Pakistan’s New Kashmir Policy

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

Those of us who attended the 6th and 7th Chaophraya track-two Dialogues on Indo-Pak relations (October 16-19, 2011) in Bangkok were in for a surprise when leading strategic thinkers and media representatives from India and Pakistan started discussing the ever so contentious ‘K’ issue. One retired senior official from the Pakistan military asked the Indians present at the dialogue bluntly: “Why do you Indians want to discuss Kashmir? We are not keen on a discussion on Kashmir. There are other more important things to be discussed”

This was not a lone view coming from a retired Pakistani official; others from the Pakistani contingent seemed to be either toeing a very moderate line on Kashmir (in comparison to Pakistan’s traditional views on the issue) or trying to rank other issues such as Afghanistan and Balochistan much above Kashmir. The Indian stand seemed to be curiously different toot: some spoke about the positive changes underway in Kashmir and some others pointed out the continuing occurrence of human rights violations in J&K. Even this was a departure from the usual Indian defensive stand on Kashmir. There was a certain attitude of accommodation, sincerity and effortlessness to the Indian stand on Kashmir.

The Pakistani climb-down on the core issue of Kashmir was coupled with an increasing focus on Afghanistan and the evolving endgame there. Not only were the Pakistanis emphatic about their accusation that India is trying to contain Pakistanin Afghanistan but were also negative about any potential strategic accommodation or cooperation with India in Afghanistan. Most of them were loud and clear about what Pakistan would want India to do vis-à-vis Afghanistan: Get Out!

Deconstructing the new Pakistani stand on Kashmir

So what do we make of Pakistan’s new stand on Kashmir? What explains this new, nuanced, and yet unprecedented Pakistani lack of interest in determining the direction in which Kashmir heads? Indeed, one would argue that Pakistani leadership does make occasional references to the UN resolutions, human rights violations in Kashmir, need to ascertain the wishes of the Kashmiri people etc. in their policy utterances, world forums and official meetings. An yet as one Pakistani participant pointed out this is how states behave: unless there is an official declaration of the radical change in official policy, states will always make their policy changes known in very subtle ways and ‘without prejudice to their held positions’. Hence Pakistani official statements on Kashmir ‘without prejudice to its held positions’ are not surprising.

Let’s return to the question what explains the new Pakistani policy shift on Kashmir. Is it because the Pakistani establishment has realized that they are increasingly losing legitimacy and ground in Kashmir and that the people of Kashmir are no longer looking towards Pakistan for deliverance? Or is it because Pakistan has realized that it hardly has any international backers on the Kashmir issue and that terrorism as a state policy is increasingly looked down upon by the international community? Is it due to the so-called Indian ‘successes’ in addressing the Kashmir issue with increased political sensitivity? Or is it because Pakistan is bogged down in Afghanistan and hence unable to commit any material, diplomatic, military and political resources for the Kashmir cause? Or is the apparent Pakistani shift a mere tactical measure in the sense that given its isolation in the international community and the precarious situation that it faces domestically, Pakistan has decided to lie low on Kashmir and will revert back to its traditional positions and strategies once it feels more secure and confident? Or is it because Pakistan’s Kashmir policy has indeed positively transformed due to a serious internal change of heart and strategic priorities? And does that change of heart stem from a realization that Pakistan’s Kashmir policy has done more harm to itself than any good?

I don’t think anyone has any obvious answers to these questions. It’s most likely that the perceptible change in Pakistan’sKashmir policy has come about due to all the above factors. Indeed, it would be better if Pakistan’s new Kashmir policy has multiple sources, because if there is only one source for this policy change, there could, at least theoretically, be a reversal of its policy in case there is a change in that source.

On its part, New Delhi should be wise enough to make use of this strategic window of opportunity and try to settle the conflict in Kashmir through an internal political process and the conflict over Kashmir with Pakistan through a sustained bilateral dialogue. If New Delhi thinks that it can afford to ignore Kashmir because Pakistan has lost its interest in the issue, it will lead to disastrous consequences for the people of Kashmir has shown in the past that they will be able to fight their own fight with New Delhi without any external helping hands. If anything, the Pakistani involvement has only given Kashmiris’ indigenous struggle against New Delhi a very bad name.

New Delhi should therefore attempt to implement the various suggestions put forward by the various Kashmiri parties, dissident and mainstream, committee of interlocutors and the reports produced by the Prime Minister’s Round Table conferences.

(Happymon Jacob teaches at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)