Why not cheer for the Pakistani team?

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

Like many of you, I was deeply shocked when I heard about the U.P government’s decision to file sedition charges against 167 Kashmiri students of the Meerut-based Swami Vivekanand Subharti University for cheering for the Pakistani cricket team when it won a cricket match against the Indian team last week. As an aside, the funny thing about Article124a of the Indian Penal Code is that it talks about offenses against the ‘government’ (Whoever brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards the Government), as opposed to the ‘state’: going by this definition, most of the political leaders should be in jail!

Most of us tend to agree that this was unquestionably unjustifiable, no question about that. There will also be an inquiry by the UP government (based on which, of course, nothing will happen) and the Kashmiri students might even be allowed back into the University campus to complete their studies. So we can be happy that we have collectively (the Omar government, human rights activists etc. etc.) defeated the nefarious designs of the U.P police and its archaic mindset. To me though, the matter does not end there for there is a deeper issue here: did the Kashmiri students who cheered for the Pakistani team, which some of them now say was not the case as they were only cheering for the spectacular Shahid Afridi and not the Pakistani team, do any wrong? Is it wrong to cheer for the Pakistani team on Indian soil when they play against the Indian team?

While there seems to be a laudable unity of opinion amongst us on the undesirability of invoking sedition laws against these students, there is no such unity on whether or not they did the right thing by cheering for the Pakistani team.  What is notable in this context is that many of our pro-Kashmiri leaders and national media houses argued that is while the sedition charges were harsh and uncalled for, the students have also done something wrong by cheering for the Pakistani team, or least they have been irresponsible in their conduct during the cricket match. When simplified, this would mean that they did something wrong by cheering for Pakistan, but they should not have been punished. It is likely that many of us – including the well-meaning ones – may have instinctively said about the incident “but what the Kashmiri students did was also wrong”. For that matter, I cannot guarantee that the students in my progressive university – JNU - would not have objected to Kashmiri students cheering for Pakistan!  

The J&K Chief Minister did not approve of what the students of his state did. That’s why he tweeted three days ago: “I believe what the students did was wrong & misguided but they certainly didn't deserve to have charges of sedition slapped against them”. There you go. We must thank him for his small mercies. I also heard a prominent Kashmir woman lawyer declaring on TV that what the Kashmir students did was “irresponsible”. 

But I, for one, simply fail to understand the foundational difference between the following arguments which are apparently used in a contrasting manner: “the Kashmir students engaged in some wrong doing, but they should not be punished” and “if they did something wrong they deserve to be punished?” To my mind, there is no big difference between these two arguments even though the former argument is held by a number of well-meaning and pro-Kashmir people, including the Chief Minister, and the latter being held by the more conservative amongst us.

Why shouldn’t we cheer for Pakistan?
That said, why is cheering for Pakistan irresponsible or wrong? Some argue that given the context of adversarial relations between India and Pakistan, we should not cheer for Pakistan. In other words, Indian citizens should constantly read up on the international situation and India’s relations with other countries to make sure that their appreciation for another country’s cricket/football/baseball/hockey team does not come in conflict with the nature of India’s relations with that country! 

The other argument is that the majority of people watching the Indo-Pak cricket match will feel hurt if you cheer the Pakistani team. So what? And since when has majoritarianism become the basis for right and wrong in this country? 

Yet another argument is that we should not cheer for the enemy nation’s cricket team because that is not a patriotic act. But then who decides what is being patriotic and what is not? In any case, the construction of patriotism is almost always undertaken in the context of a majoritarian consensus and since the majoritarian consensus in this country demands that cheering enemy nation’s cricket team is unpatriotic, it is deemed so. But I would say that the rejection of majoritarianism in a country like India is a deeply patriotic act.

Or is it because they were Kashmiris, the lesser citizens, the ones who have to prove their nationalism over and over again, that we tend to say that they did not do the right thing by cheering for the Pakistani team? In other words, would the government have dared to invoke sedition laws if a bunch of enlightened intellectuals sitting in the lawns of the India International Centre were to cheer for the Pakistani team (in the spirit of sportsmanship, of course)? I don’t think so.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, March 8, 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Mar/9/why-not-cheer-for-the-pakistani-team--8.asp)

Need for Defence reforms in India

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

The tragic accident on board INS Sindhuratna, which killed two young Indian Naval officers in the most horrible manner, should be examined in the context of the sad state of civil-military relations in the country. Moreover, this tragedy, coming close on the heels of the INS Sindurakshak accident which killed 18 Indian sailors last year, is indeed the most appropriate time for some much-needed introspection among the mandarins of the Ministry of defence and the politicians managing the country’s defence preparedness. 

The Indian higher defence system goes strictly in line with the age-old dictum of Carl von Clausewitz, the legendary German general and military theorist, who argued that “war is a mere continuation of policy by other means”. In India, political priorities, visions, objectives and mandate prescribe how the armed forces are funded, manned and managed. The Armed forces have almost no role to play in the formulation of the country’s higher defence decisions. Given the fact that a number of newly de-colonised states became dominated by their armed forces, including in neighbouring Pakistan, the experience of India, where the military is subservient to the civilian bosses, is a welcome change. So far so good. But this traditional decision to keep the armed forces at an arm’s length while making the country’s defence policies have led to a number of structural issues and the Sindhuratna tragedy should be seen as a result of this flawed structure of the Indian higher defence management. Indeed, the civilian suspicion of the armed forces have led the country to more than one strategic disasters. The most outstanding of them is the unilateralism of the political bosses in the run up to the 1962 war with China and the country’s humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese. 

This traditional civilian/political suspicion of the armed forced in conjunction with the post-Independent Indian state’s aversion to the use of force meant that there was a tendency to undermine matters military. This speaks directly of the Indian state’s strategic culture which clearly relegates military matters to the second order of things. More importantly, the civilian/political reluctance to give importance to the professional opinions of the Indian military leadership has led to the sub-optimal utilization of the country’s military prowess, as well as insufficient strategic thinking and planning. 
The Indian military and its strategising also takes place in a strategic vacuum thanks to the absence of any structured defence planning process between the civilian/political and military leadership in the country. There has been a consistent demand for security sector reforms in the country but successive governments have initiated no serious reform efforts yet. There is hardly any inter-service integration in the country nor is there an attempt to create the institution of the Chief of Defense Staff. Also what is urgently required in the country for proper defence planning is the merger of Armed Forces Headquarters with the Ministry of Defense which can then engage in defence policy planning in an informed and cohesive manner. 

In the absence of such institutional reform there is unlikely to be any major improvement in the country’s defence planning procedures.  The political bosses of the country, who are supposed to be manning the country’s defence planning with help from the civilian bureaucracy, are almost always preoccupied with political issues which are far too many in a country like India. Moreover, most of them do not have any interest or expertise in managing the various intricate issues relating to national defense or military matters. Under such conditions, it is the civilian bureaucrats of the MoD who end up doing much of the planning, thinking and managing of issues relating to the country’s defence planning and execution. How qualified are the generalist civil service officers of the country in managing the complex and high-stakes defence-related issues of the country? Someone with no prior strategic or specilised defence related training would find it extremely hard to get into the nitty-gritty of such issues especially if they don’t stay in the ministry for a considerable period of time. They would, as a result, end up either neglecting various serious aspects of the country’s defence or making status-quoist decisions which the Raksha Mantri will endorse given the proximity that the bureaucrats enjoy with the minister. 

The latest Naval tragedy should serve as a wake-up call for the country’s civilian leadership to introspect so as to realise the need for urgent reforms not only in defence procurement rules and policies but also the higher defence management systems. The current system of higher defnce management in the country is extremely archaic, to say the least. The resignation of the Navy Chief, who by doing so has assumed a certain moral high ground, and the prompt acceptance of his resignation by the Defence Minister are clearly inadequate to bring about accountability to the Indian defence management system. Why is that the Minister of Defence is unwilling to make any substantive or thoughtful political statements about these issues beyond uttering a few sentence with touch upon almost nothing? Why is it that we hear nothing about defence modernization from the Ministry of Defence which, at the end of the day, does much of the defence planning in the country? It would be self-defeating on the part of the civilian bosses to think that by putting the focus and the blame on the Navy, they can avoid major lapses and loss of the Indian soldiers in future.

(Greater Kashmir, March 2, 2014. IRL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Mar/2/need-for-defence-reforms-in-india-30.asp)

The unmistakable negativity

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

I have always been puzzled by the Government of India’s unmistakable negativity towards track-II initiatives and conferences especially when Indian track-II interlocutors talk to their Pakistani counterparts. Given the fact that one of the major objectives of track-II initiatives is to feed into the official, track-I, thinking on key issues, the unreasonable reluctance of the Indian government to stay clear of track-II initiatives is frustrating. Don’t get me wrong, I am simply not arguing that the governments should play an ‘active’ role in the running of track-IIs, which will indubitably make them useless as they would invariably be accused of being “remote-controlled” by the government. What I am concerned about is the tendency of our babus to turn a blind eye towards the existence of track-IIs and their findings and even dissuade them from initiating any contact whatsoever with the other side. 
The Indian government’s hesitation regarding track-two meetings manifests not only in its reluctance in recognizing their existence but also in, at least sometimes, actively discouraging their ability to function. They range from not granting visas to the participants from the counterpart country to sometimes instructing some of the participants, who are close to the government, to not participate in such meetings. In the last one decade that I have been part of various Indo-Pak track-IIs, I have come across a number of instances of this kind. 

On the contrary, Pakistan has consistently been very forthcoming in accepting, promoting and being attentive towards various track-II initiatives. They have regularly provided hospitality for high-level track-II delegations from India. I remember visiting Pakistan in 2005 when Gen. Musharraff was at the height of his power there. He not only invited the entire Indian delegation to the Presidential Palace and discussed his formula for Kashmir for almost two hours but also readily granted our request to let us travel to the Pakistani side of Kashmir without a visa! That is smart diplomacy. 

But what explains the Indian hesitation about favorably looking at track-II initiatives especially those between India and Pakistan? First of all, the Indian policy making systems, our famed babudom that is, are rife with nauseating levels of hierarchy which demonstrate extreme reluctance to part with information and summarily reject feedback from non-traditional sources. Add to it another drawback that plagues the Indian system – excessive levels of secrecy which prevents meaningful interactions between those in the bureaucracy and those outside. As a former insider puts it: “we respond and give information to only those writing our ACRs and who have the power to post/transfer us”. 

India has also exhibited a traditional unease towards all sorts of “third party intervention” (even though it has tired to mediate between conflicting parties i.e. the Indian mediation during the Korean war). Be it the UN or the Americans, New Delhi makes it abundantly clear: no mediation is welcome. Indeed, despite the Indian concern about the infiltration of Pak-based terror groups into India and the regular violations of the ceasefire, New Delhi has consistently refused to accept the Pakistani demand to ask the UNMOGIP to investigate such issues. Post-colonial sensibilities are also part of the problem: how can the whites tell us or fund track-II people to tell what to do and what not to do! Finally, the Indian system of not allowing lateral entry into the ranks of the country’s bureaucratic decision-making process also prevents a healthy exchange of ideas between those inside the government and those outside: the government simply believes that there is no expertise outside of it! 

Pakistan, on the other hand, has always wanted to tell the world of its diplomatic positions through whatever means available to it, be it third party mediation, public diplomacy or track-two initiatives. Moreover, there is a dynamic relationship between those inside the government and those outside of it. We get to see many more prominent and expert Pakistanis from outside the government and bureaucracy being appointed to important positions. Moreover, Pakistan suffers from less colonial hangover when compared to India. 

For sure, this pig-headed Indian approach to track-two initiatives has been to India’s disadvantage. Indian diplomacy is often seen as arrogant, unwilling to be creative, unable to communicate and inadequate to take advantage of the newer mediums of modern day diplomacy. 

But why should we focus on track-II diplomacy? Has it made any difference to anything at al? Let me give one example of how track-II diplomacy can make a difference. I was in Colombo this past week attending two sets of track-II meetings on India-Pakistan nuclear issues as well as military CBMs. The discussions were clearly not on political resolution of the outstanding conflicts but on the practical aspects of conflict management. There was a clear shift in favour of doable CBMs from political rhetoric and puritanical positions. Part of this focus on practical solutions and the nitty-gritty of conflict management come from the nature of the projects as funded by various international funding agencies or governments. Funding agencies and governments are not interested in participants restating their states’ held positions, but what these meetings can achieve on the ground. This is in sharp contrast to what the two governments often do – engage in meaningless reiteration of their stated positions, which they have been doing for many decades! This to me is an eminent achievement of the ongoing track-II initiatives in the region. 

I am not in any way suggesting that political resolution of outstanding conflicts is unimportant but that it is often useful to focus on the practical aspects of conflict management to travel towards the eventual political resolution of conflicts.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 23 February 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Feb/23/the-unmistakable-negativity-10.asp) 

‘Nice guys finish second’

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

I am using the title of BK Nehru’s famous book ‘Nice guys finish second’ as the title of my column today because what follows would have certain indirect links with Mr. Nehru’s tenure as the governor of J&K from 1982 till he was shifted out by Indira Gandhi for refusing to remove Farooq Abdullah from power in J&K. 

The Times of India carried a news item the other day that there is a strong speculation that the incumbent National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon will replace Mr. N. N Vohra as the Governor of J&K, that too in the near future. I am not sure how much to trust this story but if indeed there is such a move underway, I don’t consider that to be a good choice for a variety of reasons. 

If Menon’s stint as the Foreign Secretary and National Security Advisor is any indication of what kind of a Governor he will make, then one would have to say that he is unlikely to be any more than a guardian of the status-quo, something the people of Kashmir patently detest. Mr. Menon is a sophisticated diplomat who can articulate and justify New Delhi’s positions on various issues with élan and aplomb. But that’s it – he is no visionary who can put together a roadmap for conflict resolution in J&K considering the fact that governors in this conflict-ridden state have been given more powers than governors elsewhere. 

So what should the governor of Kashmir be like? Clearly, Kashmir and Kashmiris deserve someone better than Mr. Jagmohan whose tenure can easily be termed as one of the most disastrous in the modern history of Kashmir. First of all, the governor of J&K, where a number of internal and external security considerations converge, should be someone who can get out of the comfort of the Raj Bhavan and connect with the people of the state. He/she should be a statesman, sensitive individual, and who does not see governorship as merely a post-retirement perk. Again, when it comes to J&K, there is no point in suggesting individuals who may be very good but won’t be taken very seriously by New Delhi. So one has to be practical in one’s approach to what is ‘achievable’ as opposed to what is ‘ideal’, most certainly in this case. 

One of the individuals who, in my opinion, would fit these descriptions is Syed Ata Hasnain, who recently retired as a General of the Indian army after having commanded the strategically important 15 Corps in Srinagar. I realize that the Indian army is not among the most popular institutions in Kashmir for what it has done to the people of Kashmir for many years. But my understanding of this man gives me the confidence to say what I am saying. The other day, I was shocked to hear about the Indian Army’s decision to ‘close’ the Pathribal case wherein five Kashmiri civilians were summarily executed by the Indian army soldiers. In utter disgust, I called up Gen. Hasnain and asked his opinion. He was unambiguous in his words that it was terrible that five innocent Kashmiris lost their lives at the hands of the army and that it is even more disappointing that justice has not been done in the case. 

More so, he shows absolutely no hesitation in accepting that terrible mistakes have been committed in Kashmir and that it is important for New Delhi’s political leadership to make amends. While he led the Indian army in Kashmir, he succeeded in showing a great deal of sensitivity to Kashmiris. Remember, he was not making any political decisions but merely under orders from New Delhi. It is then reasonable to think that as a decision-maker he is likely to be even more sensitive to the Kashmiris and their predicament. And as the governor, Hasnain will undoubtedly tell the Indian army to restrain themselves from harming the human rights of the Kashmirs. I have my own differences with some of Gen. Hasnain’s arguments, but that does not prevent me from saying that here’s a man who can make a difference in Kashmir. 

On the other hand, New Delhi does not have to worry about him – he is a certified nationalist. But the question is whether New Delhi has the political imagination to differentiate between tactical and strategic approaches to conflict resolution. If indeed it wishes take the strategic approach to peace-building in Kashmir, then it should show the vision and courage to appoint a Muslim as the Governor in a Muslim majority state (one of the arguments detractors would make is that it would be unimaginable to have a Muslim governor as the Chairman of the Shri Amarnath Shrine board. That is clearly a silly argument which does not deserve any considered response).  

The other name I would propose is that of Amitabh Mattoo, a Kashmiri Pandit academic who grew up in the valley and close to the power circles in New Delhi. A great supporter of J&K’s autonomy in letter and spirit, he is often accused by the Hindu rightwing in the country as anti-national for consistently arguing that there should be a zero tolerance policy in place to deal with human rights violations in Kashmir. People like Mattoo understand how the government functions, the importance of being sensitive to the legitimate aspirations of the people of Kashmir and yet uncorrupted by the viciousness of state power. 

But I am not sure whether Hasnain or Mattoo will make it to the Raj Bhavan in Srinagar for they are simply not seen by New Delhi as conservative or pliable enough to be sent to Kashmir. It’s a tragedy that nice guys, as BK Nehru wrote, tend to finish second.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, February 2, 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Feb/2/-nice-guys-finish-second--5.asp)

The limits of democracy

I have always argued that the Indian media and political class unquestioningly abide by certain ‘deep-state’ redlines when it comes to talking about Kashmir and Kashmiris. The liberal among the ‘deep-state’ analysts empathise with Kashmiris, the more liberal might even critique New Delhi’s Kashmir policy – but would never challenge the foundational claims of the Indian state on Kashmir. That is why when Prashant Bhushan talked about the need to conduct a referendum in Kashmir, I was pleasantly surprised. But then he clarified subsequently that he argued for a referendum in Jammu and Kashmir only to decide whether the people want the army to handle internal security or not meaning that he was not talking about the “plebiscite”. While that is a comedown, it is clearly courageous of Mr. Bhushan to even say that much. 

The BJP reacted predictably, with Arun Jeitley saying, "issues of national security cannot be decided by populism or referendum. They can only be decided on security considerations." Under heavy fire from the twice-born Indian nationalists, his party chief Arvind Kejriwal clarified: “Whatever the army wants to do regarding deployment, there is no question of a referendum on it. We do not support Prashant Bhushan's statement…Deployment of the army within the country should be decided on the basis of internal security threat. There is no question of a referendum on this. But we believe the sentiments of locals should be respected. Otherwise democracy will be under threat”. 

What surprises me is not the BJP’s reaction to the Bhushan statement, not even AAP’s flip-flop on the issue, but the stark division that the party makes between ordinary issues and national security issues. Even for a party that talks about conducting consultations with the people on every issue concerning governance (from bijli to paani to crime prevention), the contentious issue of Kashmir is untouchable and is to be treated as sacrosanct and managed by the specialists of security – the Indian state and its security agencies - without any consultation with the people general or at least those people who are suffering, the Kashmiris. 

Why is it that AAP does not think it is a good idea to consult the people of Kashmir whether or not they want the continued the presence of the Indian armed forces in their midst? Why don’t they think it useful or politically correct or in keeping with the foundational aims of their party/movement to extend the fruits of their ‘revolution’ to the hapless Kashmiris? Why not think of organizing a few mohalla sabhas and public consultations with the people in Kashmir on the desirability of the presence of the armed forces in Kashmir? Why should they be denied the fruits of democracy? If the people of Vasant Vihar or Greater Kailash can pour in to the streets of Delhi, air their legitimate complaints, topple the government that did not listen to their voices and vote a bunch of people to rule them who they think will redress their grievances, why not let the people of Kashmir do the same?  Has any mainstream Indian political party shown the courage to hold public consultations in Kashmir on the question of demilitarization? I am not aware of anyone doing so. 

APP might be under the impression, and rightly so, that it can do without the votes of the Kashmiris in their quest for power in Delhi. Indeed, every Indian political party thinks so except of course the Congress party which believes in “managing” to get the votes and seats in Kashmir using innovative “methods” well-known to most Kashmiris. 

The larger question that we must ask is whether AAP has the political willingness to take unorthodox positions on national security issues? Can they stick to their pro-people approach and image when it comes to Kashmir and Kashmiris? I am not very confident that they can, because, as I have long argued, the great Indian middle class, APP’s primary support base, is extremely orthodox when it comes to national security issues, and Kashmir, whether or not one likes it, is a fundamental national security issue in the security imagination of the Indian middle class.  Indeed, this is evident not just in the case of Kashmir. I am certain that this orthodox approach of the Indian ‘liberal parties and intellectuals’ will extend to most national security issues – insurgency in the north-east, Pakistan etc. Hence, to make a larger point here, India’s self-styled liberals steer clear when it comes to challenging some of the long-held fundamentals of New Delhi’s national security constructs. In doing so, there exists a silent agreement among the liberals in letting the arenas of national security have “special” rules and norms that are not applicable in the rest of the country. 

Of course, this is not to put all the blame on AAP or the country’s liberal intellectuals. This is a far more widespread disease – most of us are schooled into believing that we must not problematise or question certain things around us – clams and practices of national security tops the list, with Kashmir being an excellent example. As a result, anything and everything – human rights violations to the denial of legitimate democratic rights to the curtailment of the freedom of movement and expression - tends to get justified by a mere invocation of national security. 

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 22 January 2014. http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Jan/19/the-limits-of-democracy-59.asp)

Strategic Implications of the Indo-US Standoff

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

Will the Devyani Khobragade incident have serious strategic implications for the Indo-US strategic partnership which the American President Barack Obama once described as the ‘defining partnership of the 21st century’? Or will the relationship limp back to normal once the din and noise settles down on the incident? Most Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) mandarins and veterans, journalists manning the foreign affairs beat and politicians in New Delhi seem to see this as an occasion to teach the Americans a lesson in response to what has been meted out to the Indian VIPs for such a long time. The American side seems to be loosening up a bit albeit still surprised by the “unprecedented” reaction from the Indian side. With the US not overreacting to the India’s retaliatory expulsion of an American diplomat from New Delhi, it is likely that the crisis is mostly over for the MEA and the Department of State, though certainly not for the diplomat involved in the mess. Not only that she may not be able to go back to the US, where her family lives, but she has also come under the scanner for a number of other reasons including the Adarsh flat she owns. While one hopes that the Indo-US relationship is not seriously harmed by this, what are the likely implications should the relations not recover quickly? 

Like a number of other analysts who have made this point earlier, I also think that the Indo-US partnership has been undergoing great stress in the recent past. The grandeur of the Indo-US relations was lost somewhere during the first term of Obama’s presidency. While George Bush was personally committed to improving the relationship, Obama is not. Once the Bush-Manmohan honeymoon was over, the Americans were looking for substance, that is, deals that would give them money. And New Delhi did not live up to their expectations. First came the MMRCA snub – India’s decision not to shortlist the American bids for the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition to supply 126 multi-role combat aircraft to the Indian Air Force (IAF). Then came the Indian Nuclear liability law, not to the liking of the United States (or for that matter to the liking of anyone), which imposes heavy fines on suppliers in case of a nuclear accident. 

Moreover, Washington also understands that New Delhi may not play to its tunes to balance Beijing’s muscle flexing. And given the rapprochement underway between the US and China, American dependence on New Delhi to checkmate China is drastically reduced. In other words, in an objective American cost-benefit analysis, from an American point of view of course, the Indo-US partnership has not really benefitted the Americans, as there are no deliverables or results in sight. This perhaps explains the low political priority attached to the relationship now and also perhaps why the White house was almost completely silent on the Khboragade affair. 

The Indo-US partnership, in other words, is going through a very bad phase and there aren’t many credible reasons why the relationship might improve in the near future. This has significant implications for both India and the United States. For India, this clearly means that the Indo-US honeymoon is over and New Delhi’s insistence on “reciprocity” on the diplomatic front will encourage the Americans to now seek reciprocity from India on the many other fronts where Washington thinks New Delhi has been free-riding on it. If New Delhi wants American help in securing the memberships of important global nuclear-trade related groups such as NSG, Australia Group and Wassanar Arrangement etc., it may have to show some reciprocity to the US. Similarly, the American support in India’s quest for a permanent seat at the UNSC may not come unreciprocated either. If New Delhi wants to be counted on the world stage, it would have to show its importance on its own, the US may not lend its feet for India to stand on. 

Not that the diplomatic standoff would have not implications for the United States. Indeed, in the longer run, the Americans would need India as much as Indians would need the US for a variety of strategic reasons. First of all, given the state of US-Pakistan ties, the Americans would be left with hardly any allies in the region at a time when the US-led NATO forces are on the verge of withdrawing from Afghanistan. China, Iran and Pakistan cannot be counted as allies by the US when thinking of stabilizing post-2014 Afghanistan. US would most certainly have to count of the Indian efforts there. The uncertain nature of the ongoing American rapprochement with Iran could go in any direction and India could still play a significant role in dealing with the Iranians on a variety of issues. Finally, despite the Sino-US rapprochement, the relationship between them is still one that is born out of the necessity of mutual accommodation. Hence by losing out on the only strategic partner that it has in the region, the Americans would be doing great disservice to themselves. 

Both the United States and India should bring the Khobragade controversy to a closure and explore ways to reinvent the relationship. 

(Source: Greater Kashmir, January 12, 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Jan/12/strategic-implications-of-the-indo-us-standoff-4.asp ) 

Dr. Singh’s Pakistan Policy: An Assessment

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

Addressing a press conference in New Delhi two days ago, the Indian Prime Minister, in response to whether India and Pakistan were on the verge of signing a historic deal on Kashmir, said “I have tried to improve relations with all our neighbours to the best of my ability and on one time it appeared that important breakthrough was in sight…Events in Pakistan for example that General Pervez Musharraf (former President) had to make way for a different set up. I think that led to the process not moving further....”. Though it might look like a statement that does not say much, those who were following the Indo-Pak negotiations from 2004 to 2007 would certainly realize that Dr. Singh is talking about the missed opportunity to finalise a political deal on Kashmir, one that had supporters in both capitals and Kashmir. More so, consider the fact that Dr. Singh has a habit of understating everything, and indeed his press conference was full of understatements!

I can feel a sense of loss in the PM’s words, rightly so. Manmohan Singh could have gone down in the history of India for having achieved yet another historic task (apart from finalizing the Indo-US nuclear deal which now seems to be facing a lot of hurdles) had he shown the courage to make that trip to Islamabad to finalsie the Kashmir deal with Musharraff in 2007. Dr. Singh was too risk-averse to take that giant leap of faith (even under reasonable circumstances) to end the conflict over Kashmir. He certainly was/is not a courageous political leader (well, for that matter, he is not even a political leader): radical decisions can only be made by leaders with courage and conviction.  

But for a man who showed exceptional grit in negotiating and finalizing the nuclear deal with the United States, thereby initiating India’s integration into the international nuclear order ending the country’s nuclear isolationism, Dr. Singh did not show any determination in ending the Kashmir conflict with Pakistan. Perhaps he was not convinced about it or his advisors were scared that Pakistan would do a ‘Shimla’ by reneging on the promise once Musharraff went out of power in Pakistan. But all indications to this day show that such a reversal would not have happened for Pakistan continues to await an honorable exit route from Kashmir. Many people in India may or may not accept this argument but this, to my mind, is simply the reality. It is also possible that Dr. Singh was not in a position to focus his administration’s energies on the Kashmir deal which unlike the nuclear deal would have had much more political repercussions at home. After all, Pakistan is India’s favorite enemy of all times. But history will judge Dr. Singh unfavourably for we love and respect leaders who can make strong decisions (no, there is no veiled reference to Narendra Modi here!) and we hate weaklings. So if the chroniclers of the UPA government point out one fault in Dr. Singh, it would be lack of courage. 

In short, Dr. Singh was unwilling to do anything radical that could have potentially transformed the India-Pakistan rivalry. But he skillfully managed a number of unpleasant situations by not letting things go out of control unlike the previous regime headed by Vajpayee. Many in India think that Dr. Singh’s pussy-footed policy towards Pakistan was unwise and that not responding to Pakistan with resolve was the biggest shortcoming of Dr. Singh’s Pakistan policy. But not letting the relationship with Pakistan boil over was his single biggest achievement, in my opinion. I start with the assumption that an aggressive policy towards Pakistan would not have led India anywhere other than prompting the international community to re-hyphenate India and Pakistan and thereby consider India to be another irresponsible power in the region. Handling Pakistan and the relationship with it takes diplomacy of a higher kind, and Dr. Singh’s government partly exhibited that by refusing to employ aggression to deal with Islamabad. Where he failed was in not showing the courage to employ such diplomacy to its fullest. 

In other words, UPA’s foreign policy, while it did not take us to war, was a celebration of the status quo. Dr. Singh often did not have the backing of his leader Sonia Gandhi and that of the Congress Party, a party that has historically exhibited an unimaginative Pakistan policy, to translate his visions into reality. He did enunciate a number of visions capped by his articulation that he was in favour of making the borders in Kashmir irrelevant. But when the time came for ‘making the borders irrelevant’, he did not want to put his head on the block. 

He also did not have the courage to deliver on increasing the trade with Pakistan despite this being an issue that is positively looked at by a lot of Indians and Pakistanis. Dr. Singh’s government could not put in place a robust system of crisis prevention measures, in the form of CBMs, to ensure that crises situations between India and Pakistan do not escalate to major standoffs. What about other issues such as Sir Creek and Siachen? The Indian and Pakistani interlocutors, track-1 and track-2, kept saying that these are really low hanging fruits, ready to be plucked. But even on those issues there has been no progress in the 10 years of Dr. Singh’s rule. Apart from all the other reasons that I have pointed out earlier in the article, I think his inability achieve anything substantive with Pakistan also came from the fact that he simply did not visit Pakistan despite multiple invitations from Islamabad. 
As Dr. Singh said in his Press conference two days ago, history might judge him kindly for he made sure that India did not get into any disastrous situations with Pakistan, but for now we have to say that doing so was not enough. He should have done better things given the ten years that he had to better the Indo-Pak relationship.

(SOurce: Greater Kashmir. January 5, 2013. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Jan/5/dr-singh-s-pakistan-policy-an-assessment-7.asp)