BMD and South Asian strategic stability

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

he logic of nuclear deterrence, at its simplest form, argues that the possession of nuclear weapons by a country would deter its adversary from using a nuclear weapon against it and if the use of nuclear weapons, the most destructive weapons by far, makes no sense when both the adversaries are nuclear armed, the use of conventional weapons makes even less sense. In other words, possession of nuclear weapons is likely to keep a country safe from enemy attacks. A related understanding with regard to nuclear deterrence is that it is premised on a certain level of mutual vulnerability. That is, for nuclear deterrence to continue to exist, the nuclear weapon countries should not try and become invulnerable to the nuclear weapon capability of the adversary. In other words, if India and Pakistan have to continue in a relationship of nuclear deterrence, there should be no attempt by India or Pakistan to build mechanisms to ensure that the other’s nuclear weapons do not land on its territory. Any attempt to do so by either country will not only destroy nuclear deterrence in South Asia but also ensue an arms race that would go far beyond the level, scope and scale of nuclear weapons themselves. 

India’s proposed BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) programme is in a sense doing precisely that – trying to make Pakistani nuclear weapons ineffective against India. Still at the most initial level (even the United States of America has not been able to develop a fool-proof BMD system despite many decades of efforts), the proponents of the Indian BMD programme claim to have developed the capability to protect two Indian cities against incoming Pakistani nuclear-tipped ballistic (not cruise though) missiles. Let alone the fact that the BMD technology is still and unproven one, what is even more worrying is that India’s BMD developments are spearheaded by its defense scientific establishment, not by the civilian political establishment. 

In a report titled as “Government baffled over DRDO chief’s claim on missile shield”, the India Today wrote sometime ago: “The government of India has been baffled by DRDO chief V.K. Saraswat’s repeated claims that a ballistic missile shield is ready for deployment, and that two locations, presumably New Delhi and Mumbai, will be the first recipients of the BMD system. Speaking on a TV programme in early May, Saraswat said that “this system is now ready for induction”. Nearly two weeks later, the claim was repeated in an interview to Press Trust of India where Saraswat was quoted as saying, “The ballistic missile defence shield is now mature… We are ready to put phase I in place.”
Saraswat also argued that “India is putting together building blocks of technology that could be used to neutralize enemy satellites. We are working to ensure space security and protect our satellites. At the same time we are also working on how to deny the enemy access to its space assets”.

It is interesting that even as there is a consistent effort underway in India to build Ballistic Missile Defence capability, none of the civilian political leaders has ever made any public statement regarding this, nor has this been discussed in the various subcommittees of the Parliament despite the long term and dangerous implications that the introduction of BMD technology can have for Indo-Pak nuclear deterrence. While the defense technocrats of the country, such as Saraswat, gives out details regarding such strategic programmes from time to time, the civilian bureaucracy or the political class also do not make such statements. While it is easy to argue that members of the civilian bureaucracy or the political class do not understand the technical details of this and hence they do not talk about it, the fundamental reason behind this ‘technology-strategy’ divide is the manner in which technological imperatives are driving India’s strategic decision making. Indeed, this divide between the technological imperatives and the political declarations and posturing is not seen for the first time in the Indian strategic decision making scene. The role of the political class in decision-making in the field of strategic technology weapon systems has always been extremely limited.

Be it the Indian nuclear programme or the ongoing BMD programme, the role of the political class has been extremely limited which is the real cause for concern. I am also one of those who think that there is no clear strategic thinking taking place in New Delhi with regard to the future of India’s security, nuclear strategy or the kind of weapon systems the country should have. If there is no such grand strategic thinking taking place in the first place, it is possible that the government does not really appreciate the long-term implications of the country’s ongoing BMD programme. Optimists argue that India’s unwillingness to clearly state’s its security/defense policies is a clearly thought-out ‘policy of ambiguity’. I belong to the pessimists’ group which contends that there is no strategy behind ambiguity, it is confusion and lack of clear thinking at best. I would go one step further. Decades of ambiguous policy making has indeed landed the Indian state in a position wherein clear thinking about strategic affairs does not come naturally to it: being ambiguous has become part of its very mental makeup. 

Whether or not India actually develops the BMD system eventually, the civilian government - defense scientists divide and the high levels of ambiguity with regard to the BMD system in India can lead Pakistan to adopting a variety of countermeasures. Pakistan, in response to India’s BMD plans, is already carrying out a number of tests of its short-range nuclear-capable ballistic missile, Nasr, as it believes that it has the capability to frustrate the BMD capability that India is building. In other words, ‘India’s’ desire to build a BMD system is already witnessing the early stages of a strategic arms race, dangerous and destabilising, in the region. 

(Source: greater Kashmir, 21 APRIL 2013. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Apr/21/bmd-and-south-asian-strategic-stability-10.asp )