Verma Committee’s AFSPA Rrecommendations

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

Kashmiri leaders, both mainstream and dissident, have hailed Justice J. S Verma Committee’s report on Amendments to the Indian Criminal Law, and rightly so. While human rights violations in Kashmir in general and molestation of Kashmiri women in particular hardly provoke the conscience of the Indian middle class, the Verma Committee, constituted to pacify the anger of the powerful Indian middle class, has brought to light the need to be concerned about the dignity of women in conflict areas such as Kashmir and the immorality and irrationality of legal instruments like the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). 

I have just finished reading the 600 plus-page long report submitted by the Verma Committee and I hope that this is indeed the beginning of a number of much-needed legal, judicial, administrative and police reforms in this country. The only concern is that numerous commissions and committees in the past have submitted reports and recommendations to the Government of India on each of these issues but not many recommended reforms have been carried out. Commissions and their recommendations are often used as time-buying strategies by the ruling regimes, and the people of Kashmir are well aware of that. 

On the question of AFSPA the Verma committee makes the following important observations: “At the outset, we notice that impunity for systematic or isolated sexual violence in the process of Internal Security duties is being legitimized by the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which is in force in large parts of our country. It must be recognized that women in conflict areas are entitled to all the security and dignity that is afforded to citizens in any other part of our country….There is an imminent need to review the continuance of AFSPA and AFSPA-like legal protocols in internal conflict areas as soon as possible. This is necessary for determining the propriety of resorting to this legislation in the area(s) concerned”.  A close and careful reading of these statements would reveal that this is a clear indictment of the atrocities committed in placed like Kashmir in the name of national security. 

The politics behind AFSPA abolition 
Over the past few years, the issue of AFSPA abolition has become the centerpiece of political debates in Kashmir. More so, it has also become a bargaining tool in the hands of politicians and various institutional interests in New Delhi and in the Valley. In 2011, when P. Chidambaram was still the Home Minister, there was a great deal of support in New Delhi to do away with the draconian legislation. Both the Home Minister and the Prime Minister seemed to be in favour of removing it from Kashmir while the Defense Minister, keen to pander to the parochial and institutional interests of the Armed Forces, was the only political leader opposed to it (of course, this does not include the Congress leaders in Kashmir such as Saifudeen Soz who have argued in favour of continuing with the controversial piece of legislation). 

What is unfortunate is that even though the infiltration rates have come down from the 2011 levels, New Delhi is still not serious about removing AFSPA from the valley. More so, there is more opposition to the removal of AFSPA today than there was in 2011. With Sushil Kumar Shinde, the new Union Home Minister, arguing during his visit to Kashmir late last year that “I know that peace has returned in Jammu and Kashmir with the consistent efforts of people. But this doesn’t mean that we can take risk and remove the AFSPA immediately”, it is now clear that the opposition to removing AFSPA has yet another strong opponent in New Delhi along with the Defense Ministry and the armed forces. Thanks to the recent LoC flare-up, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is unlikely to say anything in the near future about removing AFSPA. 

Talk is cheap
From Barack Obama to Rahul Gandhi to Omar Abdullah, one thing seems to be common: “preach about change all the time, but never practice it”. Greenhorns in politics tend to climb the political ladder by playing to the revolutionary fantasies of common people. Chief Minister Omar Abdullah’s occasional statements on AFSPA peppered with anger and outrage, carefully calibrated and nationally televised, should be seen in that light. It is easy talk about the removal of AFSPA as it is easily one of the most popular things to do in today’s Kashmir, but it takes a great deal of political courage to actually do something about it. Omar Abdullah should use all the bargain tactics in the trick book of coalition politics and force the Congress party to heed to the voice of the Kashmiri people. Come the next Assembly election in J&K, there is no doubt that the AFSPA issue will be single most important litmus test of Omar Abdullah’s government’s performance in the state. Or is it that the Abdullah scion is waiting for the elections to approach in order to increase the heat on the AFSPA issue? Wouldn’t that be a bit too late? 

AFSAP, let us face it, continues to be a tool of human rights violations in the valley and it is now duly confirmed by a (Verma) high-level Panel appointed by the Government of India. Late last year, a well-researched report entitled “Alleged Perpetrators - Stories of Impunity in Jammu and Kashmir” put out by the International Peoples Tribunal on Human Rights and Justice in Indian-Administered Kashmir [IPTK] took pains to examine the issue in great detail. Politicians in New Delhi and Srinagar should read these reports carefully and take steps to remove AFSPA from the valley once and for all.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, January 27, 2013. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Jan/27/verma-committee-s-afspa-rrecommendations-57.asp )

Shootout at LoC: In perspective

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

The recent India-Pakistan conflict on the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir and the war of words have grave implications for the future of the bilateral ties for the two countries. The conflict along the LoC, while not unprecedented since scores of them take place every year, has escalated due to a combination of factors: the hawkish claims of the Indian media, increasingly outspoken Indian armed forces, the Congress government which is unclear which direction to take the India-Pakistan dialogue process and the characteristic denial of the Pakistani state of what has been done to the dead bodies of the Indian soldiers. While the Central government, unwilling to articulate a clear policy towards Pakistan and follow it up with conviction, is on the back foot on the issue, it is the Chiefs of the Indian Army and Air Force along with a collection of retired military officers, egged on by the media, who seem to be articulating an Indian response to the Pakistani aggression on the LoC.  

New Delhi wanted to continue with ‘business as usual’ with Pakistan, but the Indian military and the overzealous, if not militant, media stalled those plans. This is a clear indication that New Delhi’s Pakistan policy lacks direction, conviction and courage. 

Dangers of conflict escalation
That the senior most military officers in India have chosen to convey to Pakistan that India would not mind “escalating” the conflict if Pakistan does not stop engaging in ceasefire violations is both puzzling and disconcerting. The BJP went on to ask the government to engage in “controlled military response” against Pakistan!” Former BJP minister Yashwant Sinha argued, “Who says that if you have a limited controlled military response then it will necessarily result in war?” These arguments by the military and the Chief opposition party in India seem to sum up the conventional wisdom in the country on the utility of flexible responses in responding to Pakistan in times of crisis.  

Anyone with an elementary understanding of conflict escalation under nuclear conditions would surely refrain from articulating such views for the simple reason that the escalation dynamics under nuclear conditions would be inherently unpredictable and unstable, especially when high-running nationalistic passions dictate defence policies. The fact of the matter is that in nuclear South Asia, flexible options without the risk of a nuclear catastrophe are simply unavailable. The biggest challenge for the leaders of the two sides today is to put in place robust mechanisms that can ensure crisis stability – strong incentives not to carry out a preemptive attack on the adversary in times of crisis of this kind. 

The flag meeting that took place between the two armies is an excellent mechanism to ensure crisis stability so is the hotline between the two DGMOs. However, there is a need to think of more innovative ways of maintaining crisis stability in the region. 

The costs of conflict
While it is clear that there are no winners in this kind of a confrontation, there are clear losers in unfortunate events such as this. In short, what happens in conflicts such as this is the following: minor skirmishes or misunderstandings lead to a militarized crisis, media then drives passions, CBMs are suspended and a war of words ensue, and eventually the conflict is deescalated. Finally bilateral relations are back to how they were before the crisis begun minus, of course, the CBMs that were suspended during the crisis. It takes yet more rounds of negotiations for the CBMs to restart and trust to be built. This ‘one-step-ahead-two-steps-backward’ sequence of events seems to characterize India Pakistan bilateral relations.  

To my mind, India loses from this kind of conflict far more than Pakistan. Why? The fact is that if India wants to become the global power that it would like to, it has no option but to stabilize its fronts. India’s economic growth and rise in its global political power will be severely hampered by what happens in Pakistan and as a result in Kashmir. Hence India would be shooting at its own foot if it tries to break off the peace process and sever relations with the civilian government in Islamabad. The fact is that New Delhi needs Islamabad and GHQ to reign in the terror groups in Pakistan. 

India has also gained more from the ongoing (?) peace process than has Pakistan. There is already a strong feeling in Pakistan that the peace process is more in favour of India than Pakistan and it is being taken forward on India’s terms and conditions. The argument is premised on the facts that the traditionally core issue of political resolution of Kashmir and demilitarisation of Siachen, something that Islamabad and GHQ are very keen to see resolved, are relegated to the backburner and ‘secondary’ issues like trade and easing of visa restrictions, important from the Indian point of view, are being pursued. 

If this argument is true, that is Pakistan has no great interest in seeing this peace process survive in which India has great stakes, then we should recognize that it would be foolish for New Delhi to even consider severing the dialogue process with Islamabad. 

Moreover, if India wants to see genuine political transformation in Pakistan, it should make sure that the hands of the civilian government in Islamabad, one that is going to complete its full term for the first time in the country’s history, is strengthened, rather then weakened, by its actions.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, January 20, 2013. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Jan/20/shootout-at-loc-in-perspective-30.asp )