It is absurd and surely not borne out by facts that emergency conditions have been prevailing in the state for over two decades! Clearly, this is indicative of a tendency on the part of the Indian state to regularize exceptions. For those in power, nothing is better than a situation where emergency laws can be applied at will with no questions asked, no constitutional challenges faced, and no accountability demanded. Better still if it can be done under the guise of preserving national security. Indeed, the manner in which a ‘state with special status’ has over the last six decades been converted into a ‘state of exception’ shows how democratically elected states can exhibit extreme authoritarian tendencies. 

Collective conscience and the state of exception 
In democracies, application of emergency provisions would normally attract widespread criticism except, of course, when such provisions are meant for certain parts of the country where the application of emergency measures are deemed to be tolerable by the majority population for their security and wellbeing. Toleration of limited violence against ‘the other’ for the pursuit of collective good, sadly, is an emerging characteristic of modern democracies. ‘Collective conscience’, we know, could easily be majoritarian, parochial and hence incognizant of the predicaments of the minorities and fringes of the nation. In a sense, it is this welfare of the majority that the Supreme Court of India referred to when it said while confirming Afzal Guru’s death sentence that “the collective conscience of the society will only be satisfied if the capital punishment is awarded to the offender”. 

It often takes massive protests on the streets of Kashmir and the deaths of scores of Kashmiris for the ‘collective conscience’ of the nation to wake up and ask what has gone wrong there. Sometimes, even when it witnesses what happens in Kashmir, the country’s ‘collective conscience’ is far from morally outraged. Most people simply believe that the emergency provisions in force should continue and that they will one day stabilize Kashmir. Since the Northeast of India does not often take to streets in a coordinated manner, much of the country does not even know that there are states of exception in existence in it’s northeastern fringes. Such ‘national indifference’ to states of exception within the country’s sovereign space is often a result of portraying those dwelling in those states of exception as the problematic other.  Kashmir, for instance, is often portrayed as a war zone, its inhabitants as terrorists, and throwing stones at gun-wielding security forces as an act of war in the Indian popular imagination. 

(Source: March 3, 2013. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Mar/3/the-making-of-a-state-of-exception-64.asp )