Monday, January 30, 2012

The geopolitics of South Asian jihad

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The geopolitics of South Asian jihad

HAPPYMON JACOB
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Jihad on Two Fronts: South Asia's Unfolding Drama. by Dilip Hiro.
Jihad on Two Fronts: South Asia's Unfolding Drama. by Dilip Hiro.

There is a proliferation of literature today on the geopolitical aspects of jihad and Islamic extremism in South Asia. And yet, the discourses on jihad in the region are rarely nuanced or problematised. They have an inherent tendency to explain the phenomenon from a religion-centric perspective infused with grand civilisational definitions and also to see it as a practice of statecraft. In other words, contemporary literature and discourses on jihad treat it as an essentialist problem and often address it by communal shaming and ruthless eradication.

What is missing is a sociological reading of Islamic extremism, one which looks at it in the light of people's (or victims?) daily lived experiences, one that highlights their appalling existential conditions, and one that scans the structural conditions that are shaped by faith, indoctrination, misperception, ignorance, and the general inability to make free choices.

It is the narrow and ‘anti-intellectual' understanding of such social — not primarily geopolitical — problems that render state policies so helpless when confronted with the high levels of social legitimacy and popular acceptability commanded by jihad and the jihadis. That is precisely why the international community is forced to make peace with the Afghan Taliban today, after exhausting every other option, although Taliban was the reason why Afghanistan was attacked in the first place. Dilip Hiro's book Jihad on Two Fronts is an excellent example of such broad-brush treatment of an important subject.

Rich in detail

Written by an experienced journalist whose knowledge of the region is commendable, the book does have its strengths. It is rich in detail and in personalised narratives of the various aspects of jihad in the region. Hiro also attempts to draw a big picture of geopolitical developments in the region viewed from a historical perspective. This surely is a layperson's introduction to the origins of jihad in contemporary South Asia. Moreover, if you have a dislike for complex intellectual formulations, there is no reason to worry, for reading Hiro's narrative is like looking at a picture that is pleasing to the eyes: simple, yet rich in detail.

However, the book suffers from a number of serious weaknesses. In a sense, its strengths are also its weaknesses. The narrative is far too simplistic and suffers from an overdose of details. The book is not well structured and hence lacks a sense of direction. The narrative style shifts from autobiographical to historical to political and to religious, not necessarily in that order. Above all, there is little attempt to neatly tie the multiple aspects of the jihad phenomenon.

Sometimes, one begins to wonder whether Hiro is writing a novel or a serious book on jihad; indeed, he has written both in the past. Witness this sentence: “In the heart of bustling, noisy, sprawling port city of Karachi lies a grand park occupying 185 acres, which is incredibly quiet except for the chirping of sparrows and cawing of cows.”

Conspiracy theory

The big picture Hiro has endeavoured to produce is faulty, I am afraid. He sees a conspiracy theory in every important event of the region and hardly any scope for hope. Some of his arguments are clearly untenable. For example, an entire chapter puts up the argument that Afghanistan is America's second Vietnam, but at the end of it the reader remains not fully convinced that it is indeed the case.

Intellectual enterprises need to be geared towards a set purpose. What is presented is nothing more than a rehash of available material on terrorism, Islamic extremism, jihad etc., some of it from Hiro's own earlier books. There is hardly any attempt to break new conceptual ground or put forth any new empirical argument.

It is claimed that, using the “archival material released by the Kremlin in 2009, as well as the secret and classified cables sent by embassies in Kabul, Islamabad and Delhi, the author challenges the conventional historical narratives of the main layers: Afghanistan, Pakistan, America, India and the Soviet Union”. But the book doesn't do justice to this claim. By bringing in too many variables and covering a vast expanse of spatio-temporal territory, it seems to complicate the picture, and the complication is clearly not positive or useful.

After going through the book that has no refreshing intellectual insight and no significant suggestion to offer on the policy front, an informed reader is inevitably left with the question: And so, what's new about Hiro's narrative?

JIHAD ON TWO FRONTS — South Asia's Unfolding Drama: Dilip Hiro; HarperCollins Publishers, A-53, Sector-57, Noida-201301. Rs. 699.


Source: The Hindu, January 31 2012. URL: http://www.thehindu.com/arts/books/article2845278.ece )

Saturday, January 28, 2012

A precarious Indo-Pak nuclear balance

OPINION » LEAD

HAPPYMON JACOB

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Pakistan has dismissed the credibility of India's declared no-first-use doctrine and has not elucidated the conditions under which it would be prompted to use its nuclear weapons.

The recently held ‘India-Pakistan Expert Level Talks on Nuclear CBMs' have once again failed to move the two countries away from their precarious nuclear balance. The Islamabad meeting ‘achieved' two things: one, Indian and Pakistani officials agreed to recommend to their Foreign Secretaries the extension of the validity of the “Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons” (signed in 2007) for another five years; and two, “both sides reviewed the implementation and strengthening of existing CBMs in the framework of [the] Lahore MoU, and agreed to explore possibilities for mutually acceptable additional CBMs.”

Indeed, the substantive aspects of the India-Pakistan nuclear dimension remain consistently untouched by the negotiators in the two countries — both after their declared nuclear status in 1998 and earlier during their undeclared status. The 1999 Lahore Declaration was a progressive step that recognised the need to understand the role played by nuclear weapons. It was crafted with a view to “reducing the risk of [their] accidental or unauthorised use” as well as “elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields.” India and Pakistan have also dutifully followed their 1988 agreement to annually exchange lists of their nuclear installations and facilities, in order to avoid attacks against them.

However, since 1999, all that the two countries have done at successive meetings is to reiterate the spirit of the Lahore Declaration, and review the existing nuclear and missile-related confidence-building measures except, of course, the 2007 agreement. In 12 years, nothing substantial has been achieved by them to bring about nuclear stability in the subcontinent. This despite the fact that a nuclear war between India and Pakistan is arguably more likely than it was between the U.S. and the USSR during the Cold War. One of the reasons is an alarming obscurity to India and Pakistan's nuclear relations, apart from their geographical proximity.

Doctrinal dilemmas

Doctrinal and conceptual clarity on nuclear strategy is fundamental to the existence of stable deterrence in a nuclearised geopolitical context. This is recognised by the Lahore Declaration, which states “[t]he two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines”. The agreement has, unfortunately, remained a mere promise. Although the strategic elites in both countries have pondered over their nuclear doctrines ad nauseam, they seem to have overlooked the ways in which credible cooperation may occur in order to achieve feasible nuclear risk reduction measures and nuclear stability. Such deficient thinking has led to a unilateral offensive strategising and the formulation of military doctrines such as India's ‘Cold Start', and the adoption of an asymmetric escalation posture by Pakistan.

Problems of ambiguity

The introduction of nuclear weapons in the Indo-Pak balance of power has not been to India's advantage. It has given the country diminishing returns from its conventional superiority and created a troublingly unpredictable nuclear escalation ladder. Moreover, Pakistan's ambiguous nuclear doctrine has plunged India into a deep dilemma on how to respond to the proxy wars that it believes Pakistan has unleashed upon it. India was forced to redeploy its forces after massing them on the border during the 2001-2002 military standoff in the wake of the attack on Indian Parliament, precisely due to this uncertainty.

Pakistan has apparently kept its nuclear doctrine ambiguous to continue to perplex Indian strategists. It has dismissed the credibility of India's declared no-first-use (NFU) doctrine and but has not elucidated the conditions under which it would be prompted to use its nuclear weapons. Apart from outlining some painfully general conditions of potential nuclear use, Pakistan has deliberately kept its ‘threshold levels' or the ‘red lines' unclear, contending that this is its only possible option to prevent an Indian attack. It is an argument that stems straight from the classical deterrence theory.

This ambiguity in the India-Pakistan conflict dyad has led to deterrence instability in the region, rather than deterrence stability. In a conflict dyad, theoretically speaking, when both parties clarify their nuclear postures, there will be relative stability. However, when both maintain doctrinal ambiguity there is likely to be increased stability; paradoxically, under such conditions deterrence has the maximum advantage. On the other hand, when one party maintains doctrinal clarity and the other maintains doctrinal ambiguity, there is likely to be instability rather than stability. This happens because the party that chooses to keep its doctrine ambiguous is also assumed to keep its various options open — ‘flexible responses'— including the tactical use of nuclear weapons. This generates a dilemma for its opponent, which is denied the option of similar flexible responses due to its pre-declared postures and resultant concerns about public opinion.

Cold Start

Cold Start, the Indian military's ‘undeclared' doctrine, is assumed to be a response to this dilemma India faces from Pakistan's doctrinal ambiguity. Indian strategists believe that if India were to use its Cold Start doctrine, it would have a flexible response option that may counter the open-ended Pakistani nuclear strategy. Cold Start imagines enabling the Indian military to carry out quick, offensive operations against Pakistan without crossing the latter's nuclear red lines in order to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure on the Pakistani side. Critics have argued that the doctrine is nothing but ‘hot air' as it has neither New Delhi's political backing nor is it considered a serious war-fighting strategy by the Indian army. While such scepticism may or may not be well-founded, the fact is even if some sections of the Pakistani war planners believe India is somewhat serious about Cold Start, it could lead to counter-strategising.

The existence of such doctrinal ambiguities, security dilemma and deep mistrust of each other — combined with the lack of a clear civilian control of nuclear weapons in Pakistan — means nothing short of a recipe for disaster for the people of both countries. There is, therefore, need to start talking about nuclear issues with far more seriousness and urgency along the lines enshrined in the Lahore Declaration.

This is all the more important because of the perceived implications of the India-U.S. nuclear deal as well as the China-Pakistan nuclear deal, and due to the potential impact of technology on the military strategies of India and Pakistan.

Ottawa Dialogue

There is also an urgent need to encourage non-official bilateral discussions on the issue in order to sensitise the strategic communities on both sides of the border. The Ottawa Dialogue, one of the very few track-two initiatives on nuclear issues, held most recently in Copenhagen in December 2011, recommended that India and Pakistan sign a CBM to the effect that their land-based nuclear arsenals will remain “de-mated” and “de-alerted” in peacetime; initiate a high-level official dialogue on how new and emerging technologies such as future sea-based systems and nuclear-armed cruise missiles will impact strategic stability; and add cruise missiles to the Agreement on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles.

The bilateral meeting also recommended that the existing hotlines and communication channels be hardened, manned 24x7 and supplemented with secure video links; a dedicated communications channel be established between the Indian National Security Advisor and the Pakistani equivalent and that each side establish a “strategic risk management unit”, which could serve some of the same communications functions as the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres in other contexts.

(Happymon Jacob teaches Disarmament at Jawaharlal Nehru University and is a member of the Ottawa Track-two Dialogue on India-Pakistan Nuclear Issues. Email: happymon@gmail.com)

COMMENTS:

Dr. Jacob's recommendations are based on a western rationale, which presupposes fuctionability and integrity of CBMs and risk management institutions. An existential institutional asymmetry (a representative government in India, and military in control of nuclear assets in Pakistan) between the two countries nullifies such rationale. Any amount of agreements between the two rival governments, will come to naught unless this asymmetry is removed. A classical example of dubiousness in Pakistani establishment's stance to agreements is the discovery of Osama Bin Laden's presence in Pakistan's heartland. Inspite of multifarious military and strategic understandings with their biggest benefactor (the United States) over the years, their establishment was found cheating. Expecting same establishment to honor track-II agreements and CBMs, is a little far fetched in my opinion.

from: surinder
Posted on: Jan 26, 2012 at 05:13 IST

The declared and undeclared nuclear doctrines of both Pakistan and India are of no consequence in the event of a war. Both countries can renounce their doctrines as and when required. The declared and undeclared nuclear doctrines of China follow the same path. China is the first country to declare that they will not use WMD first. The Chinese military threat is the tilting point in the event of a war between India and Pakistan. It is important to resolve the border issues with China so that the Chinese nuclear threat is not of future concern. Yet, the conventional military threat of China with or without war between India and Pakistan cannot be ignored. The Chinese intervention, in the event of a war between Pakistan and India, can overwhelm the Indian defense capability, though India can overcome the conventional military of Pakistan. In the event of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan, there will not be a winner, both countries will be loosers.

from: Davis K. Thanjan
Posted on: Jan 26, 2012 at 09:06 IST

We must give up our policy of no-first-use doctrine,which pakistan
has not adopted, in order to counter the pak strategy and we must be
ready 24*7 to deter the pakistan in case of any possible nuclear
attack on us. Its the need of the hour to augment our efforts to develop technology to effectively detect the nuclear submarines,radars and such other nuclaer armed missiles by upgrading our defence R and D the global
standards.

from: Rudramuni Davanagere
Posted on: Jan 26, 2012 at 09:48 IST

I have pity for people like this author and India's stratgists. The naked truth is this that Pakistan has no policy on any issue. Their credibility is zero and I want anyone to challenge me on the fact that there is not even a single treaty/agreement signed with Pakistan which was not violated by the latter or Pakistan did not allege that India violated the treaty. Look at the violations of ceasefire by Pakistan, repeated exposure of their duplicity on terror not only by India but by their allies, Simla agreement, Nuclear proliferation. I might come across as a Pakistan basher but have a look to what is happening to pledges/agreements signed between different institutions of Pakistan. These talks will lead us nowhere. India must prepare itself for the worst case scenario, rather than, relying on Pakistan to keep its word. Also see the fate of 26/11 accused case. It is a huge challenge to deal with Pakistan.

from: Harleen
Posted on: Jan 26, 2012 at 20:11 IST

Lot of arm chair generals commenting. Regardless of stated doctrine, both are rational enough to realize that a nuclear war, even if you don't get nuked is a disaster for all of South Asia. I actually pity the ones who would survive the blasts, it would be a living hell. Imagine just one nuke on top of the Indus and Ganges. These sustaining natural wonders will turn to death streams polluting the soil that feeds a population of over 1.5 billion humans.

from: Mir Azaad
Posted on: Jan 26, 2012 at 23:52 IST

In pespective of China and USA,these two countries are mere toys.Till they settle such talks have no meaning.Irony is they will never settle and life goes on in all countries under tension.

from: Ashok
Posted on: Jan 27, 2012 at 02:57 IST

"An eye for an eye only makes the world blind" is still relevent here. Rether than first use policy, why not use no use policy and dismantle the arsenal. If Pakistan should choose to use nuclear weapon against India successfully, before the polulation dies away, exhaust all our waste towards the north west and both populations should be taken care of. That is the stupidity of the stances of both governments that if nuclear weapons were to be used, there will be unmitigated disaster on our hands. The semantics of who uses this first will be truly lost as there will be very little left of the glorious civilisation in this region. China is not being strategic either as a huge nuclear expolsion is not going to be too far of chinese inhabitants.
Here is a modern indication for Gandhain principles. Destroy our nuclear arsenal and prove our intention to Pakistan. If they are foolish enough to chuck a few here, well then there will be very few to debate the rights and wrongs then!

from: Thodur Vasudevan
Posted on: Jan 27, 2012 at 05:14 IST

Any dialogue, whether an official or track-2, between these two
cultural partners appear nothing more than reiteration of the long
known rhetoric that characterizes these talks "they(Ind. & Pak) can
talk-on-the-table but can't turn-the table."
The deeds and the diplomacy resorted to by both the countries seldom
care about the agreements accepted by them at the table. Taking in
account the skewed political conditions in Pakistan with military,
judiciary, and parliament engaged in long played "hide and seek"
game and classical "blame-game" its quite natural that violations of
the T&Cs often stem from their sides. But India's responses to Pak's
military erection should be more prudent and more responsible
keeping in reckoning it's international stature. After all can we
afford to be as irresponsible as pak, as draconian as China,as
selfish as USA and deaf to our own ethos and appeal of non-violence
and "PANCH-SHEEL".

from: Ajeet K. Tiwari
Posted on: Jan 27, 2012 at 10:17 IST

India and Pakistan War.Shall we call it as a 3rd world war?A World War involving Asia.As endorsed by the Author,the time has come to mull over the consequences of this war if it happens.Surely,the losers will be the pakistanis and the hindustanis,AS Nuclear War is imminent.So,this causality of War and Nuclear War should be dealt internationally.India has always tried to offer an olive branch to the Paks,which the Paks have considered and ascertained as an ACT OF HUMILIATION AND MOCKERY.India has always maintained its NO-FIRST-GO policy and every Indian including me firmly believes this hypothesis.But,Pakistanis have never promised the same and will never do the same.Always ebullient with the support of USA and China ,they always try to instigate the cold relationship into fire.The reason lies behind the cloak of democracy which Paks are wearing.So,internationally some efforts should be entertained.

from: rahul
Posted on: Jan 27, 2012 at 13:15 IST

As a Pakistani, I believe that both countries should renounce their nuclear weapons programs We both have too many malnourished and uneducated people to take care of

from: Raza
Posted on: Jan 27, 2012 at 13:43 IST

is India enough capable to handle situation if pakistan use nuclear
weapoons against us?? What is the role of China in Indo-Pak nuclear unstability?

from: Gaurav Singh
Posted on: Jan 27, 2012 at 13:44 IST

nice article, but i think author should also have advocated for both the countries to sign CTBT. which can act as one of prominent grounds in CBM to avoid use of nuclear arsenals. Not only it will help in removing the ambiguity but also both nation can send a clear message of non-usage of nuclear bombs/devices during war.

from: Chitrabasu Khare
Posted on: Jan 28, 2012 at 00:52 IST

Wednesday, January 18, 2012

My interview on International Financial Times....

Why Pakistani Army Can’t Stage a Coup Now (EXCLUSIVE)


By BHASKAR PRASAD: Subscribe to Bhaskar's

January 18, 2012 1:11 AM EST

Tensions between Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and the military have risen over the SupremeCourt investigation into a purported government memo seeking help to prevent a possible military coup.

Pakistan's military neither has the will nor the ability to stage a coup, says Dr. Happymon Jacob, Assistant Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament at the Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.

In an exclusive interview with the International Business Times, Jacob says the military doesn't enjoy the support for a coup from the opposition, the media and the public at large.

Here are some excerpts.

Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani has won key backing in parliament. Will this put an end to the concerns in Pakistan about a military coup?

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Indeed, the likelihood of a military coup in Pakistan is lessened by this action of the Pakistani parliament. But let me hasten to add that the likelihood of a military coup has not been high right from the beginning. By not staging a coup, the Pakistan army is not doing a favour to Pakistan's fledgling democracy: it is not doing so because it is simply not in a position to do so. Had the same confluence of circumstances existed a decade ago, Pakistan would have already been under military rule.

Things have changed so drastically in contemporary Pakistan that the army realizes that it would be doing great disservice to itself by forcefully taking over the reins of the country. Moreover, the popular mood in today's Pakistan is against any sort of military takeover and in the event of a military coup, the people are unlikely to react positively let alone welcome it. This is clearly unlike the previous occasions when the military staged coups in Pakistan as large amounts of people used to welcome the coup or used to openly invite the military to dethrone the corrupt civilian leaders.

What is happening in Pakistan should be seen as positive and good for the democratic institutions of that country. It is important to note that the ongoing confrontation is not between the Pakistan army and the civilian government but between two civilian institutions: judiciary and the civilian government. That is nothing but the politics of a normal democracy and it should be seen as such.

What will be the role of judiciary in the situation? Does it favor the military over the civilian government?

I don't think that the judiciary is favoring Pakistan military over the civilian government. The judiciary is merely trying to strengthen the law of the land and to assert its rightful role in Pakistan's polity.

In that sense, even if Prime Minister Gilani would have to resign from his post because of the pressure from the Supreme Court, I would see that as good for Pakistan's democracy.

After all, let us fact it, Gilani is trying to cover up the wrongs committed by the Pakistani President, Zardari. While Gilani should be complimented for his courageous stance against the army, no credit can be given to him for challenging the judiciary in the name of safeguarding democratic institutions.

Is Pakistan moving in a dangerous direction with military once again showing its strength to control the country? Does it show the ineffectiveness of democracy in Pakistan?

In fact, I would think that the opposite is perhaps true. The military neither has the will nor the ability to stage a coup. And there is no support for a coup from the opposition, the media and the public at large as pointed out above.

What do you think of the possibility of Gilani completing his term? Is there possibility of an early election?

The jury is still out on that. If Gilani's government writes to the Swiss government for information relating to the graft charges against Zardari, there is a possibility that the court will let him go. But that is unlikely to be acceptable to Zardari and Pakistan People's Party (PPP).

It is possible that Zardari is contemplating his next steps in this game. He may replace Gilani, get close to the army and persuade them to reduce the heat on his government, take the credit for challenging the judiciary and cash on it in the upcoming elections.

If at all there is an election, will it be good or bad for Pakistan? Also which leader could emerge as the winner in such an early election?

One cannot say for sure whether an early election is going to benefit Pakistan, but it is certainly likely, under the circumstances, to benefit the PPP and Zardari. In any case, if the elections take place in the near future, it is possible that the PPP will get more seats than the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) as Imran Khan has suddenly hit a political roadblock. The more the election gets postponed, the more the gains of the PML (N) and Imran Khan will be.

Is it better for Pakistan in the present situation to come under military rule?

Not at all. I think Pakistan has started off on a new political journey and its results are only going to be positive for the country. Consider this: everything that we hear about Pakistan for the past month has been about politics, not jihad or Islamic extremism. That is surely good news.

What repercussion the present events could have on the relation with India? Does India prefer Pakistan to be an unstable democracy or an established military nation?


Not even once during the present crisis has there been an attempt from the Pakistani side to engage in diversionary war tactics against India. I think that a strong democracy in Pakistan is going to be good for India. The problem with military regimes is that if India signs peace deals with them, one can't be sure whether they will be given legitimacy by political parties. This is precisely what is happening with regard to the Musharraf formula on the Kashmir conflict. India-Pakistan back-channel negotiations during Musharraf's period had finalized a mutually acceptable solution for Kashmir, but the civilian government and political parties in Pakistan are unwilling to abide by that today.

URL: http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/283396/20120118/why-pakistani-army-t-stage-coup-now.htm