Character Certificates for Kashmiris!

Statecraft

BY HAPPYMON JACOB

How would you deal with injustice and discrimination? By equipping the victim of injustice to submissively evade it or by strongly dealing with the source of injustice? I presume your answer is the latter. If so, let me give you a similar scenario. 

When the Union Minister for Rural Development, Mr. Jairam Ramesh came visiting Kashmir last week, students of Kashmir University complained to him that they face discrimination in other parts of the country both from the police and the general public. I was deeply agitated to listen to the response of the Minister:“It has been observed that some of the trainees (Kashmiri youth who were given job training by the Jammu and Kashmir Entrepreneurship Development Institute) faced difficulty in getting accommodation outside the State. We are ready to issue a certificate in which it would be written that the trainee seeking accommodation is not linked with militancy.”

The media in Srinagar, Jammu and Delhi either chose not to comment on it or described it as an excellent example of the Union Minister’s concern for the Kashmiri youth. I am willing to admit that the Minister is most likely to have made this comment in all sincerity, wanting to help the hapless Kashmiri youth who get harassed from the moment he/she steps out of the state. However, the Minister’s assumed sincerity is no reason why anyone should overlook the potentially disastrous implications of his statement. I can either overlook the seemingly innocuous statement or critically ‘read into’ it. I am going to do the latter for that is precisely my job as an analyst. 

Deconstructing the Minister’s words 
One Jammu-based newspaper did carry a critique of the Minister’s statement arguing that the Minister’s statement does in effect challenge the unity of India because it would mean that Kashmiris would be carrying a certain letter from the government to ‘visit India’, which would effectively render them foreigners. This is hardly my concern here. 

I have several problems with the statement by Mr. Jairam Ramesh. First of all, this statement smacks of a complete lack of political imagination by the Union Minister. The minister has put forward an unworkable and unviable technocratic solution for a deeply political issue: of Kashmiris facing discrimination in other parts of India. But then I don’t particularly blame Mr. Ramesh for it; this is how the Congress party has dealt with the Kashmir issue all along, merely trying to maintain the status-quo without any political imagination. 

Secondly, a Kashmiri youngster bearing a certificate from a District Magistrate in J&K looking for a job or accommodation in other parts of the country will look like Bangladeshi or Tamil refugees who we often see in India looking for some material/financial help. That is not the status that a Kashmiri should have in India. Kashmiris are simply not refugees in this country, they are citizens and they should be treated like citizens. 

Moreover, I have deep reservations about people having to carry identity cards and letters of introductions in their own country to prove to others that they are harmless. I am reminded of the fate of the Jews in Nazi Germany who would have to carry identity cards for easy identification. We all know what happened to them after they were asked to carry identity cards or special identification marks. More so, Kashmiris already have to carry identification papers in their own state, and the Minister’s suggestion would effectively require Kashmiris to do the same in the rest of the country as well. Remember, this is not something that Indians from other parts of the country do. 

Furthermore, what message will the Kashmiri youth get when they have to carry documents certifying their non-participation in militancy for them to be treated like normal citizens in India? For sure it will make them feel that India is indeed an alien country where they are looked upon as terrorists and troublemakers, and that they are therefore unwanted there. Moreover, such certificates can and will solidify the false images that many people in the rest of the country have about Kashmiris. Those ‘Indians’ who are shown the certificate are likely to think that their impression about the Kashmirs as supporters of terrorism are indeed correct; or else why would the government take the initiative of certifying that some of them are not militants. In other words, if Omar Abdullah’s government takes the words of Jairam Ramesh seriously and issues ‘character certificates’ to Kashmiri youth ‘visiting India’ then it will surely mean that those who do not posses such character certificates are likely to be militants/terrorists. 

More importantly, this is simply not how a government deals with the issue of discrimination. If the government knows that some citizens and members of the police force in India do discriminate against the Kashmiri youth, then the government should sternly deal with such people rather than come out with unimaginative solutions of this kind. The Indian constitution is very clear on this: Article 15 under the section on Fundamental Rights prohibits ‘discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth’. Minister Ramesh should persuade his cabinet colleagues to make sure that the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Indian constitution to its citizens are indeed given to them, as a right, not as a favour, rather than offering to issue character certificates to the Kashmir youth ‘visiting India’. 

In any case, those who have been discriminating against Kashmiris either because they are Muslims or because they are Kashmiri Muslims will continue to discriminate irrespective of whether or not they carry a character certificate from Jairam Ramesh. What the Kashmiris need is not the Indian state giving them character certificates but rather uphold the laws of the land and attempt to bring about anattitudinal change in the minds of those people who have negative images about Kashmiris. 


(Source: Greater Kashmir, 29 July, 2012. URL:http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/Jul/29/character-certificates-for-kashmiris--9.asp )

Indo-Pak Cricket Diplomacy

Cricket does have the potential to create friendship between the two sides, but….

Statecraft BY HAPPYMON JACOB

Indo-Pak cricket diplomacy is back in action. India has announced that it will host the Pakistani cricket teamfor a seriesof matches in December 2012–January 2013. This decision by the Indian cricket administrators, duly supported by the government of India, is indeed a welcome one. One would imagine that this is another step in the direction of normalizing the Indo-Pak ties: but there is a need to ask a few more questions about the utility of cricket matches in promoting Indo-Pak normalisation. 

For the record, this is not the first time that the South Asian neighbours are engaging in cricket diplomacy. In 1987, Gen. Zia ul Haque visited India to ease tensions between the two countries: but the official explanation for the visit was to watch an Indo-Pak cricket match. In March last year Manmohan Singh invited his Pakistani counterpart Yousuf Raza Gilani at the Mohali cricket stadium to watch the Indo-Pak World Cup semi-final: they also talked bilateral ties on the sidelines.

The critics 
Apart from some security analysts based in Delhi, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) and former Indian cricketer Sunil Gavaskar have criticized the government’s support for the decision to invite Pakistani team to India. Gavaskar said: “Being a Mumbaikar I feel what is the urgency when there is no cooperation from the other side."Maharashtra BJP state president Sudhir Mungantiwar argued that “there is a tremendous anger among the general public against Pakistan's role in fomenting terror in India and this decision to resume the cricket ties is against that sentiment”. We are still to hear from the Shiv Sena and the members of the other lunatic fringes! 

The thrust of the critics’ arguments is the following: India should not have anything to do with Pakistan till the latter punishes the perpetrators of 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks. This was precisely the ‘wisdom’ that guided the Indian response towards Pakistan in the wake of the Mumbai terror attacks. However, India slowly realized over time that a no-talk policy would not help India meet any of its declared objectivesvis-à-vis Pakistan nor does it force Pakistan to do India’s bidding. New Delhi’s realization came late, but it did come. It is the same logic that the critics are using today to run down the proposed visit of the Pakistani cricket team’s to India. These critics do not, however, dispute the underlying assumption that inviting the Pakistani team to India would contribute to normalizing Indo-Pak bilateral ties. The critics’ argument is that inviting the Pakistani team to India is not doing justice to the victims of Mumbai 26/11. In other words, how can you play cricket with your enemies?  

That said, if one were to argue that inviting the Pakistani cricket team to India might not necessarily contribute to normalizing Indo-Pak relations, there would be some merit in such an argument. Indeed, Pakistan team’s visit to India might increase the enmity between the two sides. Cricket is religion in both India and Pakistan. Cricket can create mass hysteria in both the countries like nothing else can. More so, India-Pakistan cricket matches are portrayed as ‘wars’ and ‘battles’ by media on both sides. This mass hysteria, created by TRP-seeking media houses and profit-seeking business houses, more often than not gets identified with patriotism, infantile nationalism and pan-Indianism when the Indo-Pak ‘war’ is organized either in India or Pakistan. There is no doubt that the patriotic feelings and anti-Pakistan/India sentiments generated by ‘cricket wars’ can sustain the adversarial relations that the two sides have with each other. 

In the India-Pakistan context, the biggest mistake was not getting the Pakistani players to play for the Indian Premier League (IPL) tournaments in India. The various team owners who did not select the Pakistani players for their teams put the blame on the government saying that they were not sure whether the Pakistani players would be given visa by the government. The government, in turn, put the blame on the teams saying that they were free to choose the players. The end result was that the Pakistani players felt humiliated and so did many cricket lovers in Pakistan. Why do I say that it was a mistake not to select Pakistani players in IPL teams? I say so because when the Pakistani players were part of the IPL teams in 2008, for the first time we saw ordinary Indians, patriotic or not, cheering for Pakistani players on Indian soil. Cheering for a Pakistani player on the Indian soil would have been unthinkable before the IPL began: IPL made it acceptable and normal. You could cheer for a Pakistani cricketer in full public view and go home feeling no less patriotic! Pakistani participation in IPL-2008 not only changed Indo-Pak cricketing history, but also had a positive impact on Indo-Pak relations, people-to-people to relations, that is. I had written way back in 2008 in this very column: “While the recent visit of the Indian foreign minister to Pakistan did not yield any results, the 44 day IPL cricket tournament has managed to change mindsets in the two countries.” 

I do believe that ‘cricket wars’ between India and Pakistan has the potential to create unnecessary tension between the two sides with implications, albeit indirect, for their bilateral relations. However, if the government and the media houses in India can resist from promoting anti-Pakistan feelings in the run up to and during the December-January Pak tour of India, cricket does have the potential to create friendship between the two sides. Multi-track contacts between India and Pakistan are the only way India and Pakistan can create peace between their nations: after all, it is not enough to make peace between the officials of the two sides but also between the common people of India and Pakistan. 

However, if India’s cricket administers and government are seriously considering Indo-Pak cricket ties as a confidence building measure, then they must do more than inviting the Pakistani team to play in India. They must do what they did in 2008: create conditions for Pakistani players to be part of the next edition of IPL. What better Indo-Pak CBM can you have than Indian cricket fans cheering for Pakistani players on Indian grounds at the cost of iconic Indian players!

(Source: Greater Kashmir, July 22, 2012. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/Jul/22/indo-pak-cricket-diplomacy-5.asp )

Spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak

There is hardly any consensus about anything in today’s Pakistan

Statecraf

HAPPYMON JACOB

Fifty nine per cent of Pakistanis consider India to be the biggest threat to Pakistan as opposed to the Taliban or al Qaeda, according to the results of a recent survey carried out by the Pew Research Centre’s Global Attitudes Project. However, 62% of Pakistanis believe it is important to improve relations with India. The survey also shows that 59 per cent Indians do not have a positive opinion of Pakistan (by the way, in Pakistan’s traditional ally China, 52 per cent of people have an unfavourable view of Pakistan!). A great deal of Indians, 70 per cent, would also like to improve their relations with Pakistan. What this survey shows is something we have always known: Indians and Pakistanis have long-held complaints vis-à-vis each other but would like their relations to improve. And this is the philosophy that guides India-Pakistan dialogues on various issues, or so we thought. 

The Siachen Talks Fall Through 
Despite the stated good intentions that both sides seem to have at the moment to improve their bilateral relations, official India-Pakistan bilateral talks do not seem to be going anywhere. Consider this: every major Pakistani politician/statesman has in the recent past said that he/she would like to see the Siachen glacier standoff with India is resolved amicably. Some even argued in Pakistan, after the recent Siachen avalanche that killed over 100 Pakistani soldiers, that Pakistan should even consider the option of unilateral withdrawal from Siachen. The Pakistani negotiators, in their recent bilateral meeting with India, however, took positions no way helpful in resolving the Siachen dispute. Indian side, for instance, argued that there should be a phased approach to resolving the Siachen conflict and hence both sides should first demarcate and identify the existing positions and thereafter disengage and demilitarize. This of course comes from the Indian fear that Pakistan could, in future, do to India what it did to Pakistan in 1984. The Pakistani side, led by Pakistan’s Defence and Cabinet Secretary Nargis Sethi, refused to go by this and restated Pakistan’s traditional line: “Both sides would vacate their troops from the triangular area between Indira Col in the west, Karakoram Pass in the east and NJ 9842”. This, given India’s uneasiness about Karakoram due to the Chinese presence in the region, essentially killed the negotiations. While Pakistan stalled this round of negotiations, there is a growing constituency in New Delhi today that argues that there is no need to make any concessions on Siachen. 

Even on Kashmir-centric CBMs, Pakistan seems to be adopting a slower approach today. India has been pushing a number of Kashmir CBMs with Pakistan but Pakistani government is going slow on them insisting that the focus should not merely be on confidence building but also on the political question of Kashmir. 

All Talk, No Action
What explains this lack of willingness to take action by India and Pakistan despite their stated desire to resolve their conflicts? Pakistan’s current lack of progress on making peace with India can best be described by the age-old adage “spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak”. Here is a state with multiple existential exigencies. Pakistan has in the recent past been facing a great deal of political uncertainty and has even had its Prime Minister, who was definitely a supporter of Indo-Pak peace, dismissed by the judiciary. There is hardly any consensus about anything in today’s Pakistan, be it about its own domestic political choices and trajectories, about the alliance with the US, or relations with India and Afghanistan. Today’s Pakistan, given that its elite and society are deeply fractious, is simply unable to decide for itself who its enemies and friends are. At a more practical level, Pakistan now has a new Prime Minister who is yet to be ‘socialised’ into the Indo-Pak relations. 

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that Pakistan does not want to be seen as giving into Indian demands on their bilateral conflicts as doing so would add fuel to the jihadi fire in that country. 
What are the Indian constraints with regard to improving relations with Pakistan? On Siachen, there is a certain sense of hubris in New Delhi. The Indian strategic elite thinks that it is speaking from a position of strength with Pakistan on Siachen and hence there is no need to be very flexible on Siachen as it is pretty comfortable with the status quo. It also thinks that given the advancements in technology, there are today fewer Indian causalities (compared to more Pakistani casualties) in Siachen and more importantly, at least some members of the strategic community in New Delhi think that there are strategic advantages of being in Siachen. The Indian army is one of those actors that think that it loses nothing in continuing to be in possession of Siachen and it is pushing that position with the political class. That said, at least some members of the strategic elite in New Delhi also think that Pakistan can’t be trusted on Siachen. Given what happened in Kargil in 1999, there is absolutely no guarantee that Pakistan will not try and reoccupy Siachen once both sides withdraw fromthere. 

On Kashmir too, New Delhi believes that Pakistan has lost its case in Kashmir both in front of the Kashmiris as well as the international community. If so, why talk to Pakistan on the political aspects of the Kashmir problem. At best, New Delhi should talk to Pakistan on ‘soft’ CBMs with Islamabad. This, of course, is driven by the fear, as I have often written in Greater Kashmir, that Pakistan’s change of attitude on Kashmir is tactical in nature and not strategic and hence Pakistan might focus its destructive energies again on Kashmir once its domestic problems are over and the Afghan question is settled in its favour. 

Under these circumstances, and due to the impending elections in Pakistan and India, the only way the Indo-Pak dialogue can achieve some credible dividends now is by a visit by the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Pakistan. Such a visit could reignite the hope and optimism for peace in both the countries and force the bureaucracies and militaries on both sides in resolving at least some of their outstanding conflicts.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, July 8, 2012. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/Jul/8/spirit-is-willing-but-the-flesh-is-weak-15.asp )

Facilitate the return of Salahuddin

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

The burden of sins in Kashmir cannot be put solely on the shoulders of those who took to guns and those who gave them the guns (i.e. Pakistan); forces in New Delhi and Srinagar who drove them to take to guns should also share this. If so, the governments in Srinagar and New Delhi have a moral responsibility to rehabilitate those who crossed the border into Pakistan for armed training. And the authorities should rehabilitate them not as petty criminals but as ex-combatants who fought for a political cause and treat them with dignity. The Indian state can either choose to go the Sri Lankan way and kill them all till they finish or try and resolve the conflict by addressing the genuine concerns of the aggrieved people and rehabilitating the ex-combatants into the mainstream Kashmiri society. Welcoming Hizb-ul-Mujahideen chief Muhammad Yusuf Shah aka Syed Salahuddin back to Kashmir will be a major step in this direction of reconciliation and contribute to lasting peace in the state. Let me explain why. 

In my column last week I talked about the diminishing intensity of the Indo-Pak dimension of the Kashmir conflict and emphasised the need to put more focus on the New Delhi-Srinagar aspect of the conflict. I also argued that there is a great need today for reconciliation between the ruling elite in New Delhi and the Kashmiris. Rehabilitation of ex-combatants is an important step in the reconciliation process of any conflict-ridden society. 

But why Salahuddin? Engaging Salahuddin is important for a variety of reasons. There is no doubt that he is a genuine Kashmiri who took to guns for what the Indian security forces and government did in Kashmir from the mid-1980s onwards. He felt wronged by the government of India and hence decided to fight against the perceived injustice with the help of guns. However, Salahuddin has often made conciliatory gestures towards India in the past few years especially by promising non-interference during elections in Kashmir (remember he himself wanted to be an elected politician in the Kashmir valley!). More importantly, informed highly placed sources in India and overseas say today that Salahuddin himself is looking out for a place in the future politics of Kashmir, a political space with dignity.  In any case, his political future in Pakistan is extremely limited where he is almost a captive of the Pakistani ISI. 

But before we get into the pros and cons of welcoming Salahuddin to Kashmir let’s ask a general question as to how do we treat former Kashmiri militants once they decide to start new lives upon their surrender and rehabilitation? It is no secret that hundreds of Kashmiri militants based in Pakistan would like to return to their homeland to start a new life. The Jammu and Kashmir government in February 2012 announced an amnesty plan for Kashmiris who had crossed over to Pakistan for arms training and are now keen to return to their families. While the union home ministry is publically supportive of this policy, it has not been very enthusiastic about it which is evident in the manner the ministry has gone about processing and clearing the names of militants wiling to surrender. The home ministry’s response has been no more than reluctant enthusiasm. 

There are two major problems with the current policy of the rehabilitation of ex-combatants. One, there is no legal framework to take care of the families (who would return with the surrendering militants from the other side) of the rehabilitated militants; two, the militants have often felt that the surrender process is a one-sided affair and that they are treated without any dignity once they surrender. Indeed, this is one issue that Salahuddin has also flagged on many occasions. 

Benefits of Salahuddin’s returnOf course, one would not expect Salahuddin to limit himself to his household if he returns to Kashmir. He is likely to get active in the politics of the state. The more important question to ponder over is whether his return would make any difference to the resolution of the Kashmir conflict and the process of reconciliation there? 

First, if at all Salahuddin returns he is likely to return with a certain level of mainstream political agenda. In other words, Salahuddin is unlikely to return if the ‘return-deal’ (I am consciously not using the term ‘surrender-deal’) does not involve a political package that he can then use to consolidate his political fortunes in Kashmir. This political package is most likely to enable him to take up (moderate) Hurriyat-style politics with the possibility of mainstreaming himself in the subsequent years. Under such conditions, he is likely to strengthen the moderate faction of the Hurriyat. Indeed, he has often clarified that he would not be against working within a united Hurriyat. His return will also isolate extreme dissident tendencies of the likes of Ali Shah Geelani. With the tremendous respect that Salahuddin has in the valley, he is also likely to become a widely respected Kashmir leader. 

What does New Delhi benefit from this kind of a deal? New Delhi will look more serious in the eyes of the Kashmiris and the international community in resolving the Kashmir conflict and reconciling its differences with the Kashmiri militants based in Pakistan who are desirous of returning home. Moreover, New Delhi should simply not follow the Sri Lankan example: it must make peace with Kashmiri militants rather than trying to exterminate them. Such a gesture would also be instrumental in New Delhi owning up a lot of mistakes it made in Kashmir.  The return of Salahuddin to Kashmir would also generate an unprecedented amount of symbolic value and such symbolism will go a long way in resolving the many layers of the conflict in Kashmir. That will usher in a new era of peace and reconciliation in the Kashmir valley. 

But how will New Delhi go about doing it? Given the stature that Salahuddin enjoys among the Kashmiri militants based in Pakistan, the call has to be substantial and public. However, such public pronouncements have to be preceded by a great deal of back-channel efforts. Such back-channel negotiations should not only be conducted between New Delhi’s representatives and Salahuddin but also New Delhi and Islamabad. The public call for the return of Salahuddin into Kashmir should be choreographed to mark the beginning of a new era of reconciliation in Kashmir for, as pointed out above, if organized with care and wise statesmanship, it will have the potential of changing Kashmir political landscape for the better with positive fallouts for India-Pakistan relations as well. Salahuddin is a genuinely aggrieved Kashmiri son of the soil; welcoming him back to his homeland can only be doing the right thing. 

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 17 JUNE 2012. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/Jun/17/facilitate-the-return-of-salahuddin-4.asp )

Building peace in Kashmir: Next steps

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

Yasin Malik is an untiring leader who keenly observes and understands the unfolding of politics around him: his own life, from joining armed militancy to giving up arms to initiating Safar-i-Azadi, is witness to his deep understanding of the ever-changing nature of politics. An intellectual, full of political intensity, Malik has often been the first in Kashmir to evolve his politics according to the need of the times. His recent op-ed in the Pakistani newspaper Dawn (May 29, 2012) makes a politically sound observation: “The fate of Kashmir and the Kashmiris appears, for all intents and purposes, to have been stuck in the great game of international and power politics.” Malik is absolutely right. 

Let’s further examine and explore his arguments in the article a bit further. Indeed, as is well known, Kashmir conflict has two dimensions: the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir and the New Delhi-Kashmir conflict. Which dimension of this conflict is stuck in the vagaries of international power politics? Surely, it is the Indo-Pak dimension of the Kashmir conflict that is ‘stuck’ in the new regional balance of power. 

Kashmir and the regional balance of power 
9/11, war in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s fall from the American grace, strengthening Indo-US strategic partnership and the Chinese ambivalence have all meant that the Kashmir conflict has lost its priority status in the eyes of the international community. Pakistan’s unfortunate pariah status, strategic arms racing between India and Pakistan, and the increasing nuclearisation of the South Asian strategic scene have further diminished the importance of the Kashmir issue for the rest of the world. While Pakistan may have gained strategically from the region’s overt nuclearisation in 1998, in checkmating Indian conventional superiority in the region, its nuclear weapons and strategic behavior over the years have meant that it has lost its case in Kashmir. Nuclearized South Asia is too important for the international community to leave to the whims of the Pakistani generals who would like to wrest Kashmir from the Indian control by hook or crook. 

What does this ‘forced’ Indo-Pak thaw mean for Kashmir?  This very simply means that the ‘phase of Indo-Pak conflict’ in Jammu and Kashmir is over, at least for the time being. What we are witnessing now is the ‘phase of accommodation’ on Kashmir between the two nuclear neighbours. The two sides also recognize this fact and it is evident in their rhetoric, strategies, willingness to sign CBMs and talk about next steps in Kashmir. It is this process of dialogue and accommodation that we will witness in Kashmir in the coming years. Of course, there are potential wildcards that can frustrate this bilateral process of accommodation on Kashmir. Post-2014 Afghanistan is undoubtedly one of them. 

Given this state of play, it is perhaps wise to focus on the next steps in the resolution of the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. What are those next steps? Reduction of violence in Kashmir by both sides, by Pak-sponsored militants and Indian armed forces, is perhaps the most important next step. Apart from the reduction of violence, there is also a need to increase the intra-Kashmir connectivity. A great deal in this regard was achieved by the two sides during the 2004-2007 peace process. Many non-governmental initiatives had also played a crucial role in this process, most notably the Pugwash Conferences organized by its Secretary General Paolo Cotta Ramusinoin Islamabad, Katmandu, and Srinagar, and other world capitals. There is an urgent need to revive, encourage and strengthen such non-governmental initiatives as well. 

The state of conflict between New Delhi and Kashmir 
While the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir seems to be heading towards some sort of resolution, the conflict between New Delhi and Srinagar seems to be in suspended animation. There is apparent calm in Kashmir. The unaffordable airfares to Srinagar, even as there are over 20 flights to the city, are witness that. Such calm, however, stops at the surface. There is conflict, fear, anger and disillusionment beneath that fragile surface. There is therefore an urgent need to think about the next steps in the peace process between New Delhi and Srinagar. While New Delhi needs to be more serious than what the interlocutors recommend in their report in making peace with Kashmir, Kashmir’s dissident leaders need to reinvent their azadi struggle to avoid losing political significance and steam. Even though it may not be possible for them to join the mainstream now, they would have to look for innovative ways of doing politics and bringing peace to Kashmir. 


Having said that, I am of the opinion that the burden of proof (in demonstrating its seriousness to make peace with Kashmir) lies with New Delhi. If New Delhi thinks it has ‘won’ Kashmir and hence decides to do nothing about building durable peace in the state, it would actually be losing a golden opportunity to make peace with an alienated people in the absence of interference from Pakistan. 


Let me end with what Malik said in his Dawn op-ed: “It is only violence that gets the attention of policymakers and makes them come to the negotiating table. The new generations of Kashmiris will then draw this lesson and may take to the gun as a means of protest to make themselves heard.” Malik is so right about Kashmir’s past, and hence I hope he is wrong about its future.


(Source: Greater Kashmir, June 10, 2012. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/Jun/10/building-peace-in-kashmir-next-steps-47.asp )

Farce in three parts

Amitabh Mattoo and Happymon Jacob

On May 24, 2012, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) made public the report submitted to it by the interlocutors on Jammu and Kashmir appointed in the midst of the 2010 uprising in the Kashmir valley. The group of three interlocutors has produced a report that is rich in detail, based on extensive fieldwork, elegantly written, and apparently well meaning. However, we remain deeply sceptical that the public dissemination of such a report — or a public debate on the findings/recommendations — will help to build sustainable peace in Jammu and Kashmir. Not surprisingly, there are virtually no takers for the report among the stakeholders in the State and even the MHA has distanced itself from the work that it commissioned from the interlocutors, by adding the following caveat: “The view expressed in the Report are the views of the interlocutors. The Government has not yet taken any decisions on the Report.” In fact, we believe that the release of the report — instead of doing any good — will prove to be counter-productive and could further strengthen the sentiment in the State that the government of India is not serious about a resolution of the problems of Jammu and Kashmir. We have reason to believe that the recent ineptitude in dealing with the State stems from the decision that the Prime Minister would discontinue to have direct oversight over the affairs of the State. Contrast the “Naya” Jammu and Kashmir vision articulated by the Prime Minister in 2005 with the obtuse legalese articulated,ad nauseum, by the Home Ministry.

We have fundamental problems with almost all aspects of what has turned out to be a farcical exercise: beginning with the appointment of non-political interlocutors; and the structure and content of the report they have produced.

Ever since September 25, 2010, when the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) finalised the eight point political initiative on Jammu and Kashmir, at the height of the crises in Kashmir when over 100 people had been killed, expectations were raised that a seasoned politician would lead the panel of interlocutors. This perception was built on the successful all-party delegation that had visited the State. The announcement of a three-member non-political team provoked widespread anger and hostility and even invited ridicule. Although the three members were undoubtedly professionals, who had excelled in their respective fields, the impression was created that the panel had been finalised without due diligence or a serious application of mind by those who are quite oblivious to the complexities of the problems in the State and were insensitive to the sentiment of the people living there.

ON SYMBOLISM AND SUBSTANCE

In J&K, symbolism is almost as important as substance. Consider the history of the last half a century. Almost every political crisis and political agreement has been possible through initiatives led by heavyweights and backed by the political leadership of the country.

It was Lal Bahadur Shastri who was deputed by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1963 to help defuse the crisis following the theft of the Prophet's relic. While the chief of the Intelligence Bureau, B.N. Mullik, also played a vital role and enjoyed Nehru's confidence, it was Shastri who was the public face of the initiative.

THE THREE PARTS

The 1974 Kashmir accord was possible because of the confidence that G. Parthasarthi enjoyed of then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Similarly, in the 1990s, interlocutors like Rajesh Pilot and George Fernandes were able to make a difference because they created a perception that they were leading a serious political initiative backed by the highest political authority in the land. Indeed even the mandate of the panel of interlocutors had been defined in the most non-anodyne terms: “The three interlocutors appointed by the Govt. have been entrusted with the responsibility of undertaking a sustained dialogue with the people of Jammu & Kashmir to understand their problems and chart a course for the future.”

The Report, itself, as one of the interlocutors has suggested, needs to be read in three parts: a situation report, a set of political ideas for discussion, and a road map recommending confidence-building measures (CBM) and dialogue. Most informed observers of Jammu and Kashmir would gain little by reading the “situation report.”

The CBMs are well known and, in fact, do little to advance the work produced by the Prime Minister's Working Groups. Set up during the second round table conference of the Prime Minister in May 2006, the five working groups had a specific agenda: (i) confidence-building measures (CBMs) across segments of society in the State; (ii) strengthening relations across the Line of Control in Kashmir; (iii) economic development; (iv) ensuring good governance; and (v) Centre-State relations. Apart from the working group on Centre-State relations, all others submitted their reports in April 2007. The government had, in principle, accepted the recommendations and virtually committed itself to their implementation.

For instance, Hamid Ansari chaired the group on CBMs in the State, and it included representatives from all mainstream political parties and groups. The group's agenda included the following: measures to improve the condition of the people affected by militancy, schemes to rehabilitate all widows and orphans affected by militancy, issues relating to the relaxation of conditions which have foresworn militancy, an effective rehabilitation policy, including employment, for Kashmiri Pandit migrants, an approach considering issues relating to return of Kashmiri youth from areas controlled by Pakistan, and measures to protect and preserve the unique cultural and religious heritage of the State.

The group had recommended, among other things, a review and revocation of laws that impinge on the fundamental rights of common citizens, such as the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA), review of cases of persons in jails and general amnesty for those under trial for minor offences, devising effective rehabilitation policies for Kashmiri Pandits and a comprehensive package to enable them to return to their original residences and for the Kashmiri youth in Pakistan-controlled areas, who may have joined militancy for monetary considerations or misguided ideological reasons, measures to strengthen the State human rights commission, and setting up of a State commission for minorities. The interlocutors' report, in no way, improves on these recommendations.

The only real value addition could have been on proposing new political ideas. And here, not only are there no novel ideas, even the proposals (borrowed mostly from other reports) are embedded in the “grand” idea of the establishment of a Constitutional Committee, to review all acts and articles of the Constitution of India extended to the State after the Delhi Agreement of 1952. In other words, the Report — on the most critical issue — passes the buck and recommends that New Delhi look for someone who is regarded in high esteem in the State and the rest of the country to do the job.

On other related issues too, the Report falls well short of expectations. The report does not give importance to delivering justice to those people wronged over the last two decades. The report also fights shy of identifying some of the other primary causes of the problems in the Jammu and Kashmir conflict: including the widespread rigging of elections, and the political high-handedness of New Delhi in J&K.

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION

The report talks about the need to set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). However, the report treats the whole concept of a TRC in a very casual manner. It says, for example, “even if justice cannot be provided for all victims of violence, if some of those guilty of human rights abuses, including militants, were to ask forgiveness from the families of their victims, it would provide closure for many.”

The report also suffers from a serious lack of focus. The report's recommendations address issues that trivialise the real problems of the State. For instance, by recommending inter-regional dance and theatre competitions, cultural talks about inter-regional culture, and establishing “an art gallery in Srinagar,” the interlocutors undermine the gravitas that a report of this kind should have, if it is to be taken seriously.

Finally, how does one evaluate a report of this kind? It has not managed to reach out to important segments in Kashmir, it has not produced any sort of consensus in J&K or in New Delhi, and its impact is not likely to be felt in “grand” political terms. This report, at best, is an academic exercise of little policy consequence. The fact is there exist valuable documents and reports, which have, in great detail, explained the possible trajectories for building peace in the State. It was not yet another document that we needed to resolve the multiple conflicts in the State, but a genuine political process of reconciliation between the people of the State and New Delhi. Many dissidents from the State opposed this panel of interlocutors because they believed that the group did not have a mandate to negotiate peace, and that this was merely a diversionary tactic to buy time. One-and-half-years later, they stand vindicated.

(Amitabh Mattoo and Happymon Jacob are Professors at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.)

(Source: The Hindu, June 4, 2012. URL: http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article3487152.ece?homepage=true )

Wise, but controversial

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

Professor Abdul Ghani Bhat has done it again. It was in January last year that he made another wise but controversial statement that Kashmiri dissident leaders such as Abdul Gani Lone and Mirwaiz Maulvi Muhammad Farooq were not killed by government forces but by “their own people”. This time around he has questioned the contemporary significance of the UN resolutions on J&K. The controversy kicked up by Prof. Abdul Ghani Bhat’s comments refuses to die down, leading to ideological, bordering physical, clashes within the moderate Hurriyat. I have known both Prof. Bhat and Mirwaiz Umar Farooq for a very long time: both are wise, visionary and able leaders and hence I would hesitate to dub the ongoing debate over the UN resolutions as a leadership struggle within the ranks of the Hurryat. I would see this as a genuine debate to explore the future directions of Kashmir’s embattled Azadi movement. 

Three ‘sins’of Prof. Bhat
Prof. Bhat made three inter-related arguments: one, it is not practical anymore to implement the UN Resolutions in Kashmir; two, the Kashmir formula suggested by former Pakistan President Pervez Musharraff is worth serious consideration and; three, it may not be a bad idea to think of forging a common minimum political agenda with the PDP and NC. In response to Prof. Bhat’s suggestions, Mirwaiz argued that the UN Resolutions form the bedrock of Kashmir’s azadi movement. Mirwaiz has a point, although it is a symbolic one. However, it may be recalled that Mriwaiz himself has been a fan of Musharraff’s ideas on Kashmir and so he is only opposing two of Prof. Bhat’s suggestions: of going beyond the UN Resolutions and forging alliances with NC and PDP. Let’s unpack to understand each of these two suggestions made by Prof. Bhat.

What do the Resolutions say?
What was the basic argument made by the UN Resolutions that the Mirwaiz argues forms the bedrock of Kashmir’s azadi movement? In fact, I would argue that many Kashmiri dissidents have often overstretched the significance of these Resolutions. Consider this: if one goes strictly by the sequence of the UN Resolutions, Pakistan will have to withdraw from Azad J&K (‘PoK’) and Northern Areas since it is referred to as the invading party, and before a plebiscite is held in Kashmir, Indian troops could potentially move into the part vacated by Pakistani troops to maintain law and order. Mind you, Pakistan had also ceded a small part of J&K to China decades ago which will have to be taken back from China so that the original Princely state in its entirety can be put through a plebiscite by the UN. Thereafter, even if there is a plebiscite, people of J&K will be able to choose between India or Pakistan. The UN Resolutions promise no azadi to Kashmiris, let’s be clear about it. I am not convinced that it is such a choice that forms the bedrock of Kashmir’s azadi struggle. 

So considering the fact that azadi-seeking Kashmiri nationalists won’t be the real beneficiaries of the UN formula, who is likely to benefit out of it? Will India benefit from it? I am not so sure. If one were to argue that India is very unpopular in certain parts of Kashmir, there is a possibility that while Jammu and Ladakh would vote for India, a large number of people in Kashmir are unlikely to vote for India. What about within Pakistan? I am equally unconvinced that everyone on the Pakistani side of J&K is in love with Pakistan either. That means that some people on that side are likely to vote for India as well, just because there are only two choices. The rest is a game of numbers. So if Pakistan gets more votes in the Plebiscite, which I am not so sure of especially after meeting scores of people form the Pakistani side of the state, Kashmiris will have to join the Pakistani state. In other words, the decades-long Kashmiri nationalism will find its final resting place within the ideological anarchy of contemporary Pakistan. Would the Mirwaiz like it that way? Unlikely. Then why fault the good old Persian Professor for what he said in simple words? 

More importantly, even though Pakistan would stand a chance, just as India would, to win from a game of numbers if the UN Resolutions are implemented in Kashmir, the former has indeed given up on the Resolutions. So has the United Nations. 

Let’s now take the other ‘objectionable’ part of the Professor’s argument. Prof. Bhat argued that alliances should be forged with NC and PDP. Forget the names ‘NC’ and ‘PDP’. The Professor’s message is that it’s time to try different, read ‘mainstream’, methodologies to take the azadi movement forward. It may look contradictory at the first instance but that is precisely what ‘former’ dissidents such as People’s Conference leader Sajad Lone are successfully doing: work for the ‘achievable nationhood’ even as keeping the ‘desirable nationhood’ as the guiding principle. In other words, joining PDP or NC is not the operative part of what the Professor said, rather it is using mainstream tactics and politics to achieve the goals of the azadi movement. 

I have often argued, in my columns and elsewhere, that Sajad Lone has indeed shown the way for the future direction of Kashmir’s azadi movement, but then that’s my personal opinion about a movement of which I am not personally part of, even as I am sympathetic towards it. It’s for the Hurriyat Conference and the people of Kashmir to decide which direction they would like to take. 

That said, one thing is pretty clear. The Hurriyat needs to better respond to new situations, new movements, new political demands and a whole new generation that has a lot of political innovation and vibrancy about them. For many years now, the Hurriyat has not shown exceptional leadership skills in spearheading the movement in Kashmir. So why not listen to the Professor? 

(Greater Kashmir, May 27, 2012. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/May/27/wise-but-controversial-16.asp )