Saturday, June 11, 2011

India’s Afghan Policy

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB


The endgame in Afghanistan is rapidly evolving even as there is not yet a clear picture of what is the shape of things to come in Afghanistan in the years ahead. In July this year, the Americans will start withdrawing the 30 thousand additional troops that were sent in after 2009 as part of Obama’s ‘troop surge’. France and some other countries will start the withdrawal of their troops in July this year as well. Hence the real impact of the western war efforts in Afghanistan will start coming to the fore in the months ahead. The killing of Osama Bin Laden has further strengthened the resolve of the international community to quicken the ongoing reconciliation efforts in Kabul even as there seems to be no major headway made in that crucial direction. The international community, especially those militarily involved in Afghanistan, seems to be unambiguous about the urgent need to bring to some kind of a closure the ongoing war in Afghanistan and it is clearly headed in that direction.

Even as all of this is happening, New Delhi and the strategic community here seems to be unsure of how to make up its mind vis-à-vis the developments in Afghanistan. Recent statements from the Indian leadership and the thinking within the strategic community do suggest that there has been considerable amount of rethinking in New Delhi about India’s Afghanistan strategy and yet there is a need for New Delhi to make clear, bold and forward-looking policy pronouncements vis-à-vis Afghanistan.

New Delhi and the strategic community here had traditionally adopted a three-pronged strategy towards Afghanistan. One, moderate Taliban is a contradiction in terms; there is no such thing as moderate Taliban, one is either a Taliban or moderate. There should be no attempts at reconciling with the Taliban. Moreover, the talk of moderate Taliban is promoted by Pakistan in order to get their ‘friends’ (read Taliban) back in the power structures in Kabul and thereby control Kabul from Islamabad. This inflexible black-and-white approach now seems to be undergoing some serious rethinking in New Delhi. Not only did Manmohan Singh make it clear during his May 2011 visit to Kabul that India is not against the Western/American reconciliation attempts with the Taliban but even the think-tank community in New Delhi seems to be recognizing the importance of the reconciliation process. The fact is that there is no one monolith called Taliban and hence it is necessary to take the various Taliban groups on board the reconciliation process and negotiate the terms of a settlement with them.

The second aspect of the traditional Indian attitude towards Afghanistan was that Indian stakes in Afghanistan were too precious to give up given the security implications that political developments in Afghanistan have for India. India believed that developments in Afghanistan were of extreme significance for the country and that India needs to actively promote its interests there. During the pre-9/11 days India was actively supporting the Northern Alliance in its fight against the Taliban regime in Kabul as this was seen as a key strategy to secure Indian interests there. While terrorism emanating from Afghanistan was the primary concern for New Delhi, influence in the extended neighborhood and creation of an alternative regime in Kabul that is not under the sway of Islamabad were also important in New Delhi’s strategic calculations. Islamabad’s total control of Kabul and Pakistan’s use of its ‘strategic depth’ against New Delhi were responded to by New Delhi by arming the Northern Alliance and taking out an international campaign against the Taliban regime which in any case was among the world’s most isolated regimes. The hijack of IC-814 and the drama that unfolded in Kabul thereafter where the hijacked plane was taken to and the way India was humiliated by the Taliban and their mentors in Islamabad have always been fresh in the Indian mind. Indeed, India has always tried to forge relations with Afghanistan and this was seen as inimical by Islamabad. India had forged close relations with Kabul during the time of Mohammad Daud Khan as well as in the post-Mujahideen years both of which were seen with deep suspicion by Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan tried to neutralize each other’s role and influence in Afghanistan and Kabul became another theater of Indo-Pak rivalry.

There seems to be a slow but steady change of attitude in New Delhi about the Indian stakes in Afghanistan. It is now increasingly felt in the strategic circles that while Afghanistan remains an important neighbor for India, our stakes there are at best indirect and that there is no point engaging in proxy wars in Kabul against Pakistan. More so, at a time when Pakistan has so obviously reduced the heat in Kashmir, it is important that India does the same in Afghanistan. Therefore, the Indian strategic posture vis-à-vis Afghanistan should be more accommodative and conciliatory towards Pakistan, it is being increasingly understood. After all, Pakistan has existential stakes in Afghanistan and if the reduction of the Indian rhetoric on Afghanistan can encourage Islamabad to decide on a more constructive engagement with Afghanistan, that would have a stabilizing impact on the region as a whole. While the Indian argument that it is not consulted by the Americans in the reconciliation process in Afghanistan my be true, the fact is, as one French diplomat told me recently, that “the Americans don’t keep us informed of the negotiations they are conducting with the Taliban even though we have our soldiers fighting there”.

The third aspect of the Indian thinking on Afghanistan, even though it existed only in some quarters, has been that India should project military force into Afghanistan in order to safeguard our vital security interests there. This line of argumentation is increasingly considered as wishful thinking. The fact is, a lot of people would argue, that New Delhi neither has the military power nor the political willingness and willpower to project force into Afghanistan and sustain it in pursuit of its strategic interests there.

New Delhi’s role in Afghanistan should not be military engagement or force projection. It should involve itself in the conflict resolution process in that war-torn country, first of all, by way of organizing a regional initiative of countries such as Iran, India, China, Afghanistan, Russia and Pakistan to discuss the various aspects of the future of Afghanistan.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 12 June, 2011. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/Jun/12/india-s-afghan-policy-2.asp )

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