Why not cheer for the Pakistani team?

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

Like many of you, I was deeply shocked when I heard about the U.P government’s decision to file sedition charges against 167 Kashmiri students of the Meerut-based Swami Vivekanand Subharti University for cheering for the Pakistani cricket team when it won a cricket match against the Indian team last week. As an aside, the funny thing about Article124a of the Indian Penal Code is that it talks about offenses against the ‘government’ (Whoever brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards the Government), as opposed to the ‘state’: going by this definition, most of the political leaders should be in jail!

Most of us tend to agree that this was unquestionably unjustifiable, no question about that. There will also be an inquiry by the UP government (based on which, of course, nothing will happen) and the Kashmiri students might even be allowed back into the University campus to complete their studies. So we can be happy that we have collectively (the Omar government, human rights activists etc. etc.) defeated the nefarious designs of the U.P police and its archaic mindset. To me though, the matter does not end there for there is a deeper issue here: did the Kashmiri students who cheered for the Pakistani team, which some of them now say was not the case as they were only cheering for the spectacular Shahid Afridi and not the Pakistani team, do any wrong? Is it wrong to cheer for the Pakistani team on Indian soil when they play against the Indian team?

While there seems to be a laudable unity of opinion amongst us on the undesirability of invoking sedition laws against these students, there is no such unity on whether or not they did the right thing by cheering for the Pakistani team.  What is notable in this context is that many of our pro-Kashmiri leaders and national media houses argued that is while the sedition charges were harsh and uncalled for, the students have also done something wrong by cheering for the Pakistani team, or least they have been irresponsible in their conduct during the cricket match. When simplified, this would mean that they did something wrong by cheering for Pakistan, but they should not have been punished. It is likely that many of us – including the well-meaning ones – may have instinctively said about the incident “but what the Kashmiri students did was also wrong”. For that matter, I cannot guarantee that the students in my progressive university – JNU - would not have objected to Kashmiri students cheering for Pakistan!  

The J&K Chief Minister did not approve of what the students of his state did. That’s why he tweeted three days ago: “I believe what the students did was wrong & misguided but they certainly didn't deserve to have charges of sedition slapped against them”. There you go. We must thank him for his small mercies. I also heard a prominent Kashmir woman lawyer declaring on TV that what the Kashmir students did was “irresponsible”. 

But I, for one, simply fail to understand the foundational difference between the following arguments which are apparently used in a contrasting manner: “the Kashmir students engaged in some wrong doing, but they should not be punished” and “if they did something wrong they deserve to be punished?” To my mind, there is no big difference between these two arguments even though the former argument is held by a number of well-meaning and pro-Kashmir people, including the Chief Minister, and the latter being held by the more conservative amongst us.

Why shouldn’t we cheer for Pakistan?
That said, why is cheering for Pakistan irresponsible or wrong? Some argue that given the context of adversarial relations between India and Pakistan, we should not cheer for Pakistan. In other words, Indian citizens should constantly read up on the international situation and India’s relations with other countries to make sure that their appreciation for another country’s cricket/football/baseball/hockey team does not come in conflict with the nature of India’s relations with that country! 

The other argument is that the majority of people watching the Indo-Pak cricket match will feel hurt if you cheer the Pakistani team. So what? And since when has majoritarianism become the basis for right and wrong in this country? 

Yet another argument is that we should not cheer for the enemy nation’s cricket team because that is not a patriotic act. But then who decides what is being patriotic and what is not? In any case, the construction of patriotism is almost always undertaken in the context of a majoritarian consensus and since the majoritarian consensus in this country demands that cheering enemy nation’s cricket team is unpatriotic, it is deemed so. But I would say that the rejection of majoritarianism in a country like India is a deeply patriotic act.

Or is it because they were Kashmiris, the lesser citizens, the ones who have to prove their nationalism over and over again, that we tend to say that they did not do the right thing by cheering for the Pakistani team? In other words, would the government have dared to invoke sedition laws if a bunch of enlightened intellectuals sitting in the lawns of the India International Centre were to cheer for the Pakistani team (in the spirit of sportsmanship, of course)? I don’t think so.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, March 8, 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Mar/9/why-not-cheer-for-the-pakistani-team--8.asp)

Need for Defence reforms in India

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

The tragic accident on board INS Sindhuratna, which killed two young Indian Naval officers in the most horrible manner, should be examined in the context of the sad state of civil-military relations in the country. Moreover, this tragedy, coming close on the heels of the INS Sindurakshak accident which killed 18 Indian sailors last year, is indeed the most appropriate time for some much-needed introspection among the mandarins of the Ministry of defence and the politicians managing the country’s defence preparedness. 

The Indian higher defence system goes strictly in line with the age-old dictum of Carl von Clausewitz, the legendary German general and military theorist, who argued that “war is a mere continuation of policy by other means”. In India, political priorities, visions, objectives and mandate prescribe how the armed forces are funded, manned and managed. The Armed forces have almost no role to play in the formulation of the country’s higher defence decisions. Given the fact that a number of newly de-colonised states became dominated by their armed forces, including in neighbouring Pakistan, the experience of India, where the military is subservient to the civilian bosses, is a welcome change. So far so good. But this traditional decision to keep the armed forces at an arm’s length while making the country’s defence policies have led to a number of structural issues and the Sindhuratna tragedy should be seen as a result of this flawed structure of the Indian higher defence management. Indeed, the civilian suspicion of the armed forces have led the country to more than one strategic disasters. The most outstanding of them is the unilateralism of the political bosses in the run up to the 1962 war with China and the country’s humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese. 

This traditional civilian/political suspicion of the armed forced in conjunction with the post-Independent Indian state’s aversion to the use of force meant that there was a tendency to undermine matters military. This speaks directly of the Indian state’s strategic culture which clearly relegates military matters to the second order of things. More importantly, the civilian/political reluctance to give importance to the professional opinions of the Indian military leadership has led to the sub-optimal utilization of the country’s military prowess, as well as insufficient strategic thinking and planning. 
The Indian military and its strategising also takes place in a strategic vacuum thanks to the absence of any structured defence planning process between the civilian/political and military leadership in the country. There has been a consistent demand for security sector reforms in the country but successive governments have initiated no serious reform efforts yet. There is hardly any inter-service integration in the country nor is there an attempt to create the institution of the Chief of Defense Staff. Also what is urgently required in the country for proper defence planning is the merger of Armed Forces Headquarters with the Ministry of Defense which can then engage in defence policy planning in an informed and cohesive manner. 

In the absence of such institutional reform there is unlikely to be any major improvement in the country’s defence planning procedures.  The political bosses of the country, who are supposed to be manning the country’s defence planning with help from the civilian bureaucracy, are almost always preoccupied with political issues which are far too many in a country like India. Moreover, most of them do not have any interest or expertise in managing the various intricate issues relating to national defense or military matters. Under such conditions, it is the civilian bureaucrats of the MoD who end up doing much of the planning, thinking and managing of issues relating to the country’s defence planning and execution. How qualified are the generalist civil service officers of the country in managing the complex and high-stakes defence-related issues of the country? Someone with no prior strategic or specilised defence related training would find it extremely hard to get into the nitty-gritty of such issues especially if they don’t stay in the ministry for a considerable period of time. They would, as a result, end up either neglecting various serious aspects of the country’s defence or making status-quoist decisions which the Raksha Mantri will endorse given the proximity that the bureaucrats enjoy with the minister. 

The latest Naval tragedy should serve as a wake-up call for the country’s civilian leadership to introspect so as to realise the need for urgent reforms not only in defence procurement rules and policies but also the higher defence management systems. The current system of higher defnce management in the country is extremely archaic, to say the least. The resignation of the Navy Chief, who by doing so has assumed a certain moral high ground, and the prompt acceptance of his resignation by the Defence Minister are clearly inadequate to bring about accountability to the Indian defence management system. Why is that the Minister of Defence is unwilling to make any substantive or thoughtful political statements about these issues beyond uttering a few sentence with touch upon almost nothing? Why is it that we hear nothing about defence modernization from the Ministry of Defence which, at the end of the day, does much of the defence planning in the country? It would be self-defeating on the part of the civilian bosses to think that by putting the focus and the blame on the Navy, they can avoid major lapses and loss of the Indian soldiers in future.

(Greater Kashmir, March 2, 2014. IRL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Mar/2/need-for-defence-reforms-in-india-30.asp)

The unmistakable negativity

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

I have always been puzzled by the Government of India’s unmistakable negativity towards track-II initiatives and conferences especially when Indian track-II interlocutors talk to their Pakistani counterparts. Given the fact that one of the major objectives of track-II initiatives is to feed into the official, track-I, thinking on key issues, the unreasonable reluctance of the Indian government to stay clear of track-II initiatives is frustrating. Don’t get me wrong, I am simply not arguing that the governments should play an ‘active’ role in the running of track-IIs, which will indubitably make them useless as they would invariably be accused of being “remote-controlled” by the government. What I am concerned about is the tendency of our babus to turn a blind eye towards the existence of track-IIs and their findings and even dissuade them from initiating any contact whatsoever with the other side. 
The Indian government’s hesitation regarding track-two meetings manifests not only in its reluctance in recognizing their existence but also in, at least sometimes, actively discouraging their ability to function. They range from not granting visas to the participants from the counterpart country to sometimes instructing some of the participants, who are close to the government, to not participate in such meetings. In the last one decade that I have been part of various Indo-Pak track-IIs, I have come across a number of instances of this kind. 

On the contrary, Pakistan has consistently been very forthcoming in accepting, promoting and being attentive towards various track-II initiatives. They have regularly provided hospitality for high-level track-II delegations from India. I remember visiting Pakistan in 2005 when Gen. Musharraff was at the height of his power there. He not only invited the entire Indian delegation to the Presidential Palace and discussed his formula for Kashmir for almost two hours but also readily granted our request to let us travel to the Pakistani side of Kashmir without a visa! That is smart diplomacy. 

But what explains the Indian hesitation about favorably looking at track-II initiatives especially those between India and Pakistan? First of all, the Indian policy making systems, our famed babudom that is, are rife with nauseating levels of hierarchy which demonstrate extreme reluctance to part with information and summarily reject feedback from non-traditional sources. Add to it another drawback that plagues the Indian system – excessive levels of secrecy which prevents meaningful interactions between those in the bureaucracy and those outside. As a former insider puts it: “we respond and give information to only those writing our ACRs and who have the power to post/transfer us”. 

India has also exhibited a traditional unease towards all sorts of “third party intervention” (even though it has tired to mediate between conflicting parties i.e. the Indian mediation during the Korean war). Be it the UN or the Americans, New Delhi makes it abundantly clear: no mediation is welcome. Indeed, despite the Indian concern about the infiltration of Pak-based terror groups into India and the regular violations of the ceasefire, New Delhi has consistently refused to accept the Pakistani demand to ask the UNMOGIP to investigate such issues. Post-colonial sensibilities are also part of the problem: how can the whites tell us or fund track-II people to tell what to do and what not to do! Finally, the Indian system of not allowing lateral entry into the ranks of the country’s bureaucratic decision-making process also prevents a healthy exchange of ideas between those inside the government and those outside: the government simply believes that there is no expertise outside of it! 

Pakistan, on the other hand, has always wanted to tell the world of its diplomatic positions through whatever means available to it, be it third party mediation, public diplomacy or track-two initiatives. Moreover, there is a dynamic relationship between those inside the government and those outside of it. We get to see many more prominent and expert Pakistanis from outside the government and bureaucracy being appointed to important positions. Moreover, Pakistan suffers from less colonial hangover when compared to India. 

For sure, this pig-headed Indian approach to track-two initiatives has been to India’s disadvantage. Indian diplomacy is often seen as arrogant, unwilling to be creative, unable to communicate and inadequate to take advantage of the newer mediums of modern day diplomacy. 

But why should we focus on track-II diplomacy? Has it made any difference to anything at al? Let me give one example of how track-II diplomacy can make a difference. I was in Colombo this past week attending two sets of track-II meetings on India-Pakistan nuclear issues as well as military CBMs. The discussions were clearly not on political resolution of the outstanding conflicts but on the practical aspects of conflict management. There was a clear shift in favour of doable CBMs from political rhetoric and puritanical positions. Part of this focus on practical solutions and the nitty-gritty of conflict management come from the nature of the projects as funded by various international funding agencies or governments. Funding agencies and governments are not interested in participants restating their states’ held positions, but what these meetings can achieve on the ground. This is in sharp contrast to what the two governments often do – engage in meaningless reiteration of their stated positions, which they have been doing for many decades! This to me is an eminent achievement of the ongoing track-II initiatives in the region. 

I am not in any way suggesting that political resolution of outstanding conflicts is unimportant but that it is often useful to focus on the practical aspects of conflict management to travel towards the eventual political resolution of conflicts.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 23 February 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Feb/23/the-unmistakable-negativity-10.asp) 

‘Nice guys finish second’

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

I am using the title of BK Nehru’s famous book ‘Nice guys finish second’ as the title of my column today because what follows would have certain indirect links with Mr. Nehru’s tenure as the governor of J&K from 1982 till he was shifted out by Indira Gandhi for refusing to remove Farooq Abdullah from power in J&K. 

The Times of India carried a news item the other day that there is a strong speculation that the incumbent National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon will replace Mr. N. N Vohra as the Governor of J&K, that too in the near future. I am not sure how much to trust this story but if indeed there is such a move underway, I don’t consider that to be a good choice for a variety of reasons. 

If Menon’s stint as the Foreign Secretary and National Security Advisor is any indication of what kind of a Governor he will make, then one would have to say that he is unlikely to be any more than a guardian of the status-quo, something the people of Kashmir patently detest. Mr. Menon is a sophisticated diplomat who can articulate and justify New Delhi’s positions on various issues with élan and aplomb. But that’s it – he is no visionary who can put together a roadmap for conflict resolution in J&K considering the fact that governors in this conflict-ridden state have been given more powers than governors elsewhere. 

So what should the governor of Kashmir be like? Clearly, Kashmir and Kashmiris deserve someone better than Mr. Jagmohan whose tenure can easily be termed as one of the most disastrous in the modern history of Kashmir. First of all, the governor of J&K, where a number of internal and external security considerations converge, should be someone who can get out of the comfort of the Raj Bhavan and connect with the people of the state. He/she should be a statesman, sensitive individual, and who does not see governorship as merely a post-retirement perk. Again, when it comes to J&K, there is no point in suggesting individuals who may be very good but won’t be taken very seriously by New Delhi. So one has to be practical in one’s approach to what is ‘achievable’ as opposed to what is ‘ideal’, most certainly in this case. 

One of the individuals who, in my opinion, would fit these descriptions is Syed Ata Hasnain, who recently retired as a General of the Indian army after having commanded the strategically important 15 Corps in Srinagar. I realize that the Indian army is not among the most popular institutions in Kashmir for what it has done to the people of Kashmir for many years. But my understanding of this man gives me the confidence to say what I am saying. The other day, I was shocked to hear about the Indian Army’s decision to ‘close’ the Pathribal case wherein five Kashmiri civilians were summarily executed by the Indian army soldiers. In utter disgust, I called up Gen. Hasnain and asked his opinion. He was unambiguous in his words that it was terrible that five innocent Kashmiris lost their lives at the hands of the army and that it is even more disappointing that justice has not been done in the case. 

More so, he shows absolutely no hesitation in accepting that terrible mistakes have been committed in Kashmir and that it is important for New Delhi’s political leadership to make amends. While he led the Indian army in Kashmir, he succeeded in showing a great deal of sensitivity to Kashmiris. Remember, he was not making any political decisions but merely under orders from New Delhi. It is then reasonable to think that as a decision-maker he is likely to be even more sensitive to the Kashmiris and their predicament. And as the governor, Hasnain will undoubtedly tell the Indian army to restrain themselves from harming the human rights of the Kashmirs. I have my own differences with some of Gen. Hasnain’s arguments, but that does not prevent me from saying that here’s a man who can make a difference in Kashmir. 

On the other hand, New Delhi does not have to worry about him – he is a certified nationalist. But the question is whether New Delhi has the political imagination to differentiate between tactical and strategic approaches to conflict resolution. If indeed it wishes take the strategic approach to peace-building in Kashmir, then it should show the vision and courage to appoint a Muslim as the Governor in a Muslim majority state (one of the arguments detractors would make is that it would be unimaginable to have a Muslim governor as the Chairman of the Shri Amarnath Shrine board. That is clearly a silly argument which does not deserve any considered response).  

The other name I would propose is that of Amitabh Mattoo, a Kashmiri Pandit academic who grew up in the valley and close to the power circles in New Delhi. A great supporter of J&K’s autonomy in letter and spirit, he is often accused by the Hindu rightwing in the country as anti-national for consistently arguing that there should be a zero tolerance policy in place to deal with human rights violations in Kashmir. People like Mattoo understand how the government functions, the importance of being sensitive to the legitimate aspirations of the people of Kashmir and yet uncorrupted by the viciousness of state power. 

But I am not sure whether Hasnain or Mattoo will make it to the Raj Bhavan in Srinagar for they are simply not seen by New Delhi as conservative or pliable enough to be sent to Kashmir. It’s a tragedy that nice guys, as BK Nehru wrote, tend to finish second.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, February 2, 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Feb/2/-nice-guys-finish-second--5.asp)