New Delhi’s forgetfulness

Kashmir just happens to be right on top of Government of India’s ‘to forget’ list!

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

Like human beings, sentient and forgetful, states (governments, to be more accurate) also sometimes tend to forget or pretend so. The (successive) government(s) of India has a habit of forgetting things: issues, promises, duties and priorities. This is not only regarding the question of Kashmir, but about almost everything that needs political courage and willingness. Kashmir just happens to be right on top of Government of India’s ‘to forget’ list!

Some of the major preconditions that New Delhi had stated from time to time to take steps to resolve the Kashmir conflict are the following: Pakistan stops doing what it has been doing in Kashmir, things improve in Kashmir and that Kashmiri separatists be willing ready to negotiate less then perfect solutions (or move from their absolutist positions). New Delhi would argue that once these things happen and the stage is set, it would take steps to address the deeper political questions regarding the Kashmir conflict. Looking at the political developments in and around Kashmir these days, I a of the opinion that most of these pre-conditions have been more or less fulfilled thereby setting the stage ready for New Delhi to take the next steps.

Let’s examine these arguments in some detail. The internal situation in Kashmir has undergone a dramatic change. Cross-border infiltration into the Kashmir valley and the levels of violence there have come down drastically and this is borne out by the data provided by the Government itself. Things are getting back to ‘normal’ in Kashmir the way New Delhi wants it. The Kashmiri separatists are seemingly moving away from their puritanical stances. I am not just talking about Sajad Lone here whose mainstream political party, People’s Conference, is steadily gaining popularity in the Valley especially among the youth. Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, who has been referring to civic problems and political corruption in his recent Friday sermons, stated two days ago in Geneva that “APHC is willing to forgo international facilitation provided both the governments of India and Pakistan agree that the APHC leadership will be fully associated with the peace process at a later stage.” Yaseen Malik too has indicated time and again that he is not only willing to negotiate with New Delhi and but is also willing to look at all available options. Hardliner Syed Ali shah Geelani recently held a series of meetings in New Delhi with Indian leaders and members of Indian civil society perhaps realizing that his puritanical position does not have many takers anywhere including in Pakistan.

It is widely understood by now – and I have written about it at length in my earlier columns – that Pakistan has clearly changed its policy on Kashmir. The Indo-Pak exchanges on Kashmir are also reasonably positive. Indeed the contemporary Indo-Pak engagements on Kashmir are guided by the following baselines: that neither party will push for altering the existing borders; that they will try and increase greater linkages between the two sides of the erstwhile Princely state of J&K; Kashmir issue should not be allowed to play spoilsport in Indo-Pak relations; and that they will pick up the bilateral political dialogue from where it was left off in 2007 as and when they agree to start serious negotiations on Kashmir. This simply means that there are a number of Indo-Pak meeting points on J&K, which can be further worked on.

Moreover, Indo-Pak relations have also been steadily improving in the past few years. Number of Kashmir-specific CBMs were signed last year which are likely to be strengthened in the days to come. The recent visit of the Indian commerce minister Anand Sharma to Pakistan and the general improvement in Indo-Pak trade relations have to be seen as a step in the right direction. While Pakistan has been reducing the heat on Kashmir India is seen as reducing its anti-Pak rhetoric on Afghanistan. Indeed, after rubbing India on the wrong side by not inviting India to the 2010 Istanbul conference on Afghanistan, India was brought on board last year.

All this means that most of New Delhi’s prerequisites for initiating a political dialogue on Kashmir with the Kashmiris have since been met. And yet there seems to be no initiative from New Delhi to address the Kashmir question. Political pundits in New Delhi argue that given the impending elections in Pakistan and India and the domestic political turmoil in both the countries, it is unlikely that the two governments will initiate anything new on Kashmir. Given the fragile political existence that the UPA government has today, it would be very unwilling to touch the Kashmir issue. In fact, for months now, no one has talked about the Kashmir interlocutors and their report. It is almost as if New Delhi has forgotten the ‘K’ word. And this was the worst fear of the Kashmiris - that the Government of India will forget about Kashmir and move on with newer priorities when things cool down in and on Kashmir. While that can be seen as smart politics, the danger lies in the fact that the history of the insurgency in Kashmir shows that unforeseen incidents can sometimes destroy this fragile peace and all that has been ‘gained’ in and on Kashmir could then go completely waste.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 18 March, 2012. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/Mar/18/new-delhi-s-forgetfulness-16.asp )

The myth of Indo-Pak unity!

Indians and Pakistanis should not focus on how the two countries were born together, but how they can avoid dying together

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It was during a closed-door Indo-Pak track-two meeting last year in Bangkok that I heard three interesting and yet deeply contrasting views about the similarities between India and Pakistan, and its politics. There was a senior Indian participant in the meeting who kept pressing the argument that India and Pakistan, after all, are one people and hence they constitute one nation. Nostalgic or patronizing, am not sure, he made the all-too-familiar argument…’we have the same culture, same religions, have the same cuisine, same languages etc. etc.’ The argument was evocative, emotional and found a certain level of acceptance among the senior participants from both India and Pakistan.

However, a young Pakistani journalist spoke up in response to the Indian participant. He argued that India and Pakistan are not the same. Pakistan, which came into existence in 1947, has its own unique history, political life, cultural edifice, philosophy, way of life and destiny. I sensed in him a level of aggressive disassociation from India, also a certain level of contempt for India’s poverty and underdevelopment: he was far more than being a proud Pakistani. He further argued along the following lines: ‘I don’t know about any similarities between us; but what I do know is that India is a dominant power in the region with territorial, military and economic predominance and harbours obvious negative intentions towards Pakistan’.

Another, younger, Indian participant retorted sometime later. He started off by agreeing with his Pakistani counterpart that there are indeed no great similarities between India and Pakistan. The Indian participant pointed out that India and Pakistan are dissimilar because the two sides made starkly different choices with regard to their political trajectories and hence different future destinies await them. While Pakistan is a terrorist-infested, friendless, failed state facing an uncertain future, India is the toast of the international community as it is home to high levels of economic growth, democratic and secular values, high tolerance levels, and inclusive governance. Moreover, even Pakistan’s traditional allies such as the United States are moving away from Pakistan towards India. Additionally, he argued that but for terrorism, Pakistan does not really matter to India and that most Indians are indifferent towards Pakistan, indifference mixed with hubris.

I would say that all three arguments are wrong due to different reasons. First of all, sometimes when Indians argue that India and Pakistan are one nation, it comes across as patronizing and could potentially mean that Pakistan does not have an identity of its own which the self-respecting Pakistanis would find very difficult to digest. For many Pakistanis such an argument refutes the two-nation theory, the founding principle of the state of Pakistan. Moreover, given the history of animosity that exists between the two countries, when Indians talk about Indo-Pak unity and similarities, Pakistanis feel that it is noting short of pursuing the ‘akhand bharat’ agenda of the Indian right wing. In other words, Pakistanis feel being engulfed and swallowed by a bigger neighbour when Indians go on making the ‘similarities’ or even ‘unity’ argument.

While the Pakistani response to such an Indian argument, as described above, is to be expected, even that is founded on misperceptions and misgivings. There are indeed a lot of cultural similarities between the two countries and, more so, India has a historical tradition of cultural assimilation. It is in our blood to look for similarities between us and others and that is not just limited to Pakistanis. So the more similarities we find between us and other, the more we are likely to press the cultural similarity argument. When an Indian-origin third generation American citizen becomes famous in the United States we like to keep harping on his/her Indian roots. It does not mean that India is trying to culturally engulf them. That said, when talking about Pakistan at least some Indians do want to deny Pakistan a sense of difference and identity, and take it upon themselves to invalidate the two-nation theory. While that is perhaps why the young Pakistani wanted to aggressively disassociate himself from India and felt that India is indeed a threat, not just militarily but also culturally, I think his argument is a misconceived one. Such views are a result of the images we have in us about each other, given to us by our text books and popular culture. The Indian response that India and Pakistan are completely dissimilar because we are good and they are bad is also an argument that we should discard. One reason why we should not focus on our history with Pakistan is because it is due to that history that we are antagonistic towards each other even to this day.

As a ‘young Indian’, I feel that too much focus on the similarities between India and Pakistan is counterproductive. Indeed, there is no point in aggressively pushing the argument that we are similar and one to the extent that the other side feels insecure. We should focus on reaching agreements and sustaining them than on our similarities. Rather than emphasizing historical and civilizational linkages we should focus on how we can deal with each other in future and solve our historical problems. More importantly, Indians and Pakistanis should not focus on how the two countries were born together, but how they can avoid dying together.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, March 11, 2012. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/Mar/11/the-myth-of-indo-pak-unity--35.asp )

South Asia as a dynamic whole

(Review of SOUTH ASIA — Beyond the Global Financial Crisis: Edited by Amitendu Palit in The Hindu)

HAPPYMON JACOB

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SOUTH ASIA — Beyond the Global Financial Crisis: Edited by Amitendu Palit; Foundation Books, 4381/4 Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi-110002. Rs. 495.

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The region is at a historic crossroads and needs fresh ideas and visionary leaders

Political and economic developments are closely interlinked. And yet much of the mainstream academic scholarship on South Asia has tended to unfortunately bypass this important linkage. South Asia is often seen either as an economic powerhouse, a conflict-ridden region or as a poverty-stricken region: their significant inter-linkages are often left out by analysts. This is even more surprising considering the fact that the two potential futures of the region are either that of becoming a major engine of global economic growth or of turning out to be the epicentre of global instability. In other words, the nature of economic growth in the region can have a definitive impact on the extent of conflicts in the region and that, in turn, can have a defining impact on the economic growth potential of the region. This calls for nuanced multi-disciplinary analyses and problem solving research into the politico-economic life of South Asia as a dynamic whole.

South Asia: Beyond the Economic Crisis, edited by Amitendu Palit is, therefore, a welcome addition to the body of our knowledge on the politico-developmental trajectories of South Asia. Written in easy prose and full of insights, the central message that the book conveys is unambiguous: South Asia is in urgent need of visionary leaders and fresh ideas because the region is at a historic crossroads.The edited volume, product of a conference organised by the Singapore-based Institute of South Asian Studies, does have some extremely insightful and thought-provoking chapters, especially the ones by Mani Shankar Aiyar, Amitendu Palit, T. V Paul, Dilip Nachane and Rasul Bakhsh Rais.

IGNORED SUB-TEXT

Mani Shankar Aiyar does an excellent and well-researched job of producing a chapter on the various socio-economic developments in the region. In fact, I am tempted to say that Aiyar does a thorough ‘scholarly' job in terms of substantiating claims with empirical data and challenging established economic wisdom, and his chapter is clearly better than those of most academic scholars in the volume. Aiyar discusses the often ignored subtext of India's (and South Asia's) economic growth story. He makes the evocative argument that “South Asia is prospering; South Asians are not”. Comparing the GDP growth rates and HDI rates of South Asian states, he points out that “while GDP rates have soared from 5 to 9 percent, growth rates in HDI values in South Asia have ranged from a low of just over 0.5 percent to a high of just over 2 percent”. He says that both income inequality as well as the gap in access to basic human needs between the better-off and the worse-off is steadily growing. One of his policy suggestions, non-serious as it may sound to some, is a practical one: we need to have a Ministry of poverty alleviation which incorporates a department of Panchayat Raj to address the issue of inclusive growth and governance. In the chapter on the impact of the global financial crisis on South Asia, Palit argues that the major reason why the impact of global financial crisis was very minimal on the region was because of its “its patchy connectedness to the rest of the globe”. However, Palit argues, that “Domestic economic slowdown inflicted by partial setbacks experienced by trade and financial sectors on account of the financial crisis can create enabling conditions for further accentuation of the existing vulnerabilities” such as “poor governance, high poverty, deficient infrastructure, low literacy, malnutrition” among others.

What is the policy implication of such an empirical finding? If the argument is that the more you are connected to the international financial structures, the more you are likely to suffer in case of a global financial slowdown, then it is not a novel argument; but if some insights can be derived from such an argument about the desirable trajectories of South Asia's integration into the world economy, that would have been food for thought.

In his theoretically sound chapter, Canadian-Indian scholar, T. V Paul focuses on two critical dimensions for great power involvement in South Asia, the region's geo-strategic salience and the presence of several weak states with intense conflict dynamics among them. Pakistani scholar Rasul Bakhsh Rais rightly argues in his chapter on “Religious Extremism and Terrorism in Pakistan” that “the challenge Pakistan faces is where to situate religion in the state or in the society, and what can be an acceptable balance.”

INADEQUACIES

While the book does have some important insights for the reader, it also suffers from a number of inadequacies. The contents of the volume do not come across as belonging to one central theme. While there are some extremely well written chapters in the book, some of them are in the form of speeches delivered at the ISAS conference. Some other seem to be making tall intellectual claims without trying to substantiate them with evidence and arguments. For example, Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury, in his four-page chapter, talks about how India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have commonalities and potentials that could be positively developed through a policy of trilateralism. While this may or may not be a pipedream, there is no way he can tell us how it is possible in four pages!

SOUTH ASIA — Beyond the Global Financial Crisis: Edited by Amitendu Palit; Foundation Books, 4381/4 Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi-110002. Rs. 495.

(Source: The Hindu, March 5, 2012. URL: http://www.thehindu.com/arts/books/article2963992.ece )

Does India pose a threat to Pakistan?

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No, I don’t think that India poses a threat to Pakistan. And yet I often see that the Pakistani mindset is unnecessarily preoccupied with the clear and present Indian military threat to their existence. This impression of mine was strengthened all over again during the deliberations of the recently held 9th and 10th rounds of Chaophraya Indo-Pak track-two dialogues in Colombo. This India-phobia was especially evident during the dialogue between the retired military representatives of India and Pakistan. The Pakistani military, retired and serving, is clearly concerned about the overwhelming power of India and thinks that one day the Indian military machine will crush Pakistan under its feet.

Why is this an important question to ask at this point of time? Because the more I look at Pakistani strategic posturing and its military’s thinking I realize that it is postured in response to a perceived Indian threat. There is a certain security dilemma that operates in the Pakistani mind about India due to its fears regarding India’s geographical size, stupendous economic growth, alliances, military superiority, as well as its unresolved conflicts with Pakistan. In other words, this is surely an issue that needs to be addressed as it contributes to a lot of confusion in the minds of Pakistanis.

Perceptions are subjective and I don’t want to say whether or not they are justified. However, I wish to argue that Pakistan has no reason to worry about a military threat from India. First of all, India is unlikely to engage in any kind of subversive activities within Pakistan’s territory – a fear that Pakistan entertains vis-à-vis Balochistan – not only because Indian policy is not informed on those lines but also because India has learned from its past mistakes in propping up LTTE and supporting Bhindrenwala, at least in the beginning, during the Punjab insurgency. India has learned the painful lesson that if you promote terror as a policy of statecraft it will come back to haunt you one day.

More so, India clearly has a defensive military posture which forms one of the central drivers of India’s contemporary strategic culture. It is not only the issue of material incapacity of being unable to stage a clear military victory against Pakistan (especially under nuclear conditions) in the event of a conflict that would prevent India from a starting a military operation against Pakistan but also its own internal conflicts which in many ways have tied India down. In other words, India’s multiple internal insurgencies will be its major security pre-occupation in the years to come.

It is also important to look at the contemporary Indian global preoccupations, material and ideational, to gauge whether Indians are Pak-fixated and whether overly focusing on Pakistan can distract them from pursuing their larger international goals. Indian foreign policy discourse is hardly Pakistan-centric; its major pre-occupations are the rise of India, its soft-power promotion, UN reforms and India’s role in a reformed UN, relations with the United States etc. India also realizes that unnecessary preoccupation with Pakistan or lack of improvement in Indo-Pak relations can hamper India’s own growth.

Islamabad should also look at the patters of India’s alliance behaviour. While Pakistan has a standing all-weather anti-India alliance with China, India’s alliances are hardly targeted at Pakistan. Take, for instance, Indo-US strategic partnership. While the US is one of India’s leading strategic partners, it was also a major strategic partner of Pakistan at least until recently. The breakdown of their relations was neither desired nor caused by India. India’s ties with Russia, Japan or France are not to bring harm to Islamabad and that should seriously be noted by Pakistan’s policy makers when trying to gauge India’s potential behavior towards Pakistan.

Of course India is a fast growing economy and has a certain level of economic dominance over the rest of South Asia. One might also argue that this economic prowess could be converted to construct a huge military machine which can become a threat to Pakistan. But why should that that be the case? I would argue that not only should Pakistan look at India’s economic growth in a benign manner but also should explore opportunities to benefit from the Indian economic growth.

And yet eternal skeptics could make the argument that there is the pervasive question of uncertainty in international relations and so you can never be sure of the intentions of other states. More so that there is no guarantee that states will never change their views over the course of time. That’s true, and that is precisely why Pakistan should, so should India, try and resolve their bilateral conflicts so that there is no reason for them to fight with each other. Moreover, apart from resolving their conflicts they should also try and make constituencies of peace on either side. One of the ways of doing that is to strengthen trade ties between the two sides. The recent meeting of the trade ministers of India and Pakistan is therefore a welcome step.

An Indo-Pak no-war pact
India and Pakistan should also try and sign a ‘no-war pact’. Leaders from both the sides, including Jawaharlal Nehru and Pervez Musharraff, have offered it in the past. Skeptics, again, might argue that such ‘feel-good’ declarations have no value when the push comes to shove, that is, when there is an overwhelming reason to fight a war. While it is true that war as a last resort can not be ruled out in the relationship between states, it is also true that confidence building measures such as a no-war pact can make states perceive each other differently, resolve their differences peacefully and generally tend not to break the pact for domestic and international normative reasons.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, March 4, 2012. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/Mar/4/a-question-of-curiosity-14.asp )

New Delhi’s hypocritical Iran policy

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Ancient Greek philosopher Thucydides wrote in his epic treatise History of the Peloponnesian War that while the strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must. While this describes the inner workings of the international system in general, then and now, no wisdom better than this can explain the philosophy behind the global nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as the ongoing confrontation between Iran and the United States (along with the European countries and Israel).

While this should not surprise the students of international politics, what may be surprising for many is the moral rhetoric with which the west attacks the Iranian regime. They argue that Iran has no right to make nuclear weapons (not that Iran has admitted to making nuclear weapons) because it will be a violation of Iran’s NPT obligations, it is not good for stability in the West Asian region and that Iran is a sponsor of terrorism. Informed observers of international politics, am sure, will be able to call the bluff of these arguments without much effort. My focus today is on the Indian policy towards the Iranian nuclear programme.

Hypocrisy towards Iran
New Delhi, whenever possible, tries to remain silent on the Iranian nuclear question. When pushed to the corner, it would argue that Iran should not develop nuclear weapons. Surely, suspected development of nuclear weapons is not the only reason why the US has a problem with Tehran; there is deep enmity between Iran and US notwithstanding the nuclear developments in Iran. This means that even though Iran is clearly under threat from US and Israel, New Delhi’s policy posture seems to assume that the American policy towards Iran is justified.

India argues that Iran should give up its nuclear weapons programme, if any, because Iran, unlike India, is a signatory to the NPT and hence it has treaty obligations which it should respect. Is that not a hypocritical argument to make? India has traditionally argued that the global non-proliferation regime is discriminatory and that India does not agree with NPT-mandated ‘nuclear apartheid’. If so, how can India blame Iran for violating a treaty that India thinks is blatantly discriminatory in the first place?

More importantly, it is clear that one lesson that we can draw from global nuclear politics is that the powerful countries have always had their way in defining standards for the less powerful ones as the Marxist historian E. H Carr rightly points out “morality is the product of power”. This explains why Israel is able to have its secret nuclear weapons programme without being challenged by the international community. By pointing fingers at Iran, India is not only agreeing to these very same arguments but is also conveniently forgetting the not-so-clean history of India’s nuclear development which is witness to a number of instances of India diverting nuclear material sourced from the western countries for civilian purposes to its weapon programme. Given such a history, how can India blame Iran? I am reminded of a biblical story: when a woman accused of adultery was brought to Jesus for his opinion on whether or not she should be stoned to death as per the Law of Moses, he said “He who is without sin among you, let him be the first to throw a stone at her.”

What explains the Indian behaviour?
Surely, New Delhi’s policy towards the Iranian nuclear programme is not informed by moral or normative considerations but plain geopolitical calculations. There is a heightened level of pressure on New Delhi from the US and west for isolating Iran and this was predicted by many Indian analysts during the negotiations of the Indo-US nuclear treaty. The Hyde Act passed by the US Congress specifically requires India to cooperate with the US to isolate Iran.

Apart from the pressure exerted by the US and the West on New Delhi, there is also the Indian calculation of potential benefits that it can get if it joins forces with them against Iran. New Delhi’s illusion of being the new strategic lynchpin of American grand strategy in the region has convinced it to give up on its traditional partners, alliances and ideals. With the Pak-US relations nose-diving, and China’s rise being resisted by the Euro-Atlantic alliance partners and India being courted by them to checkmate China, New Delhi feels the need to make use of the geopolitical opportunity to become the key strategic partner for the US and the West in the region. Hence maintaining a strategic silence on the issue of Iran and speaking up against it when pushed to do so is seen as the correct strategy by New Delhi. Keeping this in mind, India voted against Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in late 2005 and early 2006 thereby giving up the traditional Indo-Iranian relations which until then were smooth, mutually beneficial and accommodative.
I am convinced that India will have to pay dearly for adopting such hypocritical policy towards Iran. Indeed, our hypocritical policy towards Iran has been costing us geo-strategically, economically, politically, and even grand strategically. United States may be an ally for India but Iran is a neighbour: allies change, neighbours don’t.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 19 February, 2012, URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/Feb/19/new-delhi-s-hypocritical-iran-policy-6.asp)

Pervez Musharraff: Rise and Fall

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General (retd.) Pervez Musharraff has been a controversial man – both as a soldier and politician. Today, I would like to reflect about him in the larger context of how Pakistan has treated its politicians including the soldiers-turned-politicians. History is witness to the fact that Pakistan has not treated its politicians fairly and accorded them the dignity they deserve: while many Pakistani politicians – Zulfikar Ali and Benazir Bhutto and Zia-ul Haq included – faced violent deaths, some of them were thrown out of their elected office (Bhutto, Shariff et. al.), and some others have criminal charges pending against them. Musharraff himself survived a number of assassination attempts, have criminal cases pending against him in Pakistani courts and was indirectly forced out of office. Today, he is unable to return to Pakistan and his political legacy is questioned and challenged by even those who stood by him during his heydays. The Pakistani political system has a tendency to vilify their leaders.

I am no supporter of Musharraff. In fact, I think his time is over and it is perhaps best for him not to return to Pakistan. After all, in politics, time is everything. One of the reasons why I would like to write this piece about him is because of my recent visit to Munich to attend the Munich Security Conference (MSC). The meeting was attended by over 400 participants including Hillary Clinton, John McCain, US Defense Secretary, many Prime Ministers, Defense and Foreign Ministers from around the world. I saw Musharraff twice, seated in the 5th or 6th row like an ordinary participant. Someone, one of his staff members I guess, approached me thinking that I was a Pakistani participant and told me that the German and international media covering MSC was not giving any importance to the former President and that I should do what I can to get him more media attention. Of course, I had neither the resources nor the willingness to do anything about it. But then that’s not the point of this story. This was a complete contrast to 2005 when I had met him in his office in Islamabad. I was very impressed by his ideas about Kashmir and way he visualized Indo-Pak relations. Musharraff, then, was at the pinnacle of his regime and was indeed one of the most sought-after leaders in the region. He was courted by the Americans, the Europeans and was thought of even by the Indians as the man who could bring peace between the two nuclear rivals.

Musharraff is a much troubled former military dictator today. His return to Pakistan is uncertain. He is likely to be arrested and tried for a number of cases pending against him in Pakistan. While on the one hand, the major political parties in the country would consider him as an absolute anathema, there is no popular mood in support of him either. Even Imran Khan, who Musharraff thought of allying with, has refused to do so. Musharraff apparently has no political ally left in the country. Pervez Musharraff is a much unwanted man in Pakistan’s siasat today.

What about his ideas and initiatives on conflict resolution? Will the embattled leader’s ideas, especially the ones relating to India in general and Kashmir in particular, survive the political downturn that his legacy is witnessing in the country today? Well, no one seems to be sure of that. No one wants identity with him and his ideas especially when it is not sure whether or not he is returning to Pakistan and what will happen to him if he does return. Even those who were close to him have been saying that they have no knowledge of whatever he said or did.

Understandably, this is not liked by a lot of people in Kashmir for they had not only appreciated the Musharraff formula for Kashmir but had also pinned their hopes on him and his formula to get a better political deal for them. Although in today’s Pakistan not everyone is very happy to endorse Musharraff’s ideas, the fact is that the rethinking he began about India and Kashmir in Islamabad is not all over. Many actors, including political parties, may be willing to accept his formula if New Delhi pushes for it but without the ‘Musharraff tag’ attached to it.

Musharraf was an accepted Pakistani leader in New Delhi while he was in power and his ideas on Kashmir had a lot of takers here. When negotiating with him, New Delhi was willing to downplay his legacy of Kargil for the sake of reaching an amicable solution on Kashmir. However, the mood in New Delhi seems to have changed and a lot of people here now prefer to remember him as the architect of Kargil - which he is – not as the Pakistani leader India negotiated the longest and most successful peace process with.

The rise and fall of Musharraf holds significant lessons for democracy, peace processes and especially for a potential political solution to the Kashmir conflict. However, what is important for us is to keep in mind that although we may or may not like the political careers or political lives of some of our political leaders, we must not malign their good deeds or emancipatory political ideas they pursued with vision.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 12 FEBRUARY 2012, URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/Feb/12/pervez-musharraff-rise-and-fall-30.asp )

ARTS » BOOKS

January 31, 2012

The geopolitics of South Asian jihad

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Jihad on Two Fronts: South Asia's Unfolding Drama. by Dilip Hiro.

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There is a proliferation of literature today on the geopolitical aspects of jihad and Islamic extremism in South Asia. And yet, the discourses on jihad in the region are rarely nuanced or problematised. They have an inherent tendency to explain the phenomenon from a religion-centric perspective infused with grand civilisational definitions and also to see it as a practice of statecraft. In other words, contemporary literature and discourses on jihad treat it as an essentialist problem and often address it by communal shaming and ruthless eradication.

What is missing is a sociological reading of Islamic extremism, one which looks at it in the light of people's (or victims?) daily lived experiences, one that highlights their appalling existential conditions, and one that scans the structural conditions that are shaped by faith, indoctrination, misperception, ignorance, and the general inability to make free choices.

It is the narrow and ‘anti-intellectual' understanding of such social — not primarily geopolitical — problems that render state policies so helpless when confronted with the high levels of social legitimacy and popular acceptability commanded by jihad and the jihadis. That is precisely why the international community is forced to make peace with the Afghan Taliban today, after exhausting every other option, although Taliban was the reason why Afghanistan was attacked in the first place. Dilip Hiro's book Jihad on Two Fronts is an excellent example of such broad-brush treatment of an important subject.

Rich in detail

Written by an experienced journalist whose knowledge of the region is commendable, the book does have its strengths. It is rich in detail and in personalised narratives of the various aspects of jihad in the region. Hiro also attempts to draw a big picture of geopolitical developments in the region viewed from a historical perspective. This surely is a layperson's introduction to the origins of jihad in contemporary South Asia. Moreover, if you have a dislike for complex intellectual formulations, there is no reason to worry, for reading Hiro's narrative is like looking at a picture that is pleasing to the eyes: simple, yet rich in detail.

However, the book suffers from a number of serious weaknesses. In a sense, its strengths are also its weaknesses. The narrative is far too simplistic and suffers from an overdose of details. The book is not well structured and hence lacks a sense of direction. The narrative style shifts from autobiographical to historical to political and to religious, not necessarily in that order. Above all, there is little attempt to neatly tie the multiple aspects of the jihad phenomenon.

Sometimes, one begins to wonder whether Hiro is writing a novel or a serious book on jihad; indeed, he has written both in the past. Witness this sentence: “In the heart of bustling, noisy, sprawling port city of Karachi lies a grand park occupying 185 acres, which is incredibly quiet except for the chirping of sparrows and cawing of cows.”

Conspiracy theory

The big picture Hiro has endeavoured to produce is faulty, I am afraid. He sees a conspiracy theory in every important event of the region and hardly any scope for hope. Some of his arguments are clearly untenable. For example, an entire chapter puts up the argument that Afghanistan is America's second Vietnam, but at the end of it the reader remains not fully convinced that it is indeed the case.

Intellectual enterprises need to be geared towards a set purpose. What is presented is nothing more than a rehash of available material on terrorism, Islamic extremism, jihad etc., some of it from Hiro's own earlier books. There is hardly any attempt to break new conceptual ground or put forth any new empirical argument.

It is claimed that, using the “archival material released by the Kremlin in 2009, as well as the secret and classified cables sent by embassies in Kabul, Islamabad and Delhi, the author challenges the conventional historical narratives of the main layers: Afghanistan, Pakistan, America, India and the Soviet Union”. But the book doesn't do justice to this claim. By bringing in too many variables and covering a vast expanse of spatio-temporal territory, it seems to complicate the picture, and the complication is clearly not positive or useful.

After going through the book that has no refreshing intellectual insight and no significant suggestion to offer on the policy front, an informed reader is inevitably left with the question: And so, what's new about Hiro's narrative?

JIHAD ON TWO FRONTS — South Asia's Unfolding Drama: Dilip Hiro; HarperCollins Publishers, A-53, Sector-57, Noida-201301. Rs. 699.

Source: The Hindu, January 31 2012. URL: http://www.thehindu.com/arts/books/article2845278.ece )