Negotiating an Indo-Japan Nuclear deal

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ongoing visit to Japan is his first bilateral foreign trip outside the region which, in a sense, demonstrates the importance New Delhi attaches to the bilateral partnership with Japan. Though a number of issues, ranging from “bullet train” to defence deals, are likely to figure in the bilateral consultations during Modi’s visit to Tokyo, the likelihood of a possible nuclear deal between the two sides has attracted the most attention. New Delhi and Tokyo have been in consultations for a number of years to finalise a nuclear agreement which will enable the former to buy nuclear technology from Japanese companies. Even though these negotiations have not been as strenuous as the Indo-US negotiations were, India’s status as a nuclear outlier state has been a major stumbling block in inking the deal. Japanese reservations about the deal come from its tragic history with nuclear weapons, whereas New Delhi’s urgency in signing a deal comes from its urgent need for nuclear energy. 

Why is it important for India?
India’s desire for a civilian nuclear deal with Japan comes from material and symbolic considerations. From a material point of view, New Delhi needs Japanese nuclear technology in order to advance its massive nuclear energy expansion plans, something that the Modi government has been very keen on. More importantly, India’s nuclear deals with US and France would also be inadequate without a nuclear agreement with Japan since Japanese firms such as Toshiba Corporation and Hitachi Ltd have major stakes in US and French firms such as Westinghouse Electric Co. and Areva. New Delhi’s plans to buy nuclear reactors from these firms can actualise only after a nuclear deal is signed with Japan. 
An Indo-Japan nuclear agreement is also useful to New Delhi for a variety of symbolic reasons. First of all, we need to understand that this is the first time that Japan has engaged in a sustained dialogue with a non-NPT country to conclude a civilian nuclear agreement, even though Japan has been highly critical of India’s nuclear weapon programme. Thus nudging Tokyo to go past this psychological barrier is itself a great victory for New Delhi. Secondly. Japan is a major pillar of the contemporary global nuclear order and has been very active in demanding a nuclear weapon free world. Japan is some sort of a normative gatekeeper of such an order. Therefore, being able to sign a nuclear deal with it will not only enhance India’s standing in the nuclear order but is also likely to smoothen its attempts at further integration with the global order. Besides Japan, the other deal that is in the pipeline is the one with Australia, which is likely to be concluded in the first week of September when the Australian Prime Minister would come to New Delhi. If New Delhi is indeed able to finalise these two deals, it will clearly improve its legitimacy and standing in the global nuclear order. 

Why the deal is important for japanThe nuclear deal is also very important for the Japanese government.  First of all, there are high stakes involved in it from a commercial point of view given the fact that billions of dollars are riding on potential nuclear trade with India. The Japanese firms are looking to get a major share of that money especially at a time when nuclear energy has suffered a major setback in Japan thanks to the Fukushima incident.  Secondly, Japan is also conscious of the importance of strengthening its ties with India so as to checkmate the Chinese aggression in the region. While the Modi government is most likely to reach out to the Chinese leadership, the reality is that there is no love lost between China and India. In the Japanese understanding, then, “enemy’s enemy is a friend”! 

Then there are alliance considerations. Tokyo has also been encouraged by Washington to enter into the deal with New Delhi since many American firms, controlled in turn by the Japanese majors, would not be in a position to sell reactors to India without the nod from the Japanese government. 

What are the stumbling blocks?
And yet there are a number of issues that can create major hurdles in concluding an agreement. The anti-nuclear lobby in Japan is critical of a nuclear deal with India. But more importantly, given India’s status as a country that has not signed either the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty (CTBT), the Japanese government is faced with a moral dilemma when it comes to signing a nuclear deal with New Delhi given its activism against nuclear weapons. The other issue is the Japanese concern about future nuclear tests by India. It has been insisting that the Indian government should provide a guarantee that it would not conduct any more nuclear tests in future thereby closing the possibility that India might conduct a thermonuclear test to strengthen its nuclear deterrence with China.  Moreover, Japan is also keen on including in the agreement certain clauses that will enable it to conduct inspections to ensure that the material supplied by it is not used for weapon purposes by India. 

Likely Indian responses 
On the eve of his departure for Japan, Prime Minister Modi held a meeting with Japanese journalists in which he tried to alleviate some of these fears. On the question of whether or not India will test again, he said, “We are committed to maintaining a unilateral and voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing”. However, it is very unlikely that he would be willing to give any documentary undertaking in this regard. India is also unlikely to agree to sign the NPT or the CTBT. However, post-1998, New Delhi has not ruled out the possibility of adopting a more positive approach to CTBT should the American and Chinese governments sign and ratify the treaty. On the question of potential diversion of nuclear material, Modi government is unlikely to concede to any more than what it has agreed to in the agreement that it has signed with the IAEA. 

That said, Modi has far more legroom to finalise a nuclear agreement with Japan unlike his predecessor Manmohan Singh whose government went through a number of existential crises when negotiating the nuclear deal with the Americans.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, August 31, 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Aug/31/negotiating-an-indo-japan-nuclear-deal-15.asp) 

Regulating India’s nuclear estate

HAPPYMON JACOB

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For the country’s nuclear energy sector plans to be effective, the government should lift the veil of opaqueness surrounding its civilian programme. The first step would be to establish an autonomous, transparent and accountable regulatory institution

The 2014 Nuclear Materials Security Index prepared by the Washington-based Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) has ranked India 23rd out of 25 countries with weapons-usable nuclear materials. While the NTI ranking has been criticised for a variety of reasons including inadequacies in its methodology, it has rightly pointed out the absence of an independent nuclear regulatory mechanism in India with the mandate to ensure that high standards of safety and security are observed in India’s civilian nuclear facilities. Even though many Indian analysts and officials dismiss the NTI ranking as being uninformed, New Delhi needs to take such criticism seriously given its long-standing desire to mainstream itself into the global nuclear order including gaining membership to key international export control cartels such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Given this context, there is a need to take a critical look at the proposed Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority.

Background to the Bill

Currently, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), established in 1983 through a gazette notification, is tasked with regulating the safety and security aspects of the country’s civilian nuclear facilities. However, it is not an autonomous body as it depends on the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) for all practical purposes. It has, as a result, been unable to perform its regulatory functions effectively. The demand for establishing a truly autonomous nuclear regulatory authority has been a long-standing one. In 1997, the Raja Ramanna Committee report had recommended that the Atomic Energy Act (1962) should be amended to enhance the effectiveness of the nuclear regulatory system in the country. Even though the Union government, in 2000, had directed the DAE to suggest the necessary amendments to the 1962 Act, nothing substantial happened for almost a decade. Finally, it was the Mayapuri radiation accident (New Delhi) in 2010 and the Fukushima disaster (Japan) of 2011 that served as a wake-up call for the DAE.

 “Since the NSRA Bill will now have to be reintroduced in Parliament, the Department of Atomic Energy should try and accommodate the eminently useful suggestions given by the standing committee and other independent experts” 

In 2011, the Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority (NSRA) Bill was drafted by the DAE and submitted to the Union Cabinet for approval. The DAE note that sought approval from the Cabinet to introduce the Bill in Parliament had cited both the Mayapuri and the Fukushima accidents as the factors that contributed to the urgency to strengthen the country’s nuclear regulatory mechanism. However, even the NSRA, as currently envisioned by the DAE, does not propose the establishment of a truly autonomous regulatory authority. The Bill, first introduced in the Lok Sabha in 2011, has now lapsed and will have to be reintroduced in the new Lok Sabha. Before the NSRA Bill is reintroduced in Parliament, there is a need to strengthen the powers of the regulatory authority that it proposes to set up.

CAG and Committee reports

Even as the DAE was preparing to table the NSRA Bill in Parliament, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India had undertaken a “Performance Audit on Activities of Atomic Energy Regulatory Board.” The CAG report, tabled in Parliament in August 2012, concluded that “the legal status of AERB continues to be that of an authority subordinate to the Central Government, with powers delegated to it by the latter,” and recommended to the government to “ensure that the nuclear regulator is empowered and independent. For this purpose, it should be created in law and should be able to exercise necessary authority in the setting of regulations, verification of compliance with the regulations and enforcement of the same in the cases of non-compliance.”

Following the CAG report, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament also produced a report in 2013 entitled “Activities of Atomic Energy Regulatory Board” in which it agreed with the view taken by the CAG on the functioning of the AERB. The PAC also highlighted the observation made by the “Parliamentary Standing Committee on Science and Technology, Environment and Forests” in 2012 that the NSRA lacks autonomy. The PAC, in the light of the observations made by the standing committee and the CAG, was critical of the functioning of the AERB as well as the proposed NSRA Bill and stated in its report that the “DAE should seriously re-examine the provisions of the Bill and take necessary steps urgently so as to ensure that the nuclear regulator becomes an independent and credible body at par with similar regulators in other Countries.” In other words, the NSRA Bill, as it stands today, is far from satisfactory even though the DAE has made the assurance that the Standing Committee’s recommendations would be seriously considered.

Issue of authority

The Council of Nuclear Safety to be established by the NSRA Bill — with the Prime Minister as the Chair and mostly government representatives as members — will be a very powerful body with the power to appoint the chairperson and members of the new regulatory body. This will diminish the powers of the regulator since it will be subordinate to the Council chaired by the Prime Minister. We will, as a result, end up having a government-controlled regulator all over again. The NSRA Bill is explicit on the ability of the government to control the regulator: “the Central Government may, by notification, supersede the Authority for such period, not exceeding six months, as may be specified in the notification.”

The NSRA also does not say which facilities would be put under the new authority — currently, the AERB can only oversee the civilian facilities. The Bill states that “the Central Government may, for the purposes of national defence and security, exempt any nuclear material, radioactive material, facilities, premises and activities; the premises, assets and areas associated with material and activities from the jurisdiction of the Authority.” So, the question is this: who will oversee the safety and security of the strategic facilities and programmes for which there is currently no regulatory authority? The Bill mentions that new regulatory bodies can be created to regulate the strategic programmes. The Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee had recommended the creation of other bodies to do so. However, there has not been any movement so far on that front. Another issue is the exclusion of the NSRA from the purview of RTI Act, thereby reducing the requirement for the regulator to be transparent.

This is not to say that the NSRA Bill is not an improvement from the existing AERB. Clearly, there are significant differences between the two. For one, while the AERB was set up by a government order, the new regulator will be established by an Act of Parliament, thereby making it more powerful. More so, while the AERB reported to the AEC, the new authority will not report to the AEC but will submit its report to Parliament.

Way ahead

It is unknown how many of the amendments suggested by the standing committee have been incorporated by the DAE. Since the Bill will now have to be reintroduced in Parliament, the DAE should try and accommodate the eminently useful suggestions given by the standing committee and other independent experts. The new government should encourage the DAE to carry out at least the following three amendments: one, the new regulatory body should be given complete financial, administrative and institutional autonomy from the Central government and made accountable to Parliament; two, the new regulatory body should also include persons from outside government such as scientists, civilian auditors, environmentalists and independent experts; three, given the crucial role that the NSRA will play in the years to come, the selection of its members should be done by a body comprising the Leader of the Opposition and the Speaker of the Lok Sabha.

If India’s plans to drastically expand its nuclear energy sector have to be effective, and acceptable to the people at large, it should bring the country’s civilian nuclear establishment out of the thick layers of secrecy and opaqueness within which it has traditionally operated. The first step in that direction will be to establish a genuinely autonomous, transparent and accountable institution that is capable of regulating the country’s “nuclear estate.”

The words of Professor Kiyoshi Kurokawa, who chaired the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission are eminently appropriate in the Indian context as well: “What must be admitted — very painfully — is that this was a disaster ‘Made in Japan.’ Its fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture: our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question authority; our devotion to ‘sticking with the program’; our groupism; and our insularity … nuclear power became an unstoppable force, immune to scrutiny by civil society. Its regulation was entrusted to the same government bureaucracy responsible for its promotion.”

(Happymon Jacob teaches Arms Control and Disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. E-mail: happymon@gmail.com)

(Source: The Hindu, August 29, 2014. URL: http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/lead-article-regulating-indias-nuclear-estate/article6360984.ece)

Playing Chicken with Pakistan

New Delhi’s decision to call off the August 25 Foreign Secretary level talks with Islamabad in response to the latter’s unwillingness to stop consulting the Kashmiri separatists is counterproductive and short-sighted even as such a populist act makes perfect electoral sense for the BJP in the run up to the Assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) where it looks to make unprecedented electoral gains. 

On the face of it, New Delhi’s argument for calling off the talks might look logical and based on national interest. But a deeper analysis would show that there are a number of problems with the rationale for doing so. First of all, discussions between the separatists and Pakistani diplomats/politicians have never led to anything. For the most part, these discussions have been symbolic and at best, an irritant. More importantly, ever since Pervez Mushrraff gave a new direction to Pakistan’s Kashmir policy, Pakistan has been cold-shouldering the Kashmiri separatists, especially Ali Shah Geelani who, as a result, has become very critical of Pakistan’s new Kashmir policy. And the Kashmiri separatists have also often reminded Pakistan that there is a need to discuss the situation in Pakistan Administered Kashmir as well. Now, with one strike, New Delhi has undone all that and forced a new friendship between the separatists and Islamabad: a classic diplomatic self-goal.

BJP’s ‘Mission Kashmir’This sudden move by the Modi government should also be seen as an important piece in BJP’s evolving electoral strategy for winning a significant number of seats in the upcoming Assembly elections in J&K so as to play a major role in the government formation in the state. Finding potential partners in Kashmir, which it is currently engaged in, is a major part of this mission. Consolidating the non-Muslim vote in J&K is another major part of this strategy. In this context, the earlier statements by BJP on Article 370 and the return of Pandits to Kashmir, and now calling off the talks with Pakistan form part of a well-considered strategy to increase the party’s popularity in Jammu and even in parts of Kashmir. 

On the other hand, in Kashmir, denial of its ‘representative role’ by New Delhi will force the separatists to strengthen their poll boycott calls. The boycott call by the separatists, and BJP’s increasing popularity in Jammu and Ladakh, could lead to the emergence of BJP as a key player in post-poll J&K. This then is a game being well played by BJP. 

Implications for Kashmir New Delhi’s relationship with Kashmir’s separatist leadership is far more complex than it is often recognized. Both India and Pakistan have funded separatist groups in the Valley, promoted one over the other depending on the political climate, played one against the other, and engaged in overt and covert negotiations with them. Indeed, New Delhi, over last two decades, has understood the ‘importance’ of the Kashmiri separatists, especially the moderate ones, and as a result they have been a crucial part of New Delhi’s containment strategy in the valley.  Over the past few years, however, the influence of the moderate Kashmiri dissidents in the valley has been steadily diminishing among the valley’s alienated youth even as Geelani’s, the most hawkish of them all, popularity has only increased. New Delhi’s objection to the meeting between the Pakistan High Commissioner and the separatists will only improve Geelani’s standing in the eyes of the Kashmiris. This will be damaging for New Delhi’s long-term strategy to contain the Kashmir insurgency. 

Kashmiri separatists have consistently argued that there are three parties to the Kashmir conflict: New Delhi, Islamabad and Kashmiris, an argument vehemently rejected by New Delhi. Now, by engaging in a public spat with Islamabad based on the logic “either us or the separatists”, New Delhi has not only pitched itself and the separatist leadership at the same level but also unwittingly admitted that the separatists are a party to the Kashmir conflict. 

Portraying Kashmiri separatism through the political articulations of Geelani, in a sense, does help the Indian state in arguing that Kashmiri separatism is essentially anti-India and Pro-Pakistan (which is fundamentally misleading). However, such arguments tend to paint Kashmir’s non-mainstream politics with the same brush and silence the reasonable voices of Kashmir’s moderate dissidents. This, as a result, delegitimises the genuine demands of the Kashmiris in the eyes of the Indian public and help fan separatist passions in the Valley. The reality is that, whether or not one likes it, the Indian state needs the Kashmiri separatists if it wishes to bring about genuine peace and reconciliation in the valley. 

Implications for Indo-Pak relations
By calling off the meeting between the two Foreign Secretaries, the Modi government has convoluted a bilateral dialogue process that was beginning to take a positive direction after the ‘historic’ meeting between the two Prime Ministers. There is no clarity as of now whether or not the other scheduled Indo-Pak engagements will take place. Given that the Modi government has indirectly set a pre-condition for future talks, it will be perceived as fickle-minded if future interactions indeed take place without Pakistan having conceded to the Indian demand vis-à-vis Kashmiri separatists. On the other hand, if the “Islamabad should only talk to us or we won’t talk at all” logic applies to future interactions as well, New Delhi will eventually be forced to get down from its diplomatic high horse or risk not having a dialogue process with Islamabad at all. 

It is indeed a bizarre logic to argue that a bilateral Indo-Pak dialogue process is only useful for Pakistan, not India. The reality is that India needs a dialogue process as much as Pakistan needs it. In reality, no government in Pakistan can become popular by talking to India, but every Pakistani government does so because they realize its importance. New Delhi, therefore, needs to shed the illusion that by engaging in a bilateral dialogue, it is doing a favor to Islamabad. In any case, Islamabad has not been too pleased with the ongoing dialogue with New Delhi as the former thinks that the talks are progressing on terms set by the latter. For instance, the contemporary Indo-Pak dialogue has three broad focal areas: acts of terrorism against India, trade and transit, all of which are important for New Delhi, not so much for Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan would like more progress on finding a political solution for Kashmir and resolving the Siachen standoff both of which are not emphasized by the current dialogue process. So how is it that India is in any way ‘hurting’ Pakistani interests by calling off a dialogue which Islamabad thinks is going in India’s favour?  

From a long-term strategic point of view, attempts by New Delhi to achieve stability in Kashmir without giving Pakistan an honorable exit will not be an enduing one. And that is precisely what Islamabad is looking for vis-à-vis Kashmir: an honorable exit from the mess that Kashmir has become for Pakistan’s life as a nation. The Kashmir formula proposed by Pervez Musharraf was exactly one such honorable way out. Even today, the broad contours of such a formula, minus the Musharraf tag, have great traction within Pakistan’s political class.   

Moreover, New Delhi’s decision to call off the engagement with Pakistan comes at a time when it needs to proactively engage with Islamabad for a number of reasons. The implications of the NATO drawdown from Afghanistan and the stunning military exploits of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) are still not properly understood even as they are unfolding not too far from India. Therefore, sustaining a stable relationship with Islamabad is important for New Delhi when considering the long-term strategic implications of the geopolitical churning that is taking place in its near abroad.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, August 24, 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Aug/24/playing-chicken-with-pakistan-5.asp) 

A Performance Audit of the J&K Government

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

When Omar Abdullah was sworn in as the 11th chief minister of J&K in January 2009, at the age of 38, in an election that was widely considered as reasonably free and fair, we were all delighted, and hopeful. We continued to be hopeful despite having reservations about an NC-Congress tie-up (with key ministries going to the Congress) because of what NC-Congress tie-ups have done in the past to J&K. It was not an easy job for Omar Abdullah, at least in the beginning, due to the agitations on the streets of Srinagar in 2010. However, the post-2010 years were comparatively calmer, if not entirely peaceful. Unlike the PDP Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, Omar managed to convince the Congress party to give him a full term as the Chief Minister. And the fact that there was a “friendly” government in New Delhi was an added advantage. More importantly, the government was led by a well-meaning man, Omar Abdullah, who is personally not corrupt. This was a truly historic opportunity for the “young and dynamic” Chief Minister to prove his mettle as a leader, for the National Conference to redeem its sins of the past, and for the State of J&K to go past its many miseries. Has the NC-led government managed to live up to the expectations or have they have wasted a truly historic opportunity? 

AFSPA faux pas
The continued existence of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) is a shameful testament of NC’s political inability, and Omar Abdullah’s personal failure, to persuade their ally and coalition-partner, the Congress party, to revoke the much-hated Act from J&K. The UPA government in New Delhi, as usual, engaged in all kinds of political tactics – including hypocrisy, conveying half-truths, taking contradictory positions, among others – to wriggle out of having to even dilute the controversial Act. The J&K government claims it did everything to persuade New Delhi to concede to its request, even as New Delhi claims that the J&K government never gave its request officially, in writing (as if it would have made any difference!). If only the J&K government had managed to get AFSPA out of the way, Omar could have stood in Lal Chowk, with his head held high, and claimed that he is capable of taking the legacy of his grandfather, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, forward. But he has missed the bus. I don’t even want to talk about the grand claims Omar made about a so-called “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” which, according to the NC manifesto (2008) would “suggest ways to redress the wrongs, compensate the affected and punish the guilty.” It further says,  “we owe it to the people so they all know what went wrong and where”.  Yes, you do! 

Forget AFSPA for a moment: will the Chief Minister please explain why he could do nothing even to revoke the Disturbed Areas Act and the Public Safety Act from the state? The 2008 Election Manifesto of the National Conference refers to these laws as ‘anti-people’, by the way! 

Decentralization of power The much-hailed Panchayat elections in the state were seen as a way to decentralize power and ensure that the people had a say in how they should be governed. However, the Panchayat Raj system in J&K has essentially made a mockery of the concept of decentralization of power. The local bodies and their representatives continue to be deprived of the necessary powers including financial autonomy and sufficient resources to bring development to their areas. Panchayat development funds are often channeled by the state government through MLAs which defeats the whole purpose of the local bodies. As a result, those elected to the local bodies have lost their credibility in the eyes of the common masses. 

“Bijli, Sadak, Paani” 
NC’s 2008 election manifesto also goes on and on about the need to provide “Bijli, Sadak, Paani” to the people. It breaks my heart to see the state of “Bijli, Sadak, and Paani” in the state of J&K. There are hardly any roads in Srinagar city, forget about any in the far-flung villages. The general infrastructure in the state is in such ruin that one could mistake Srinagar for a 16th century township. The government has not done anything to ensure that there is timely payment of electricity tariff by the consumers without which it would not be able to buy electricity from the NHPC: a state that can not collect taxes will eventually be in deep financial trouble. And that is exactly what is happening to J&K. There is no point is shouting from the rooftops that the electricity generated in the state is consumed by other states, without having ensured that a proper payment mechanism is put in place. Nothing comes free, including electricity. 

Industrial development 
Kashmir is alien to industrial development. Hardly been any new industrial projects have come to the state in the past 5 years. When the government organized star-studded functions in Srinagar with Ratan Tata, Rajiv Bajaj and Kumaramangalam Birla in October 2012, there was great hope that this was going to be a grand beginning for the state’s economic development. Barring a few pharma companies, none has set up shops in the state ever since the much-publicised road show of 2012. 

State of Human rights 
Human rights violations continue unabated in Kashmir. Hardly anyone is held accountable when innocent youngsters get killed at the hands of the authorities.  What has the government done to ensure accountability for what happened in 2010 when more than 120 young Kashmiri lives were lost? Whatever happened to the Omar government’s repeated pledges that the guilty will be brought to book? 

What about the many unmarked mass graves found in Kashmir? The government refused to conduct DNA tests to find out the identity of the persons buried in those graves because doing so was considered to be impractical! Sure, ensuring human rights is never easy. But then that’s part of your job.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 10 AUGUST 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Aug/10/a-performance-audit-of-the-j-k-government-25.asp) 

Countdown to the Battle for Srinagar

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

State Assembly election in J&K is not a local event: it is not only analysed by national and international Kashmir watchers and pundits but also has implications beyond the confines of the state. Elections to the state assembly are not declared, and yet the political rumblings have already begun in Kashmir. The ruling coalition fired the first shot by agreeing to enter into a divorce of convenience. The National Conference (NC) does not want to be seen in the company of the Congress party anymore, because the latter, for a lot of Kashmiris, represents the arrogance of New Delhi, and rightly so. Congress party comes to Kashmir with a heavy burden of the past, of terrible and unforgivable mistakes. The NC, which was often at the receiving end of the Congress party’s soulless politics in Kashmir and the brazen tactics used by it to gain power in Srinagar, clearly does not want to go to the people seeking votes with the Congress in tow. But after a neat political arrangement that benefitted both sides for close to six years, even as it did not benefit the state, can the two now really keep this relationship off the minds of the Kashmiri voter? 

For the Congress too, this divorce makes a lot of sense. While both the Congress and the NC presided over an unabashedly corrupt regime in Srinagar for six years now, the Congress gets to point fingers at the NC especially when it gets down to electioneering in the coming months. And it can state with such innocence: ‘we are not responsible for the rampant corruption in the state because the NC was running the government’! Or so it hopes. 

Moreover, given that it sees itself as the only party that can put up a serious fight against BJP in the Jammu province (which has 37 seats), it would benefit the Congress to go to the Jammuites “minus” the ‘taint’ of Omar Abdullah’s well choreographed and widely televised outbursts on Article 370 and ASFPA. This “running with the hare and hunting with the hound” strategy that the Congress is likely to use in Jammu, combined with the usual arguments about ridding J&K of corruption (for which, of course, NC is responsible!) and deterring the spread of RSS fascism by upholding the values of secularism in Jammu (which only Congress can do!), the Congress leadership in the state believes, will increase its gains in the upcoming election.  

My word of advise to the Congress party is this: whatever may be the final outcome of the 2014 Assembly elections, they should try hard, however difficult it may be, to resist the temptations of grabbing power in Srinagar, just like it did after the two previous elections in the state (and many times previously). Congress party’s devious designs to grab power in the state are legendary and have greatly contributed to the current state of affairs in J&K. Congress should keep itself out of office, and support, if need be, a truly local party to form the next government in J&K.

Can the separatists rethink their politics? 
The political decisions of the Valley’s separatist parties would make a significant difference to the electoral outcome in the upcoming elections. They have a number of political choices before them, both constructive and unproductive. Just like they did in previous years, they can completely shun the process and give a boycott call, extend some under-the-table support to individual candidates, or alternatively articulate a political choice and back it up with a sound political rationale. Clearly, the support base of the separatists are eroding by the day and, as a result, their politics will soon be irrelevant in the larger context of Kashmir’s political future. The only way, to my mind, they can continue to be relevant to the emerging political landscape in Kashmir is by clearly articulating their support for one or the other mainstream political parties in Kashmir, without giving up their essential stance, of course. Even better, they could decide to contest a few seats from their strongholds in Kashmir. But I don’t think they will do that.  

The real question is how long can the Mirwaizes and Yaseen Maliks remain outside the mainstream political developments in Kashmir and how long, by doing so, can they keep their politics alive. I suspect not too long. Hence the upcoming election is an opportune moment for them to take a relook at their brand of politics and its future. The reason why BJP is steadily increasing its vote share in J&K is because the Kashmiri separatists nudge their supporters not to vote in the elections. Given that the BJP is seriously readying itself to come to power in Srinagar, by any and all means, the separatists should make up their mind now or by the time they decide to stop the saffron tide towards Srinagar, it would be too late to do so.

(Next Week: “A performance audit of the National Conference Government”). 

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 03 AUGUST 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Aug/3/countdown-to-the-battle-for-srinagar-16.asp)

A Blueprint of Modi’s Kashmir Policy

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

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Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Kashmir was uneventful: he returned to New Delhi without making any radical policy announcements, ‘positive or negative’. Indeed, it may be too early to predict his Kashmir policy and one visit may simply be too little to gauge what Modi’s policy towards Kashmir will eventually look like.

That said, what is abundantly clear is that Modi’s visit was nothing more than a ‘business trip’ to Kashmir and an analysis of this may give us some insights into the kind of Kashmir policy that Modi has in mind. His immediate predecessors, UPA’s Manmohan Singh and NDA’s Atal Behari Vajpayee, had also made ‘business trips’ to Kashmir, but what distinguishes them from Modi is that they also had their own political visions for Kashmir, which they articulated during their visits to the Valley. Modi’s just concluded visit did not articulate any political roadmap for Kashmir even as he looked keen on addressing the various economic issues plaguing the state. Modi did refer to his BJP predecessor Vajpayee in his address: “I want to give a message to the people of Jammu and Kashmir that the journey started by Atal Bihari Vajpayee in the state will be taken to its logical conclusion”. But this mention seemed more like an attempt by BJP’s new Prime Minister in claiming the much-eulogised Vajpayee legacy, than adopting the political strategy Vajpayee promised to address Kashmir with, as epitomized in his “insaniyat ke dayirae mein” speech in Kashmir.

But he does seem to have a certain vision for Kashmir, though this may not be to the liking of many Kashmiris. ‘Economic development’ clearly tops the list of to-do things that Modi has vis-à-vis Kashmir: “My objective is to win the hearts of the people of Jammu and Kashmir through development, and this intention for the welfare of the people has nothing to do with politics.” This statement by Modi is spot-on: its development, and not politics that will be the focus. But then, the so-called economic development of J&K was given priority to by all governments in New Delhi, at least in theory. If all this time they were so focused on economically developing J&K, one wonders, how come the state continues to remain so underdeveloped. Unless, of course, it was only a convenient ‘political’ slogan.

The second element of Modi’s evolving Kashmir policy seems to be on de-emphasising the role of ‘Kashmir politics’ in J&K. The major part of this agenda would be to do away with, or at least try to, the special status given to the state through Article 370. Clearly, it affects Kashmir more than Jammu, as Jammuites are mostly unconcerned about Article 370. The second part of this plan would be to make Jammu the focal point of New Delhi’s engagement with Kashmir. There are a number of reasons behind this: New Delhi finds it easier to deal with Jammu than Kashmir; BJP’s influence is stronger than ever in Jammu today; Pak-sponsored militant infiltration into Kashmir is at an all-time low and so the security concerns vis-à-vis Kashmir are bound to recede; and Jammu is likely to play a major role in Srinagar after the State Assembly elections, which is likely to see BJP gaining massively in Jammu, and so there is a need to promote Jammu region’s interests.

The third element of Modi government’s Kashmir policy is likely to revolve around the return of Kashmiri Pandits (KPs). For sure, KPs must return and they have a right to do so, with respect and honour. But merely focusing on the return of KPs to their rightful home in Kashmir without any talk whatsoever about doing justice to Kashmiris is an exercise in selective justice.  More so, New Delhi must be very careful about its plans for creating separate settlements/rehabilitation zones for KPs in Kashmir as doing so could potentially create social tensions. Ideally, KPs must be given their homes and lands and not rehabilitation zones, which, in all likelihood, will eventually have habitats worse than those in Jammu’s Muthi camp where thousands of Kashmiri Pandits live in squalor. To start with, New Delhi should make the living conditions of such camps more humane.  In the long term, Kashmiri Muslim leadership should be engaged to ensure that KPs return to their homes without any fears and concerns. In other words, resettlement of KPs should be a joint effort of the government and the civil society in Kashmir. Any attempt by New Delhi to bring back the KPs through the use of rehabilitation zones will not be a lasting solution.

In New Delhi’s political imagination, under the new Prime Minister, Kashmir issue is a thing of the past. New Delhi will continue to play the waiting game, which it has been doing for a long time; but now with increased confidence, to finally normalize and win back Kashmir. New Delhi realizes that the time is ripe for changing the discourse in Kashmir. In the 1990s and early 2000s, high profile visits from New Delhi to Kashmir would be welcomed with terror attacks or bomb blasts. Today, such visits meet shutdowns. This is a huge change, whether or not we realize it.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, July 7, 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/jul/6/a-blueprint-of-modi-s-kashmir-policy-25.asp)

When nationality becomes a burden

Statecraft
HAPPYMON JACOB

However detached we may be from the state – its policies, politics, objectives, deeds, elites etc. – we are often defined by what our states are, what they represent and what they do, even if we have nothing to do with them. Clearly, we can’t exist without them, not only because sometimes states are our last refuge, but also because, as political scientist RBJ Walker so rightly reminds us, modern states have monopolized our political imagination. We simply are incapable of imagining ourselves, as political entities, outside the confines of the modern state. By defining our politics, states define who we are. Of course, we identify ourselves with states, more often than not, for a variety of reasons ranging from our upbringing and socialization to instrumental ones. 

But there are times even when we do not want to have anything to do with what a state does – due to lack of interest, living on the periphery, or want to actively disassociate with the state – and yet what the state does on our behalf continues to haunt us. In other words, whether or not we like it, we get identified with what our states do because the state acts on our behalf in whatever it does. I often get that feeling when I visit Kashmir – when I am asked to explain and atone for what the Indian state has done to Kashmir. Often, my explanation, that I have nothing to do with it, has no impact on my listeners. That’s because others’ political imagination of us does not extend beyond the state we come from. 

Innocent civilians are often persecuted for what their states do or assumed to be doing in the political imagination of others. This is the tragic dilemma of modern statehood and citizenship: while on the one hand we are politically condemned to identify with the state (as we really don’t have a choice), our states’ misdeeds (or perceived misdeeds) have far reaching implications for our daily existence because the state acts on our behalf, and others politically identify us with our states. 

I was reminded of this dilemma when I was traveling from Thailand to the US via Hong Kong last week. My Cathay Pacific flight from Bangkok, which was supposed to depart in the morning, was rescheduled to the previous night leaving me with a stopover time of about 14 hours in Hong Kong.  The Cathay flight had originated from Karachi and there were a number of Pakistanis on the flight some of whom were transiting via Hong Kong to other destinations and had similar layovers like me. I went to the Cathay counter along with some of the Pakistanis who I had befriended on the flight and requested to be accommodated in the airport lounge or a hotel outside the airport given that the layover time was very long.  The staff at the counter called up the lounge but were informed that the lounge was full. When the Pakistanis insisted that they be given the night’s accommodation outside the airport, they were told that Pakistani citizens did not have the privilege of visa on arrival in Hong Kong (even though Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China which is an “all-weather friend” of Pakistan) and hence they could not stay in a hotel outside the airport even if the airline provided it. A large number of Pakistanis, including women, young kids and elderly, were told to stay in the airport for 10 to 14 hours. I was told that Hong Kong gives Indians visa on arrival (even though China is not India’s friend or ally!) and was given visa assistance, hotel accommodation in Hong Kong and cab fare by the airline. 

Most of the Pakistanis who spent the long, probably sleepless, night at the Hong Kong airport were denied the services they were entitled to, one could argue, just because they belonged to a state whose polices have been disapproved of by a number of other countries even though the hapless Pakistani travellers had nothing to do with those policies.  They were caught in the politics among nations and the burden of their identities (I am not suggesting that the national identity per se is a burden but that it certainly was in this case). The Cathy Pacific staff in Hong Kong airport could not look beyond the nationality of those passengers whose comfort they were paid to look after. 
I was reminded of it again when I saw a tweet from Husain Haqqani, the former Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, two days ago: “North Koreans can travel to 9 more countries visa free than ones travelling on #Pakistan passport”. Haqqani was referring to the recent index on visa restrictions published by “The Henley & Partners” (https://www.henleyglobal.com/files/download/hvri/VISA_Index_2014_04_11_Web.pdf) that ranks Pakistan below North Korea. 

A friend of mine here in the US tells me that many Pakistanis in the US often introduce themselves as Indians given that Indians are seen in better light than Pakistanis. This confirmed a Times Of India story that I saw a few years ago ‘Pakistanis are posing as Indians to escape discrimination' (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/Pakistanis-are-posing-as-Indians-to-escape-discrimination/articleshow/5907956.cms). I have also heard of stories of Pakistanis in Europe and America naming their restaurants “Indian Restaurant”. 

Clearly, such experiences are not a preserve of the Pakistanis alone. Many of us face this in one form or another at some point of time in our interactions with the ‘others’. This is perhaps one very good reason why we should, at least from time to time, think beyond the state, why our political imaginations should be able to break out of the narrow confines imposed by the state and why, as citizens, should call into question what our states do on our behalf for if we don’t we will suffer on their behalf.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 29 June, 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Jun/29/when-nationality-becomes-a-burden-5.asp)