Thursday, November 5, 2009

The limits of coercive diplomacy

Happymon Jacob

The so-called ‘peace overture’ that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made to Pakistan from the Kashmir Valley last week, came almost a year after the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks and New Delhi’s subsequent indefinite halt of the peace process with Islamabad. The major dialogue channels between the two countries — the composite dialogue and the back-channel negotiations — continue to remain closed. Since November 2008, there have only been some underdeveloped and half-hearted attempts towards a thaw in the prevailing icy state of relations between the two countries. There seems to be no way forward.

However, following mounting international pressure and an increasing number of jihadist attacks on its soil, including an audacious assault on the Army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi and a series of attacks on police installations in Lahore, Pakistan has urged a resumption of dialogue with India. Dr. Singh’s peace overture has come at a time when there is an urgent need to re-examine India’s policy of ‘no-dialogue’ with Pakistan.

Has it worked?

It is perhaps an opportune time to ask whether the Indian strategy of coercive diplomacy has worked against Pakistan. What has India gained by not talking to Pakistan for 11 months, and what more is India likely to gain if it continues along this path? Do New Delhi’s foreign policy mandarins think India profits strategically by refusing to engage Pakistan in discussion?

Do they assume that India can indefinitely retain the moral high ground it thought it had when it broke off relations with Pakistan last year? They seem to hold this assumption, erroneous though this might be. As a result, New Delhi is not only losing precious time by isolating itself from Pakistan, but is harming its own strategic interests.

India has achieved all it can hope to with its silence; there is nothing more it can reasonably hope to gain by refusing to restart the dialogue process. Pakistan has accepted that the perpetrators of 26/11 came from its territory and has, in principle at least, agreed to prosecute them. India also helped focus the attention of the international community on Pakistan post-26/11. However, New Delhi’s insistence that it will talk to Islamabad only after Jama’at-ud-Da’wah (JuD) chief Hafiz Mohammad Saeed is prosecuted may indeed be demanding too much. India should work with Pakistan to initiate Saeed’s prosecution rather than hounding Islamabad to go it alone: a strategy of pure coercion and compellence with no reasonable payoff is clearly counterproductive.

If New Delhi continues along this route, Pakistan may well up the ante against India (through border incursions, for example) in an attempt to bring India to the negotiating table: states have a tendency to behave irrationally when pushed to the corner. India’s strategy of compellence has never really worked against Pakistan. And it is unlikely to work in the future.

Counterproductive

Not only is a ‘no-dialogue’ policy towards Pakistan not useful, it is indeed counterproductive. Consider the following. First of all, the former Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, is increasingly becoming a ‘persona non-grata’ among the ruling elites of Pakistan — both civilian and military. There is an emerging tendency among many Pakistani politicians and retired generals who once worked under Gen. Musharraf, to feign ignorance of his statements and actions (especially vis-À-vis India) and to distance themselves from him.

In other words, there is today a clear unwillingness in Pakistan to own the political legacy of its former military dictator. It is now widely recognised that the 2004-2008 peace process — which was seriously considering out-of-the-box solutions to resolve outstanding rifts — not only had the full support of Dr. Singh and Gen. Musharraf but, through its back-channel route, had even prepared a tentative blueprint for peace. More precisely, it is believed that the bilateral back-channel negotiations had taken the peace process on Jammu and Kashmir to a new level. If the new government and the strategic community in Pakistan renege on Gen. Musharraf’s past promises, there will be serious implications for Indo-Pakistan relations, especially with respect to Kashmir.

Therefore, undoing Gen. Musharraf’s legacy will also mean undoing the Indo-Pakistan peace process and all that it may have achieved over time. If this process of demonising and demolishing Gen. Musharraf’s legacy is already under way in Pakistan, then India’s consistent refusal to engage Islamabad will only further contribute to the undoing of the gains of the Indo-Pakistan peace process. In other words, the Indian unwillingness to engage Pakistan will reverse the gains that India had made in recent years in resolving its conflicts with Pakistan.

Another emerging trend in Pakistan is to accuse India of sponsoring terrorism against Pakistan. Today many in the Pakistan establishment are making serious allegations that India supports the Baloch insurgents as well as some Pakistan Taliban groups. While such allegations may not be wholly new, what is perhaps new is the focussed and predetermined manner in which these accusations are being made today and the manner in which this argument is gaining currency within Pakistan’s strategic elite. Although this may be purely for domestic consumption — as the international audience is unlikely to buy this line of argument — a Pakistani population and civil society unfavourably disposed towards India is not something New Delhi should ignore. It will be genuinely counterproductive for Indian interests in the long term.

More so, this shows that there is a perceptible change in Pakistan’s attitude: from being defensive and cornered in the months immediately after 26/11, it is now on the offensive. To some extent this has been a result of India’s overuse of coercive diplomacy, which it continues to indulge in without properly weighing its options in a cost-effective manner. Quite apart from the fact that this approach has degraded relations between the two countries and made Pakistan feel more insecure (which in turn may prompt it to be more belligerent), it has led the international community to regard the two countries as part of the problem rather than as part of the solution. More so, the more time India spends refusing to have a dialogue with Pakistan, the more difficult it will be for the country to start talking if and when it decides to talk.

Status quo bias

New Delhi’s unwise handling of Pakistan is a result of a deep-seated status quo bias that permeates New Delhi’s policy towards Pakistan, terrorism, and even Kashmir which in many ways is the ‘ground zero’ of Indo-Pakistan relations and India’s struggle against terrorism. This status quo bias has manifestly narrowed the Indian government’s understanding and approach to terrorism in the region.

New Delhi sometimes appears to consider terrorism a problem that is unique to India, as though no other country has ever suffered its consequences. It therefore persists with its demand that others (that is, Pakistan) ‘fix’ the problem first before it (the perpetual victim) will discuss other political and security issues.

This head-in-the-sand approach ignores the reality that terrorism is a global/regional problem requiring a global/regional solution. This solution can only be achieved in a cooperative mode and by creating cooperative mechanisms to contain the menace of terror in the region. And India needs to take the lead in this process, however challenging and long-drawn-out it may turn out to be. It is imprudent to attempt to enact unilateral measures to ‘control’ terrorism, precisely because terrorists respect no borders and are by their very nature extremely difficult to control.

A status quo bias may ‘benefit’ the painfully slow-moving Indian political and bureaucratic apparatus, but it is not beneficial for a country that desires to become a great power in an age of fast-changing international politics. To start with, therefore, New Delhi needs to shed its status quo bias and restart the dialogue with Pakistan in its own long-term strategic interests.

(Source: The Hindu, November 4, 2009. URL: http://beta.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article42838.ece)

COMMENTS:

After all the dialogues we indulged with Pakistan since 1947 there has been no significant shift in policies or view points of both the countries.The best solution for India is to stop giving undue importance to Pakistan and focusing more on problems at home. Terrorism that has emerged in names of naxalites, Maoists and many other groups as a result of neglect and weak character of Indian governments has to be controlled first if India desires to achieve a Super Power status ever in future.I agree with the author in the matter that Indian government should stop whining about how Indians have been a victim of Pakistan sponsored Terrorism.We should rather focus on creating a feeling of security by improving the intelligence services and infrastructure for defense and paramilitary forces so that they can effectively counter the militias all over the country.Instead of a dialogue with Pakistan, India can gain more by initiating a dialogue with its own people who have taken up arms.

from: Vinayak
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 02:21 IST

India needs to maintain current status of any talks with Pakistan. Why do we forget that the main culprit named by the arrested Terrorist, providing cogent evidence agaisnt him, is still at large enjoying official support. Evidence provided by India is being either denied or is being rated insufficient. The more we adopted soft diplomakcy to Pakistan the more terrorists landed in India, including Jammu and Kashmir. Government of India, for the first time, as taken right decision to ask Pakistan to first prosecute the main culprit roaming at large before sitting on the dialogue table. We should appreciate the Government's approach which is in overall National interest.

from: Arjoo
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 08:19 IST

Wonderfully written!

from: Mahmood
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 08:23 IST

The author makes some valid points, but looses sight of the larger goal. Talks will help when actions or agreements result. In the case of Pakistan, the main problem is that once the leadership changes (and this seems to happen a lot), the "Talks" have to start again from square one, with all the agreements already concluded deemed worthless. In the current scenario, it does not appear anyone is in control in Pakistan (so no actions possible either).

from: Pradeep
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 10:28 IST

I have to disagree that India needs to pay its unruly neighbour so much attention. India must crush Pakistan's overtures by ignoring it as much as possible, not giving it the level playground it covertly seeks through terrorism.

from: B S Kumar
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 10:32 IST

I don't agree. India should continue to be firm in its position that there will be no talks until the 26/11 terrorists are prosecuted. If Pakistan is really sincere in improving its relations with India, it must do at least the one thing that India is asking for. If it cannot fulfill this one request, how can we be sure it will fulfill other requests made during any future talks? It is Pakistan's credibility at stake here, and there is no need for India to rush to restart talks. Restarting talks for talks sake is futile and everybody knows it. Let's be patient but firm and consistent in our position.

from: Kiran A
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 10:58 IST

While there is no doubt that dialogue can sort out issues across the world, there is a worry India should have to start the same. As one should have noticed in the past, whenever there was an atmosphere created for dialogue, the terrorists had always made hurdles. So if India really want to start the dialogue, let it happen and if there is no agenda, then let it now happen. If one really wants to go and get the issues solved, both these countries should have an open and negotiation mind to start with. Because Paistan can't ask India to hand over entire Kashmir to them, India won't agree to it. Likewise, India should also not insist that we are going to resume the dialogue like our predecessors... If there is no solutions foreseen, then it is better not to have dialogue rather than a failed dialogue.

from: Umesh
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 12:27 IST

India Pakistan relations have always been governed by emotions and events, whether it is Plebscite offering by nehru, shimla agreement , nuclear bomb etc. Every single event or word spoken or action taken has become a cornerstone in deciding future course of action. To make coercive diplomacy successful again, India should talk really tough and not give in as it did at Sharm-el-Sheikh by admitting to look at Balooch accusations. Historical mistakes need not be repeated, else it will harm us in long term.

from: Amit Kumar
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 12:32 IST

I agree with the assessment that coercive diplomacy has all but failed. The US only plays to its self-interest in any region. India has never really stood up to itself in its actions against Pakistan and is seen more as a whiner. The time when we make strong words supported by meaningful action, our aspiration for a super power will be realised. As to the specific re-engagement with Pakistan, it does India no harm in opening channels of back-door diplomacy. But it can be futile with an instable Pak Govt and insecure country.

from: Nandith Nedungadi
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 13:59 IST

I think that the author has been very right in his optimistic attitude for better India-Pak relations. But, i guess the author misses the point that if what is happening in Pakistan now-a-days persists sometime longer, there would be no Pakistan to talk about. The International community has changed their views towards Muslims, which is really a sad thing, people see them as terrorists, everyone and this is because some of them are doing it. I think India can't achieve the Super Power status until and unless it has its issues resolved with Pakistan. But again starting the peace process is not a solution.

from: Ravi
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 14:06 IST

Considering the status quo in Pakistan, Pakistan government and security agencies would be more concerned about their internal security. Mounting pressures to dismantle an entire terror infrastructure may not be a realistic approach from a neighbour like India at this juncture of affairs. It is also true that talks in the current situation may be futile, but being responsible power India needs to resume talks with Pakistan to ensure the state support. An instable Pakistan is a greater threat to India than to themselves.

from: Manu R S
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 14:10 IST

The article could only be construed as a justifier and ground-maker for the to-be announced decision of the Government to carry on the composite dialogues with Pakistan. In the last 62 years, the CBMs ventured by India have only ended in leaving many Indians dead at the hands of terrorists and our intelligence and security forces weakend. India can start, and should, start dialogues only after either the Kashmir problem is solved or when there is a solid proof on the cessation of all terrorism activities that target India in Pakistan.

from: Sakthi
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 14:26 IST

We cannot change our neighbours (neighbouring countries), we have to live with them. Brothers can quarrel sometimes and live apart, but somebody in the family stream should continue to work towards appeasement between the families for a breakthrough in rebuilding the relationship. The misunderstandings of 1947 between the families during our forefathers' period need not have to continue all the way through their grand children and great grand children. We need dialogies between these two great families (India and Pakistan) to come to some good understanding and rejoining. This is the wish of the great great grand children of these two families.

from: Suma
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 14:43 IST

I disagree with the author. You cannot have friendly relations with a country which has throughout history proved to be a backstabber and says that the evidence to frame the terrorists provided by the GoI is not enough!! In the past 10 years itself we faced 3 major attacks by Pakistani terrorists- Kargil War, attack on the parliament and 26/11. I was specially appalled by the following line from the article- ''New Delhi sometimes appears to consider terrorism a problem that is unique to India, as though no other country has ever suffered its consequences.'' Let me point out here that India might not be the only country who had to face the consequences of terrorism but India is the only country who despite of n number of terrorists, anti-Indian elements surrounding the entire border, insurgents, has without a war, diplomatically handled the situation. USA also faced terrorism on it's soil and what did it do? Attack Afghanistan and crumble it to pieces. Instead of applauding the peaceful efforts of the government without waging a war, the author says that India has little to gain by stalling the dialogue process?! My question, what did we gain by resuming it in the first place in 2000? attack on parliament and 26/11..?

from: Jaya Srivastava
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 15:03 IST

I agree with the author that a sensible dialogue is needed from/with Pakistan but NOW is not the time for that.India should wait till the dust settles down there and the signs for peace-making are clearly visible.

from: Senthil Rajan
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 17:23 IST

The broad goals of India's diplomacy should be clear enough: 1. Weaken elements in Pakistan that are violently anti-Indian. 2. Strengthen pro-India elements. The fact that not talking has not achieved this goal does not automatically imply that talking will achieve them. In fact, we could put ourselves in a worse situation by talking. I think both objectives can be achieved if India is able to identify a pro-India element in the Pakistani polity and supporting it consistently. Such element should not be identified with individual persons. India should instead promote concepts like "democracy", "rule of law" and "religious moderation" and be willing to backup any group in Pakistan that embraces these principles. There is no point talking to any government in Pakistan at this time because all of them are controlled by a power structure whose sole aim is to destabilize India. India should create and promote a more friendly atmosphere.

from: Vijay
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 19:03 IST

Coercive diplomacy is just one of the tools of diplomacy. India has used it with limited effect, getting Pakistan to arrest at least the lower level minions of the terrorist infrastructure that has been nurtured there over the past 60 years. It is too early to be called off. In fact, it is not clear that it should ever be called off though it can be re-calibrated. This is not to be confused with the notion that India isn't engaged in interacting with Pakistan. It simply means that sitting down with the Pakistani political leadership at this time would be a wasted effort. Events have proven beyond any doubt that the Pakistani leadership is far too weak to take on the military-bureaucratic establishment that dominates Pakistan. So it suites India to conduct diplomacy that cajoles and prods rather than sits and talks. If there is one important lesson to be learned from engagement with Pakistan, it is that the gains are only possible in conjunction with coercion and force, both diplomatic or military. The 1971 war, the Kargil war and Mumbai terror episode all bear testimony to that simple fact.

from: Gopal
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 19:21 IST

Tuesday, November 3, 2009

Manmohan should get a new speechwriter on Kashmir




New Delhi’s deep-seated status-quo bias permeates its policy towards Kashmir which, in many ways, is the ‘ground zero’ of Indo-Pak relations. This status-quo bias has manifestly narrowed the Indian government’s understanding and approach to resolving the problem and has prevented India from taking any radical steps. Although it may ‘benefit’ the painfully slow-moving Indian political and bureaucratic apparatuses, this approach is not beneficial for a country desirous of becoming a great power in an age of fast-changing international politics. The routine manner with which New Delhi approaches Kashmir is disturbing. By not being willing to take radical steps, and granting the state typical bureaucratic treatment, New Delhi is failing the Kashmiris. The PM’s speech in Srinagar shows a lamentable bankruptcy of ideas. Maybe it’s time that Manmohan Singh got a new speechwriter on Kashmir.

Take, for example, the recent visit of the Prime Minister and the Congress Chief to the Kashmir Valley. With the top man in the central government in the lead, the most powerful politician in the country backing him, a friendly and forthcoming state government under Chief Minister Omar Abdullah, and even the major opposition party in J&K, the PDP, welcoming the delegation from New Delhi, what did the recent visit of the Indian Prime Minister and his delegation achieve? Nothing new, nothing substantial. The PM and his delegation made the usual promises, expressed hope (as they always do), claimed there is normalcy in the state (which they have been doing for a very long time), talked about the inclusive dialogue process (that occurred in the UPA’s first term and achieved nothing); and, yes, inaugurated the 12km-long Anantnag-Qazigund railway line. The PM’s speech in Kashmir was a grim reminder of how unimaginative the government has become about conflict resolution in the state. New Delhi’s seasonal theatrics in Kashmir have become all too familiar and predictable in recent years: It’s the same old wine, in the same old bottle.

Home Minister Chidambaram claimed that New Delhi is contemplating the “withdrawal of some paramilitary battalions and vacation of occupied houses and land by the army and paramilitary”. These are the right words, said with the right sentiment, but we have heard similar statements from previous ministers. How are we to believe that this time things will be different and the Kashmiris will get their houses, orchids and schools back? However at least Chidambaram is willing to make such a bold claim; the PM stuck to the tried-and-tested, unwilling to go beyond his speechwriter’s unimaginative rendering of the situation.

Manmohan Singh is credited with making a peace overture to Pakistan from Kashmir that has been hailed as statesmanlike, and as a potential way forward toward reconciliation between India and Pakistan. The essence of what the PM said is that if Pakistan shows good faith and addresses the issue of terrorism, India will not be found wanting in its response. What is so new, different, radical, or statesmanlike in that? Was he not repeating a line that New Delhi has been reiterating for the past 11 months, since the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai? It would have been path-breaking and a real peace overture had the PM made an unconditional offer to talk to Pakistan. I am willing to accept the argument made by many analysts that the PM is serious about restarting the dialogue with Pakistan, but that does not excuse him for his genuinely unsubstantial response to Kashmir.

For many commentators it is politically correct to say that the issue of Kashmir is an issue that is between India and Kashmir and that Pakistan has nothing to do with it. The recently initiated ‘silent diplomacy’ with Kashmiris at the behest of Mr. Chidambaram and the other measures by New Delhi seem to be pointing towards such a direction. What is forgotten here is that there are two important dimensions to the Kashmir problem: the problem of Kashmir and the problem in Kashmir. ‘Silent diplomacy’ will be useful in resolving the problem in Kashmir: poor governance, fear of violence, lack of development, and the army’s occupation of private property, but there is also the problem of Kashmir. The problem of Kashmir exists between India and Pakistan and must also be resolved in order to achieve stability between the two countries, as well as sustainable peace in J&K. Pakistan has in the recent past been reasonable in its declared approaches to the problem of Kashmir. India could legitimately, if cautiously, talk with its neighbour about the issue, rather than consistently trying to isolate Pakistan.

In all of this, one wonders about the exact role that Omar Abdullah has been playing. It looks as though he is increasingly playing second fiddle to the Congress government and that he is endorsing the latter’s peace initiatives. Kashmir’s history bears witness to the fact that J&K chief ministers who have become too close to New Delhi have not excelled in the state. Omar has a mind of his own and should therefore design his own peace initiatives; something he seems hesitant to do thus far. Omar had a vision for Kashmir when he was in opposition that appears to be lacking today. If Omar Abdullah, fired by the enthusiasm of his late thirties, cannot take radical steps now he will never be able to do so, and waiting for New Delhi to do so is proving fruitless.

(Happymon Jacob teaches at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)

(Source: Greater Kashmir, November 3, 2009)

Monday, October 12, 2009

Talk time

Why India Should Start Talking to Pakistan. Now.



Politics is a fast changing game; more so international politics. Though statesmen might want to control and constrain it, they may well be in for a few unpleasant surprises. Statesmen desire to maintain the status-quo if they feel it suits their interests. This often clouds their understanding of international politics, narrowing their perspectives and leaving them uninformed of contemporary realities. New Delhi has traditionally followed an unwise status-quo approach towards Pakistan in its reluctance to engage the country in effective dialogue. Do New Delhi’s foreign policy mandarins think that India profits strategically by refusing to engage Pakistan in discussion? Do they assume that by refusing to engage Islamabad, India can continue to hold the moral high ground it thought it had when it broke off relations post-26/11? They seem to, erroneous though this might be. New Delhi is not only losing precious time by isolating itself from Pakistan, but it is also harming its own strategic interests by doing so. A recent track-two meet in Bangkok between former officials of the countries (from ISI, R&AW, Foreign Ministries, and the Defence Forces) that this author had the chance to attend, exposed some interesting insights into the multifarious negative consequences of giving Pakistan the silent treatment.


First of all, former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraff is increasingly becoming a ‘persona non-grata’ among the ruling elites of Pakistan – both civilian and military. There is now an emerging tendency among many Pakistani politicians and retired generals, who once worked under Musharraff, to feign ignorance of his statements and actions (especially vis-à-vis India) and to distance themselves from him. In short, there is a clear unwillingness in Pakistan to own the political legacy of its former military dictator. This has very serious implications for Indo-Pak relations and the peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue. It is now widely recognized that the 2004-2008 peace process - which was seriously considering out-of-the-box solutions to resolve the outstanding problems between the two countries – not only had the full support of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and former president Musharraff but, through its back-channel route, had even prepared a tentative blueprint for peace. More precisely, it is believed that the bilateral back-channel negotiations had taken the peace process on J&K to a new level. There was only left to share the progress that had been made with the J&K leadership, both mainstream and dissident, many of whom had already welcomed the ‘Musharraff formula’ as a possible way forward. If the new government and the strategic community in Pakistan renege on Musharraff’s past promises, there will be serious implications for Indo-Pak relations, especially for Kashmir. In other words, undoing Musharraff’s legacy also means undoing the Indo-Pak peace process and all it may have achieved. If this process of demolishing Musharraff’s legacy is already underway in Pakistan, then India’s consistent refusal to engage Islamabad will only further contribute to the undoing of the gains of Indo-Pak peace process.

Another emergent trend in Pakistan is to accuse India of sponsoring terrorism there. The Pakistani government seems to be raising this charge against India in various domestic forums and the strategic community is also singing a similar tune in international meetings. While this may not be a wholly new phenomenon, what is perhaps new is the focused and predetermined manner in which these accusations are being made today. India has been accusing Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism for a long time, and now Islamabad is returning the dubious favour. This may be for purely domestic consumption, as the international audience is unlikely to buy this line of argument, however a Pakistani population unfavourably disposed towards India is not something New Delhi should ignore. It is surely counterproductive for Indian interests in the long term.


What precisely is India gaining by not talking to Pakistan? In my opinion, since severing dialogue with the country post-26/11, India has already achieved whatever it ‘possibly can’. Pakistan has accepted that the perpetrators of 26/11 came from its territory and has agreed to prosecute them. India also managed to turn the heat of the international community on to Pakistan post-26/11. There is nothing more that India can reasonably gain from the current scenario. Insisting that New Delhi will only talk to Pakistan after Jama'at-ud-Da'wah (JuD) chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed is prosecuted may be demanding too much. The Indian government should now work with Pakistan to get Sayeed prosecuted rather than trying to force Pakistan to do so alone; a strategy of pure coercion and compulsion with no reasonable payoff is clearly counterproductive. If New Delhi continues along this route, Pakistan may well up the ante against India (through border incursions, for example) in an attempt to bring the latter to the negotiating table. India’s strategy has never worked against Pakistan, and it is unlikely to work in future.

In international relations, ‘signaling’ is an important tactical measure used by countries to engage adversaries without explicitly stating a position. Such signals, unfortunately, frequently go unread. For example, many analysts asserted that the Pakistani army was sending positive signals to India when the ISI chief attended an Iftar celebration hosted by the Indian High Commission in Islamabad. Yet this was not taken seriously by New Delhi. Many in Pakistan’s strategic community today believe that New Delhi should try to engage the Pakistani army – perhaps the real centre of power – in order to resolve the outstanding issues between the two countries. Talking to the Pakistani army is something New Delhi has never considered, but it should now do so.


There is a perceptible change in Pakistan’s attitude: from being defensive and cornered in the months immediately after 26/11, the country today is on the offensive. This has partly been a result of India’s overuse of coercive diplomacy against Pakistan. Quite apart from the fact that it will worsen the relations between the two countries and make Pakistan feel more insecure (which will in turn prompt it to be more belligerent), it will also encourage the international community to continue to consider the two countries as part of the problem. More so, the more time India spends refusing dialogue with Pakistan, the more difficult it will be for the country to start talking as and when it so decides. International politics is a fast-changing game; and New Delhi must improve its strategy if it expects to be a serious and successful player.

(Happymon Jacob teaches at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)

Source: Greater Kashmir, October 13, 2009. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/today/full_story.asp?Date=13_10_2009&ItemID=45&cat=11

Monday, September 28, 2009

Resurrecting the Peace process



Yet another season of peace talks has arrived in Kashmir. The UPA’s Kashmir interlocutors have been discussing their resumption with the dissidents in Srinagar. These closed door meetings are expected to iron out the agenda and modus operandi of another peace process, following the abandonment of its precursor midway through 2005. Since then many things have changed in the region, in the state, in India and in Pakistan; the dynamics between all players have complicated and shifted. In this new environment it is necessary to ponder whether things have changed for better or worse. Does the contemporary political scenario lend itself more comprehensively towards a successful outcome this time? More importantly, has this latest process begun favourably, or are we headed for the fall already?

Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, the young, fiery yet sophisticated, moderate dissident is the flavour of the season. He is currently being courted by New Delhi to wade through the complexities of Kashmiri politics, and to preempt potential troubles in the Valley during the coming months. Essentially, this man of the moment is being courted to help revive the peace process - no small task. New Delhi understands that quiet in Kashmir is not necessarily indicative of contentment. The centre was caught off guard by the land transfer agitations and again vis-à-vis the Shopian rape-murder case. The Chief Priest of Kashmir has apparently responded positively despite these significant hiccups, saying that the “time to be anti-India is over.” This pragmatism is not a rejection of the rhetoric of dissent in favour of mainstream politics, but rather is an important reiteration of the need to talk peace.

Let us try and understand the regional context within which New Delhi and Srinagar are now operating. The regional environment has suffered overarching uneasiness between India and Pakistan since 26/11 and the two countries remain virtually isolated from one another, with what little contact there is notable for its awkwardness. The back-channel meetings that almost ‘finalized’ the fate of Kashmir just two years ago are a rapidly fading memory. In this new context what stands remarkable is the absence of Pakistan as a factor, directly or indirectly, in the peace process that is beginning to take shape between New Delhi and Srinagar. Also important is that Pakistan has been relatively silent on Kashmir in the recent past - the country seems to be too busy with itself.


This means, firstly, that at least some of the actors in the dissident camp who might look to Pakistan for broad political direction may find themselves without counsel. Secondly, pitching the J&K peace process as being unconnected from the larger India-Pakistan peace process may hamper the actors from reaching any ‘lasting’ or ‘final’ resolutions. Thirdly, and more importantly, the absence of Pakistan leaves India without the external political pressure required to motivate New Delhi to make worthwhile concessions. In other words, New Delhi would be speaking from a position of strength, unchallenged. The new dialogue may not, therefore, deliver many dividends.


What are the potential wildcards that may impact upon the process? I can see at least three in this dialogue that could take shape in the coming months. One, the hardliner Ali Shah Geelani and his Hurriyat faction may try to make the peace process appear as a meaningless exercise before the public. Yet it might not be possible for the other parties to include Geelani in the process since his preconditions may be unacceptable to them. Secondly, that the upcoming dialogue will likely be conducted without regard for Pakistan’s concerns, and without its involvement, means that it is unlikely to support whatever results may be achieved. Thirdly, it is widely believed that the ‘security establishment’ in New Delhi will not allow for any ‘radical’ solutions to Kashmir to be discussed. We may therefore be confronted with just another case of history repeating itself; reports suggest that New Delhi has added only a few limited soft issues as part of its peace offer this time around.


Of course, I concede that the idea of a dialogue between the conflicting parties is a good thing per se, and should be appreciated for that alone. However at the same time, initiating a dialogue without proper preparation and minus clear objectives and aims will surely make it a useless one, as we have seen in the past. More so, a dialogue that ends abruptly without concrete results not only creates bad blood among the parties concerned, but also increases the cynicism that exists among the people at large. I have, like many others, in the past underscored the need to look for and focus on any potential common positions among the various actors in J&K. There will be opportunities to revisit some of the aspects that have already been discovered if this dialogue goes ahead. New Delhi must also avoid limiting the dialogue to Mirwaiz Manzil alone as it prepares to talk afresh to the Kashmiri leadership. It should, for its own good, involve a cross section of Kashmiri moderate voices.


Now may not be the ideal season to resume the ever-precarious peace process if its outcome is to be positive. Yet too many seasons have already passed in Kashmir for that argument to hold water; perhaps it is not an ideal season that makes peace, but rather peace that makes the season ideal. The omens are no perfect, but then peace in Kashmir cannot wait for the arrival of perfect omens.

(Happymon Jacob teaches at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi).

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 29 September, 2009. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/today/full_story.asp?Date=29_9_2009&ItemID=19&cat=11 )


Monday, September 7, 2009

‘Our’ Kashmir-Myth

Let’s first unlearn each other and then learn afresh



First, a caveat: I do not speak for all Indians, of course, as I cannot, and I do not intend to be judgmental but merely self-reflective. It is personally difficult for me to unravel Kashmir’s complex mythology; it requires stepping out of my political comfort zone and asking some very confronting questions. Because if we Indians created the Kashmir-myths then I created them too; I am, after all, an Indian.

We, in the ‘rest of India’, have our own views and assumptions about Kashmir: right, wrong, misconceived, moderate, extreme and so on. We have held them for what seems like an eternity and do not often reflect over them. Most of these views are misconceived and yet they show no signs of erosion. Indeed, these views have a perverse tendency to reproduce and perpetuate themselves, to pass on from generation to generation and gather additional mythological content as they do. The bad news is that these views, to a large extent, form the collective Indian perception of Kashmir and Kashmiris, which is too frequently negative and oft dismissive. The good news, however, is that mythological and constructed that these perceptions are, they can be washed from our collective memory. Our Kashmir paradigm may be well-entrenched but not forever ingrained. Kashmir, in our imagination, lies far away, physically as well as psychologically, but to change our perceptions all we need to do is bring ourselves closer to Kashmir. We need to learn it.

To our detriment, we do not overly concern ourselves with historical nuances. Our political and social lives are rife with generalities and simplicities that feed into our perceptions. The Kashmirirs are a thankless people who have forgotten all that India has done for them - they survive on ‘our’ resources and manpower. The Kashmiri economy is kept alive on our toil. In a sense, therefore, Kashmir is a liability to the ‘rest of India’. Paradoxically though we also believe that Kashmir is an 'atoot ang' of the Indian nation. We are certain that Kashmiris aid and abet `terrorists’ sent from Pakistan to destabilize India. Pakistan, for one, has capitalized on our regional missteps and its more disreputable actors continue to take advantage of our dearth of knowledge. To our great disadvantage, many of us do not understand that the turmoil of the 1980s was a direct result of India’s imprudent meddling in J&K’s political process. That is why we were surprised when then Prime Minister AB Vajpayee said in 2002 that the forthcoming elections in J&K would be free and fair. We naively did not realize that the preceding ones were not.

We have very sophisticated double-standards. Any anti-establishment movement in Kashmir is considered an act of terrorism though our civil society and media praises those who stand up to the irresponsible and anti-people policies of the establishment in other parts of the country. We have strikes, shut-downs and darnas all over India on a daily basis; they are considered to be an essential part of our democratic life. But when Kashmiris protest against the heavy-handed excesses of the security forces or the administration, we cry foul. The Aarushi Talwar murder case is mourned by our civil society leaders but they failed to notice the Shopian rapes, or so it would seem. Azadi is blasphemous even as we do not bother to understand what it means (I am someone who always believed that azadi has many meanings). Kashmiris are hypocritical, we think, when they say that they want Indian forces gone from Kashmir: aren’t the forces there for their own safety? Some of us think that India has spoiled J&K with the enormous economic largesse it perpetually funnels into the state. “Stop giving them money and they will learn a lesson,” we declare, conveniently forgetting the thriving tourist industry that existed prior to the 1980s. Planeloads of visitors from all over the world arrived in Srinagar every day of the tourist season eager to experience India’s very own paradise. But such vital economic activity is the first causality in a trouble-torn state, and paradise was lost.

We are not keen to appreciate J&K’s political complexity and we hurry to paint Kashmiris with one brush: all anti-Indian colours. We celebrate political plurality in rest of India but not in J&K. When our Dalit leaders talk about self-respect for the downtrodden, when our women talk about equal participation in governance, when New Delhi’s politicians talk about the need to keep the military out of civilian life, when far flung regions of the country speak out against discrimination, and whenever the state is accused of being anti-people, we call it the resilience and vibrancy of our democracy. But when the Kashmiri complains of atrocities at the hands of the security forces we call it thankless. When they ask for the removal of the army from their schools and orchards we call it secessionist tendencies, and when they throw stones at security forces firing directly at them we call it an anti-national attitude. What we do not understand, and why we are utterly surprised at the Kashmiri’s uneasiness about having to live surrounded by security personnel, is that our only experience of the Indian army or paramilitary forces comes from Bollywood movies that show only sanitized scenes of the ideal Indian Jawan.

Why do we think this way? Our Kashmir paradigm has been carefully constructed from a multitudinous variety of historical, ideational, psychological and emotional building blocks. Many popular myths have been inculcated by us about Kashmir and continue to feed our collective understanding. These myths, as discussed above, gain sustenance from sources as diverse as our great power aspirations (“Kashmir is a hindrance in our onward journey towards great power status”), our arguments on secularism (“Kashmir means a lot to the secular fabric of our polity” – as if India’s secular polity is so feeble), our national pride (“whenever the Kashmiris create problems in the Valley it negatively affects Brand India”), and our sense of righteousness (“we are a great nation that has a culture of tolerance and sympathy going back thousands of years and so we cant really go wrong in Kashmir. We therefore simply must be doing the right thing there”).

Many of us make some appallingly jingoistic arguments: we cannot talk to separatists while our soldiers give up their lives in Kashmir; any concession to Kashmiris would lead to an undesirable domino effect; after all these small aberrations happen in the process of nation building. We hate anyone else talking about Kashmir. We know how to resolve our internal issues and do not need any advice whatsoever, thank you very much. There are also other tactical reasons such as the strategic importance of J&K to Indian security, the need to have victory in the ongoing zero-sum game against Pakistan, and the unwillingness of our intelligence agencies to let their political bosses grant concessions on Kashmir.

Finally, another caveat: there are many Indian opinions on Kashmir and rarely are they expressed in the somewhat exaggerated manner (exaggeration has its uses too) that I have used. I realize that not all opinions held by Kashmiris about the 'rest of India' and Indians are spectacularly progressive in nature, and that there may be many demonized India-myths circulating there. In the end, we need first to unlearn each other and then learn all over again, for a better tomorrow.


Source: Greater Kashmir, SEPTEMBER 08, 2009, URL:http://greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=8_9_2009&ItemID=34&cat=11)

Saturday, June 27, 2009

Contemporary India-Pakistan Relations: a View From New Delhi

AIIA Policy Commentary
Published by the Australian Institute of International Affairs, June 2009

UPA’s Foreign Policy: A Critique

By Happymon Jacob, Kimberley Layton

Source: Economic & Political Weekly, June 20, 2009 vol xliv no 25