Shootout at LoC: In perspective

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

The recent India-Pakistan conflict on the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir and the war of words have grave implications for the future of the bilateral ties for the two countries. The conflict along the LoC, while not unprecedented since scores of them take place every year, has escalated due to a combination of factors: the hawkish claims of the Indian media, increasingly outspoken Indian armed forces, the Congress government which is unclear which direction to take the India-Pakistan dialogue process and the characteristic denial of the Pakistani state of what has been done to the dead bodies of the Indian soldiers. While the Central government, unwilling to articulate a clear policy towards Pakistan and follow it up with conviction, is on the back foot on the issue, it is the Chiefs of the Indian Army and Air Force along with a collection of retired military officers, egged on by the media, who seem to be articulating an Indian response to the Pakistani aggression on the LoC.  

New Delhi wanted to continue with ‘business as usual’ with Pakistan, but the Indian military and the overzealous, if not militant, media stalled those plans. This is a clear indication that New Delhi’s Pakistan policy lacks direction, conviction and courage. 

Dangers of conflict escalation
That the senior most military officers in India have chosen to convey to Pakistan that India would not mind “escalating” the conflict if Pakistan does not stop engaging in ceasefire violations is both puzzling and disconcerting. The BJP went on to ask the government to engage in “controlled military response” against Pakistan!” Former BJP minister Yashwant Sinha argued, “Who says that if you have a limited controlled military response then it will necessarily result in war?” These arguments by the military and the Chief opposition party in India seem to sum up the conventional wisdom in the country on the utility of flexible responses in responding to Pakistan in times of crisis.  

Anyone with an elementary understanding of conflict escalation under nuclear conditions would surely refrain from articulating such views for the simple reason that the escalation dynamics under nuclear conditions would be inherently unpredictable and unstable, especially when high-running nationalistic passions dictate defence policies. The fact of the matter is that in nuclear South Asia, flexible options without the risk of a nuclear catastrophe are simply unavailable. The biggest challenge for the leaders of the two sides today is to put in place robust mechanisms that can ensure crisis stability – strong incentives not to carry out a preemptive attack on the adversary in times of crisis of this kind. 

The flag meeting that took place between the two armies is an excellent mechanism to ensure crisis stability so is the hotline between the two DGMOs. However, there is a need to think of more innovative ways of maintaining crisis stability in the region. 

The costs of conflict
While it is clear that there are no winners in this kind of a confrontation, there are clear losers in unfortunate events such as this. In short, what happens in conflicts such as this is the following: minor skirmishes or misunderstandings lead to a militarized crisis, media then drives passions, CBMs are suspended and a war of words ensue, and eventually the conflict is deescalated. Finally bilateral relations are back to how they were before the crisis begun minus, of course, the CBMs that were suspended during the crisis. It takes yet more rounds of negotiations for the CBMs to restart and trust to be built. This ‘one-step-ahead-two-steps-backward’ sequence of events seems to characterize India Pakistan bilateral relations.  

To my mind, India loses from this kind of conflict far more than Pakistan. Why? The fact is that if India wants to become the global power that it would like to, it has no option but to stabilize its fronts. India’s economic growth and rise in its global political power will be severely hampered by what happens in Pakistan and as a result in Kashmir. Hence India would be shooting at its own foot if it tries to break off the peace process and sever relations with the civilian government in Islamabad. The fact is that New Delhi needs Islamabad and GHQ to reign in the terror groups in Pakistan. 

India has also gained more from the ongoing (?) peace process than has Pakistan. There is already a strong feeling in Pakistan that the peace process is more in favour of India than Pakistan and it is being taken forward on India’s terms and conditions. The argument is premised on the facts that the traditionally core issue of political resolution of Kashmir and demilitarisation of Siachen, something that Islamabad and GHQ are very keen to see resolved, are relegated to the backburner and ‘secondary’ issues like trade and easing of visa restrictions, important from the Indian point of view, are being pursued. 

If this argument is true, that is Pakistan has no great interest in seeing this peace process survive in which India has great stakes, then we should recognize that it would be foolish for New Delhi to even consider severing the dialogue process with Islamabad. 

Moreover, if India wants to see genuine political transformation in Pakistan, it should make sure that the hands of the civilian government in Islamabad, one that is going to complete its full term for the first time in the country’s history, is strengthened, rather then weakened, by its actions.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, January 20, 2013. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Jan/20/shootout-at-loc-in-perspective-30.asp )

The mindless LoC killings

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

The tit-for-tat barbarian killings of the Indian and Pakistani soldiers by each other along the LoC and the passions running high on each side spearheaded by the ultranationalist media is straight out of a medieval military mindset. Not only has the media on both sides been asking for more and more blood to trump up their TRP ratings, but a prominent Indian news channel, absurdly, also argued it was OK for the Pakistani army to kill Indian soldiers: “Retaliation OK, but mutilation unacceptable”! 
The ongoing Indo-Pak killing spree is unfortunate and will undoubtedly be a major set back for the India-Pakistan peace process. But before we get to that, let us look at the barebones account of what happened/is happening.

Facts and FictionThere seems to be a great deal of misunderstanding among the general public that this is the first ceasefire violation that is happening along the LoC. That is inaccurate as every year tens of such violations take place. Indeed, in 2011 alone there were around 120 ceasefire violations. The fact is that these violations take place quite regularly, and sometimes even lives are lost. Secondly, media on both sides of the divide seem to project that only soldiers belonging to their respective side have lost lives. Again, as we know both Indian and Pakistani soldiers have lost their lives as well as villagers in Kashmir, and that is unfortunate: a life lost is a life lost, Indian, Pakistani or Kashmiri. The third fact to consider is that soldiers, all over the world, when seeking revenge for the killing of their colleagues, do engage in the torture of enemy soldiers. While it is the Pakistani side that has engaged in this barbaric act this time (in retaliation to the killing of one of their soldiers by the Indian side), let us not fool ourselves in thinking that the Indian side has never engaged in such acts. The Pakistani media has often carried stories of Indian brutalities. 

Is there a Pakistani strategy behind all this?
An important question to be asked at this point is whether the Pakistani side has any clever strategy behind the present ceasefire violation that has led to this crisis? Frankly, I don’t think so. I can’t see any political, diplomatic or military benefit that Islamabad or Rawalpindi can get out of this. Was it a strategy to put pressure on the Indian side to resolve the Kashmir conflict? Unlikely, as Pakistan knows by now that such a strategy would never lead to the resolution of Kashmir. Was it a repeat of Kargil type stealth strategy wherein Pakistan was trying to sneak its soldiers into the Indian territory and then fight to retain it? Such a scenario is also unlikely as lessons from Kargil have convinced Pakistan that such a strategy would not work. 

Or is it the Pakistan Army’s way of showing its displeasure with the ongoing peace process between New Delhi and the civilian establishment in Islamabad and thereby indicating that it wants the peace process to be suspended? Again, this to me does not seem to be the logic since Pak army has recently been making noises about the need to confront the internal ghosts rather than worrying about India. More importantly, a charitable explanation would suggest that letting the peace process go on would give the Pak army the necessary time to focus on the internal problems, recuperate and then focus on India, if need be, when the internal issues are settled. But the fact is that its internal problems are far from over. Indeed, they are constantly increasing. 

If anything, this event will frustrate Pakistan’s ‘normalisation’ process and its much-needed focus on domestic issues. The peace process is in Pakistan’s interest as much as it is in India’s interest. Hence, Pakistan will stand to lose from this crisis as much as India would. 

What about the return of Tahir-ul-Qadri who has been challenging the Pakistani establishment since his return from Canada? Has his return to Pakistan, the wide publicity he is receiving and the fear that he may, at this rate, influence the outcome of this year’s elections in Pakistan prompted Pakistani establishment to engage in a classic diversionary tactic? Again, I don’t think that is the case purely because the sequence of events does not suggest that. Qadri returned to Pakistan on the 23rd of December and the roots of this crisis predate that. 

Implications
What are the long-term implications of this crisis? Clearly, the ongoing crisis has shown how fragile the Indo-Pak dialogue peace process is. If this kind of an incident has the potential to deeply frustrate the Indo-Pak dialogue, what would be the result of a repeat of Mumbai? Secondly, the many CBMs between the two sides are likely to be stalled. Pakistan has already suspended the Srinagar-Muzzaffarabad bus. The cross-LoC trade between India and Pakistan in Kashmir is put on hold due to the crisis and the traders are losing huge amounts of their investments. Finally, this crisis shows the how much each side distrusts the other. 

What is ironical is that while India does not trust any inquiry conducted by Pakistan into the mutilation of the bodies of the Indian soldiers, it also does not accept any international inquiry since it does not want to internationalise the issue. And what is unfortunate is the manner in which Pakistan goes about denying that its soldiers have actually crossed into India and did what it did. It’s perhaps time to think of innovative ways of resolving the crisis.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 13 January, 2013. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Jan/13/the-mindless-loc-killings-10.asp )

India’s Regional Dilemmas

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

India has long been accused of being the regional hegemon that often tries to intervene in the internal affairs of its smaller South Asian neighbours, or bully them into doing its bidding. Many of the country’s neighbours maintain that the various Indian institutions, especially its bureaucracy, continue to think and behave like the erstwhile British Empire. While there may or may not be some truth in that, recent developments in the region tell a different story altogether. 

The Maldivian government recently decided to declare the multi-year contract that it had signed with the India-based G. M. Rao Group to run their international airport, and did so unilaterally without heeding to requests from New Delhi to reconsider its decision. India’s new External Affairs Minister Salman Kurshid’s calls to his counterpart in Maldives did not manage to convince the country to alter its decision. Remember, India provides a great deal of economic and military assistance to the tiny state in the Indian Ocean region. Indeed, last year when the then President of Maldives was dethroned in a not-so-proper manner, he had asked India to intervene and reinstate him as the President. He was widely considered to be close to India, but New Delhi did nothing. It simply did not want to interfere in the internal politics of another sovereign country. Reports now indicate, or least G. M Rao, the head of GMR Group, claims, that ‘foreign hands’ – meaning Chinese – were responsible for the ouster of the GMR Group from Maldives. 

Take the case of Sri Lanka. Developments in the last few years show that the island county, which recently managed to militarily defeat the LTTE, is no more dependent on or tolerant of India as it used to for many decades in the past including officially requesting India to intervene in its internal affairs to defeat the LTTE. India did not even provide Colombo with weapons let alone actively intervening Sri Lanka’s civil war after its intervention there in the late 1980s went terribly wrong. But the Chinese sensed an opportunity and helped Colombo, again. Now, as a result, Colombo and Sri Lanka are getting closer by the day. 

In Myanmar, prior to its ongoing transition phase (of becoming a normal mature democracy), India was asked by the democratic forces there including its leader Ang San Sukyi and the international community, though in indirect terms, to play a role in leading Myanmar towards democracy. India did not do so primarily because of the Chinese closeness to Myanmar’s junta. India feared that if it went against the ruling military regime in Myanmar it would pave the way for an increased involvement of China there which would be against India’s strategic interests. Nor could India make up its mind to support the Junta fearing reprisals from the pro-democracy activists and the international community. As a result, India did not have traction with either of the groups, the junta or the pro-democracy groups. India was losing out either way. Ang San Sukyi said in a recent interview in New Delhi that she had wished that India had done more to help the cause of democracy in Myanmar. 

What do all these mean?  Is India really losing its influence and sway in the region? For the land of Jawaharlal Nehru, who was one of the most respected world leaders of his time, an architect of the Non Aligned Movement and contributed a great deal to resolving many international conflicts, these failures in the neighbourhood can be seen as a historic low. For a country that is so often criticized for its hegemonic behavior in the neighbourhood, it doesn’t even seem to be able to take care of its genuine business interests in the region. 

What explains this incongruence between perceptions and results in the Indian behavior towards the region? There seem to be a number of variables at play here. First of all, there is a clear Chinese angle here which offsets the Indian efforts in the region. China is willing to extend military, economic and other forms of help to the various South Asian states with hardly any preconditions attached. Their fundamental objective is strategic leverage and economic benefit in the pursuit of which they are willing to forgo ethical and human rights considerations. Chinese involvement in Myanmar and Sri Lanka are clear examples of that. This has frustrated the Indian policy in the region since India is constrained by a number of non-strategic and non-economic factors in its foreign policy pursuits. The second aspect is the lack of institutional coordination and the general lack of foreign policy purpose. Often there is no cohesive and consultative foreign and foreign economic strategy making by the various concerned Indian institutions in India. 

Thirdly, Indian foreign policy pursuits and behaviour are severely hamstrung by deeply ingrained normative considerations and moral dilemmas that the country has inherited over many decades of its independence as well as from its own non-violent freedom struggle. For India, its foreign policy decisions and commitments have to pass the test of its moral preconditions and ethical standards. This means that apart from the fact that it would find it difficult to interfere in the internal affairs of another state and support regimes that violate human rights of its people, it would also find it difficult to forgo its peaceful and defensive posturing to engage in force projection outside its borders. These self-perceived moral and ethical aspects are now further ‘complicated’ by India’s openness to and interface with various international normative standards. 

There are no easy answers to any of these dilemmas faced by India especially when there is another actor that is quite willing to operate under a completely different set of standards which gives a certain ‘freedom of choice’ to the many states of India’s neighbourhood.

(SOurce: Greater Kashmir, December 23, 2012. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/Dec/23/india-s-regional-dilemmas-21.asp )

Bon Voyage, Mirwaiz

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

The All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC-M) leadership is currently in Pakistan after a gap of five years to hold discussions with the Pakistani leadership, creating yet another controversy. I have often been critical of APHC’s political course of action despite the personal admiration that I have for the Mirwaz, Umar Faroq, and some of the others in the group. For one, but for the calm and non-condescending personality of Umar Farooq, the coalition of over 20 parties would not have stayed under the same political roof for such a long time. 

Not unsurprisingly, the APHC and the Mirwaiz are being criticized by a number of Kashmiri intellectuals for undertaking this trip to Pakistan: while some of it is valid, most of the criticism is unfair and misplaced. Here’s why. 

Limited agenda and bad timing 
Critics are right that the APHC is visiting Pakistan with a limited agenda and at a bad time. While one wonders why APHC chose to visit Pakistan at a time when Pakistan itself is in deep political flux. Didn’t they know that in politics timing is everything? The elections are around the corner in Pakistan and the present regime there is most likely going to lose power in upcoming elections. The current President may not even be in the country after the elections thanks to the many cases of corruption pending against him. Hence anything that APHC discusses with the current regime will bear limited dividends in the days to come. I think there is some validity in this argument. What about the rationale for the visit? I am not too convinced that the APHC could have asked for anything better under the circumstances. Let me explain. First of all, so much water has gone under the bridge since the 2007 visit of APHC to Pakistan. For one, Indo-Pak relations and the peace process were at their height in 2007 and more so there was a certain peace deal that was being finalized between the two sides with the full knowledge of the AHPC (they may or may not acknowledge that though). Today, the dialogue process is just picking up; the major stakeholders in the region are waiting for the US-NATO pullout to begin from Afghanistan; and nothing in New Delhi and Islamabad will have any political shape or form till the new governments come to power in these two countries. Hence there are far too many variables that need to fall in place for anything concrete to happen on something as vexed as the Kashmir conflict. So under these circumstances, the APHC could have either waited or started mediating: they have chosen the latter.  

More so, the two countries have now seriously begun their talks on all outstanding issues including Kashmir. Therefore, it makes perfect sense for the APHC to insist that the Kashmiri opinion is heard when they talk to each other about Kashmir. 

It’s now or God-knows-when
Secondly, five years, let’s face it, is a very long time. If the APHC does not visit Pakistan now, they might as well wait for three more years since one hopes that by 2015 we might have a clearer understanding of where the region is heading. So it’s now or God-knows-when. 

But then why visit Pakistan at all? Let me quote the Mirwaiz: “The purpose of the visit would be to bring Kashmir to the fore. We would stress on Islamabad to bring Kashmir back on its agenda…we want to clear the impression that the CBMs on small issues like trade are not going to help Kashmir. You have to address Kashmir issue to bring permanent stability in South Asia.”

To do so the APHC will be meeting with Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf, Foreign Minister Heena Rabbani Khar, PML-N Chief Nawaz Sharief, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf leader Imran Khan and leaders form the PAK.

To my mind, for the APHC to have achieved anything more than this is asking for far too much. 

Why it is a good visit
I would go on to argue that there is a symbolic political value to this visit. First of all, by planning and undertaking this important political visit the APHC is proving that they still have the resourcefulness and wisdom to negotiate between the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan which happens to be the primary aim of the coalition. Indeed, this visit should be seen in keeping with one of the declared aims of APHC as laid down in their constitution: “To make endeavour for an alternative negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dispute amongst all the three parties to the dispute -- India, Pakistan and people of the Jammu and Kashmir -- under the auspices of UN or any other friendly countries, provided that such settlement reflects the will and aspirations of the people of the state.”
Secondly, this visit also highlights the distinct and special place that Kashmir has in Indo-Pak relations. What should be noted here is that this visit is being organized with the green signal from New Delhi. 

While APHC’s critics have used this to argue that it is acting under the directions of New Delhi, I would adopt a different line of argument. APHC is not an underground organization and if it has to visit Pakistan to talk to them on behalf of the Kashmiri people, there is no way they can do so without the go ahead from New Delhi. This does not in any way mean that APHC is compromising on their basic goals by deciding to use Indian travel documents: after all, this visit is a part of the agenda to change that very status quo. More so, if the declared objective of the APHC is to negotiate between the two states, how can they do so without visiting, meeting and talking to the two sides? Indeed, if anything, the Hurriyat has to be more proactive in talking to both India and Pakistan. 

In other words, what the APHC’s detractors are missing is the political message and symbolism of this visit. How often do you see a dissident group from India visiting a foreign country to negotiate between the two countries? Never. That is precisely what the Mirwaiz and the senior leadership of the APHC is doing in Pakistan now and that is precisely why they are doing the right thing.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 16 December 2012. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/Dec/16/bon-voyage-mirwaiz-19.asp )

Why death penalty is immoral

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

Killing someone is not an occasion to celebrate. Indeed, rejoicing as a nation at the killing of someone, even if he is a dreaded terrorist or criminal, shows the moral degradation of that society. If anything, the detailed, blow-by-blow account of the events relating to the hanging of Ajmal Amir Kasab, the terrorist who shot scores of innocents in Mumbai on 26/11, and the ensuing ‘widespread celebration’ thereafter, are deeply disturbing and forces one to reflect over crime, punishment and moral progress in our country. 

Death penalty as spectator sport 
Popular reactions and the jubilant media coverage of the ‘secret execution’ of Kasab bears an uncanny resemblance to the use of death penalty as a sport in 18th century Europe, intended for purposes of deterrence and to demonstrate the might of the state. Public execution of condemned prisoners even earned the state some revenue as spectators had to pay to witness the gory sight (there were of course no TV channels that could boost up their TRP ratings then!). The Taliban in Afghanistan as well as some other countries continue to use the method of public execution. Killing of criminals by the state, in public or private, negatively affects the moral core of the society as it clearly violates the sanctity of human life. More so, there is a thin line between the use of death penalty for deterrence and public execution as spectator sport as both the acts end up legitimizing the killing of another human being. What is problematic here is the killing of a human person; legitimate or not depends on the moral order that one lives in. In any case, empirical research has shown that death penalty only kills the criminal, not the crime. There is no correlation between the two and so we have to conclude that deterrence cannot be the logic behind the death penalty. 

Meaning of justice 
One of the major claims made by the supporters of death penalty is that by awarding death to the perpetrator of a heinous crime the state is providing justice to the victim’s families. While this is a powerful argument, one fails to see how killing the criminal can provide justice to the victim’s family. Notwithstanding the fact that the state, as per this line of argumentation, is seen as a ‘contract killer’, what it actually does, on many occasions, by killing the criminal, is ‘compensating’ for real justice that it is unable/unwilling to provide. The EU memorandum on death penalty, for instance, says: “capital punishment should not be seen as an appropriate way of compensating the suffering of crime victims’ families, as this view turns the justice system into a mere tool of illegitimate private vengeance.” In other words, most states limit their provision of justice to awarding death to the criminal instead of a) providing material and psychological support to the victim’s families, b) ensuring that such crimes are not repeated by adopting preventive measures, and c) understanding the sociological, psychological and economic contexts which created the criminal in the first peace and addressing them. 

Killing a criminal is easy, but preventing crime is a complex process that the state is often unwilling to undertake. Theoretically, therefore, it is even possible to see a positive correlation between the extent of a state’s inability to protect the lives of its people and the severity of the punishment meted out to the criminals. 

Society and crime
Those advocating capital punishment often tend to imagine that crime is committed in a social vacuum, and claim that crime is essentially social deviance.  A more sophisticated understanding of criminal behaviour would require us to see it as a result of social conditioning and the moral, political, and psychological conditions that the doer of a particular crime finds himself or herself in. The tendencies to overlook this important sociological aspect of crime and, more importantly, self-righteously isolate the rest of the society from the criminal lead to an unproblematised understanding of crime and criminal behaviour. 

Supporters ofdeath penalty should consider for a moment that those who do good deeds are not born with better genes; they just happen to be exposed to better social conditioning and conditions. The argument here is not intended to deprive individual humans of their moral agency to choose good over evil, but rather to point out that in many cases, social conditioning and conditions have a great role to play in the making of a criminal.  Take the example of Kasab. Much of the information available on the 26/11 terrorist suggest that he comes from a social background where being a jihadi and waging jihad in the name of Islam are seen as laudable. Indeed, the religious indoctrination he was subjected to clearly convinced him that he was engaging in a noble endavour in the name of God. While that does not justify what he did, it certainly enlightens us on where our focus should be if we were to eradicate terrorism from our midst. 

Why modern societies should not kill
If one is persuaded to agree with the argument that societies can not absolve themselves completely of the crimes that criminals commit, then it is only logical that societies should not only take part of the blame but also should adopt such methods to rehabilitate criminals which does not involve the violent removal of the criminal from the society. Moreover, states and societies have no right to play ‘God’ not just because societies have to accept part of the blame for the crimes in their midst but more importantly because by giving the state the right to kill individuals, we are erroneously awarding the state absolute power over our lives which in the long term would have significant negative implications. Gone are the days when we thought that our rulers and governments were infallible; today we know that they habitually make mistakes. 

Fighting terrorism
It is increasingly understood today that the phenomenon of terrorism symbolizes the moral, political and philosophical challenges that our societies face; the gun-wielding terrorist is a symbol of a larger socio-political malady. The only way to defeat terrorism or extremism is to fight it politically and with the power of ideas. By merely killing the individuals who are, in a sense, as much victims of their ideology, we will not be able to defeat terrorism. It’s time our governments realized that we can’t defeat unconventional and ideological threats such as terrorism and religious extremism using conventional means of discipline and punishment. Our ‘war’ on terrorism has to start its fight from the root causes as well as address the sanctity for violence that exists in our societies that gives rise to terrorism in the first place. Indeed, symptomatic treatment of such a deep-rooted malaise will prove to be counterproductive. 

India and the global norms India as a nation has always prided itself in being one of the few islands of liberalism, tolerance, enlightenment values and non-violence in the developing world. Practice of death penalty is undeniably one significant blot on the collective conscience of such a forward-looking society. At a time when most of the contemporary international community is moving towards delegitimizing death penalty, India, by executing Kasab, seems to be going against the world opinion. Moreover, by hanging Kasab, we have discarded our own self-imposed moratorium on death penalty. A country that has long struggled to advocate a moral international order, based on the visions of Gandhi and Nehru, and one that now wants to be a major norm maker of a reformed and egalitarian international system should have a more liberal and humanitarian approach to crime and punishment. Fyodor Dostoyevsky once observed, “The degree of civilization in a society can be judged by entering its prisons”. The continued presence of archaic forms of punishment, including death penalty, can also tell us a lot about the moral character of our societies. Regrettably, India failed to be on the side of nations that voted to adopt a recent UN Resolution asking states to put in place a moratorium on executions in order to eventually abolish the death penalty. 

The politics of Kasab’s hanging
The Congress party, under whose rule both the 26/11 carnage and the hanging of Kasab took place, has not, thankfully, exhibited any triumphalism after sending the Pakistan-born terrorist to gallows. While that is commendable, what is missing from the debate generated by the hanging of Kasab are questions such as how 26/11 was allowed to happen in the first place and what improvements have hence been put in place in the national security management of the country to take care of the crucial lapses that made 26/11 possible. The Mumbai police and the Union Home Ministry had claimed after the 26/11 attacks that they would make the Indian coast impenetrable to the country’s enemies. Clearly, nothing much has happened on that front, various media reports suggest that. If we think that by hanging Kasab we have taken care of our national security, we are sadly mistaken.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 09 DECEMBER 2012. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/Dec/9/why-death-penalty-is-immoral-4.asp )

On Nuclear Disarmament

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

I was in Vienna the other day discussing strategic stability and nuclear politics with contemporaries from other nuclear-weapon possessing countries such as USA, Russia, China, Israel (!) and Pakistan. This ongoing initiative brings together mid-career analysts from these countries to deliberate on strategic stability under nuclear conditions and the potential for a world without nuclear weapons. 

The boys who can’t handle their toys 
My first impression from the 2-day conference was that there is a great deal of worry and concern in the West and US about Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons, much more about the Pakistani nukes though. There is palpable fear that the Indians and Pakistanis, again more vis-à-vis Pakistan, may not be able to handle their nukes in a responsible way. Indeed, there seems to be more worry about Pakistan in the West today than in India. No, my argument is not that there is absolutely no need to fear or worry about the Pakistani nuclear weapons, postures and the dilemmas they pose for India. We in India don’t tend to look at Pakistani nuclear weapons in isolation but rather as part of the Pakistani state’s security apparatus, security dilemmas and its threat/security perceptions. That is why unlike in the West where you get to hear talks about ‘taking out’ Pakistani nukes through surgical strikes, you don’t get to hear that in India very often. When indulging in this talk of South Asia being the dangerous nuclear flashpoint what the Americans forget is that it was their country that first used nuclear weapons against live humans for target practice, not India or Pakistan. 

There is also a lot of uneasiness about the preferential treatment meted out to India by the United States through the Indo-US nuclear agreement and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver. Here is where one gets to see the convenient coming together of the West, that likes to preach to the rest, and Pakistan, that suffers from a permanent inferior complex vis-à-vis India. 

‘Our’ hypocrisy 
There is no doubt that India has been given preferential nuclear treatment by the US though I don’t for a moment doubt that India deserves it. India deserves to be made a partner in the global nonproliferation order simply for the reason that it has had a very clean proliferation record: it has not engaged in nuclear pilferage or in any way behaved irresponsibly in nuclear matters (if we choose to ignore for a moment the internal diversion of nuclear material meant for peaceful purposes to military purposes). And yet there is no way one can make the argument that India has never engaged in hypocritical doubletalk on nuclear issues. The fact is that even as India kept making vociferous demands for global nuclear disarmament through the Cold War years ever since 1947, having nuclear bombs, at the opportune time, was clearly something India had in mind. While the politicians and civilian strategic community kept mouthing the pious platitudes on global nuclear disarmament, the scientific community in the country quietly went about their work and finally produced nuclear weapons. When it realized that the preaching was not doing any good, India decided to move sides and declared itself a nuclear weapon state and asked others to recognize it to be so. Surely, this is hypocrisy, not because India made nuclear bombs but because it kept swearing that it had no plan to make nuclear bombs when they were actually making them in the backyard. 

For long we argued that the global nuclear order was an example of apartheid, and then claimed a place right at the center of that very apartheid order, burying the rhetoric of the past so unceremoniously. Pragmatic it may be, but hypocritical it surely is. 

‘Their’ hypocrisy
The Indian hypocrisy, at least in part, is the result of consistent hypocritical positions by the Nuclear-5 (USA, UK, France, China and Russia). By putting together a fundamentally discriminatory nuclear order in 1970 through the entry into force of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that essentially states that those who produced nuclear weapons before January 1, 1967 would continue to have them while those did thereafter would not be designated as Nuclear Weapon States, the P-5 founded one of history’s biggest hypocrisies. Thus countries like India and Pakistan became lawbreakers as per NPT and its promoters. Over and above this discrimination, although the NWS kept mouthing the ‘global nuclear disarmament slogan’ from the hallowed pulpits of the United Nations, it refused to put in place a time-bound plan to do so. So far the Americans and Russians have only agreed to reduce the number of their nuclear weapons, down to thousands from tens of thousands. 

The problem of nuclear zero
The latest American/Western nuclear fad is the movement for ‘Nuclear Zero’ spearheaded by the Obama administration. While the unwillingness to make a time-bound nuclear disarmament plan clearly frustrates the ‘Nuclear Zero’ movement, the bigger challenge comes from the fact that even if the Americans are willing to let go of their nukes, the other states may not be happy to do so thanks to the overhang of American conventional superiority. In other words, in a world where there are no nuclear weapons, the Americans will continue to enjoy high levels of superiority in conventional weapons which will be disadvantageous to states like Russia and China and they have clearly said so. Russia has clearly said that any reduction in its nuclear arsenal will have to be linked to deep cuts in American conventional weapons. This logic applies to secondary nuclear rivalries as well, namely India Vs. China and India Vs. Pakistan. While Pakistan clearly benefits vis-à-vis India due to its nuclear weapon status since it is conventionally weaker than India, the Indians have a sense of security from their nukes vis-à-vis China. 

The problem with the Nuclear Zero logic and many other similar nuclear disarmament arguments is that when they talk about a world without nuclear weapons they seem to mean a world minus nuclear weapons. Indeed, a world without nuclear weapons should be a world where peace and security should be the overarching tendencies of the international system: the preeminent culture of such a world should be peaceful resolution of conflicts where differences are resolved through dialogue rather than on the battlefield. That is why I would argue that for nuclear disarmament to ever become a reality it has to have a radical peace plan before itself and the nations of the world. In other words, a world without nuclear weapons will not only witness the obsolescence of those dangerous weapons but also the eventual erosion of the tendency and willingness to engage in mass murder of humanity that those weapons symbolize. 

But how do we get there? 
I am convinced that US is the wrong country to preach nuclear disarmament even as they have to begin rolling the ball by destroying its weapons first. There should also be a focus on conventional weapons reductions by major powers – US, Russia, China and India. It is likely that the others might follow suit then. 

(Source: Greater Kashmir, November 18, 20102. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/Nov/18/on-nuclear-disarmament-4.asp ) 

What does Obama’s reelection mean for India?

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

Does the reelection of President Barack Obama make any difference to India’s strategic interests? Does it have implications for the country’s foreign and defence policy as well as national security? I am increasingly prone to think that while the ‘reelection’ part would have some implications for India and its neighbourhood, the ‘Obama’ part would be of less relevance. The ‘Obama part’ is less relevant because whoever becomes the President of the world’s only superpower will essentially choose the beaten track with some minor variations. The ‘reelection’ part will make a difference because the reelected president will be unleashed in his external/defence policy pursuits primarily because he doesn’t have to face yet another reelection and also because his reelection clearly means that his policies have been endorsed by the country by and large. Moreover, I have no hesitation in admitting that Obama is better evil than the rightwing republicans, any day. 

I am also persuaded to think that Obama’s policies will not have any ‘direct’ negative implications for the country. Indo-US relations have reached a situation of great cooperation and mutual understanding of the needs, expectations and constraints of each other that it would be difficult for the American President to harm the already robust relationship. Even though Obama keeps talking against outsourcing of American jobs to India, the fact is that he has not done anything against it apart from merely reducing the tax benefits of those forms that engage in this practice. At the very least, status quo will continue, and the bilateral partnership will see new heights at best. That said, Obama’s policies towards the Southern Asian region could potentially have negative implications for the country, indirectly that is. 

Before looking at those scenarios, let us look at some of the likely ‘constants’ in Indo-US relations under the Obama Administration. The fast-evolving Indo-US strategic partnership is likely to remain unaffected. After all, the Indo-US strategic partnership is not a one-way traffic; the Americans are beneficiaries too. Secondly, the increasing economic, cultural and people-to-people interaction between the two sides will clearly increase in the next few years to come. The ‘civilian nuclear partnership’ is most likely to continue with the present momentum that is no less promising. The Americans are also unlikely to go back on their promise to help India make its mark in the international system by supporting India’s entry into various elite nuclear clubs, permanent membership of the UNSC etc. 

That said, India is also likely to fiercely protect its strategic autonomy. Even though one could argue that the words and deeds of Indo-US partnership have drastically transformed during India’s transition from being non-aligned towards the Cold War rivalry to merely insisting on tis strategic autonomy in its relations with the US, the fact is that New Delhi attaches a great deal of importance to maintaining its autonomy in taking decision on strategic issues. It is important to note here that India is one of the very few countries that have managed to maintain its foreign and defence policy autonomy even while being in a strategic partnership with the US as well a US beneficiary. Most US allies have tended to fall into the overwhelming US embrace pretty soon. The question is whether India will be able to continue to maintain its strategic autonomy for too long. 

The new Southern Asia and its challenges 
Apart form the Middle East, the other area of strategic interest for the Obama Administration is likely to be the Southern Asian region. With the withdrawal of NATO and US combat troops from the Afghan theater in 2014, the region will witness the official beginning of the Afghan endgame even if not the endgame itself. Given the kind of acrimonious relations that Washington currently shares with Islamabad, one is at a loss when it comes to describing what might be the shape of things to come in and around Kabul. Washington realizes that the way out of Kabul is through Islamabad and hence it is likely to mend its relations with the latter. And yet one is left with more questions than answers. Will the Taliban return to the seat of power in Kabul? Will there be a tie-up between Islamabad and/or Rawalpindi and the Taliban leadership? What attitude will the US adopt towards the neo-Taliban? And what would be the regional security implications of these developments? In particular, what role would India play, and be allowed to play by Islamabad and Washington, in all of these? We will have to wait for answers. 

Yet another theater of conflict is likely to be Iran. There seems to be no letting up in Washington’s efforts at putting pressure on Tehran to given up its alleged nuclear weapons programme. Is Obama going to play diplomacy with Iran as he did in the beginning of his first term or is he going to play hardball with it? Will he be able to resist the ever-continuing Israeli demands to use force against Iran? And if Israel decides to go it alone, what will be Obama’s response? Given the fact that the Middle East is already on the boil, how will a military campaign against Iran contribute to worsen it? How will it affect India, not just economically due to its dependence on Iran for energy needs, but also geopolitically and strategically? 

Yet another factor that needs to be carefully looked at is Obama’s attitude towards the growing power of China. The rise of China is coinciding with the decline of the United States. Washington is clearly nudging New Delhi to play ball to contain the Chinese rise to Super Power status. It has left no stones unturned in making this logic of classical balance of power clear to India. India has so far resisted Washington’s attempts to go against China knowing fully well that it makes no sense to do America’s dirty job of balancing against China who happens to be India’s next door neighbor and India’s biggest trading partner. Will this trend continue or will India fall into the American pressures? What will be the implications of potential Indian postures vis-à-vis China? 

The world waits with bated breath for part-II of Obama’s presidency, so do we.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, November 11, 2012. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/Nov/11/what-does-obama-s-reelection-mean-for-india--15.asp )