New Delhi’s decision to call off the August 25 Foreign Secretary level talks with Islamabad in response to the latter’s unwillingness to stop consulting the Kashmiri separatists is counterproductive and short-sighted even as such a populist act makes perfect electoral sense for the BJP in the run up to the Assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) where it looks to make unprecedented electoral gains.
On the face of it, New Delhi’s argument for calling off the talks might look logical and based on national interest. But a deeper analysis would show that there are a number of problems with the rationale for doing so. First of all, discussions between the separatists and Pakistani diplomats/politicians have never led to anything. For the most part, these discussions have been symbolic and at best, an irritant. More importantly, ever since Pervez Mushrraff gave a new direction to Pakistan’s Kashmir policy, Pakistan has been cold-shouldering the Kashmiri separatists, especially Ali Shah Geelani who, as a result, has become very critical of Pakistan’s new Kashmir policy. And the Kashmiri separatists have also often reminded Pakistan that there is a need to discuss the situation in Pakistan Administered Kashmir as well. Now, with one strike, New Delhi has undone all that and forced a new friendship between the separatists and Islamabad: a classic diplomatic self-goal.
BJP’s ‘Mission Kashmir’This sudden move by the Modi government should also be seen as an important piece in BJP’s evolving electoral strategy for winning a significant number of seats in the upcoming Assembly elections in J&K so as to play a major role in the government formation in the state. Finding potential partners in Kashmir, which it is currently engaged in, is a major part of this mission. Consolidating the non-Muslim vote in J&K is another major part of this strategy. In this context, the earlier statements by BJP on Article 370 and the return of Pandits to Kashmir, and now calling off the talks with Pakistan form part of a well-considered strategy to increase the party’s popularity in Jammu and even in parts of Kashmir.
On the other hand, in Kashmir, denial of its ‘representative role’ by New Delhi will force the separatists to strengthen their poll boycott calls. The boycott call by the separatists, and BJP’s increasing popularity in Jammu and Ladakh, could lead to the emergence of BJP as a key player in post-poll J&K. This then is a game being well played by BJP.
Implications for Kashmir New Delhi’s relationship with Kashmir’s separatist leadership is far more complex than it is often recognized. Both India and Pakistan have funded separatist groups in the Valley, promoted one over the other depending on the political climate, played one against the other, and engaged in overt and covert negotiations with them. Indeed, New Delhi, over last two decades, has understood the ‘importance’ of the Kashmiri separatists, especially the moderate ones, and as a result they have been a crucial part of New Delhi’s containment strategy in the valley. Over the past few years, however, the influence of the moderate Kashmiri dissidents in the valley has been steadily diminishing among the valley’s alienated youth even as Geelani’s, the most hawkish of them all, popularity has only increased. New Delhi’s objection to the meeting between the Pakistan High Commissioner and the separatists will only improve Geelani’s standing in the eyes of the Kashmiris. This will be damaging for New Delhi’s long-term strategy to contain the Kashmir insurgency.
Kashmiri separatists have consistently argued that there are three parties to the Kashmir conflict: New Delhi, Islamabad and Kashmiris, an argument vehemently rejected by New Delhi. Now, by engaging in a public spat with Islamabad based on the logic “either us or the separatists”, New Delhi has not only pitched itself and the separatist leadership at the same level but also unwittingly admitted that the separatists are a party to the Kashmir conflict.
Portraying Kashmiri separatism through the political articulations of Geelani, in a sense, does help the Indian state in arguing that Kashmiri separatism is essentially anti-India and Pro-Pakistan (which is fundamentally misleading). However, such arguments tend to paint Kashmir’s non-mainstream politics with the same brush and silence the reasonable voices of Kashmir’s moderate dissidents. This, as a result, delegitimises the genuine demands of the Kashmiris in the eyes of the Indian public and help fan separatist passions in the Valley. The reality is that, whether or not one likes it, the Indian state needs the Kashmiri separatists if it wishes to bring about genuine peace and reconciliation in the valley.
Implications for Indo-Pak relations
By calling off the meeting between the two Foreign Secretaries, the Modi government has convoluted a bilateral dialogue process that was beginning to take a positive direction after the ‘historic’ meeting between the two Prime Ministers. There is no clarity as of now whether or not the other scheduled Indo-Pak engagements will take place. Given that the Modi government has indirectly set a pre-condition for future talks, it will be perceived as fickle-minded if future interactions indeed take place without Pakistan having conceded to the Indian demand vis-à-vis Kashmiri separatists. On the other hand, if the “Islamabad should only talk to us or we won’t talk at all” logic applies to future interactions as well, New Delhi will eventually be forced to get down from its diplomatic high horse or risk not having a dialogue process with Islamabad at all.
It is indeed a bizarre logic to argue that a bilateral Indo-Pak dialogue process is only useful for Pakistan, not India. The reality is that India needs a dialogue process as much as Pakistan needs it. In reality, no government in Pakistan can become popular by talking to India, but every Pakistani government does so because they realize its importance. New Delhi, therefore, needs to shed the illusion that by engaging in a bilateral dialogue, it is doing a favor to Islamabad. In any case, Islamabad has not been too pleased with the ongoing dialogue with New Delhi as the former thinks that the talks are progressing on terms set by the latter. For instance, the contemporary Indo-Pak dialogue has three broad focal areas: acts of terrorism against India, trade and transit, all of which are important for New Delhi, not so much for Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan would like more progress on finding a political solution for Kashmir and resolving the Siachen standoff both of which are not emphasized by the current dialogue process. So how is it that India is in any way ‘hurting’ Pakistani interests by calling off a dialogue which Islamabad thinks is going in India’s favour?
From a long-term strategic point of view, attempts by New Delhi to achieve stability in Kashmir without giving Pakistan an honorable exit will not be an enduing one. And that is precisely what Islamabad is looking for vis-à-vis Kashmir: an honorable exit from the mess that Kashmir has become for Pakistan’s life as a nation. The Kashmir formula proposed by Pervez Musharraf was exactly one such honorable way out. Even today, the broad contours of such a formula, minus the Musharraf tag, have great traction within Pakistan’s political class.
Moreover, New Delhi’s decision to call off the engagement with Pakistan comes at a time when it needs to proactively engage with Islamabad for a number of reasons. The implications of the NATO drawdown from Afghanistan and the stunning military exploits of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) are still not properly understood even as they are unfolding not too far from India. Therefore, sustaining a stable relationship with Islamabad is important for New Delhi when considering the long-term strategic implications of the geopolitical churning that is taking place in its near abroad.
(Source: Greater Kashmir, August 24, 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Aug/24/playing-chicken-with-pakistan-5.asp)
On the face of it, New Delhi’s argument for calling off the talks might look logical and based on national interest. But a deeper analysis would show that there are a number of problems with the rationale for doing so. First of all, discussions between the separatists and Pakistani diplomats/politicians have never led to anything. For the most part, these discussions have been symbolic and at best, an irritant. More importantly, ever since Pervez Mushrraff gave a new direction to Pakistan’s Kashmir policy, Pakistan has been cold-shouldering the Kashmiri separatists, especially Ali Shah Geelani who, as a result, has become very critical of Pakistan’s new Kashmir policy. And the Kashmiri separatists have also often reminded Pakistan that there is a need to discuss the situation in Pakistan Administered Kashmir as well. Now, with one strike, New Delhi has undone all that and forced a new friendship between the separatists and Islamabad: a classic diplomatic self-goal.
BJP’s ‘Mission Kashmir’This sudden move by the Modi government should also be seen as an important piece in BJP’s evolving electoral strategy for winning a significant number of seats in the upcoming Assembly elections in J&K so as to play a major role in the government formation in the state. Finding potential partners in Kashmir, which it is currently engaged in, is a major part of this mission. Consolidating the non-Muslim vote in J&K is another major part of this strategy. In this context, the earlier statements by BJP on Article 370 and the return of Pandits to Kashmir, and now calling off the talks with Pakistan form part of a well-considered strategy to increase the party’s popularity in Jammu and even in parts of Kashmir.
On the other hand, in Kashmir, denial of its ‘representative role’ by New Delhi will force the separatists to strengthen their poll boycott calls. The boycott call by the separatists, and BJP’s increasing popularity in Jammu and Ladakh, could lead to the emergence of BJP as a key player in post-poll J&K. This then is a game being well played by BJP.
Implications for Kashmir New Delhi’s relationship with Kashmir’s separatist leadership is far more complex than it is often recognized. Both India and Pakistan have funded separatist groups in the Valley, promoted one over the other depending on the political climate, played one against the other, and engaged in overt and covert negotiations with them. Indeed, New Delhi, over last two decades, has understood the ‘importance’ of the Kashmiri separatists, especially the moderate ones, and as a result they have been a crucial part of New Delhi’s containment strategy in the valley. Over the past few years, however, the influence of the moderate Kashmiri dissidents in the valley has been steadily diminishing among the valley’s alienated youth even as Geelani’s, the most hawkish of them all, popularity has only increased. New Delhi’s objection to the meeting between the Pakistan High Commissioner and the separatists will only improve Geelani’s standing in the eyes of the Kashmiris. This will be damaging for New Delhi’s long-term strategy to contain the Kashmir insurgency.
Kashmiri separatists have consistently argued that there are three parties to the Kashmir conflict: New Delhi, Islamabad and Kashmiris, an argument vehemently rejected by New Delhi. Now, by engaging in a public spat with Islamabad based on the logic “either us or the separatists”, New Delhi has not only pitched itself and the separatist leadership at the same level but also unwittingly admitted that the separatists are a party to the Kashmir conflict.
Portraying Kashmiri separatism through the political articulations of Geelani, in a sense, does help the Indian state in arguing that Kashmiri separatism is essentially anti-India and Pro-Pakistan (which is fundamentally misleading). However, such arguments tend to paint Kashmir’s non-mainstream politics with the same brush and silence the reasonable voices of Kashmir’s moderate dissidents. This, as a result, delegitimises the genuine demands of the Kashmiris in the eyes of the Indian public and help fan separatist passions in the Valley. The reality is that, whether or not one likes it, the Indian state needs the Kashmiri separatists if it wishes to bring about genuine peace and reconciliation in the valley.
Implications for Indo-Pak relations
By calling off the meeting between the two Foreign Secretaries, the Modi government has convoluted a bilateral dialogue process that was beginning to take a positive direction after the ‘historic’ meeting between the two Prime Ministers. There is no clarity as of now whether or not the other scheduled Indo-Pak engagements will take place. Given that the Modi government has indirectly set a pre-condition for future talks, it will be perceived as fickle-minded if future interactions indeed take place without Pakistan having conceded to the Indian demand vis-à-vis Kashmiri separatists. On the other hand, if the “Islamabad should only talk to us or we won’t talk at all” logic applies to future interactions as well, New Delhi will eventually be forced to get down from its diplomatic high horse or risk not having a dialogue process with Islamabad at all.
It is indeed a bizarre logic to argue that a bilateral Indo-Pak dialogue process is only useful for Pakistan, not India. The reality is that India needs a dialogue process as much as Pakistan needs it. In reality, no government in Pakistan can become popular by talking to India, but every Pakistani government does so because they realize its importance. New Delhi, therefore, needs to shed the illusion that by engaging in a bilateral dialogue, it is doing a favor to Islamabad. In any case, Islamabad has not been too pleased with the ongoing dialogue with New Delhi as the former thinks that the talks are progressing on terms set by the latter. For instance, the contemporary Indo-Pak dialogue has three broad focal areas: acts of terrorism against India, trade and transit, all of which are important for New Delhi, not so much for Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan would like more progress on finding a political solution for Kashmir and resolving the Siachen standoff both of which are not emphasized by the current dialogue process. So how is it that India is in any way ‘hurting’ Pakistani interests by calling off a dialogue which Islamabad thinks is going in India’s favour?
From a long-term strategic point of view, attempts by New Delhi to achieve stability in Kashmir without giving Pakistan an honorable exit will not be an enduing one. And that is precisely what Islamabad is looking for vis-à-vis Kashmir: an honorable exit from the mess that Kashmir has become for Pakistan’s life as a nation. The Kashmir formula proposed by Pervez Musharraf was exactly one such honorable way out. Even today, the broad contours of such a formula, minus the Musharraf tag, have great traction within Pakistan’s political class.
Moreover, New Delhi’s decision to call off the engagement with Pakistan comes at a time when it needs to proactively engage with Islamabad for a number of reasons. The implications of the NATO drawdown from Afghanistan and the stunning military exploits of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) are still not properly understood even as they are unfolding not too far from India. Therefore, sustaining a stable relationship with Islamabad is important for New Delhi when considering the long-term strategic implications of the geopolitical churning that is taking place in its near abroad.
(Source: Greater Kashmir, August 24, 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Aug/24/playing-chicken-with-pakistan-5.asp)
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