Does he mean business?

Zardari’s ‘Business Plans’ with India

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

Asif Ali Khan Zardari, the newly elected President of Pakistan, lacks in popular legitimacy. He is still known to a large number of common Pakistanis and committed cadres of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) as the widower of their favorite leader. In other words, President Zardai’s only claim to fame so far is his marriage to late Benazir Bhutto even as there are many reasons why he is infamous. As the President of Pakistan, he would like to do a radical make-over of his political and personal images and he knows that he can easily do so by making some radical political decisions. After all, politics is the game of the present. Pakistani leaders can make history by either whipping up passions against India or by making unprecedented peace moves towards India. While it may be too early to say that is what Zardari will do in the days to come, one can surely say that that is what he is aiming to do in the days to come. Let’s look at some evidence in this regard.

As soon as he was sworn in as the county’s 12th President in Islamabad, Zardari made three key foreign policy overtures all of which are important for India. First of all, contacts with the Indian government, he said, were underway and that the people would soon hear good news about Kashmir (possibly in a matter of months since he said that the good news will be there before UPA goes into elections next year). Secondly, he was unequivocally indicating that Pakistan needs to have a good friend in Afghanistan and he sent that message out by inviting the Afghan President for his swearing in ceremony. Hamid Karzai commented at the post-swearing in press conference, “I find in President Zardari a good will and vision not only for relations between the two countries but for the region that I have seen for the first time in this region” (emphasis added). That these comments came from someone who has been openly accusing the Pakistani government of sponsoring the militant attacks in his country shows the way ahead between the two countries. Thirdly, Zardari said the government now has a strategy in place to combat terrorism and added that he himself remained a victim of terrorism. He further said, “the challenge for us is to dismantle the militant cells so that they do not hold the foreign policies of two independent nations (India and Pakistan) hostage to their acts of terrorism.”

His recent comments on Kashmir as the president of Pakistan should be seen in continuation of what he had said earlier about Kashmir and his clarification regarding that later on. After the Zardari-led PPP had come to power in Pakistan, Zardari said that Kashmir should be kept on the backburner, that his government wants to improve its relations with India, and would not let the Jammu and Kashmir dispute become an obstacle in the friendly relations between the two countries: “We can be patient till everybody grows up further and leave the Kashmir dispute for the future generations to resolve in atmosphere of trust”. When this statement was criticized by pro-Kashmiri leaders in Pakistan he clarified that he is committed to the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. He made it clear, again, in March this year when some of us had met him at the Zardari House in Islamabad as part of the Pugwash delegation that he is ready to talk about Kashmir, ready to think out of the box in order to resolve the issue and that he is ready to ‘do business’ with India on Kashmir. He explained what he meant by doing business with India saying that his government will take steps to establish mutually beneficial commercial and economic projects in the erstwhile princely state of J&K in consultation with the government of India. He said that the future of Kashmir should be seen in terms of a bridge of commerce and trade and other mutually beneficial interactions between the two counties.

I do not see Zardari’s statements on Kashmir as impulsive utterances of a shrewd politician trying to impress the audience of the day. Over the last few months he has elaborated on his plans for Kashmir on more than one occasion. He made two important statements recently prior to assuming the presidency of the country. “Pending a final settlement, we agree with the statement of your Prime Minister supporting an autonomous Kashmir running much of its own affairs”, Zardari said to an Indian media organisation. He further said that a Commission can be established between the two countries and the “leaders of Kashmir themselves to work out what should be done in foreign and defence affairs”. After he became President, he said that he has been consulting key leaders in Pakistan regarding Kashmir policy and that a parliamentary committee will soon be set up to discuss all possible solutions to resolve the Kashmir issue.

The timing of his statement, as president, on Kashmir assumes significance because he did not choose to lash out against India especially at a time when there are anti-India protests raging in the Kashmir valley. This is indicative of the political maturity of his vision for Kashmir and for India-Pakistan relations.

Should Zardari’s statements on Kashmir be taken seriously? If so why? First of all, he is a smart businessman and is keen to make his mark in Pakistan’s polity and so he is likely to think out of the box on Kashmir. Secondly, given the situation that Pakistan is currently in (fall from the US grace, dubbed by the international community as the epicenter of global terrorism, multiple insurgencies at home etc.), it is likely to adopt a conciliatory approach to India and other players in the region. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, he is a moderate, modern and progressive Muslim, and not a fanatic and so will understand the rules of the modern states system.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, September 17, 2008. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=17_9_2008&ItemID=14&cat=11 )

Greater common good

Dissidents Need a Common Minimum Programme

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

The question that many, including in J&K, are asking today is whether the dissident leadership in the state knows what it wants. One is not sure if they have indeed arrived at a consensual blueprint, behind closed doors, as to what their endgame is going to be. It doesn’t look they have a blueprint, going by the statements of various leaders, trajectory of the movement, shifting stances of the various dissident formations and the incongruence between the mood of the public and the deeds of the leaders. The leaders of the ongoing dissident struggle in Kashmir have come from a wide range of political formations, shades of opinion and political persuasions and have therefore shown no great deal of unity of purpose in the ongoing struggle. Added to this is the simmering dissent within the dissident camp that has now become fairly clear. First of all, Syed Ali Shah Geelani’s claim to ‘sole leadership’ has not gone down very well with the other leaders and they have expressed that in many words. Secondly, Geelani and his disciples are ostensibly spearheading the ongoing struggle for azadi. Moreover, his camp seems to be making both the grand strategy and tactics of the ongoing struggle. What this means is that even if others do not know what their endgame is, Geelani does.

More importantly, Geelani’s recent statements about other Kashmiri dissident leaders and questioning their credentials have not gone down well with the rest of them. What this dissent in the dissident camp will do, slowly but steadily, is to weaken the momentum of the ongoing agitations. One of the reasons why the other leaders do not seem to be contesting Geelani’s modus operandi is because it will not be tolerated by the common Kashmiris who are participating in the protests: they would like to see their leaders united and they see Geelani as the grand old patriarch who can provide the necessary symbolism to the ongoing agitations. Anyone who shows dissent in the dissident camp today would most definitely have his political career cut short.

So while this apparent ‘unity’ will sustain, under the circumstances, the ongoing agitations in the days to come without any serious ruptures, what this will deprive the ‘movement’ is a unity of purpose. First of all, they need to have a commonly worked out scheme on how to talk with New Delhi and secondly, what to demand from New Delhi. At present there does not seem to be any serious formal or backchannel efforts to engage New Delhi. If the dissidents believe that they can sustain the momentum of the agitations for as long as they wish, they are mistaken: popular movements invariably have their lifespan. It is advantage dissident camp at this point of time, but then the ball is in their court too: they need to make their demands loud and clear. One of the reasons for this lack of common demand is that different leaders in the dissident camp believe in different things. While Geelani may be having a field day with his leadership, ideas, and ideology, ruling the roost today, there are other equally competing ideologies within Kashmir’s dissident camp. Consider for example: one of the slogans that one gets to hear rather frequently during the ongoing agitations is: Ham Pakistani Hain, Pakistan Hamara Hai (We belong to Pakistan, and Pakistan belongs to us). Apart from Geelani, not many would agree with this slogan but even then they don’t seem to be in a position to speak up against that.

If the aim of the agitations so far was to create conditions to force New Delhi to listen to the Kashmiris regarding innovative and out-of-the-box solutions to resolve the issue, they have undoubtedly achieved that and now the time has come for them to reach a consensual and workable solution. Can the dissident camp continue the present momentum and have a unity of purpose at the same time? They can, provided they decide upon a ‘common minimum programme’ while the agitations are in their prime. This requires a willingness on the part of the dissident leadership to do some collective and realistic strategising. As this writer has pointed out in earlier columns in GK, there are indeed many common themes in the opinions of the Kashmiri dissident leadership regarding what the future of Kashmir should be. While it is true that the wide range of dissident opinions ranging from merger with Pakistan to greater autonomy, the middle-of-the-road solution between the two extremes seems to be the restoration of the provisions of an undiluted Article 370.

The significance of ‘Achievable Nationhood’

One of the key documents that need to be carefully examined by the dissident camp today is the much acclaimed Achievable Nationhood produced by People’s Conference led by Sajad Lone. Lone’s document not only makes a realistic assessment of the situation in J&K but also proposes innovative methods to address the feelings and needs of the people of J&K. While some of his solutions might be beyond the brief of Article 370, one must understand that, this is a document that is open to be put to discussion, deliberations and, perhaps, amends to suit the needs of the various constituencies in the state. The importance of this document lies in its inherent flexibility to address the aspirations of various actors and so the dissident leadership needs to give serious consideration to this document in order to lay out a common minimum programme which is perhaps a must at this point of time.

An afterthought

Even as the anti-India protests are gaining in strength in Kashmir, India’s National Security Advisor M K Narayanan was sent by New Delhi’s political leadership to assess the security situation in Srinagar and report back. Those accompanied included the Defence Secretary, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Director of Intelligence Bureau and a Joint Secretary at the Prime Minister’s Office. There were no politicians in this high level delegation and, for that matter, no senior political leader from New Delhi has visited the valley ever since the protests began there. This shows that New Delhi still prefers to look at it as a law and order and security problem and not a political problem. More importantly, why do New Delhi’s politicians shy away from engaging the people and dialoging with them when it matters the most? Politics, our politicians need to understand, is not a bed of roses.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, September 3, 2008: URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=3_9_2008&ItemID=3&cat=11)

Responses to my article "Need to rethink our Kashmir Policy", The Hindu, August 22, 2008

Letters to the Editor, The Hindu, August 25, 2008

Kashmir issue
This refers to the article “Need to rethink our Kashmir policy” (Aug. 22) and the letters published in response to it (Aug. 23). It is a matter of serious concern that a grave issue such as the Kashmir imbroglio has not been resolved by successive governments for 60 years.
There is no doubt that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of the Indian Union. Being a border State, it is strategically important for us. We cannot discard it under any circumstance. The immediate thing to do is to abolish Article 370 and encourage people from neighbouring States to settle down in Kashmir.
Yohannankutty Mathai,
New Delhi

The article says that despite all their promises to the Kashmiris, the governments in Srinagar and New Delhi have done almost nothing in the last four years to resolve the problem to the satisfaction of Kashmiris. As citizens of India, I think we ought to shoulder the responsibility for the actions of the governments we voted to power. It is “our” promises, made to a particular section among us.
Sanjoe Tom Jose,
Mumbai

The Centre needs to adopt a people-centric approach to the J&K crisis, failing which the situation in the State may escalate further. Kashmir is not a colony of India. It is as much an integral part of India as any other State and the Centre cannot allow anyone to manipulate this.
The ISI and some sections in Pakistan are trying their best to present a view that does not reflect true public opinion.
Sarvesh Kumar Dubey,
Jamshedpur

The Kashmir issue has been hanging fire for 60 years and more, and no solution is in sight. The peace initiatives and dialogues have not produced the desired results. The agitation which started over the Amarnath land transfer issue has flared up beyond control. The conflict is now between Hindus in Jammu and Muslims in the Kashmir Valley. The clamour for azadi is growing louder in the Valley. How long can the government allow the stalemate to continue? It should allow the people of the State to decide their fate.
E. Sivasankaran,
Coimbatore

Since 1947, India has espoused a self-righteous attitude and pretended to know everything from democracy and secularism to modernity, and rejected all good advice even from its best friends to let Kashmiris live peacefully. It has continued to militarise J&K. A basic shift in the Indian approach to the Kashmir issue would mean letting Kashmiris have their sovereignty. Demilitarisation and force withdrawal should begin now.
Reehana Kabeer, Dharapuram

URL: http://www.hindu.com/2008/08/25/stories/2008082555551001.htm

******

Letters to the Editor, August 23, 2008

Kashmir policy
The article “Need to rethink our Kashmir policy” (Aug. 22) is one of the best articles I have read on the situation in Jammu and Kashmir. It rightly points out that even though Kashmir is legally part of the Indian Union, Kashmiris do not feel part of it and that it is the flawed policies of the Indian state for 60 years that are to blame. Although shouting slogans of azadi is no solution to the problem, implementation of an undiluted Article 370, which was the basis of Kashmir’s accession to India, is one of the best practical solutions.
Azhar Yasin,
Srinagar
* * *
The article rightly pointed out that Kashmiris feel let down by the Indian government. Much of this sentiment can be traced to an aspect of the conflict that is generally overlooked: lost economic opportunities due to misguided policies in the region since Partition. The epicentre of the present insurgency and the regions most affected by it are marked by low levels of development and governance. There are many potential solutions but unless India and Pakistan abandon the combative mindset, no progress is possible.
A. Bhagavathi Meena,
Valliyur
* * *
While various explanations such as the ISI hand, the communal divide, and the strengthening of the separatist movement are being advanced for the unrest in J&K, the fact is India’s political leadership has lost the confidence of the average citizen of the State.
The people feel that the Central leadership lacks credibility and moral authority. The UPA government will be blamed by history if separatists have their way in Kashmir. It should immediately constitute a team of senior people who enjoy credibility, and are not in politics, to visit J&K to find a solution.
N.S. Venkataraman,
Chennai
* * *
Ever since the accession of J&K to India, the demand to hold a plebiscite has been turned down. Article 370 which promises a special status for Kashmir has become a political tool for the BJP, which is bent on abolishing it. The Amarnath land transfer row and the economic blockade have given enough fodder to the separatists to sway the Kashmiris to demand azadi. It is time a political consensus was evolved to grant de facto autonomy to Kashmir within the framework of the Indian Constitution.
Syed Sultan Mohiddin,
Kadapa
* * *
The problem in Kashmir is deep rooted. Roundtable conferences and formation of working groups won’t do. Kashmiris feel alienated and betrayed because the Centre has reneged on many promises made to them.
Faizan Qadir,
Srinagar
* * *
A special status, economic packages and other blandishments are mere palliatives and do not address the deeper malaise afflicting the Kashmiri mindset. If the Indian leadership makes a bold attempt to find a meaningful solution to the Kashmir issue, it is sure to have the backing of the people. It will make way for durable peace in the subcontinent and give a fillip to the confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan.
R. Ravichandran,
Chennai

Source: The Hindu, August 24, 2008.

URL: http://www.thehindu.com/2008/08/23/stories/2008082355351000.htm

India & Pakistan: Pathways Ahead

Authors
Amitabh Mattoo, Kapil Kak and Happymon Jacob
Category: Defence & Strategic Studies
ISBN: 978-81-87966-66-1
Year: 2007
Price: Rs. 840/ USD$ 34
Pages: 307 + xxii pp
Format: Hardback

Publisher: KW Publishers, New Delhi

Authors : Amitabh Mattoo is the Vice Chancellor of the University of Jammu. He is also Professor of International Relations at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Professor Mattoo has been a member of the Standing Committee of the Association of Indian Universities; was member of the Governing Council of the Nuclear Science Centre; was a member of India's National Security Council's Advisory Board, and was also a member of the Task Force constituted by the Indian Prime Minister on Global Strategic Developments. He has been visiting Professor at Stanford University, the University of Notre Dame, and the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign. He has authored many books and articles on International Relations and Foreign Policy.

Air Vice Marshal Kapil Kak AVSM VSM (Retd), formerly of the flying branch of the Air Force, is a well-known defence and security affairs analyst who earlier served as Deputy Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. He also did a 4-year stint as Advisor (Strategic Studies), University of Jammu, and is currently Additional Director, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi.

Happymon Jacob teaches Strategic Studies at the Department of Strategic and Regional Studies, University of Jammu. He is also a Visiting Fellow at the Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi. Jacob is the Coordinator of the Pugwash Kashmir Initiative, and has been associated with the Observer Research Foundation, Centre for Air Power Studies and the Delhi Policy Group. Jacob's publications include HIV/AIDS as a Security Threat to India (Manohar, 2005) and The Rise, Fall and Resurgence of the Taliban (Observer Research Foundation, 2005).

Need to rethink our Kashmir policy

The turmoil in Jammu and Kashmir calls for the need to deal with the Kashmiri sentiments with more sympathy, patience and sophistication.

The ongoing turmoil in Jammu and Kashmir is unprecedented in its intensity and mass appeal, and has the potential to recast the State’s existing political realities as well as force a rethink of India’s traditional lines on the Kashmir problem and most certainly give way to newer political realities when all is said and done.

While comparisons are rightly made between the current turmoil in the State and the situation in the early 1990s (minus the militancy), what needs to be noted is that despite all the efforts by the Indian state (and use of all sorts of measures ranging from force to negotiations with the separatists) in the last two decades or so, the dislike, let us face it, that a large number of Kashmiris express for India is real and there for everybody to see. It doesn’t help any more to comfort ourselves by saying that this is only an urban phenomenon in downtown Srinagar and not all Kashmiris share this sentiment. The anti-India agitations in Kashmir have given us, as a nation, an opportunity to introspect on some of our policies towards Kashmir.

Underlying causes
In order to understand the underlying dynamics of the ongoing turmoil in Kashmir, it is necessary to understand what led to this state of affairs. While the otherwise innocuous Amarnath land transfer may have been a triggering point, there are more profound and serious causes to what is happening in the Valley today. An analysis of the recent political history of Kashmir proves one thing beyond any doubt: peace in Kashmir is too fragile to be taken for granted and a mistake was committed in taking it for granted.

In retrospect, despite all their promises to the Kashmiris, what have the governments in Srinagar and New Delhi done, in the last four years, to resolve the Kashmir problem to the satisfaction of Kashmiris? Almost nothing.

Reports forgotten
One might argue, as many political commentators are doing today, that so much money has been pumped into Kashmir. But political problems are not resolved by monetary measures alone.
The Prime Minister’s Round Table Conferences and the reports that were produced subsequently by various working groups have been neatly archived and forgotten about. The reports and the contents were indeed very encouraging and one had hoped that the governments would act on them helping, thereby, to improve the situation in the State. The government in Delhi did not bother to do that.

It has now become clear that New Delhi was sleeping through the various phases of peace in Kashmir (and the unprecedented groundswell of popular support for it), ignoring the daily demands and pleas from dissidents, activists, mainstream politicians and analysts to engage the State and the problems therein more proactively.

It was not just that there was unprecedented willingness on the part of dissidents and various sections of Kashmiris to look for a solution to the State’s problems. More importantly, many of the suggestions to conflict resolution were concrete and should have been taken into serious consideration. The government’s passive, if not dismissive, attitude towards such gestures and proposals has brought about the prevailing situation of political disconnect between the people and the State.

The implications
The most obvious implication of the current turmoil in Kashmir is the resounding return of the popular slogan of azadi to the streets of Srinagar. What started as a struggle for land grew in proportion when Jammuites economically blockaded Kashmir and is now rapidly spreading as a pro-azadi movement: land or the blockade are no longer issues in this movement. From what was widely termed as an ‘irreversible’ peace process between India and Pakistan as well as between Srinagar and New Delhi, things have changed so radically in about two months’ time that neither of the peace processes exists today.

That many years of negotiations with Kashmiris, the ‘special status’ and large amounts of economic aid have not been able to win the hearts and minds of the people of Kashmir has to make not only New Delhi but we as a nation sit up and rethink our traditional policies towards Kashmir and Kashmiris’ feelings towards the rest of us.

The ongoing struggle between Kashmir and Jammu has also witnessed the rise of Jammu as a political stakeholder in the State. Until a couple of months ago, Jammu and Kashmir meant Kashmir: Jammu felt politically, economically and developmentally sidelined and neglected, even as the facts do not bear out much of this perception of neglect. However, in politics, perceptions sometimes matter more than facts.

While the Sangh Parivar is quite obviously trying to get political mileage out of what is happening in Jammu, it needs to be pointed out that the struggle in Jammu is not merely religious and the issue, again, is not only about the land transfer: Jammu wants to be heard at the high table of J&K politics, and it is no more willing to accept a Kashmir-centred polity in the State.

While this is likely to further divide the two regions, it would also benefit the Hindutva forces in Jammu. From being on the margins of the political landscape in J&K, the Bharatiya Janata Party is now likely to emerge as a decisive force in the politics of the State thanks to the local discontentment against the policies of the National Conference, the People’s Democratic Party and the Congress during the ongoing crisis in Jammu.

The All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) that has been spearheading the Kashmiri agitation is also facing a political dilemma of how far to go and how much to ask from New Delhi. While the three APHC demands (opening the roads to Pakistan for trade, release of Kashmiri political prisoners and the non-application of the Armed Forces Special Powers’ Act in the State) are not akin to seeking azadi, the increasing popular support for azadi in the State would put the APHC in a tight spot: the APHC led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq may not be prepared to seek complete independence from India though Tehreek-i-Hurriyat chief Syed Ali Shah Geelani would press for it in the days to come. The question at this point of time is whether and how Mirwaiz can pacify the hard-line elements who will try to go beyond the brief of his moderate political agenda.

What lies ahead?
Even if New Delhi’s multi-faceted strategy to restore normality in Kashmir becomes fruitful in the days to come, the future of the State is likely to be characterised by some significant developments. First of all, the ongoing turmoil will convince New Delhi of the need to grant greater autonomy to J&K. Mere promises of “anything short of azadi” will not work now; they will need to be delivered on the ground. Thinking on the lines of greater autonomy to the State (along the line of an undiluted Article 370) is perhaps a way ahead. A close examination of the proposals put forth by most stakeholders in J&K points to such a consensual solution. In this process, it is now all the more important that the various regions within the State do not “feel” neglected.

Secondly, this spate of agitations is likely to be followed by fresh and committed attempts at establishing greater linkages and collaboration between the two sides of the erstwhile princely State of Jammu and Kashmir. Let us remember that such measures were under serious consideration long before the new spell of agitations began in the State. What peace could not achieve, conflict might.

Thirdly, and most importantly, the ongoing turmoil also calls for the need to deal with the Kashmiri sentiments with more sympathy, patience and sophistication. Considering the fact that one of the immediate causes of what is happening today was the arrogant and allegedly communal statements by the then Chief Executive Officer of the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board such as why “Muslim pollution is tolerable and not Hindu pollution” (pointing to the pollution caused to the Dal Lake, the Wular Lake, etc., by local residents), which he made while addressing a press conference in Srinagar before the agitations began.

Source: The Hindu, August 22, 2008.

URL: http://www.thehindu.com/2008/08/22/stories/2008082254791000.htm

What awaits Kashmir?

What awaits Kashmir?

J
ammu and Kashmir is witness-
ing a return to the early 1990s,
sans the militant attacks. The
ongoing struggle in both Jam-
mu as well as Kashmir does

not belong to a pre-scripted design fo...read more...

This marks the end of yet another peace process?

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

There appears to be an increasing possibility of history repeating itself yet again vis-à-vis the bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan: a long eventful history that has recorded relative clam and mutual animosity in succession. Even as the peace process is officially on, there does not seem to be much peace left in it. Events in the past months seem to have got the better off the four-year-old peace process and the five-year-old ceasefire. This comes at a time when yet another important peace process – between J&K and the Indian government – seems to be going down the drain. The internal peace process that had raised the hopes of many in the subcontinent now seems to be losing steam. Indeed, the relationship between New Delhi and Srinagar as well as Jammu and Srinagar seems to be worsening by the hour. While the two peace processes – India-Pakistan and New Delhi-Srinagar – are two sides of the same coin, they have different rationale, dynamics, pulls and pressures, and endgames.

The last few months have been eventful and testy for India-Pakistan relations and their peace initiatives. The recent history of India-Pakistan relationship was characterised by increasing infiltration from across the border, reported incidents of firing across the LoC which both countries chose to ignore until recently in order to continue the peace process, deadly attack on the Indian mission in Kabul which had clear ISI signature (say Indian and US intelligence agencies), and the serial bombings in Bangalore and Ahamadabad that pointed fingers towards Pakistan. After all of this, the Indian government decided that there was no way that the peace process could go on as if nothing had happened.

It was against this background that the foreign ministers and prime ministers of the two countries met in Colombo on the sidelines of the SAARC summit to discuss ways and means to salvage the peace process that was dying a sad and untimely death. However, not to the surprise of many analysts, nothing significant came out of this meeting. While the Indian government engaged in some plain speaking and hard diplomacy, Pakistani side was trying to save face (as the entire SAARC community seemed to be talking passionately about the need to contain terror in the region) by sounding conciliatory and pointing out the Pakistani decision to expand the positive list of items for import from India and to begin the process of inviting Indian firms to invest in Pakistan. This, however, did not seem to have cut much ice with the Indian side.

That said, let us go back a step further to seek answers and explanations for what is happening to the peace process. Despite the fact that there is widespread popular support for the peace process and that Indians and Pakistanis, in general, want to see that the two south Asian neighbours live in peace and harmony, the peace process is only going downhill. What explains this contradiction between popular desire and official actions? Furthermore, what explains the official lines and actual results?

First of all, there is some merit in the argument that the current crisis in India-Pakistan relations is part of the age-old diversionary war strategy, even as that alone cannot explain the present stalemate. As per this theory, a country adopts a belligerent posture vis-à-vis another country when faced with too many pressing domestic concerns, such as political turmoil, lack of legitimacy, economic decline, power struggles etc. There are elements of all of these in today’s Pakistan. The president who ruled the country for around 10 years is on the verge of an impeachment (one is unsure of what happens if he is impeached). The failed attempt at reigning in the ISI by trying to put it under civilian control has questioned the authority and power of the political bosses. No one is sure who controls the Pakistani state today: is it the army, is it Musharraf, it is Zardari, is it Prime Minister Gilani or is it sheer anarchy that is ruling Pakistan? The Pakistan army in tandem with the ISI could easily be making use of this political ambiguity at home to press their traditional lines on India and the political leadership in Pakistan (including the Prime Minister and his men) may have decided to be a silent spectator to let the domestic steam out on India.

There is also a widespread view today about Pakistan that it is proceeding towards state failure. While it is certainly not in India’s interest to see a balkanized Pakistan in its neighborhood, one cannot rule out symptoms of state failure in Pakistan. Look at the many regions in today’s Pakistan that are reeling under anarchy. There are varying but increasing degrees of violence, subversion and anarchy in many parts of Pakistan such as the North West Frontier Province, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Balochistan, to name a few. Incidents of violence in Pakistan have increased manifold during 2003 and 2007. Total number of killed in Pakistan (civilians, security force personnel and terrorists combined) was 189 in 2003, it increased to 863 in 2004, 1471 in 2006 and last year the figure stood at 3599.

Can a country that cannot hold itself together be expected to deliver on the peace process? In order to make sustainable progress on the peace process a country needs to have relative peace and stability at home, which Pakistan unfortunately lacks. This is what the Indian government needs to keep in mind when it demands the Pakistani establishment to deliver on its promises. The Indian government is likely to maintain an aggressive posture in the face of Pakistani inability to act, again, primarily due to domestic political pressures in India. In an election year the Indian government either needs to show that it has achieved a commendable lot on the Pakistan front or adopt a belligerent posture if there are no achievements to show. UPA’s Pakistan policy hasn’t achieved much, so it is unlikely to adopt a soft line now lest that be manipulated by the BJP.

Added to this is the problem that there is an unfortunate absence of any high-level diplomacy or chemistry between the leaders of the two countries: the meeting between Mr. Gilani and Dr. Singh in Colombo was at best cordial in nature, not fruitful. Personal diplomacy often works in international relations and can do wonders when combined with political will and domestic legitimacy. None of these is in existence between the leaders of India and Pakistan as of today.

The immediate future does not look promising unless, of course, the two countries are willing to take some radical steps towards peace. That can, under the circumstances, happen only if there are peace dividends for political use available for both the countries. This, again, seems to be lacking in the case of India and Pakistan. The UPA government, at this point of time, is unlikely to work towards a national consensus months before parliamentary elections and the BJP will not, even if approached, let that happen.

Source: Greater Kashmir, August 13, 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=13_8_2008&ItemID=2&cat=11