New Delhi’s hypocritical Iran policy

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

Ancient Greek philosopher Thucydides wrote in his epic treatise History of the Peloponnesian War that while the strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must. While this describes the inner workings of the international system in general, then and now, no wisdom better than this can explain the philosophy behind the global nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as the ongoing confrontation between Iran and the United States (along with the European countries and Israel).

While this should not surprise the students of international politics, what may be surprising for many is the moral rhetoric with which the west attacks the Iranian regime. They argue that Iran has no right to make nuclear weapons (not that Iran has admitted to making nuclear weapons) because it will be a violation of Iran’s NPT obligations, it is not good for stability in the West Asian region and that Iran is a sponsor of terrorism. Informed observers of international politics, am sure, will be able to call the bluff of these arguments without much effort. My focus today is on the Indian policy towards the Iranian nuclear programme.

Hypocrisy towards Iran
New Delhi, whenever possible, tries to remain silent on the Iranian nuclear question. When pushed to the corner, it would argue that Iran should not develop nuclear weapons. Surely, suspected development of nuclear weapons is not the only reason why the US has a problem with Tehran; there is deep enmity between Iran and US notwithstanding the nuclear developments in Iran. This means that even though Iran is clearly under threat from US and Israel, New Delhi’s policy posture seems to assume that the American policy towards Iran is justified.

India argues that Iran should give up its nuclear weapons programme, if any, because Iran, unlike India, is a signatory to the NPT and hence it has treaty obligations which it should respect. Is that not a hypocritical argument to make? India has traditionally argued that the global non-proliferation regime is discriminatory and that India does not agree with NPT-mandated ‘nuclear apartheid’. If so, how can India blame Iran for violating a treaty that India thinks is blatantly discriminatory in the first place?

More importantly, it is clear that one lesson that we can draw from global nuclear politics is that the powerful countries have always had their way in defining standards for the less powerful ones as the Marxist historian E. H Carr rightly points out “morality is the product of power”. This explains why Israel is able to have its secret nuclear weapons programme without being challenged by the international community. By pointing fingers at Iran, India is not only agreeing to these very same arguments but is also conveniently forgetting the not-so-clean history of India’s nuclear development which is witness to a number of instances of India diverting nuclear material sourced from the western countries for civilian purposes to its weapon programme. Given such a history, how can India blame Iran? I am reminded of a biblical story: when a woman accused of adultery was brought to Jesus for his opinion on whether or not she should be stoned to death as per the Law of Moses, he said “He who is without sin among you, let him be the first to throw a stone at her.”

What explains the Indian behaviour?
Surely, New Delhi’s policy towards the Iranian nuclear programme is not informed by moral or normative considerations but plain geopolitical calculations. There is a heightened level of pressure on New Delhi from the US and west for isolating Iran and this was predicted by many Indian analysts during the negotiations of the Indo-US nuclear treaty. The Hyde Act passed by the US Congress specifically requires India to cooperate with the US to isolate Iran.

Apart from the pressure exerted by the US and the West on New Delhi, there is also the Indian calculation of potential benefits that it can get if it joins forces with them against Iran. New Delhi’s illusion of being the new strategic lynchpin of American grand strategy in the region has convinced it to give up on its traditional partners, alliances and ideals. With the Pak-US relations nose-diving, and China’s rise being resisted by the Euro-Atlantic alliance partners and India being courted by them to checkmate China, New Delhi feels the need to make use of the geopolitical opportunity to become the key strategic partner for the US and the West in the region. Hence maintaining a strategic silence on the issue of Iran and speaking up against it when pushed to do so is seen as the correct strategy by New Delhi. Keeping this in mind, India voted against Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in late 2005 and early 2006 thereby giving up the traditional Indo-Iranian relations which until then were smooth, mutually beneficial and accommodative.
I am convinced that India will have to pay dearly for adopting such hypocritical policy towards Iran. Indeed, our hypocritical policy towards Iran has been costing us geo-strategically, economically, politically, and even grand strategically. United States may be an ally for India but Iran is a neighbour: allies change, neighbours don’t.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 19 February, 2012, URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/Feb/19/new-delhi-s-hypocritical-iran-policy-6.asp)

Pervez Musharraff: Rise and Fall

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

General (retd.) Pervez Musharraff has been a controversial man – both as a soldier and politician. Today, I would like to reflect about him in the larger context of how Pakistan has treated its politicians including the soldiers-turned-politicians. History is witness to the fact that Pakistan has not treated its politicians fairly and accorded them the dignity they deserve: while many Pakistani politicians – Zulfikar Ali and Benazir Bhutto and Zia-ul Haq included – faced violent deaths, some of them were thrown out of their elected office (Bhutto, Shariff et. al.), and some others have criminal charges pending against them. Musharraff himself survived a number of assassination attempts, have criminal cases pending against him in Pakistani courts and was indirectly forced out of office. Today, he is unable to return to Pakistan and his political legacy is questioned and challenged by even those who stood by him during his heydays. The Pakistani political system has a tendency to vilify their leaders.

I am no supporter of Musharraff. In fact, I think his time is over and it is perhaps best for him not to return to Pakistan. After all, in politics, time is everything. One of the reasons why I would like to write this piece about him is because of my recent visit to Munich to attend the Munich Security Conference (MSC). The meeting was attended by over 400 participants including Hillary Clinton, John McCain, US Defense Secretary, many Prime Ministers, Defense and Foreign Ministers from around the world. I saw Musharraff twice, seated in the 5th or 6th row like an ordinary participant. Someone, one of his staff members I guess, approached me thinking that I was a Pakistani participant and told me that the German and international media covering MSC was not giving any importance to the former President and that I should do what I can to get him more media attention. Of course, I had neither the resources nor the willingness to do anything about it. But then that’s not the point of this story. This was a complete contrast to 2005 when I had met him in his office in Islamabad. I was very impressed by his ideas about Kashmir and way he visualized Indo-Pak relations. Musharraff, then, was at the pinnacle of his regime and was indeed one of the most sought-after leaders in the region. He was courted by the Americans, the Europeans and was thought of even by the Indians as the man who could bring peace between the two nuclear rivals.

Musharraff is a much troubled former military dictator today. His return to Pakistan is uncertain. He is likely to be arrested and tried for a number of cases pending against him in Pakistan. While on the one hand, the major political parties in the country would consider him as an absolute anathema, there is no popular mood in support of him either. Even Imran Khan, who Musharraff thought of allying with, has refused to do so. Musharraff apparently has no political ally left in the country. Pervez Musharraff is a much unwanted man in Pakistan’s siasat today.

What about his ideas and initiatives on conflict resolution? Will the embattled leader’s ideas, especially the ones relating to India in general and Kashmir in particular, survive the political downturn that his legacy is witnessing in the country today? Well, no one seems to be sure of that. No one wants identity with him and his ideas especially when it is not sure whether or not he is returning to Pakistan and what will happen to him if he does return. Even those who were close to him have been saying that they have no knowledge of whatever he said or did.

Understandably, this is not liked by a lot of people in Kashmir for they had not only appreciated the Musharraff formula for Kashmir but had also pinned their hopes on him and his formula to get a better political deal for them. Although in today’s Pakistan not everyone is very happy to endorse Musharraff’s ideas, the fact is that the rethinking he began about India and Kashmir in Islamabad is not all over. Many actors, including political parties, may be willing to accept his formula if New Delhi pushes for it but without the ‘Musharraff tag’ attached to it.

Musharraf was an accepted Pakistani leader in New Delhi while he was in power and his ideas on Kashmir had a lot of takers here. When negotiating with him, New Delhi was willing to downplay his legacy of Kargil for the sake of reaching an amicable solution on Kashmir. However, the mood in New Delhi seems to have changed and a lot of people here now prefer to remember him as the architect of Kargil - which he is – not as the Pakistani leader India negotiated the longest and most successful peace process with.

The rise and fall of Musharraf holds significant lessons for democracy, peace processes and especially for a potential political solution to the Kashmir conflict. However, what is important for us is to keep in mind that although we may or may not like the political careers or political lives of some of our political leaders, we must not malign their good deeds or emancipatory political ideas they pursued with vision.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 12 FEBRUARY 2012, URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/Feb/12/pervez-musharraff-rise-and-fall-30.asp )

ARTS » BOOKS

January 31, 2012

The geopolitics of South Asian jihad

HAPPYMON JACOB

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Jihad on Two Fronts: South Asia's Unfolding Drama. by Dilip Hiro.

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There is a proliferation of literature today on the geopolitical aspects of jihad and Islamic extremism in South Asia. And yet, the discourses on jihad in the region are rarely nuanced or problematised. They have an inherent tendency to explain the phenomenon from a religion-centric perspective infused with grand civilisational definitions and also to see it as a practice of statecraft. In other words, contemporary literature and discourses on jihad treat it as an essentialist problem and often address it by communal shaming and ruthless eradication.

What is missing is a sociological reading of Islamic extremism, one which looks at it in the light of people's (or victims?) daily lived experiences, one that highlights their appalling existential conditions, and one that scans the structural conditions that are shaped by faith, indoctrination, misperception, ignorance, and the general inability to make free choices.

It is the narrow and ‘anti-intellectual' understanding of such social — not primarily geopolitical — problems that render state policies so helpless when confronted with the high levels of social legitimacy and popular acceptability commanded by jihad and the jihadis. That is precisely why the international community is forced to make peace with the Afghan Taliban today, after exhausting every other option, although Taliban was the reason why Afghanistan was attacked in the first place. Dilip Hiro's book Jihad on Two Fronts is an excellent example of such broad-brush treatment of an important subject.

Rich in detail

Written by an experienced journalist whose knowledge of the region is commendable, the book does have its strengths. It is rich in detail and in personalised narratives of the various aspects of jihad in the region. Hiro also attempts to draw a big picture of geopolitical developments in the region viewed from a historical perspective. This surely is a layperson's introduction to the origins of jihad in contemporary South Asia. Moreover, if you have a dislike for complex intellectual formulations, there is no reason to worry, for reading Hiro's narrative is like looking at a picture that is pleasing to the eyes: simple, yet rich in detail.

However, the book suffers from a number of serious weaknesses. In a sense, its strengths are also its weaknesses. The narrative is far too simplistic and suffers from an overdose of details. The book is not well structured and hence lacks a sense of direction. The narrative style shifts from autobiographical to historical to political and to religious, not necessarily in that order. Above all, there is little attempt to neatly tie the multiple aspects of the jihad phenomenon.

Sometimes, one begins to wonder whether Hiro is writing a novel or a serious book on jihad; indeed, he has written both in the past. Witness this sentence: “In the heart of bustling, noisy, sprawling port city of Karachi lies a grand park occupying 185 acres, which is incredibly quiet except for the chirping of sparrows and cawing of cows.”

Conspiracy theory

The big picture Hiro has endeavoured to produce is faulty, I am afraid. He sees a conspiracy theory in every important event of the region and hardly any scope for hope. Some of his arguments are clearly untenable. For example, an entire chapter puts up the argument that Afghanistan is America's second Vietnam, but at the end of it the reader remains not fully convinced that it is indeed the case.

Intellectual enterprises need to be geared towards a set purpose. What is presented is nothing more than a rehash of available material on terrorism, Islamic extremism, jihad etc., some of it from Hiro's own earlier books. There is hardly any attempt to break new conceptual ground or put forth any new empirical argument.

It is claimed that, using the “archival material released by the Kremlin in 2009, as well as the secret and classified cables sent by embassies in Kabul, Islamabad and Delhi, the author challenges the conventional historical narratives of the main layers: Afghanistan, Pakistan, America, India and the Soviet Union”. But the book doesn't do justice to this claim. By bringing in too many variables and covering a vast expanse of spatio-temporal territory, it seems to complicate the picture, and the complication is clearly not positive or useful.

After going through the book that has no refreshing intellectual insight and no significant suggestion to offer on the policy front, an informed reader is inevitably left with the question: And so, what's new about Hiro's narrative?

JIHAD ON TWO FRONTS — South Asia's Unfolding Drama: Dilip Hiro; HarperCollins Publishers, A-53, Sector-57, Noida-201301. Rs. 699.

Source: The Hindu, January 31 2012. URL: http://www.thehindu.com/arts/books/article2845278.ece )

A precarious Indo-Pak nuclear balance

OPINION » LEAD

January 26, 2012

HAPPYMON JACOB

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Pakistan has dismissed the credibility of India's declared no-first-use doctrine and has not elucidated the conditions under which it would be prompted to use its nuclear weapons.

The recently held ‘India-Pakistan Expert Level Talks on Nuclear CBMs' have once again failed to move the two countries away from their precarious nuclear balance. The Islamabad meeting ‘achieved' two things: one, Indian and Pakistani officials agreed to recommend to their Foreign Secretaries the extension of the validity of the “Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons” (signed in 2007) for another five years; and two, “both sides reviewed the implementation and strengthening of existing CBMs in the framework of [the] Lahore MoU, and agreed to explore possibilities for mutually acceptable additional CBMs.”

Indeed, the substantive aspects of the India-Pakistan nuclear dimension remain consistently untouched by the negotiators in the two countries — both after their declared nuclear status in 1998 and earlier during their undeclared status. The 1999 Lahore Declaration was a progressive step that recognised the need to understand the role played by nuclear weapons. It was crafted with a view to “reducing the risk of [their] accidental or unauthorised use” as well as “elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields.” India and Pakistan have also dutifully followed their 1988 agreement to annually exchange lists of their nuclear installations and facilities, in order to avoid attacks against them.

However, since 1999, all that the two countries have done at successive meetings is to reiterate the spirit of the Lahore Declaration, and review the existing nuclear and missile-related confidence-building measures except, of course, the 2007 agreement. In 12 years, nothing substantial has been achieved by them to bring about nuclear stability in the subcontinent. This despite the fact that a nuclear war between India and Pakistan is arguably more likely than it was between the U.S. and the USSR during the Cold War. One of the reasons is an alarming obscurity to India and Pakistan's nuclear relations, apart from their geographical proximity.

Doctrinal dilemmas

Doctrinal and conceptual clarity on nuclear strategy is fundamental to the existence of stable deterrence in a nuclearised geopolitical context. This is recognised by the Lahore Declaration, which states “[t]he two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines”. The agreement has, unfortunately, remained a mere promise. Although the strategic elites in both countries have pondered over their nuclear doctrines ad nauseam, they seem to have overlooked the ways in which credible cooperation may occur in order to achieve feasible nuclear risk reduction measures and nuclear stability. Such deficient thinking has led to a unilateral offensive strategising and the formulation of military doctrines such as India's ‘Cold Start', and the adoption of an asymmetric escalation posture by Pakistan.

Problems of ambiguity

The introduction of nuclear weapons in the Indo-Pak balance of power has not been to India's advantage. It has given the country diminishing returns from its conventional superiority and created a troublingly unpredictable nuclear escalation ladder. Moreover, Pakistan's ambiguous nuclear doctrine has plunged India into a deep dilemma on how to respond to the proxy wars that it believes Pakistan has unleashed upon it. India was forced to redeploy its forces after massing them on the border during the 2001-2002 military standoff in the wake of the attack on Indian Parliament, precisely due to this uncertainty.

Pakistan has apparently kept its nuclear doctrine ambiguous to continue to perplex Indian strategists. It has dismissed the credibility of India's declared no-first-use (NFU) doctrine and but has not elucidated the conditions under which it would be prompted to use its nuclear weapons. Apart from outlining some painfully general conditions of potential nuclear use, Pakistan has deliberately kept its ‘threshold levels' or the ‘red lines' unclear, contending that this is its only possible option to prevent an Indian attack. It is an argument that stems straight from the classical deterrence theory.

This ambiguity in the India-Pakistan conflict dyad has led to deterrence instability in the region, rather than deterrence stability. In a conflict dyad, theoretically speaking, when both parties clarify their nuclear postures, there will be relative stability. However, when both maintain doctrinal ambiguity there is likely to be increased stability; paradoxically, under such conditions deterrence has the maximum advantage. On the other hand, when one party maintains doctrinal clarity and the other maintains doctrinal ambiguity, there is likely to be instability rather than stability. This happens because the party that chooses to keep its doctrine ambiguous is also assumed to keep its various options open — ‘flexible responses'— including the tactical use of nuclear weapons. This generates a dilemma for its opponent, which is denied the option of similar flexible responses due to its pre-declared postures and resultant concerns about public opinion.

Cold Start

Cold Start, the Indian military's ‘undeclared' doctrine, is assumed to be a response to this dilemma India faces from Pakistan's doctrinal ambiguity. Indian strategists believe that if India were to use its Cold Start doctrine, it would have a flexible response option that may counter the open-ended Pakistani nuclear strategy. Cold Start imagines enabling the Indian military to carry out quick, offensive operations against Pakistan without crossing the latter's nuclear red lines in order to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure on the Pakistani side. Critics have argued that the doctrine is nothing but ‘hot air' as it has neither New Delhi's political backing nor is it considered a serious war-fighting strategy by the Indian army. While such scepticism may or may not be well-founded, the fact is even if some sections of the Pakistani war planners believe India is somewhat serious about Cold Start, it could lead to counter-strategising.

The existence of such doctrinal ambiguities, security dilemma and deep mistrust of each other — combined with the lack of a clear civilian control of nuclear weapons in Pakistan — means nothing short of a recipe for disaster for the people of both countries. There is, therefore, need to start talking about nuclear issues with far more seriousness and urgency along the lines enshrined in the Lahore Declaration.

This is all the more important because of the perceived implications of the India-U.S. nuclear deal as well as the China-Pakistan nuclear deal, and due to the potential impact of technology on the military strategies of India and Pakistan.

Ottawa Dialogue

There is also an urgent need to encourage non-official bilateral discussions on the issue in order to sensitise the strategic communities on both sides of the border. The Ottawa Dialogue, one of the very few track-two initiatives on nuclear issues, held most recently in Copenhagen in December 2011, recommended that India and Pakistan sign a CBM to the effect that their land-based nuclear arsenals will remain “de-mated” and “de-alerted” in peacetime; initiate a high-level official dialogue on how new and emerging technologies such as future sea-based systems and nuclear-armed cruise missiles will impact strategic stability; and add cruise missiles to the Agreement on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles.

The bilateral meeting also recommended that the existing hotlines and communication channels be hardened, manned 24x7 and supplemented with secure video links; a dedicated communications channel be established between the Indian National Security Advisor and the Pakistani equivalent and that each side establish a “strategic risk management unit”, which could serve some of the same communications functions as the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres in other contexts.

(Happymon Jacob teaches Disarmament at Jawaharlal Nehru University and is a member of the Ottawa Track-two Dialogue on India-Pakistan Nuclear Issues. Email: happymon@gmail.com)

Keywords: India-Pakistan strategic talks, no-first-use doctrine, nuclear policy, nuclear CBMs

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COMMENTS:

Dr. Jacob's recommendations are based on a western rationale, which presupposes fuctionability and integrity of CBMs and risk management institutions. An existential institutional asymmetry (a representative government in India, and military in control of nuclear assets in Pakistan) between the two countries nullifies such rationale. Any amount of agreements between the two rival governments, will come to naught unless this asymmetry is removed. A classical example of dubiousness in Pakistani establishment's stance to agreements is the discovery of Osama Bin Laden's presence in Pakistan's heartland. Inspite of multifarious military and strategic understandings with their biggest benefactor (the United States) over the years, their establishment was found cheating. Expecting same establishment to honor track-II agreements and CBMs, is a little far fetched in my opinion.

from: surinder

Posted on: Jan 26, 2012 at 05:13 IST

The declared and undeclared nuclear doctrines of both Pakistan and India are of no consequence in the event of a war. Both countries can renounce their doctrines as and when required. The declared and undeclared nuclear doctrines of China follow the same path. China is the first country to declare that they will not use WMD first. The Chinese military threat is the tilting point in the event of a war between India and Pakistan. It is important to resolve the border issues with China so that the Chinese nuclear threat is not of future concern. Yet, the conventional military threat of China with or without war between India and Pakistan cannot be ignored. The Chinese intervention, in the event of a war between Pakistan and India, can overwhelm the Indian defense capability, though India can overcome the conventional military of Pakistan. In the event of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan, there will not be a winner, both countries will be loosers.

from: Davis K. Thanjan

Posted on: Jan 26, 2012 at 09:06 IST

We must give up our policy of no-first-use doctrine,which pakistan
has not adopted, in order to counter the pak strategy and we must be
ready 24*7 to deter the pakistan in case of any possible nuclear
attack on us. Its the need of the hour to augment our efforts to develop technology to effectively detect the nuclear submarines,radars and such other nuclaer armed missiles by upgrading our defence R and D the global
standards.

from: Rudramuni Davanagere

Posted on: Jan 26, 2012 at 09:48 IST

I have pity for people like this author and India's stratgists. The naked truth is this that Pakistan has no policy on any issue. Their credibility is zero and I want anyone to challenge me on the fact that there is not even a single treaty/agreement signed with Pakistan which was not violated by the latter or Pakistan did not allege that India violated the treaty. Look at the violations of ceasefire by Pakistan, repeated exposure of their duplicity on terror not only by India but by their allies, Simla agreement, Nuclear proliferation. I might come across as a Pakistan basher but have a look to what is happening to pledges/agreements signed between different institutions of Pakistan. These talks will lead us nowhere. India must prepare itself for the worst case scenario, rather than, relying on Pakistan to keep its word. Also see the fate of 26/11 accused case. It is a huge challenge to deal with Pakistan.

from: Harleen

Posted on: Jan 26, 2012 at 20:11 IST

Lot of arm chair generals commenting. Regardless of stated doctrine, both are rational enough to realize that a nuclear war, even if you don't get nuked is a disaster for all of South Asia. I actually pity the ones who would survive the blasts, it would be a living hell. Imagine just one nuke on top of the Indus and Ganges. These sustaining natural wonders will turn to death streams polluting the soil that feeds a population of over 1.5 billion humans.

from: Mir Azaad

Posted on: Jan 26, 2012 at 23:52 IST

In pespective of China and USA,these two countries are mere toys.Till they settle such talks have no meaning.Irony is they will never settle and life goes on in all countries under tension.

from: Ashok

Posted on: Jan 27, 2012 at 02:57 IST

"An eye for an eye only makes the world blind" is still relevent here. Rether than first use policy, why not use no use policy and dismantle the arsenal. If Pakistan should choose to use nuclear weapon against India successfully, before the polulation dies away, exhaust all our waste towards the north west and both populations should be taken care of. That is the stupidity of the stances of both governments that if nuclear weapons were to be used, there will be unmitigated disaster on our hands. The semantics of who uses this first will be truly lost as there will be very little left of the glorious civilisation in this region. China is not being strategic either as a huge nuclear expolsion is not going to be too far of chinese inhabitants.
Here is a modern indication for Gandhain principles. Destroy our nuclear arsenal and prove our intention to Pakistan. If they are foolish enough to chuck a few here, well then there will be very few to debate the rights and wrongs then!

from: Thodur Vasudevan

Posted on: Jan 27, 2012 at 05:14 IST

Any dialogue, whether an official or track-2, between these two
cultural partners appear nothing more than reiteration of the long
known rhetoric that characterizes these talks "they(Ind. & Pak) can
talk-on-the-table but can't turn-the table."
The deeds and the diplomacy resorted to by both the countries seldom
care about the agreements accepted by them at the table. Taking in
account the skewed political conditions in Pakistan with military,
judiciary, and parliament engaged in long played "hide and seek"
game and classical "blame-game" its quite natural that violations of
the T&Cs often stem from their sides. But India's responses to Pak's
military erection should be more prudent and more responsible
keeping in reckoning it's international stature. After all can we
afford to be as irresponsible as pak, as draconian as China,as
selfish as USA and deaf to our own ethos and appeal of non-violence
and "PANCH-SHEEL".

from: Ajeet K. Tiwari

Posted on: Jan 27, 2012 at 10:17 IST

India and Pakistan War.Shall we call it as a 3rd world war?A World War involving Asia.As endorsed by the Author,the time has come to mull over the consequences of this war if it happens.Surely,the losers will be the pakistanis and the hindustanis,AS Nuclear War is imminent.So,this causality of War and Nuclear War should be dealt internationally.India has always tried to offer an olive branch to the Paks,which the Paks have considered and ascertained as an ACT OF HUMILIATION AND MOCKERY.India has always maintained its NO-FIRST-GO policy and every Indian including me firmly believes this hypothesis.But,Pakistanis have never promised the same and will never do the same.Always ebullient with the support of USA and China ,they always try to instigate the cold relationship into fire.The reason lies behind the cloak of democracy which Paks are wearing.So,internationally some efforts should be entertained.

from: rahul

Posted on: Jan 27, 2012 at 13:15 IST

As a Pakistani, I believe that both countries should renounce their nuclear weapons programs We both have too many malnourished and uneducated people to take care of

from: Raza

Posted on: Jan 27, 2012 at 13:43 IST

is India enough capable to handle situation if pakistan use nuclear
weapoons against us?? What is the role of China in Indo-Pak nuclear unstability?

from: Gaurav Singh

Posted on: Jan 27, 2012 at 13:44 IST

nice article, but i think author should also have advocated for both the countries to sign CTBT. which can act as one of prominent grounds in CBM to avoid use of nuclear arsenals. Not only it will help in removing the ambiguity but also both nation can send a clear message of non-usage of nuclear bombs/devices during war.

from: Chitrabasu Khare

Posted on: Jan 28, 2012 at 00:52 IST

(Source: The Hindu, January 26, 2012. URL: http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article2832290.ece?homepage=true )