Tuesday, June 10, 2008

The Northeast: India’s Achilles Heel

J&K hogs headlines, but here lies the real rub
STATE CRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

The conflict in and on Kashmir tends to dominate the security discourse in India. Many Indians, Pakistanis, Kashmiris and people around the world tend to think that if Kashmir is resolved, then there will be no more issues in India (some even suggest that the Indian state doesn’t want to resolve the Kashmir issue so that it can continue to keep the Indian army engaged; an absurd argument at that). My recent visit to Manipur and Nagaland has dispelled this long-held conviction in me.

Northeast India is to the rest of India what Africa is to the World – far away and forgotten. Both in the cases of Africa and the Northeast, mainlanders witness these peripheral regions sliding into underdevelopment, uncertainty and anarchy. Since nothing much can be done to save them, safeguard the status quo, they believe, so that things do not go out of control. While it may be comparing the incomparable, the message is loud and clear that parts of Northeast India is close to near total collapse – from the points of view of governance, law and order, and development - and still the government policies have not gone beyond mere ad hoc measures aimed at maintaining the status-quo. Even as the governability of the state and governance therein are severely damaged, the parties - the governments both at the Centre and in the states, local politicians, the many Underground Organisations and the narcotics mafia – all seem safe in their comfort zones. The governance and development in these two states have been severely affected by a host of problems: narcotics, insurgency, corruption, and HIV/AIDS. Manipur and Nagaland lie physically next to what is referred to as the “Golden Triangle” comprising Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and the Yunnan Province of China which is World’s most prominent source of illicit heroin and opium. Burmese heroin is transported to Manipur through the border zone of Moreh (an Indian town in Manipur) from the Burmese town Thamu. Alternatively, narcotics also transits through Nagaland. Transit of drugs through these states leads to a) increase in drug addiction (Manipur is estimated to have around has around 50,000 drug addicts), b) local officials make their share of the profit from drug trade and 3) separatists in the two states aid, run or permit drug trade in order to make quick money. Reports suggest that the NSCN (IM), a prominent militant group in the region, controls most of the ganja trade in Manipur and Nagaland. They make sure that the consignment reaches the Assam-Nagaland border. It is interesting to observe that sometimes clashes among various insurgent groups take place not due to any ideological or political reasons, but for the control of routes and areas known for narcotics trade. While on the one hand this means general breakdown of law and order, this also means increased instances of HIV/AIDS in these two states. With hardly any development in the form of industries or other enterprises in these states, drug trade is today a booming business in the Northeast. Along with drug abuse, alcoholism is also becoming a social problem in the northeast. Alcohol is widely available in every nook and corner of the two states despite the fact that both of them are officially declared “dry” states (some call them the “wettest dry” states of the country!).

Insurgency has become the mainstay of politics and all other aspects of life in the Northeast except perhaps in the case of Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram. Not a single day passes without an incident related to insurgency in either Nagaland or Manipur nor are the general population free from the dictates of the insurgents who claim to fight for their liberation. While on the one the one hand, there is functional cooperation among many of these organisations, there are also feuds among many of them. Some of them even maintain links with Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and Chinese intelligence agencies, and have bases in Mynamar, Bangladesh, Thailand and Bhutan. Manipur alone has around 15 active insurgent organizations. Over the years, the insurgents have managed to infiltrate into the governing systems of the two states. Locals say that the insurgents not only take a share of their salaries/income from them, they do so directly from the concerned government department. Government servants at all levels are forced to give ‘tax‘ to the underground organizations. The insurgents impose their wishes in the local elections, police recruitment and development initiatives. Local politicians take the help of the insurgents to win elections and the insurgents make sure that their sympathizers are recruited in to the police service. Most industrialists run away from the two states when the insurgents demand a monthly share from them. There is hardly any industry in the state, nor is the state of basic infrastructure like roads and electricity any good. While the government of India is pumping a lot of money into the two states, most of it goes into the pockets of the politicians or local bureaucrats (corruption is so rampant in the two states) and the insurgent groups ask for a “cut” in whatever is left. Hardly anything is left for the actual development of the region.

The government of India thinks that the situation is not yet out of control and that it is too complicated to get into to find a resolution to the issues there; the insurgent organisations have a free hand in the affairs of the two states, and the people are too tired of expecting anything better and so they unwillingly listen to the insurgent groups. The result is a parallel government in Nagaland and Manipur, something not even heard of even in places like Jammu and Kashmir. Jammu and Kashmir may have captured the headlines across the world, but the real Achilles Heel of India is the Northeast.

(Happymon Jacob is Assistant Professor Department of Strategic and Regional Studies, University of Jammu)

Thursday, June 5, 2008

Sports Need not be Divorced from Politics

Sports Need not be Divorced from Politics

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB


Politics should not spill over into sports; but that is no reason why sports should not spill over into politics. The former is negative and can have negative repercussions but the latter is healthy and progressive. When politics spills over into sports, politicians can use sports to settle their scores, promote their people and to make money etc. etc. On the other hand, if sports spill over into politics, it can carry the sportsman spirit into politics and can sometimes help society resolve its conflicts. One might, however, look at the sporting history of India and Pakistan and argue that cricket matches between the two countries, the most commonly played game between the two countries, have often been nothing less than battles. Losing a cricket match not only meant losing to an enemy country but also facing verbal and physical attacks back home.

A considered second look at the cricketing history between India and Pakistan would make it clear to us that the matches were played like battles because politics interfered with sports, because they were not playing cricket but fighting wars by extension, not because sports spilled over into politics. The cricketers were given briefs to fight for the honour of religion, nation and country: not to enjoy the game or to entertain the crowds, the two principal aims of any game. That sports can have positive effects on politics is also borne by the history of ‘Cricket Diplomacy’ between India and Pakistan and ‘Ping Pong Diplomacy’ between the United States and China in the 1970s. That is history. Welcome to the new era of cricketing between the two ‘unfriendly’ neighbours. The widely-circulated images of Indian crowds cheering Pakistani cricketer Sohail Tanveer‘s winning shot in Mumbai (the shot that defeated the Chennai team led by the Indian captain M S Dhoni) in the final match of the DLF Indian Premier League (DLF IPL) tournament indicate that Indian crowds do not necessarily hate Pakistani cricketers. The recently concluded DLF IPL tournament that went on for 44 days was not only immensely popular all over the country but also first confused and then redefined cricketing loyalties in India and Pakistan. Thirteen Pakistani players had been members of the eight Indian teams that participated in the tournament. The Calcutta team made extraordinary efforts to get iconic Pakistani speedster Shoaib Akhtar play for the team. Saurav Ganguly, Ishant Sharma, Salman Butt and Shoaib Akhtar (Kolkata Knight Riders) were up against Sohail Tanvir and Munaf Patel (Jaipur Rajasthan Royals). Crowds in various Indian cities where the games were played were seen cheering Pakistani players of their team and refusing to cheer for the iconic Indian players belonging to the opposing team. This is perhaps first of this kind in India and Pakistan. We have had instances where Pakistanis cheering Indian players and vice versa but not at the cost of their own players. What it shows is that labeling someone as an enemy or friend by the media and the government has a deep impact on the collective psyche of the general public. Crowds generally tend to go by what is fed to them by the media and those in power. The responsibility of changing those labels, therefore, lies with them. The famous test match played between India and Pakistan in 2004 in Lahore’s Gaddafi stadium had also witnessed unprecedented warmth shown to Indian players by Pakistani fans. That was good hospitality. What differentiates between what IPL has done and what had happened in Lahore in 2004 is the following. In Lahore, Pakistani fans were being nice and hospitable to the Indian players and fans; in the IPL tournament, the nationality of the players were surpassed and forgotten, loyalties were blurred and the spirit of the sport won the day. Pakistani players were all of a sudden no more representatives of an enemy country, and were as likable as the Indian players, and sometimes even more. The media, for a change, played down the objections raised by the Shiv Sena against the Pakistani participation in the game, and realizing that the public and the media were not concerned about their gimmicks anymore, the Shiv Sena stopped airing remarks against the Pakistani players. This is in stark contrast to what they had done in 1999 on the eve of an India Pakistan match when they had dug up the Ferozshah Kotla pitch in Delhi. The media in Pakistan and India were also facing up to the changing times – no one made any jingoistic remarks. In fact, the media in India was not even talking about ‘Pakistani players’ but as mere players of the team they were hired for, and the Pakistani media was covering and discussing the tournament (with the Geo TV live telecasting the tournament in Pakistan) as if it was happening in Lahore or Islamabad and as if the Pakistani team was playing in the tournament. Cheering for a Pakistani player in the Indian soil would have been unthinkable before the IPL began; today this has become acceptable and natural. Indian celebrities embracing Pakistani players in full view of the spectators in a cricket stadium would have been unacceptable before the IPL began; today they do it with Indian crowds cheering them. Promotion of sports as a confidence building mechanism between ‘unfriendly’ countries is an important aspect of multi-track diplomacy which many say is the way ahead between the two ‘unfriendly’ neighbors in the subcontinent. While the recent visit of the Indian foreign minister to Pakistan did not yield any results, the 44 day cricket tournament has managed to change mindsets in the two countries. It is high time the two countries gave more importance to sports as a Confidence Building Measure (CBM).


(Happymon Jacob is Assistant Professor at the Department of Strategic and Regional Studies, University of Jammu, J&K. Feedback at happymon@gmail.com).

Thursday, May 29, 2008

The Valley livens up

The Valley livens up

I
f normalcy is understood as pas-
sivity and calm then one might
say there is no semblance of
normalcy in the militancy-hit
state of Jammu and Kashmir.

However, if the state is today witnes...read more...

Tuesday, May 27, 2008

A Tale of Three Visits

STATE CRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB
Pranab Mukherjee’s visit to Pakistan.
Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s visit to Pakistan last week was a much needed one and should have been made much earlier. The high profile visit was badly timed and the visiting foreign minister was caught in the midst of Pakistan’s internal political uncertainty and didn’t know who he should talk to or rather who all he should talk to. The content, the format and the outcome of the meetings were modest but, one should admit, it was impossible to expect more radical outcomes under the political circumstances prevailing in Islamabad. The visit ended with both the countries signing an agreement to grant consular access to prisoners from either country held across the border. The other positive outcome of the visit was Pakistan’s statement that it wants to have a ‘grand reconciliation’ with India through dialogue to resolve all outstanding issues “with self-respect and dignity.” While the Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi who coined the term ‘grand reconciliation’ did not explain what it meant, this is one way of telling that India-Pakistan relations will not be held hostage to the issue of Jammu and Kashmir and that there needs to be a comprehensive approach to peaceful existence between the two countries – piecemeal approaches to peace are not desirable and would not work. The emphasis on “with self-respect and dignity” is also significant here as Pakistan is clearly hinting that a zero-sum end to conflicts between the two countries is unacceptable to Pakistan – it is not enough that conflicts should end but that Pakistan can not be seen as having lost out on its claims and interests. It is in this context that the Indian policy makers and security ‘think tanks’ have to keep in mind the fact that India can not make sustainable peace in the subcontinent by defeating Pakistan: peace between the two countries can only be sustainable by accommodating each other. The much talked about Iran-Pakistan-India ‘peace pipeline’ also found reference in the Pakistan Prime Minister’s statement wherein he suggested that two countries are committed to take it forward. The importance of the visit has to be seen in the context of the recent statements by Pakistan on Kashmir and the increase in cross border infiltration and the bomb attacks in Jaipur. If India were to respond to Pakistan Prime Minister’s statement that whatever has been achieved by Manmohan Singh and Musharraf for J&K is “half-baked”, the talks would have failed and the peace process stalled. In other words, India could have sounded jingoistic and lost the peace process. Fortunately, better sense prevailed and the peace process is safe. One only hopes that the peace process goes ahead full steam and regains its lost momentum as and when political certainty returns to Pakistan.
Presidential visit to Kashmir
President Pratibha Patil’s five day visit to Kashmir, still in the process as I write this, and concluded by the time it appears in print, has already attracted a lot of criticism though not for any political reasons. The President has been criticized for brandishing an AK-47 - apparently captured by the troops from the militants – which critics find aggressive, amusing and not befitting the stature of the President in a conflict ridden state. That said, the visit is to be seen as part of New Delhi’s attempts to give increased political attention to J&K and the state’s problems. The president has claimed that “New Delhi and State governments are making all efforts to put Jammu and Kashmir on the fast track of development and progress”. One doesn’t distrust that. New Delhi is arguably giving more attention to the state of Jammu and Kashmir than any other state in the federation: no arguments with that. But there seems to be an apparent lack of well thought-out political strategies and policies for the state. The economic and developmental measures, well-meaning they may be, lack a consistent and logical political vision for the state. In other words, New Delhi’s Kashmir policies seem to be designed and executed in ‘fits and starts’ with no grand vision for political reconciliation behind it. More importantly, wise statecraft demands that if you do something, you should be seen as doing it with commitment and a vision behind it.

Concert for Peace
The third important visit of the week was by the Pakistani Junoon rock band to Kashmir. The famous Pakistani band came to the Dal Lake with a message – a message of peace, reconciliation and change. Cultural CBMs like this is will go a long way in bringing peace not just to Kashmir but to the two countries as well. Junoon’s lead singer Salman Ahmad’s words to an excited audience on the banks of the Dal Lake were symbolic of the changing times and moods of the common man in the state: “We are all one. Beware of the people who divide”. How long will the two countries be able to resist and discard the surge of emotions that the bonds of culture, music and films can evoke in the minds of ordinary citizens in the two countries? The two governments can not stop this spontaneous outpouring of emotions by the people who they represent. The earlier we realize this the better it is for our countries and our societies.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, May 28. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=28_5_2008&ItemID=30&cat=11 )

Saturday, May 24, 2008

Impact of HIV/AIDS on Governance in Manipur and Nagaland

The paper is the product of a six-month study that I completed early this year. The study was aimed at understanding the linkages between HIV/AIDS and governance in India's militancy hit north east region. The paper was commissioned and published by AIDS, Security and Conflict Initiative (ASCI – www.asci.ssrc.org), a joint programme of Social Science Research Council (SSRC), New York and the Netherlands Institute of International Relations.
Introduction
Northeast India is to the rest of India what Africa is to the World – far away and forgotten. Both in the cases of Africa and the Northeast, inhabitants of the ‘core’ witness these peripheral regions sliding into underdevelopment, uncertainty and anarchy. Since nothing much can be done to save them, safeguard the status-quo, they believe, so that things don’t go out of control.[1] While it may be comparing the incomparable, the message is loud and clear that parts of Northeast India is close to near total collapse – from the points of view of governance, law and order, and development - and still the government policies have not gone beyond ad hoc measures aimed at maintaining the status-quo. Even as the governability of the state and governance therein are severely damaged, the powerful parties - the Central government, state governments, politicians, the many Underground Organisations (UGs) and the narcotics mafia - seem safe in their comfort zones.

The objective of this study is to assess the impact that HIV/AIDS has had on governance in Nagaland and Manipur. More specifically, the questions that this study seeks to answers for are the following:

- What has been the impact of the disease on the health and education sectors of the two states under study?
- What has been the impact of the disease on elected bodies of the local and regional government structures?
- What has been the impact of HIV/AIDS on the local police and the military in Nagaland and Manipur?

The study has, as the questions above reveal, focused on four aspects of governance: law enforcement, education, health, and democratic processes. These aspects of a state, the study argues, are indicative of the state of governance there. Therefore, if these aspects are adversely affected by HIV/AIDS, the state’s ability to deliver governance to people can be understood to be severely affected, this study argues. In other words, a state’s ability to carry out its governance related functions will be seriously hampered if the above mentioned four sectors of a government are severely affected by HIV/AIDS.

Additionally, the study also considers that legitimacy of the state among the population, violent rivalries among the various ethnic groups in the state and nexus between parts of the state apparatus and criminal gangs can additionally weaken the state. But does HIV/AIDS have anything to do with these? Not directly. However, the disease and its impact are aggravated due to these very factors. Armed insurgency, narcotics trade, corruption, underdevelopment, nexus between Underground Organizations (UGs) and the political/bureaucratic elite can act as force multipliers in a situation wherein HIV/AIDS is rapidly weakening the governance apparatus of the state.
[1] In an interview with the author the Deputy Commissioner of the Churchandpur District, Manipur, Mr. Sumant Singh pointed out, “The administration is fighting to maintain status-quo. Where are the machinery, time and money for other initiatives like combating HIV/AIDS?”
** The complete reportcan be accessed at: http://asci.researchhub.ssrc.org/impact-of-hiv-aids-on-governance-in-manipur-and-nagaland/attachment

What happened to the Peace Process?

Kashmiris are not new to peace processes: it comes and goes like the tourists do in the valley. It is often difficult to keep track of the many peace processes we have had so far. Peace processes in Kashmir can be described as piecemeal approaches bereft of any grand political vision for peace. The latest one too started off with a lot of fanfare and symbolism. But what has happened to it? Has the establishment in Delhi and the various tack-two ‘walas’ forgotten about the frozen valley? Whatever happened to all those Round Table (RT) reports and the various recommendations therein? Have they also been put away in to the dustbins of Kashmiri history like many other reports, recommendations and rhetoric ( a la ‘sky is the limit’ promise by Narasimha Rao) of this kind? No one seems to have any answers. That said, this seems to be nothing new but in line with the same old Indian strategy on Kashmir that it has practiced over the last many years. Approach Kashmir and the politics there with a feudal mindset: hold talks, meetings and conferences in fits and starts. New Delhi starts the dialogue process when it feels like, it invites participants it feels like, it holds such meetings at an interval that is suitable to it, and unilaterally sets the agenda that it is comfortable with. Then the grand finale takes place with some dignitary releasing the reports etc. Sadly then, the meetings, participants, agenda and the recommendations are all forgotten even before one is able to gauge what is happening. This is followed by a long sarkari silence on the issue, like the present one, before dissidents, militants and ‘external pressures’ force the government to start the process all over again. The process begins, but it’s altogether a new process. The bureaucrats, politicians and the intelligence walas have all forgotten what happened up until now: it’s now about forgetting and forgiving whatever has happened and looking at the future, they will tell you. The above description perhaps best suits the off-and-on peace process that New Delhi has undertaken vis-à-vis the Kashmir issue. One would argue that the political turmoil (first the woes of Pervez Musharraf and then the assassination of Benazir Bhutto) in Pakistan has compelled the government of India to go slow on the peace process and the reports produced by the working groups. But of the five working groups (CBMs, Cross-LoC relations, Economic Development, Governance and, Centre-State relations) just one concerns Pakistan, the one on Cross-LoC relations. The other groups and their recommendations are about New Delhi and Srinagar. New Delhi does not need to get a go-ahead from Islamabad to talk to its own citizens in J&K. More importantly, let us be clear about the fact that the Kashmir issue is not one between India and Pakistan, it is about New Delhi and J&K, even as it is possible to argue that India is giving the attention that it does to Kashmir only because of the Pakistan dimension. A cursory glance at New Delhi’s attitude towards Northeast would make that amply clear. Here lies the critical and alarming distance between those who govern and those who are governed. Problems in Jammu and Kashmir are as much (or more) internal as much (or lees) they are external. Let us not befool ourselves by claiming that the problems in Kashmir are merely due to Pakistan. New Delhi’s feudal policies are as much part of the problem: Pakistan only took advantage of our follies. If one accepts that historical fact, then it also needs to be accepted that the solution should first of all be worked out between New Delhi and the people of Jammu and Kashmir. For that, we do not need to wait for things to settle down in Pakistan: that is neither clever strategy nor responsible statecraft. If one says that since the India-Pakistan dialogue on Kashmir is put on the backburner, we can not do much with Kashmir, I would argue that we need to do more in Kashmir precisely for that reason. There is an emerging peace constituency in and on Kashmir which we cannot afford to lose. Reconciliatory strategies should be adopted now especially because much has changed in Kashmir, not just the number of causalities or infiltration of militants from across the broder: I have never understood the logic and civility behind measuring peace with the number of causalities. Consider this. Today’s context seems to be special and unprecedented for Kashmir as well as for New Delhi-Srinagar rapprochement. There is general agreement today that the ongoing peace process in Kashmir and between India and Pakistan and the results it has produced are there to stay despite the political turmoil in Pakistan and the uncertainty it has created for the Kashmir peace process. This confusion has not really adversely affected the peace process in and on Kashmir which seems to have taken a life of its own. This is because there is a new lease of hope among the people of J&K that peace and its fruits are not very far away. Contemporary politics in and on Kashmir is charecterised by two important and unprecedented features: one, the Pakistani leadership and most serious Kashmiri leaders have now gone back on their demand for altering the borders between the two countries; two, most of the leaders have now enunciated what they would like to achieve in terms of a settlement of the Kashmir issue. Responsible statecraft and clever strategic thinking, therefore, would require that New Delhi revives the now frozen process of peace in Kashmir making use of the twin advantages pointed out above before the assembly elections in J&K (later this year), parliamentary elections (next year) and continuation of uncertainty in Pakistan hamper the positive momentum for peace in J&K. How long should peace in Kashmir be sacrificed at the alter of electoral calculations and bilateral concerns?

Kashmir resolution: Do we have a consensus?

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB
One of the major reasons, among a host of many others, why we are unable to resolve the Jammu and Kashmir conflict is because there are too many plans, proposals, formulas and ‘solutions’ put forward for its resolution. This multiplicity of proposals is explained by the fact that there isn’t just one conflict in Kashmir: there are many conflicts within the one conflict in J&K. The important question, however, is that while we have scores of proposals for resolution, do we have some sort of consensus among them? Not yet, or perhaps we haven’t done enough exercise in building one. Precisely because there are many actors and players in J&K with divergent views and stakes, politics and proposals, it is impossible to accept one of them as the ‘mater plan’ to resolve the Kashmir conflict, however good, sensible and accommodative that one plan may be. Accepting one proposal over the others will only further vitiate the political atmosphere, let alone contribute towards resolving it. If we are not waiting for a ‘master proposal’ to come down to us, what the different stakeholders in J&K need to logically do is to create a consensual roadmap from among the existing proposals. Creation of such a consensual document may ideally go through the following phases: 1) look for commonalities and differences in the existing proposals; 2) devise a mechanism/fora for discussing and resolving the outstanding differences, and; 3) propose to implement the most common denominators among the them. This is oversimplification, some might argue. But complicated processes of conflict resolution have to pass through various stages of simplifying the issues at hand so that the general public and even the actors themselves understand what the others are talking about and how to start negotiating with them. While identifying the commonalities is extremely important, no less important is understanding the differences among them. There are and will be differences. Obvious differences and contradictory positions should not stop us from understanding the significance and import of flushing out the common themes running through the various proposals for therein lies the solution for many ills of the state. But which are those important proposals we are talking about here? The most important ones that one might want to consider are: 1) JKLF Roadmap for J&K, 2) Musharraff Proposals, 3) Article 370 of the Indian Constitution and the Delhi Agreement, 4) KSG Proposals, 5) The United States of Kashmir Proposal by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, 6) Peoples Democratic Party proposal, 7) People’s Conference (Sajad Lone) proposal, 8) J&K State Autonomy Committee Report (National Conference), 9) Balwaristan National Front proposal, and 10) Manmohan Singh’s ideas. And what are those commonalities? As a starting point, I would like to point out five common themes among them for further discussion. The most important theme running through all of these proposals is the issue of Self-Rule and autonomy. While some of the proposals delve at length into these two related yet different issues, some do not. But all of these proposals do realize the need to give greater autonomy short of independence to Jammu and Kashmir (except perhaps in the case of JKLF which demands no less than complete independence). The other key agreement among these proposals is that all of them realize the need for cross-border mechanisms for deliberating, consulting and deciding on a variety of issues concerning both sides of J&K. Even as there has been a heated debate on the issue of joint management of resources and certain mutually agreed upon sectors of governance and what it entails among other things (whether this means joint control or joint management etc.), what is pertinent to note is that the key stakeholders have realized that this is one possible way ahead in a world that is quickly going past the confines of borders not just for peace but also for benefits of a great variety. Interestingly, let us remember that both Manmohan Singh and Pervez Musharraf apart from Sajad Lone, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and PDP have endorsed this idea. Despite such huge high-level support for this proposal, this truly great idea is lies mired in obscure details. The third important, if not entirely common, factor in these proposals is the emphasis given to sub-regional problems and aspirations. Valley politics and discourse, by default or design, tends to dominate over most other pressing problems in the whole of J&K state, including on the Pakistani side of the border: issues relating to Jammu and Kashmir have come to identify solely with what happens in the Kashmir valley. It is necessary, therefore, to address and attend to such regional aspirations and problems be it regional autonomy, highlighting their differences with the valley or addressing governance related issues in the peripheral regions. The fourth issue addressed by most of these proposals is also the much debated issue of demilitarization in J&K. While many actors are chary of addressing the issue, some have looked at it openly with a willingness to discuss it. Despite the differences in this regard due to its politico-strategic sensitivity, there seems to be some agreement on phased demilitarization. Demilitarization when adequately phased and timed well with a reduction in terrorist violence, even the hawks within the government of India would be fine with it. Another equally important common factor seems to be the need to accord the state a lot more autonomy regarding financial matters, recruitments into civil services etc. While much of this is easy to do, this involves a great deal of trust and flexibility apart from political will from the part of the government in Delhi. Implementing the common themes pointed out above would require a lot of political will, courage, wisdom, flexibility and deliberations. The primary responsibility in this regard lies with the separatist leadership who has to think together to put up a common set of demands for J&K. Let us not forget that it is easy to rule when the opposition is divided. New Delhi would also need to bring itself to accept the need to think out of the box on Jammu and Kashmir.
(Source: Greater Kashmir, February 6, 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=6_2_2008&ItemID=6&cat=11)