Resurrecting the Peace process

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

Yet another season of peace talks has arrived in Kashmir. The UPA’s Kashmir interlocutors have been discussing their resumption with the dissidents in Srinagar. These closed door meetings are expected to iron out the agenda and modus operandi of another peace process, following the abandonment of its precursor midway through 2005. Since then many things have changed in the region, in the state, in India and in Pakistan; the dynamics between all players have complicated and shifted. In this new environment it is necessary to ponder whether things have changed for better or worse. Does the contemporary political scenario lend itself more comprehensively towards a successful outcome this time? More importantly, has this latest process begun favourably, or are we headed for the fall already?

Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, the young, fiery yet sophisticated, moderate dissident is the flavour of the season. He is currently being courted by New Delhi to wade through the complexities of Kashmiri politics, and to preempt potential troubles in the Valley during the coming months. Essentially, this man of the moment is being courted to help revive the peace process - no small task. New Delhi understands that quiet in Kashmir is not necessarily indicative of contentment. The centre was caught off guard by the land transfer agitations and again vis-à-vis the Shopian rape-murder case. The Chief Priest of Kashmir has apparently responded positively despite these significant hiccups, saying that the “time to be anti-India is over.” This pragmatism is not a rejection of the rhetoric of dissent in favour of mainstream politics, but rather is an important reiteration of the need to talk peace.

Let us try and understand the regional context within which New Delhi and Srinagar are now operating. The regional environment has suffered overarching uneasiness between India and Pakistan since 26/11 and the two countries remain virtually isolated from one another, with what little contact there is notable for its awkwardness. The back-channel meetings that almost ‘finalized’ the fate of Kashmir just two years ago are a rapidly fading memory. In this new context what stands remarkable is the absence of Pakistan as a factor, directly or indirectly, in the peace process that is beginning to take shape between New Delhi and Srinagar. Also important is that Pakistan has been relatively silent on Kashmir in the recent past - the country seems to be too busy with itself.

This means, firstly, that at least some of the actors in the dissident camp who might look to Pakistan for broad political direction may find themselves without counsel. Secondly, pitching the J&K peace process as being unconnected from the larger India-Pakistan peace process may hamper the actors from reaching any ‘lasting’ or ‘final’ resolutions. Thirdly, and more importantly, the absence of Pakistan leaves India without the external political pressure required to motivate New Delhi to make worthwhile concessions. In other words, New Delhi would be speaking from a position of strength, unchallenged. The new dialogue may not, therefore, deliver many dividends.

What are the potential wildcards that may impact upon the process? I can see at least three in this dialogue that could take shape in the coming months. One, the hardliner Ali Shah Geelani and his Hurriyat faction may try to make the peace process appear as a meaningless exercise before the public. Yet it might not be possible for the other parties to include Geelani in the process since his preconditions may be unacceptable to them. Secondly, that the upcoming dialogue will likely be conducted without regard for Pakistan’s concerns, and without its involvement, means that it is unlikely to support whatever results may be achieved. Thirdly, it is widely believed that the ‘security establishment’ in New Delhi will not allow for any ‘radical’ solutions to Kashmir to be discussed. We may therefore be confronted with just another case of history repeating itself; reports suggest that New Delhi has added only a few limited soft issues as part of its peace offer this time around.

Of course, I concede that the idea of a dialogue between the conflicting parties is a good thing per se, and should be appreciated for that alone. However at the same time, initiating a dialogue without proper preparation and minus clear objectives and aims will surely make it a useless one, as we have seen in the past. More so, a dialogue that ends abruptly without concrete results not only creates bad blood among the parties concerned, but also increases the cynicism that exists among the people at large. I have, like many others, in the past underscored the need to look for and focus on any potential common positions among the various actors in J&K. There will be opportunities to revisit some of the aspects that have already been discovered if this dialogue goes ahead. New Delhi must also avoid limiting the dialogue to Mirwaiz Manzil alone as it prepares to talk afresh to the Kashmiri leadership. It should, for its own good, involve a cross section of Kashmiri moderate voices.

Now may not be the ideal season to resume the ever-precarious peace process if its outcome is to be positive. Yet too many seasons have already passed in Kashmir for that argument to hold water; perhaps it is not an ideal season that makes peace, but rather peace that makes the season ideal. The omens are no perfect, but then peace in Kashmir cannot wait for the arrival of perfect omens.

(Happymon Jacob teaches at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi).

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 29 September, 2009. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/today/full_story.asp?Date=29_9_2009&ItemID=19&cat=11 )

‘Our’ Kashmir-Myth

Let’s first unlearn each other and then learn afresh

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

First, a caveat: I do not speak for all Indians, of course, as I cannot, and I do not intend to be judgmental but merely self-reflective. It is personally difficult for me to unravel Kashmir’s complex mythology; it requires stepping out of my political comfort zone and asking some very confronting questions. Because if we Indians created the Kashmir-myths then I created them too; I am, after all, an Indian.

We, in the ‘rest of India’, have our own views and assumptions about Kashmir: right, wrong, misconceived, moderate, extreme and so on. We have held them for what seems like an eternity and do not often reflect over them. Most of these views are misconceived and yet they show no signs of erosion. Indeed, these views have a perverse tendency to reproduce and perpetuate themselves, to pass on from generation to generation and gather additional mythological content as they do. The bad news is that these views, to a large extent, form the collective Indian perception of Kashmir and Kashmiris, which is too frequently negative and oft dismissive. The good news, however, is that mythological and constructed that these perceptions are, they can be washed from our collective memory. Our Kashmir paradigm may be well-entrenched but not forever ingrained. Kashmir, in our imagination, lies far away, physically as well as psychologically, but to change our perceptions all we need to do is bring ourselves closer to Kashmir. We need to learn it.

To our detriment, we do not overly concern ourselves with historical nuances. Our political and social lives are rife with generalities and simplicities that feed into our perceptions. The Kashmirirs are a thankless people who have forgotten all that India has done for them - they survive on ‘our’ resources and manpower. The Kashmiri economy is kept alive on our toil. In a sense, therefore, Kashmir is a liability to the ‘rest of India’. Paradoxically though we also believe that Kashmir is an 'atoot ang' of the Indian nation. We are certain that Kashmiris aid and abet `terrorists’ sent from Pakistan to destabilize India. Pakistan, for one, has capitalized on our regional missteps and its more disreputable actors continue to take advantage of our dearth of knowledge. To our great disadvantage, many of us do not understand that the turmoil of the 1980s was a direct result of India’s imprudent meddling in J&K’s political process. That is why we were surprised when then Prime Minister AB Vajpayee said in 2002 that the forthcoming elections in J&K would be free and fair. We naively did not realize that the preceding ones were not.

We have very sophisticated double-standards. Any anti-establishment movement in Kashmir is considered an act of terrorism though our civil society and media praises those who stand up to the irresponsible and anti-people policies of the establishment in other parts of the country. We have strikes, shut-downs and darnas all over India on a daily basis; they are considered to be an essential part of our democratic life. But when Kashmiris protest against the heavy-handed excesses of the security forces or the administration, we cry foul. The Aarushi Talwar murder case is mourned by our civil society leaders but they failed to notice the Shopian rapes, or so it would seem. Azadi is blasphemous even as we do not bother to understand what it means (I am someone who always believed that azadi has many meanings). Kashmiris are hypocritical, we think, when they say that they want Indian forces gone from Kashmir: aren’t the forces there for their own safety? Some of us think that India has spoiled J&K with the enormous economic largesse it perpetually funnels into the state. “Stop giving them money and they will learn a lesson,” we declare, conveniently forgetting the thriving tourist industry that existed prior to the 1980s. Planeloads of visitors from all over the world arrived in Srinagar every day of the tourist season eager to experience India’s very own paradise. But such vital economic activity is the first causality in a trouble-torn state, and paradise was lost.

We are not keen to appreciate J&K’s political complexity and we hurry to paint Kashmiris with one brush: all anti-Indian colours. We celebrate political plurality in rest of India but not in J&K. When our Dalit leaders talk about self-respect for the downtrodden, when our women talk about equal participation in governance, when New Delhi’s politicians talk about the need to keep the military out of civilian life, when far flung regions of the country speak out against discrimination, and whenever the state is accused of being anti-people, we call it the resilience and vibrancy of our democracy. But when the Kashmiri complains of atrocities at the hands of the security forces we call it thankless. When they ask for the removal of the army from their schools and orchards we call it secessionist tendencies, and when they throw stones at security forces firing directly at them we call it an anti-national attitude. What we do not understand, and why we are utterly surprised at the Kashmiri’s uneasiness about having to live surrounded by security personnel, is that our only experience of the Indian army or paramilitary forces comes from Bollywood movies that show only sanitized scenes of the ideal Indian Jawan.

Why do we think this way? Our Kashmir paradigm has been carefully constructed from a multitudinous variety of historical, ideational, psychological and emotional building blocks. Many popular myths have been inculcated by us about Kashmir and continue to feed our collective understanding. These myths, as discussed above, gain sustenance from sources as diverse as our great power aspirations (“Kashmir is a hindrance in our onward journey towards great power status”), our arguments on secularism (“Kashmir means a lot to the secular fabric of our polity” – as if India’s secular polity is so feeble), our national pride (“whenever the Kashmiris create problems in the Valley it negatively affects Brand India”), and our sense of righteousness (“we are a great nation that has a culture of tolerance and sympathy going back thousands of years and so we cant really go wrong in Kashmir. We therefore simply must be doing the right thing there”).

Many of us make some appallingly jingoistic arguments: we cannot talk to separatists while our soldiers give up their lives in Kashmir; any concession to Kashmiris would lead to an undesirable domino effect; after all these small aberrations happen in the process of nation building. We hate anyone else talking about Kashmir. We know how to resolve our internal issues and do not need any advice whatsoever, thank you very much. There are also other tactical reasons such as the strategic importance of J&K to Indian security, the need to have victory in the ongoing zero-sum game against Pakistan, and the unwillingness of our intelligence agencies to let their political bosses grant concessions on Kashmir.

Finally, another caveat: there are many Indian opinions on Kashmir and rarely are they expressed in the somewhat exaggerated manner (exaggeration has its uses too) that I have used. I realize that not all opinions held by Kashmiris about the 'rest of India' and Indians are spectacularly progressive in nature, and that there may be many demonized India-myths circulating there. In the end, we need first to unlearn each other and then learn all over again, for a better tomorrow.

Source: Greater Kashmir, SEPTEMBER 08, 2009, URL:http://greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=8_9_2009&ItemID=34&cat=11)

Contemporary India-Pakistan Relations: a View From New Delhi

AIIA Policy Commentary

Published by the Australian Institute of International Affairs, June 2009

URL: http://www.aiia.asn.au/associations/8220/files/Complete_Pakistan.pdf

UPA’s Foreign Policy: A Critique

By Happymon Jacob, Kimberley Layton

Source: Economic & Political Weekly, June 20, 2009 vol xliv no 25

URL: http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/13631.pdf

Pakistan: need for smart diplomacy

Pakistan: need for smart diplomacy

Amitabh Mattoo & Happymon Jacob

India should be systematically working towards constructing a Pakistan that is at peace with itself and in harmony with the region.

It has been clear for some years now that there are few other states in the international system more troubled than Pakistan. And yet, tragically, the Indian debate — academic as well as at the policy-level — reflects neither an appreciation of the complexity of the situation nor a recognition that Pakistan needs to be dealt with at multiple levels, even (and especially) after the Mumbai attacks. Instead, we witness routinely (in the soundbyte-driven media di scussions and predictable seminars) knee-jerk responses — even from otherwise sage former diplomats and intelligence officers — which suggest that even after 61 years, the Indian policy establishment does not really understand Pakistan.

In this sense, the failure of Pakistan is as much the failure of India. Can the inability to stabilise a troubled neighbour inspire confidence outside the immediate landscape? Can India really become a great power when it cannot even influence, leave alone pacify, its own “backyard?” Should India not have a more nuanced and deeper understanding of the range of forces operating in the country? But can India really develop a thoughtful and comprehensive understanding of Pakistan when we have virtually no academic expert or policy analyst who can speak, say, Pashto or Balochi? And should India not be systematically working towards constructing a Pakistan that is at peace with itself and in harmony with the region? Mea culpa is, unfortunately, not a term that exists in the Indian diplomatic or academic dictionary.

The reality is that much of the contemporary Indian analysis of Pakistan is rooted in a blinkered, and often partial, and simplistic understanding of the country as it exists today, and drawn, often, from crude textbook readings of the realist discourse in international relations. Pakistan is not a rational, unitary and univocal actor capable of making coherent foreign and defence policy decisions, or of executing them in a predictable and reliable manner. It is this misconstruction of the nature of the Pakistani state and society that sadly informs the Indian policy, for instance, of nuclear deterrence, compellance, the fight against terrorism and even the composite dialogue. Not surprisingly then, the policy does not and will not work. Contemporary Pakistan is not just another country that can be dealt with by following the well-known axioms of international politics or bilateral diplomacy.

Pakistan’s potential futures

Given the many challenges that Pakistan faces today, we argue that it has at least four potential futures: Fractured Pakistan, Fascist-Islamist Pakistan, Failed Pakistan and, Friendly Pakistan.

The first image is of a Fractured Pakistan. This is the Pakistan the world is faced with today: a state that has been (for at least a couple of decades or more now) on a trajectory that is counter-productive and self-destructive. It is a Pakistan that runs with the hare and hunts with the hounds; creates Frankensteins that confront the maker; rides a tiger from which it is unable to dismount; and bleeds itself almost to death in an attempt to bleed its enemy through a thousand cuts. It is a state that is reaping what it has sown for several decades now. It fits every cliché on the dangers of being short-sighted, tactical and double-faced.

This is a Pakistan which is permanently on the edge of a precipice, with competing centres of power, and increasingly out of the control of even the strongest institution: the army. A Fractured Pakistan would maintain an unpleasant status quo with India and the region, even if it is hurting itself in the process. Elements within the state would fight the jihadis, on the one hand, and others would encourage them, on the other. The state would be in denial of any internal disequilibrium and its almost pathological hostility towards India would increasingly be the only glue that would seem to bind its fractured divisions. A Fractured Pakistan could well descend into a Fascist or Failed Pakistan.

A Fascist-Islamist Pakistan is the worst-case scenario projected by the Cassandras of the strategic community. A state that would be taken over by the jihadis, thanks to the material and ideological help provided by the Taliban, the al-Qaeda, and, to some extent, the rising prominence of the Pakistani army’s ‘Zia bhartis.’ A Fascist-Islamist Pakistan would not just be dangerous and unpredictable but could also become an exaggerated version of Afghanistan under Mullah Omar’s Taliban rule. It goes without saying that the security of India and the rest of the world would be seriously jeopardised if the jihadis were able to gain control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

A Failed Pakistan would be a state that would disintegrate and divide itself into multiple entities. Warlordism, civil war, huge refugee flows, a rise in crime, and the probable spread of a radical, violence-based sectarian ideology would be some of the markers of a failed Pakistan. India, all those who glee at the prospect of a Failed Pakistan should remember, would be a natural target for all the dangerous forces unleashed by Pakistan’s disintegration.

Finally, and unlikely as it seems today, there still exists a possibility of a Friendly Pakistan. It would be rooted in Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s original design for the state: Muslim, Moderate and Modern. It is this Pakistan that an Indian grand strategy must systematically work towards constructing.

Indian grand strategy

India’s grand strategy, we argue, should include a careful application of moral, political and soft power resources; multilayered employment of diplomacy, communication and smart power; and sophisticated coordination of global, regional, bilateral and domestic means to engage Pakistan.

Pakistan, as Richard Holbrooke’s visit reminded us, is no longer just a South Asian conundrum. We will continue to see ‘special envoys’ dispatched to the region with unprecedented frequency. New Delhi, instead of reacting uneasily to what it sees as unnecessary interference in its ‘sphere of influence’ should confidently join such initiatives. This would create the space in which it may become possible to build international and regional coalitions/consensus to help Pakistan move from being fractured to friendly.

But the most important part of this grand strategy is bilateral. Managing the bilateral segment of the grand strategy is perhaps our biggest challenge. India needs to use “smart diplomacy” to engage more than one internal actor in Pakistan, and at various levels. It must take imaginative unilateral steps to empower moderate voices and build real stakeholders. India’s vibrant civil society must be encouraged to engage with Pakistan. While Kashmir may need to be dealt with “symbolically,” it is on the issue of water that Pakistan and Pakistanis will need real reassurance and accommodation.

We should make much greater use of South Asia’s traditional liberal Islam to confront the radicalisation of Pakistan. But soft power has other uses as well. The acclaimed Pakistani novelist, Mohsin Hamid, was asked by Dawn: if he took a break from fiction to pen the script for a Punjabi blockbuster, how would the plot unfold? He responded: “In an operations centre, deep below Heera Mandi in Lahore, a fat man with a moustache receives his briefing. He is a secret agent, code-named Suth Panja, and his mission, if he chooses to accept it, is to infiltrate India and kidnap the one man who can revitalise Lollywood.” All this does not preclude what New Delhi may or may not do to confront those elements that are as much an enemy of moderate Pakistan as they are of India.

This grand strategic approach to dealing with Pakistan is in no way exhaustive, but we hope that it will be a step towards realising that complex problems can be addressed only in a comprehensive manner. Piecemeal and half-hearted approaches simply will not deliver.

(Amitabh Mattoo and Happymon Jacob are Professors at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.)

(Source: The Hindu, February 25, 2009. URL: http://www.thehindu.com/2009/02/25/stories/2009022555381000.htm )

Omar’s Tryst with Kashmir’s Destiny

Let’s see how it’s going to prove for Kashmiris

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

Yet another era in the politics of Jammu and Kashmir has begun, and begun with the right dose of fanfare, symbolism, and politically correct gestures by both the winning and the losing parties. Omar Abdullah has sent out portents of hope to one and all in the troubled state of Kashmir, á la Obama. The Muftis have promised to be a responsible and constructive opposition in the State Assembly; the dissidents have been mostly silent without knowing what to do and where to go; New Delhi thinks its job in Kashmir is over with the free and fair elections that it conducted; and the people of J&K are waiting, yet again, for the blue-eyed Abdullah scion to make their lives better.

Omar Abdullah is a well-meaning person, as well as being politically mature and unafraid of some administrative experimentation, but he still needs to clarify his vision for J&K’s future. He and his party have not progressed beyond basic ‘campaign utterances’ regarding their plans for the days ahead. Newspaper reports have indicated that the NC is working on a vision document which is likely to be released shortly. Omar should not however, in his youthful enthusiasm to get life back on track in Kashmir, attempt to plan for the state’s future all on his own. Kashmir’s mainstream politicians, of whom he is the torchbearer now, ought not try to appropriate the politically significant task of designing J&K’s path all by themselves. They must entice the major actors from the other side of the political divide, namely the dissident leadership, over into the political mainstream. Now is the ideal time for doing so for a number of significant reasons. 

First of all, dissent in Kashmir is no longer considered to be the politics of the outcast – it is fast becoming the politics of the politically aware. The contours of its symbolism are evolving into a more mature, more vital form of political activity. After all, shouldn’t a space for (constructive) political dissent be provided, and indeed dissent itself be considered sacrosanct, in a vibrant democracy like our own? Secondly, the azadi politics of the Kashmir valley have calmed somewhat and moderate actors there are now more willing to negotiate. It is true that there are extremists among the dissident groups. However, extremist politics are likely to be rendered redundant sooner rather than later if the radicals do not rethink the fundamentals of their political positions and demands. Thirdly, the ball is now firmly in the court of the mainstream actors. They are fresh with a popular mandate and can therefore negotiate with the dissidents from a position of strength. Finally, failing to make political inroads into the ‘enemy’ camp now risks worsening the political discontent in the Valley and will make the future pathway more difficult to tread. Omar should therefore use this historic juncture in the annals of Kashmir’s politics to preach peace to those not ‘converted’. 
The first step in strategizing such a plan of action could be initiating one-on-one ‘low key’ parleys with the more moderate leadership of the dissident movement. Considering the fact that much of their political platform is founded on the genuine aspirations of Kashmiris, the mainstream leadership should engage in an ongoing, yet ‘offbeat’, dialogue with the dissident leadership. Omar, with his youthful and marketable political stances, must take the lead. The second and perhaps the most important step, is to adopt some of the primary demands proposed by the dissident leaders in their own documents and plans. It is acceptable for the ruling party (National Conference) to have its own vision document for the state’s future, but the Chief Minister should not be bound by the party line.

Omar Abdullah can, and therefore should, think beyond partisan politics in terms of the larger issues and problems of the state. With decades of political career ahead of him, he has the time and, almost paradoxically, the youthful ingenuousness that just might be able to bridge the huge political gaps that exist in J&K. Omar has arrived at a time when he could very well save the state from its present state of hopelessness, or at least make some serious inroads. His recent announcement about the need to set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission is a concerted step in the right direction. However, Omar needs to recognize and appreciate the development of the idea of such a Commission; there are others, such as Sajad Lone, who have floated the concept prior to him.  Acknowledgement of the way other actors, from other sections of the political landscape of J&K, have made (and continue to make) valuable contributions to political activity within the state is imperative if the new Chief Minister is to bridge the gaps discussed above.    

What would Omar Abdullah’s comprehensive vision document look like? The document, as previously discussed, should adopt key demands from other actor’s proposals as well as ‘solutions’ suggested by the various mainstream and non-mainstream parties of J&K. It should address four key aspects: psychological, material, political and cross-LoC dynamics. The proposed Truth and Reconciliation Commission could be the first step in addressing the psychological needs of the Kashmiri people. Lone’s Achievable Nationhood has already comprehensively discussed possible strategies for addressing the socio-psychological wounds inflicted on the citizens of J&K.  Material aspects need no elaboration: the people overwhelmingly voted for a government that can cater to their bijli, sadak, paani issues. Omar now needs to force the administration of the second-most corrupt state in the country to help him deliver what he has promised to those voted him into office. 
The political dimension is arguably the most important aspect of all, and the most difficult to negotiate. However, on the positive side, there are some well thought-out blueprints for action on it. A plethora of ideas for creating a set of broad-based political options to resolve the Kashmir issue be drawn from projects such as Lone’s Achievable Nationhood, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq’s United States of Kashmir, the PDP’s Self Rule Proposal and NC’s own autonomy proposal, to name but a few.  Finally, peace and stability in J&K will be the product of cross-LoC connections. More than ever before the political parties in J&K, as well as the governments in India and Pakistan, are open and positive toward creating cross-LoC links, and better: they are talking about it. Omar should make use of the widespread goodwill that currently exists for this idea and take steps to direct the idea to fruition. 

The year 2008 has been both positive and negative for J&K: the people of the state made it clear to the leadership in Srinagar and New Delhi that they are still unafraid to take the streets when they feel marginalized and ignored. They are similarly unafraid to participate politically and to use what power they have in defiance of the many obstacles that confront them; Kashmiri’s lined up in huge numbers at polling booths to hammer home the message to the dissidents that there is no space for irresponsible politics in their lives. 2009 has dawned with a new leadership, new chances for constructive action, and a new sense of hope in Jammu and Kashmir. One hopes that this encouraging start is a sign that there are only good things to come in the future of the troubled state, and it is now up to Omar Abdullah to lead the way.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, January 23, 2009. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=21_1_2009&ItemID=21&cat=11 )

Responses to my article in the Hindu "26/11 and India’s Pakistan dilemma"

January 7, 2009, The Hindu

Opinion - Letters to the Editor    

Pakistan’s dilemma

Contrary to the claim that the Indian government handled the diplomatic aftermath of the Mumbai attacks in an inept manner (“26/11 and India’s Pakistan dilemma,” Jan. 5), I feel it was very tactful in dealing with Pakistan and mobilising international support for its cause. Never before has Pakistan been under such severe international pressure to bring the perpetrators of a terror attack to book. As for the change in the attitude of the Zardari government, it was because of the pressure from the Pakistan Army and the ISI which wield real power in Pakistan.

Peace with Pakistan is necessary but not at the cost of Indian lives. India should take concrete and offensive action, including military action if necessary, to rein in the unruly neighbour.

Anjan Kumar Sahu,

New Delhi

***

The real power in Pakistan lies with the Punjabi feudal class, Islamist militants and the military. The claim that the friendly Zardari regime backtracked because of India’s rhetoric is not true. It was the fear of the military which made it change its stance.

It is no use talking to Pakistan or helping it to stabilise. The psyche of Pakistan’s ruling class is to destroy India. Its military rulers want a common enemy to unite their divided country and India serves their purpose.

Johnson Mathai,

Indore

***

The way India handled the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks reflected its maturity. Rather than attacking Pakistan, it decided to launch a shaming campaign against it bringing it under insurmountable international pressure to dismantle the terror infrastructure on its territory.

Shivendra Srivastava,

Jamshedpur

***

The article is right is saying the Indian government handled the diplomatic aftermath of the 26/11 attacks in an inept manner. Aggressive diplomacy does not bear fruit in the long run, as seen in the case of Afghanistan and Israel.

At this point of time when the world is reeling under an economic recession, a war with Pakistan would amount to hara-kiri. We should continue with the peace process.

Y.V.K. Ravi Kumar,

Hyderabad

***

Diplomatic efforts to strengthen Pakistan’s civilian government appear to be a sane course as all steps taken so far have yielded no visible results. But a civilian government takes time to tackle well-entrenched interests, including fundamentalism.

Talking to the Pakistan government directly or through Track 2 diplomatic channels is a well-advised option.

M.B. Bhatt,

Chennai

(Source URL: http://www.hindu.com/2009/01/07/stories/2009010753871003.htm )