Pakistan’s New Kashmir Policy

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

Those of us who attended the 6th and 7th Chaophraya track-two Dialogues on Indo-Pak relations (October 16-19, 2011) in Bangkok were in for a surprise when leading strategic thinkers and media representatives from India and Pakistan started discussing the ever so contentious ‘K’ issue. One retired senior official from the Pakistan military asked the Indians present at the dialogue bluntly: “Why do you Indians want to discuss Kashmir? We are not keen on a discussion on Kashmir. There are other more important things to be discussed”

This was not a lone view coming from a retired Pakistani official; others from the Pakistani contingent seemed to be either toeing a very moderate line on Kashmir (in comparison to Pakistan’s traditional views on the issue) or trying to rank other issues such as Afghanistan and Balochistan much above Kashmir. The Indian stand seemed to be curiously different toot: some spoke about the positive changes underway in Kashmir and some others pointed out the continuing occurrence of human rights violations in J&K. Even this was a departure from the usual Indian defensive stand on Kashmir. There was a certain attitude of accommodation, sincerity and effortlessness to the Indian stand on Kashmir.

The Pakistani climb-down on the core issue of Kashmir was coupled with an increasing focus on Afghanistan and the evolving endgame there. Not only were the Pakistanis emphatic about their accusation that India is trying to contain Pakistanin Afghanistan but were also negative about any potential strategic accommodation or cooperation with India in Afghanistan. Most of them were loud and clear about what Pakistan would want India to do vis-à-vis Afghanistan: Get Out!

Deconstructing the new Pakistani stand on Kashmir

So what do we make of Pakistan’s new stand on Kashmir? What explains this new, nuanced, and yet unprecedented Pakistani lack of interest in determining the direction in which Kashmir heads? Indeed, one would argue that Pakistani leadership does make occasional references to the UN resolutions, human rights violations in Kashmir, need to ascertain the wishes of the Kashmiri people etc. in their policy utterances, world forums and official meetings. An yet as one Pakistani participant pointed out this is how states behave: unless there is an official declaration of the radical change in official policy, states will always make their policy changes known in very subtle ways and ‘without prejudice to their held positions’. Hence Pakistani official statements on Kashmir ‘without prejudice to its held positions’ are not surprising.

Let’s return to the question what explains the new Pakistani policy shift on Kashmir. Is it because the Pakistani establishment has realized that they are increasingly losing legitimacy and ground in Kashmir and that the people of Kashmir are no longer looking towards Pakistan for deliverance? Or is it because Pakistan has realized that it hardly has any international backers on the Kashmir issue and that terrorism as a state policy is increasingly looked down upon by the international community? Is it due to the so-called Indian ‘successes’ in addressing the Kashmir issue with increased political sensitivity? Or is it because Pakistan is bogged down in Afghanistan and hence unable to commit any material, diplomatic, military and political resources for the Kashmir cause? Or is the apparent Pakistani shift a mere tactical measure in the sense that given its isolation in the international community and the precarious situation that it faces domestically, Pakistan has decided to lie low on Kashmir and will revert back to its traditional positions and strategies once it feels more secure and confident? Or is it because Pakistan’s Kashmir policy has indeed positively transformed due to a serious internal change of heart and strategic priorities? And does that change of heart stem from a realization that Pakistan’s Kashmir policy has done more harm to itself than any good?

I don’t think anyone has any obvious answers to these questions. It’s most likely that the perceptible change in Pakistan’sKashmir policy has come about due to all the above factors. Indeed, it would be better if Pakistan’s new Kashmir policy has multiple sources, because if there is only one source for this policy change, there could, at least theoretically, be a reversal of its policy in case there is a change in that source.

On its part, New Delhi should be wise enough to make use of this strategic window of opportunity and try to settle the conflict in Kashmir through an internal political process and the conflict over Kashmir with Pakistan through a sustained bilateral dialogue. If New Delhi thinks that it can afford to ignore Kashmir because Pakistan has lost its interest in the issue, it will lead to disastrous consequences for the people of Kashmir has shown in the past that they will be able to fight their own fight with New Delhi without any external helping hands. If anything, the Pakistani involvement has only given Kashmiris’ indigenous struggle against New Delhi a very bad name.

New Delhi should therefore attempt to implement the various suggestions put forward by the various Kashmiri parties, dissident and mainstream, committee of interlocutors and the reports produced by the Prime Minister’s Round Table conferences.

(Happymon Jacob teaches at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)

"Harud: In Memoriam"

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

The multitude of narratives surrounding the Harud literary festival in Kashmir has exposed the many deep cleavages within the discursive space of Kashmir politics. If the existence of a multitude of divergent opinions and viewpoints can be seen as an indication of the wellbeing of the discursive space within a political community, then Harud, to me at least, has proven again that in spite of what has happened to and done to Kashmir in the past many decades, the Kashmiri knows how to speak his/her mind out and will do so: and hence any attempt to deny them that opportunity would have to be called tragic.
The stupidity of the Organisors
The organisors of ‘Harud-The Autumn Festival of Literature’ displayed utmost ignorance and stupidity – and I do not wish to mince words here – when they declared that the festival would be an apolitical forum and later when they decided to cancel it. First of all, if literature is to do with society, emotions, culture, life, impressions etc., how on earth can it be apolitical? Isn’t ‘apolitical literature’ an oxymoron, to say the least? If the organisors of the Jaipur Literature Festival consider literature to be an apolitical affair, they have no right to engage in anything to do with literature: they are at best corporate event managers of glitzy literary outputs if they think they are engaging in an apolitical act. Hence, if Harud was intended to be organized along the lines of a flashy corporate event, it’s better that we don’t have it because politics lies at the heart of literature.
The norm-setters of the society have told us that educational institutions are and should be apolitical, but are they and should they be? We probably have the finest and most informed political debates happening in our university and college campuses. I have, over the last decade or so, gained more political knowledge from the post-dinner public meetings conducted in JNU’s mess halls than from any clinically written textbooks of politics. They say classrooms are and should be apolitical, but are they and should they be? I teach issues relating to national security at JNU and every lecture I give at JNU’s School of International Studies ends up becoming a discussion/debate about the politics of national security.
The organisors also cited potential protests at the site of the festival as a reason for canceling the event. But what did they expect? Did they expect that Kashmir is as calm as the Dal Lake and that there would be no security threats and protests? Did they think that since the Indian state has tried to silence the Kashmiris for so long, they would be an obedient group of passive individuals who would say no more than what was required of them?

Why the opposition to Harud was misconceived
The organisors of the Harud Festival are stupid, why buy their stupidity? If claiming that a literary festival is an apolitical affair is stupid, then protesting against that stupid comment to the extent to making the organisors to refuse to host the much needed event in Kashmir is not wise either. While political criticism is, for sure, social service, critiquing something for the sake of it and/or then not doing anything alternative or parallel to rectify the mistakes is irresponsibility.
More so, was Harud indeed an attempt by the Indian state’s propaganda machine to paint the picture that all is well in Kashmir? The Indian government has of course tried to “normalize” Kashmir for many decades. It purchased local politicians, pumped thousands of crores of rupees into the state, micromanaged and manipulated politics there, and its policies led to the deaths of thousands of Kashmiris. But have all these attempts by the Indian state managed to stop the dissenting Kashmiris? No. Have these attempts by New Delhi convinced us that all is well in Kashmir? No. Did the misplaced sense of triumphalism in Srinagar and New Delhi regarding the ‘victory of democracy and the defeat of dissent’ in the Valley witnessed after the 2008 State Assembly elections stop the Kashmiris from taking to streets in protest against the killings of innocent Kashmiris in the summer of 2010? No. Did the visit of the Pakistani rock-band Junoon in May 2008 and their performance at the Dal Lake give us a feeling that all is well in Kashmir? No.
Had Harud been organized in Srinagar as per schedule, would it have meant that all is well in Kashmir and moreover would it have been a victory for the Indian state in Kashmir? No. Was the proposal to hold Harud in Kashmir by a non-governmental organization a conspiracy of the Indian state to paint an “all is well” picture of Kashmir? No.

Whose loss is it anyways?
At the end of the day, when the intellectual dust generated by the debates surrounding Harud settles down, we will need to ask ourselves an important question: who has lost most from the cancellation of the Harud festival? For sure, it’s a loss for art, for the young aspiring artistic-minded kashmirs and their youthful dreams, and most importantly, for our levels of tolerance. I wonder why it is that the intellectuals and writers who voiced their opinion loud and clear against holding Harud in Kashmir kept mum when some protesters there threatened that they would do anything to stop a particular person from coming to Kashmir to attend Harud. Don’t they believe in artistic freedom? Didn’t we hear them cry foul when the Hindutwa fundamentalists publicly posed death threats to late M. F. Hussain for his anti-Hindu paintings? Why is there a double standard?

(Source: Greater Kashmir, October 2, 2010. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/Oct/2/harud-in-memoriam-4.asp )

Will, not bill, needed for Kashmir

Nizam-ud-Din Bhat’s statement is ill-timed, ill-conceived and amounts to no more than empty rhetoric

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

The recent bill proposed by the People’s Democratic Party legislator, Nizam-ud-Din Bhat, seeking the deletion of Article 3 of the J&K constitution which links the state with the Indian Union is ill-timed, ill-conceived and amounts to no more than empty rhetoric, to say the least. While the PDP has distanced itself from its legislator’s attention-seeking behaviour, one wonders how a responsible political Party’s legislator is allowed by the party leadership to engage in such irresponsible politics. Either the Party has lost its grip among its second-rung leaders or it is trying to test waters in Srinagar, and by extension in New Delhi, to see how proposals such as these will be responded to. PDP’s self-rule document is a visionary proposal for conflict resolution in J&K but ill-conceived proposals from the likes of Bhat will only erode the credibility of such a well though-out official proposal.

National Conference (NC) leader and state Chief Minister, Omar Abdullah, argued in the state assembly in October 2010 that the state did not merge with the Indian Union but has only acceded to the country. Since it has acceded and not merged with India, there are certain special provisions, as enshrined in the Article 370 of the Indian constitution that the J&K state enjoys today. Unlike Nizam-ud-Din Bhat’s misguided argument, Omar’s argument is sound, logical and accurate. Omar’s argument focusing on accession as opposed to merger is even more significant in today’s context when there seems to be an effort to find a political solution to the Kashmir conflict, rather than a military one. Unlike in the case of the erstwhile Princely states, the state of Jammu and Kashmir never gave up their special status at the time of acceding to India. More so, it is important to remember as well-known Kashmir expert Balraj Puri wrote in his book Kashmir: Insurgency and After “The special constitutional status of Jammu and Kashmir was not granted by the Government of India, but was sanctioned by the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act of 1935, the India Independence Act of 1947, the India (Provisional Constitution) Order of 1947 and the Instrument of Accession.” The point is that J&K is different from other Indian states wherein it is legally empowered to retain a level of distance from the Indian Union.

That said, I find arguments by both Abdullah and Bhat to be nothing but empty rhetoric bereft of political will or a sense of direction, though for different reasons. While Bhat’s argument is illogical, Omar’s argument suffers from a sense of purpose and clarity of vision. Why does the Chief Minister of J&K, who is a coalition partner in the Union government in New Delhi and with the influence he wields in Delhi, especially with the Gandhi family, choose to limit his vision regarding a political solution in Kashmir to his speeches alone? Why can’t the Chief Minister prevail over New Delhi to do for Kashmir what he and his party think should be done? Why wouldn’t he make it a prestige issue for himself and his party? Why can’t the NC and Abdullah insist New Delhi to deliver on what they think should be done for Kashmir? And more so, if New Delhi doesn’t agree to his proposals, why wouldn’t he show the courage and conviction to walk out of the coalition arrangement? Don’t the NC and its leader understand the virtues of coalition politics which enable every coalition partner to wield considerable amount of influence on the federal government especially in matters concerning the state that the coalition partner represents? PDP and its visionary leader, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, not only understood the bargaining power of coalition politics but also had managed to elicit certain benefits from New Delhi in the form of crucial intra-Kashmir CBMs.

In politics, talk is cheap, and actions are rare! The dissident leaders in Kashmir have always talked about the various contours of a political solution for the Kashmir conflict; but they have never delivered anything. They do not have the ability to do what the mainstream parties can do in terms of engaging in concrete political action. But the least they can do is to get their act together in terms of generating a popular debate about what is achievable (a la what Sajad Lone has talked about), what their long term and short term goals are, and identify a common strategy to achieve their goal in a realistic manner within the ambit of the prevailing political and geo-strategic conditions. Instead, all they are able to do is to revel in empty rhetoric.

Political leadership in New Delhi also engages in this empty rhetoric from time to time. Narasimha Rao famously talked about sky being the limit when it comes to conflict resolution in Kashmir, A. B. Vajpayee talked about addressing the conflict in Kashmir within the framework of humanity and Manmohan Singh talked about making borders in Kashmir irrelevant. And yet, Kashmir conflict continuous to exist and no political solution has been found. In the meantime we keep hearing about more and more unmarked graves in Kashmir when thousands of Kashmiris are buried, unsung and unidentified.

The Kashmir ‘hands’ in Sringar and New Delhi, including Srinagar’s mainstream and dissident political parties, are now gearing up for another round of Kashmir talk which will begin with the submission of the final report of the Centre’s interlocutors on Kashmir. While we do not yet know the contents of the report, not many people are convinced that the report will generate anymore than neatly choreographed talk-shows and smartly-written newspaper columns in New Delhi and Srinagar.

(Source: 19 September 2011. Greater Kashmir. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/Sep/18/will-not-bill-needed-for-kashmir-17.asp )

Please don’t call it a revolution

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

Anna Hazare is a courageous man and I admire him for his guts. He has managed to do what a lot of others have not: think of it, a villager from Maharashtra is close to winning an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation against a huge state machinery which is not in a habit of listening to the voice of the people. Before you start thinking that “I Am Anna”, let me clarify: today’s column is a political criticism of the Anna movement. And yet I wish to acknowledge that the “anti-corruption” part of the campaign and team Anna’s courage to take on the state are both laudable. That said, I am extremely skeptical of messiahs, I think they are a dangerous species for modern democracies and, in any case, too much adulation often turn them into tyrants – umpteen examples from history will bear me out on this. In all, I have four major critiques of the Anna movement.
Cult of anti-politics
First of all, I am worried that the Anna movement is the beginning of anti-politics in India. There is a certain understandable cynicism in the minds of the Indian middle class about the political class in India. Popular culture in India (jokes, cinema etc.) and the media in general assert that the root cause of all problems lie with the politicians in the country, be it corruption, crime, poverty or communalism. It is this deep sense of anger and skepticism that the Anna has managed to gather around himself in Delhi’s Ramlila maidan. This campaign seems to be clearly promoting a culture of anti-politics which, together with the impending defeat of the government, will lead to a further erosion of middle class’ faith in the country’s institutions. The Anna movement will prompt many more groups to take law into their own hands. Such tendencies of deinstitutionalization will have far-reaching implications for a pluralistic, diverse, conflict-ridden and developing country such as India. More than anyone else, deinstitutionalization will prove to be disastrous for those living at the economic, political, social and geographical peripheries of the country. Let’s face it, the last refuge of the underprivileged and minorities in India will never be the Indian middle class, but the state - a much better state of course! The rise of the middle class skepticism of institutions in the backdrop of the already receding state portends the beginning of the end of political representation as we know it now.

Many liberal commentators are taken aback by the huge amounts of people on the streets supporting the Anna campaign and hence argue that it is a legitimate campaign because it seems to have a huge amount of support around the country. But then getting people on the streets in a country like India is no formidable task: didn’t the Sangh Parivar manage an even bigger mobilization for the ‘Kar Seva’? Or for that matter, can not the Hindutva right wing in India mobilize such numbers for purely communal objectives? Remember, this is an age when the so called yoga gurus and spiritual gurus seem to take centre-stage in matters of politics and governance!

Politics of the apolitical middle class
Whose protest is it anyway? This protest is choreographed to suit the ‘apolitical’ tendencies of the Indian middle class which is in the habit of critiquing politicians and politics but would not find time to cast their votes when elections come. They are in search of quick solutions and speedy justice, which, they assume, can and should be achieved by circumventing the din and noise of politics. Why corruption? Because corruption is apparently an apolitical issue (or so they think), isn’t it? When Kashmir burned last summer and over a hundred Kashmiris were killed by security forces, the Indian middle class was busy chit-chatting about “Aisha” and “Rajneeti” – none of them were seen protesting in the Ramleela maidan against the atrocities committed on Kashmiris! They would, however, find time to assemble at the India Gate in candle-lit processions to protest against ‘high-profile murders’ (of urban, English speaking ‘one of them’) and when the Indian army fights Pakistan (remember the middle class and media support for the Kargil war?). And yet they prefer to look the other way when Dalit women are raped and killed in hinterland India or thousands of farmers commit suicide in the country or raise their voice against AFSPA, human rights violations and other draconian laws: these issues don’t matter to the middle class because farmers, Dalits, slum-dwellers, Kashmiris, Manipuris etc. are not part of their class. More so, how could the middle class take up those issues – they are ‘political’ in nature, after all (which corruption is not)!!

The rightwing rising
The Anna campaign would not have come at a better time for the Hindutva rightwing in India – they were in the process of losing political direction having run out of ideas, appeal and steam generated by Ram Mandir, nuclear tests and such other issues. What the nationalist, overly-patriotic, feverishly flag-waving Indian middle class led by political puritans like Anna, yoga gurus, and spiritual gurus (with excellent RSS background work) has done are multiple things: they have shown that the Congress is an indecisive and spineless political party which does not have it in it to rule this country; that we need a new ‘national awakening’ in the country and the congress cant lead it; it is alright for the religious figures to be part of the ‘civil society’s’ efforts at nation building, and; that the country needs to unite by blurring the various ‘differences’ (national agenda formulation process) that exist in the country in order to engage in nation building (read the last one as ‘the other issues don’t matter, only corruption does). All this bear good news for the resurrection of the Hindutva rightwing in the country. It is becoming ever so clear that the national struggle against corruption is increasingly becoming a cradle of rightwing ideas and Hindutva organizations.

This is no spontaneous movement
Politics is understood to be dynamic and transformative; Anna campaign is self-serving, condescending and even dictatorial at times. More so, I am unprepared to believe that the Anna movement is a spontaneous countrywide mass uprising against corruption. Notwithstanding the fact their definition does not include all kinds of corruption, it is important to note that this movement is mechanical and result-oriented in a negative manner – as opposed to being organic and transformatory – and is led by technical experts and ex-bureaucrats, and certainly not a campaign led by the downtrodden and oppressed for their better tomorrow. The Anna movement excludes more than it includes.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, August 28, 2011. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/Aug/28/please-don-t-call-it-a-revolution-20.asp).

In defense of track-two dialogues

prejudiced and panic-stricken reactions call for a considered response

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

The recent arrest of Kashmir-born Executive Director of the Washington-based Kashmir American Council, Ghulam Nabi Fai, has generated a fierce debate within the Indian intelligentsia and media about the need, role and nature of track-two engagements between India and Pakistan on outstanding bilateral issues especially Kashmir. Sections of the Indian media and civil society have reacted thoughtlessly and hysterically to what they describe as ‘five star seminar circuit on Kashmir funded by the ISI’. Such prejudiced and panic-stricken reactions call for a considered response in defense of the philosophy behind track-two dialogues between unfriendly countries and the issue of funding for such initiatives.

The ISI connection
Critics have argued that the Indian participants did not care to check the antecedents of the organizer, Ghulam Nabi Fai in this case, and thereby worked against India’s national interest by going to an ISI-sponsored seminar. What they seem to ignore is that if it was after all a covert operation by the ISI and took the FBI, one of the world’s best investigative agencies, to finally unearth the link between Mr. Fai and the ISI, how can one expect the Indian academics, activists and intellectuals to have uncovered this link before they decided to air their views in seminars organized by Mr. Fai? While the criticism against respected Indian intellectuals and activists for participating in allegedly ISI-sponsored conferences on Kashmir in Washington can be dismissed by the simple argument that almost all of them were unaware of the source of Fai’s funding, the larger issue that needs to be addressed is about the importance of Indo-Pak track-two dialogues which many rightwing anchors have termed as a ‘cottage industry of wining and dining’ in the name of Kashmir.

Who funds these dialogues?
One major criticism against many of the ongoing track-two dialogues is regarding their source of funding. Critics say that these dialogues are funded by people with vested interests and because the participants are ‘well-taken care of’ they would happily endorse the hidden agenda of the organizers and will not keep the national interest of the country in mind. Such ‘unintellectual’ criticism needs to be seriously contested before being wholly dismissed. Let us come to the issue of funding first. There are at least four track-two dialogues going on at the moment between India and Pakistan and they had gathered momentum during the period when there was no dialogue between India and Pakistan after the Mumbai terrorist attacks. Almost all of them are funded by well-known and transparent funding agencies based abroad or neutral foreign governments. One of the major reasons why indigenous funding is discouraged for India-Pakistan track-two dialogues is that if it is funded by Indian funders, Pakistani participants would find it difficult to attend the conference and may have to answer uncomfortable questions at home and vice versa. Secondly, the Indian government has always adopted a hands-off policy when it comes to track-two dialogues and has in the past denied visas to Pakistani participants which is why most of these dialogues are held outside India and Pakistan. Holding these conferences outside India and Pakistan also helps participants to share their ideas freely and frankly without being under the constant glare and pressure of various actors back home. Moreover, it is hardly possible to verify the sources of a seminar organizer’s funding before one accepts the invitation to participate in it.
On the question of participants endorsing the hidden agenda of seminar organisors, it may be pointed out that most of the track-two dialogues are locally owned and locally organized even if foreign-funded. In other words, the agenda formation and consensus building are carried out by the Indians and Pakistanis themselves and most track-two meetings have roughly equal number of Indian and Pakistani participants. More significantly, most participants in these meetings are retired high-ranking officers from the bureaucracies and armed forces of India and Pakistan as well as well-known academics and experts from various think tanks and Universities. To claim that they are out there to be purchased by foreign intelligence agencies is making an unreasonably presumptuous argument, to say the least. The narrow minded nationalists and prime-time ‘televangelists’ are indeed indulging in self-flattery when they claim that they understand Indian national interests better than these individuals.

Why track-two engagements?
Since the ongoing campaign seems to be denigrating the very idea behind track-two engagements, it is necessary to put the philosophy behind these dialogues in proper perspective. Track-two dialogues are primarily meant to give an opportunity to senior and informed members of a country’s strategic community to interact with those of the rival state. There are multiple objectives behind such interactions: one, to appreciate the fears, concerns and demands of the other side; two, to understand the redlines and tipping points of the rival state; three, to engage in an unencumbered exchange of perceptions and ideas, and; four, convey the various suggestions and proposals from the other side to the decision-makers in one’s home country. One of the major advantages of track-two settings is that since most of these dialogues are held under Chatham House rules wherein nothing would be attributed to anyone after the meeting, participants are more likely to be frank and candid in their opinions leading to a better discussion of major issues and their potential solutions.

Kashmir and track-two dialogues
Track-two dialogues on Kashmir have in the past proved to be useful in a number of ways. They have helped the track-two interlocutors from the Indian side to clearly understand the positive transformation of the Pakistani approach to the conflict in Kashmir even as there has not been an official admission of it. Indeed, there have been occasions when the Pakistani decision makers made use of the venue provided by these forums to test waters on some of their out-of-the-box ideas on Kashmir. The meeting of an Indian track-two group with the then Pakistan President Pervez Musharraff in 2005 is a good example in this regard. In that meeting Musharraff outlined the various aspects of the so-called ‘Musharraff formula’ for the resolution of the Kashmir conflict and asked the interlocutors from both sides to discuss it further.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 31 July, 2011. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/Jul/31/in-defense-of-track-two-dialogues-33.asp )

Nuclear Confidence-building in South Asia

(Statement adopted by the members of the Ottawa Dialogue at their meeting at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, July 6-8, 2011)

The members of the Ottawa Dialogue are heartened by the fact that high-level official talks on nuclear CBMs have begun once again. We encourage the governments to continue them and to supplement them with regular meetings of high-level officials from the military and intelligence fields in order to broaden the dialogue and establish mechanisms to further understanding and prevent escalation of tension. We also encourage the two countries to continue to observe their respective moratoria on nuclear testing.

It is important to note that nuclear CBMs cannot succeed independent of broader steps to ease the relationship. These must include conventional military CBMs/restraint measures and steps to encourage people-to-people engagements. While these broader matters are not in the purview of the Ottawa Dialogue, we recognize that they are essential to the CBMs we are suggesting here. Thus, we recognize that some of the CBMs we advocate cannot be undertaken in the absence of

measures to stabilize other aspects of the relationship. But we believe that others can be and will

contribute to the creation of a “virtuous cycle;” an atmosphere in which progressively more ambitious steps can be taken in all fields of confidence-building.

Finally, there should be an informed public dialogue on the subject of the implications of a nuclear conflict in South Asia, and of the opportunity costs which attend the continuation of an uncontrolled nuclear rivalry. Such a dialogue should also include discussions of the underlying causes of the dispute.

On the subject of nuclear CBMs, we offer the following list of possible CBMs as ones that we believe could be considered by the governments.

Unilateral and/or Bilateral Declaratory Steps:

• Assurances that missiles will not be tested during periods of tension;

• Assurances that “bolt from the blue” surprise nuclear attacks will not be planned for or undertaken;

• Assurances that measures will be taken to prevent un-authorized and unintended launches (such as a mutual commitment to maintain the practice of the separation of warheads from delivery systems);

• Commitment to inform the other side well in advance of tests of new systems; and

• Building on the agreement not to attack nuclear facilities, assurances that sensitive targets will be avoided in the case of conventional conflict.

Strategic Restraint Measures:

• Agreement to develop and adopt a common terminology on strategic issues;

• Regular discussions on doctrinal issues and strategic stability;

• Agreement to include cruise missiles in the Agreement on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles;

• Agreement that missile flight tests will be notified to each side as early as possible;

• Agreement to test missiles only from notified ranges in notified directions;

• Agreement to enter into a dialogue concerning Ballistic Missile Defence in which views of the impact of such systems on strategic stability will be explored; and

• Agreement to enter into a regular dialogue on the impact of the introduction of new technologies on strategic stability.

Communication Measures:

• Agreement to expeditiously set up nuclear risk reduction centres (though possibly not under this name), through a comprehensive agreement, specifying the staffing, communication and functional aspects;

• Agreement to upgrade the existing hotlines to introduce redundant and assured communications which can be activated at the request of either party;

• Agreement to ensure a daily communication exchange when demanded by either party;

• Agreement to harden each side’s communication lines downwards to provide protected and assured communications; and

• Agreement to establish consultative mechanisms as required to implement these CBMs.

Physical Measures:

• Agreement not to deploy tactical nuclear weapons;

• Agreement to retire the Hatf 1 and Prithvi 1 short-range systems;

• Agreement that the Hatf 2 and Prithvi 2 will be designated as conventional-only systems; and

• Agreement to forego MIRVing of nuclear missiles.

Cooperation between the civilian nuclear establishments:

• Agreement to exchange on a regular basis information relating to the management of nuclear accidents;

• Agreement to share different experiences in creating and running Nuclear Regulatory Authorities;

• Agreement (bilateral or regional) on cooperation and exchange of safety related information of Nuclear Power Plants;

• Agreement to cooperatively develop civilian nuclear techniques in the fields of agriculture and medicine in such areas as:

o Plant strains with characteristics of high yield and resistance to pest, disease, drought, and salinity.

o Animal health through improved vaccines

o Extension of shelf life of perishable foods

o Practices for prevention and early detection of cancer

o Practices for treatment of acute radiation sickness

Participants from South Asia at the Palo Alto meeting of the Ottawa Dialogue:

1. Shamshad Ahmad, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan;

2. RN Ganesh, Vice Admiral, retired, Indian Navy;

3. Mohan Guruswamy, Chairman, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Delhi;

4. Jamshed Hashmi, Chairman Emeritus, Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority;

5. Rifaat Hussain, Professor, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad;

6. Happymon Jacob, Assistant Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi;

7. Aziz Ahmad Khan, Ambassador, retired, Foreign Service of Pakistan (former High Commissioner to India);

8. Feroz Khan, Brigadier General, retired, Pakistan Army, former Director Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs, Strategic Plans Division

9. Riaz Khan, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan;

10. Lalit Mansingh, former Foreign Secretary of India;

11. Talat Masood, Lieutenant General, retired, Pakistan Army;

12. Shuja Nawaz, Director of the South Asia Centre, Atlantic Council of the United States; Washington, DC;

13. TV Paul, Professor, McGill University

14. Ramamurti Rajaraman, Emeritus Professor of Theoretical Physics, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi;

15. Najmuddin Shaikh, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan; and

16. Vijay Shankar, Vice Admiral, retired, Indian Navy (former Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Strategic Forces Command)

Members of the Ottawa Dialogue unable to be present in Palo Alto:

1. Shahzad Chaudhry, Air Vice Marshal, retired, Pakistan Air Force;

2. Tariq Osman Hyder, Former Additional Foreign Secretary, Pakistan;

3. Amitabh Mattoo, Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi;

4. Raja Menon, Rear Admiral, retired, Indian Navy; and

5. Abdul Hameed Nayyar, Senior Research Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute.

Waiting to fall in love

States are functional, not emotional entities

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

During a nuclear conference that I attended at the Stanford University last week, one retired Pakistani foreign secretary argued, “Lack of trust is the major reason why India and Pakistan are unable to stabilise their bilateral relations. If the two countries have to make peace with each other, a trust-building exercise has to take place”. The argument about trust-deficit sounds pretty convincing and has therefore been widely used by many Indian and Pakistani statesmen, analysts and common people. And yet this otherwise compelling argument suffers from great flaws. It assumes that peace between warring parties depends, to a great extent, on their ability to trust each other and de-emphasises the objective and practical conditions that should exist for conflict resolution.

Consider the following: the most successful peace-process ever in the history of India-Pakistan relations has been the one between 2004 and 2007 and this was led by Pervez Musharraf and the Indian government led by Manmohan Singh. After what Musharraf had done in Kargil – betraying the trust that the Indians put in the Pakistani establishment at the Lahore Summit – it is impossible to argue that the Indian establishment had any trust in the architect of Kargil and yet the peace process turned out to be the most successful one ever. Why? Consider another example before you answer the question: the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) signed 50 years ago has stood the test of time even though India and Pakistan fought many wars between them? That is, even though there were many occasions of extreme mistrust between them, India or Pakistan never tried to break the deal they have on the Indus Rivers. Why?The reason, in my opinion, is simple and is out there for everyone to see: the India-Pakistan peace process during the 2004-2007 period was goal-oriented, properly structured and, very importantly, conducted in a systematic manner. The IWT stood the test of time as well as the challenges arising from the lack of trust because, generally speaking, state actors and parties tend to respect existing agreements, structures and mechanisms. And that is what the IWT is all about, not trust. Countries tend to stand by properly defined and carefully designed structures, agreements, and treaties for fear of condemnation from the international community and domestic audience if they renege on their commitments as well as due to sheer socialisation that happens during state interactions and negotiations.

There are many examples, including that of Kashmir, where the Indians waited for perfect political conditions and complete trust to occur so that it could sign deals with Pakistan but eventually lost out on the opportunity to make peace and sign deals because the perfect conditions never occurred and complete trust never came about. Hence I would argue that it is no prudent statecraft to wait to first to fall in love with Pakistan before India decides to start talking to Pakistan on the various outstanding issues between them in a meaningful manner in order to reach sustainable agreements.Such misleading arguments about trust-deficit have prevented India and Pakistan from addressing many important bilateral issues with significant implications for the entire region for they think that first trust needs to be built before serious issues can be resolved.

One of the important issues that India and Pakistan have not yet seriously addressed in their bilateral context is the nuclear rivalry between them. Ever since the two countries went overtly nuclear in 1998, there has just been one meaningful meeting between them on how to manage the South Asian nuclear situation even as the region is widely and correctly considered to be a nuclear flashpoint. After the 1999 Lahore agreement which contained important declarations about India-Pakistan nuclear relations - many of which have remained unfulfilled - almost every meeting that has been held between the two countries thereafter to discuss nuclear issues were either not result-oriented or have remained inconclusive. Even if one were to assume that the two countries are rational entities and hence may not use nuclear weapons against them in case of a conflict, can we rule out the possibility of accidental use of nukes against each other? Are the two countries adequately prepared for such an eventuality?There is therefore a need to think beyond the bliss of ignorance.

The bliss of nuclear ignorance which the two countries seem to inhabit in is characterised by a number of dangerous myths. The first myth is that nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan will function automatically and we don’t need to bother with it let alone creating mechanisms to prevent nuclear use. This argument is mythical because mere possession of nuclear weapons will not guarantee nuclear deterrence or their non-use against each other: there are other important variables that play a role in the nuclear use or non-use decision of a country. The second myth is that the decision makers are not stupid to use nuclear weapons against each other. Again the fact is that sometimes we might be stupid enough to consider nuclear use. There are enough examples from the Cold War history which suggest that the Cold War rivals had contemplated the use of nukes on a number of occasions. Yet another myth is that our nuclear weapons are safe and if the west can manage their nukes why can’t we do so! T

he fact is that nuclear safety is an issue that needs more detailed consideration in South Asia. Japan is one of those countries that is extremely conscious about the safety standards of its nuclear industry and yet Fukushima catastrophe happened, so was Soviet Union and yet Chernobyl took place. It is living in the fool’s paradise if we believe that we don’t need to bother about nuclear safety and security at all.Pakistan does not have a no-first-use policy of nuclear weapons which simply means that in Pakistan’s strategic thinking nuclear deterrence is an extension of conventional deterrence. There is hence a conceptual dissonance since the two rivals understand the use of nuclear weapons in different ways. Unless the two countries understand and manage to reach an agreement as to what nuclear weapons mean to their bilateral relations, conceptual dissonance will continue to exist and nuclear weapon use cannot be ruled out.

While trust and love are laudable emotions, states do not operate on the basis of emotions. States function on the basis of their socialisation, structures that they are in, and agreements and arrangements they arrive at with others. States are functional entities, not emotional entities and hence statesmen should attempt at creating conducive conditions and structures of peace and cooperation rather than waiting for trust and love to occur.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 17 July, 2011. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/Jul/17/waiting-to-fall-in-love-2.asp)