Impact of HIV/AIDS on Governance in Manipur and Nagaland

The paper is the product of a six-month study that I completed early this year. The study was aimed at understanding the linkages between HIV/AIDS and governance in India's militancy hit north east region. The paper was commissioned and published by AIDS, Security and Conflict Initiative (ASCI – www.asci.ssrc.org), a joint programme of Social Science Research Council (SSRC), New York and the Netherlands Institute of International Relations.

Introduction
Northeast India is to the rest of India what Africa is to the World – far away and forgotten. Both in the cases of Africa and the Northeast, inhabitants of the ‘core’ witness these peripheral regions sliding into underdevelopment, uncertainty and anarchy. Since nothing much can be done to save them, safeguard the status-quo, they believe, so that things don’t go out of control.[1] While it may be comparing the incomparable, the message is loud and clear that parts of Northeast India is close to near total collapse – from the points of view of governance, law and order, and development - and still the government policies have not gone beyond ad hoc measures aimed at maintaining the status-quo. Even as the governability of the state and governance therein are severely damaged, the powerful parties - the Central government, state governments, politicians, the many Underground Organisations (UGs) and the narcotics mafia - seem safe in their comfort zones.

The objective of this study is to assess the impact that HIV/AIDS has had on governance in Nagaland and Manipur. More specifically, the questions that this study seeks to answers for are the following:

- What has been the impact of the disease on the health and education sectors of the two states under study?
- What has been the impact of the disease on elected bodies of the local and regional government structures?
- What has been the impact of HIV/AIDS on the local police and the military in Nagaland and Manipur?

The study has, as the questions above reveal, focused on four aspects of governance: law enforcement, education, health, and democratic processes. These aspects of a state, the study argues, are indicative of the state of governance there. Therefore, if these aspects are adversely affected by HIV/AIDS, the state’s ability to deliver governance to people can be understood to be severely affected, this study argues. In other words, a state’s ability to carry out its governance related functions will be seriously hampered if the above mentioned four sectors of a government are severely affected by HIV/AIDS.

Additionally, the study also considers that legitimacy of the state among the population, violent rivalries among the various ethnic groups in the state and nexus between parts of the state apparatus and criminal gangs can additionally weaken the state. But does HIV/AIDS have anything to do with these? Not directly. However, the disease and its impact are aggravated due to these very factors. Armed insurgency, narcotics trade, corruption, underdevelopment, nexus between Underground Organizations (UGs) and the political/bureaucratic elite can act as force multipliers in a situation wherein HIV/AIDS is rapidly weakening the governance apparatus of the state.
[1] In an interview with the author the Deputy Commissioner of the Churchandpur District, Manipur, Mr. Sumant Singh pointed out, “The administration is fighting to maintain status-quo. Where are the machinery, time and money for other initiatives like combating HIV/AIDS?”

** The complete reportcan be accessed at: http://asci.researchhub.ssrc.org/impact-of-hiv-aids-on-governance-in-manipur-and-nagaland/attachment

What happened to the Peace Process?

Kashmiris are not new to peace processes: it comes and goes like the tourists do in the valley. It is often difficult to keep track of the many peace processes we have had so far. Peace processes in Kashmir can be described as piecemeal approaches bereft of any grand political vision for peace. The latest one too started off with a lot of fanfare and symbolism. But what has happened to it? Has the establishment in Delhi and the various tack-two ‘walas’ forgotten about the frozen valley? Whatever happened to all those Round Table (RT) reports and the various recommendations therein? Have they also been put away in to the dustbins of Kashmiri history like many other reports, recommendations and rhetoric ( a la ‘sky is the limit’ promise by Narasimha Rao) of this kind? No one seems to have any answers. That said, this seems to be nothing new but in line with the same old Indian strategy on Kashmir that it has practiced over the last many years. Approach Kashmir and the politics there with a feudal mindset: hold talks, meetings and conferences in fits and starts. New Delhi starts the dialogue process when it feels like, it invites participants it feels like, it holds such meetings at an interval that is suitable to it, and unilaterally sets the agenda that it is comfortable with. Then the grand finale takes place with some dignitary releasing the reports etc. Sadly then, the meetings, participants, agenda and the recommendations are all forgotten even before one is able to gauge what is happening. This is followed by a long sarkari silence on the issue, like the present one, before dissidents, militants and ‘external pressures’ force the government to start the process all over again. The process begins, but it’s altogether a new process. The bureaucrats, politicians and the intelligence walas have all forgotten what happened up until now: it’s now about forgetting and forgiving whatever has happened and looking at the future, they will tell you. The above description perhaps best suits the off-and-on peace process that New Delhi has undertaken vis-à-vis the Kashmir issue. One would argue that the political turmoil (first the woes of Pervez Musharraf and then the assassination of Benazir Bhutto) in Pakistan has compelled the government of India to go slow on the peace process and the reports produced by the working groups. But of the five working groups (CBMs, Cross-LoC relations, Economic Development, Governance and, Centre-State relations) just one concerns Pakistan, the one on Cross-LoC relations. The other groups and their recommendations are about New Delhi and Srinagar. New Delhi does not need to get a go-ahead from Islamabad to talk to its own citizens in J&K. More importantly, let us be clear about the fact that the Kashmir issue is not one between India and Pakistan, it is about New Delhi and J&K, even as it is possible to argue that India is giving the attention that it does to Kashmir only because of the Pakistan dimension. A cursory glance at New Delhi’s attitude towards Northeast would make that amply clear. Here lies the critical and alarming distance between those who govern and those who are governed. Problems in Jammu and Kashmir are as much (or more) internal as much (or lees) they are external. Let us not befool ourselves by claiming that the problems in Kashmir are merely due to Pakistan. New Delhi’s feudal policies are as much part of the problem: Pakistan only took advantage of our follies. If one accepts that historical fact, then it also needs to be accepted that the solution should first of all be worked out between New Delhi and the people of Jammu and Kashmir. For that, we do not need to wait for things to settle down in Pakistan: that is neither clever strategy nor responsible statecraft. If one says that since the India-Pakistan dialogue on Kashmir is put on the backburner, we can not do much with Kashmir, I would argue that we need to do more in Kashmir precisely for that reason. There is an emerging peace constituency in and on Kashmir which we cannot afford to lose. Reconciliatory strategies should be adopted now especially because much has changed in Kashmir, not just the number of causalities or infiltration of militants from across the broder: I have never understood the logic and civility behind measuring peace with the number of causalities. Consider this. Today’s context seems to be special and unprecedented for Kashmir as well as for New Delhi-Srinagar rapprochement. There is general agreement today that the ongoing peace process in Kashmir and between India and Pakistan and the results it has produced are there to stay despite the political turmoil in Pakistan and the uncertainty it has created for the Kashmir peace process. This confusion has not really adversely affected the peace process in and on Kashmir which seems to have taken a life of its own. This is because there is a new lease of hope among the people of J&K that peace and its fruits are not very far away. Contemporary politics in and on Kashmir is charecterised by two important and unprecedented features: one, the Pakistani leadership and most serious Kashmiri leaders have now gone back on their demand for altering the borders between the two countries; two, most of the leaders have now enunciated what they would like to achieve in terms of a settlement of the Kashmir issue. Responsible statecraft and clever strategic thinking, therefore, would require that New Delhi revives the now frozen process of peace in Kashmir making use of the twin advantages pointed out above before the assembly elections in J&K (later this year), parliamentary elections (next year) and continuation of uncertainty in Pakistan hamper the positive momentum for peace in J&K. How long should peace in Kashmir be sacrificed at the alter of electoral calculations and bilateral concerns?

Kashmir resolution: Do we have a consensus?

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB
One of the major reasons, among a host of many others, why we are unable to resolve the Jammu and Kashmir conflict is because there are too many plans, proposals, formulas and ‘solutions’ put forward for its resolution. This multiplicity of proposals is explained by the fact that there isn’t just one conflict in Kashmir: there are many conflicts within the one conflict in J&K. The important question, however, is that while we have scores of proposals for resolution, do we have some sort of consensus among them? Not yet, or perhaps we haven’t done enough exercise in building one. Precisely because there are many actors and players in J&K with divergent views and stakes, politics and proposals, it is impossible to accept one of them as the ‘mater plan’ to resolve the Kashmir conflict, however good, sensible and accommodative that one plan may be. Accepting one proposal over the others will only further vitiate the political atmosphere, let alone contribute towards resolving it. If we are not waiting for a ‘master proposal’ to come down to us, what the different stakeholders in J&K need to logically do is to create a consensual roadmap from among the existing proposals. Creation of such a consensual document may ideally go through the following phases: 1) look for commonalities and differences in the existing proposals; 2) devise a mechanism/fora for discussing and resolving the outstanding differences, and; 3) propose to implement the most common denominators among the them. This is oversimplification, some might argue. But complicated processes of conflict resolution have to pass through various stages of simplifying the issues at hand so that the general public and even the actors themselves understand what the others are talking about and how to start negotiating with them. While identifying the commonalities is extremely important, no less important is understanding the differences among them. There are and will be differences. Obvious differences and contradictory positions should not stop us from understanding the significance and import of flushing out the common themes running through the various proposals for therein lies the solution for many ills of the state. But which are those important proposals we are talking about here? The most important ones that one might want to consider are: 1) JKLF Roadmap for J&K, 2) Musharraff Proposals, 3) Article 370 of the Indian Constitution and the Delhi Agreement, 4) KSG Proposals, 5) The United States of Kashmir Proposal by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, 6) Peoples Democratic Party proposal, 7) People’s Conference (Sajad Lone) proposal, 8) J&K State Autonomy Committee Report (National Conference), 9) Balwaristan National Front proposal, and 10) Manmohan Singh’s ideas. And what are those commonalities? As a starting point, I would like to point out five common themes among them for further discussion. The most important theme running through all of these proposals is the issue of Self-Rule and autonomy. While some of the proposals delve at length into these two related yet different issues, some do not. But all of these proposals do realize the need to give greater autonomy short of independence to Jammu and Kashmir (except perhaps in the case of JKLF which demands no less than complete independence). The other key agreement among these proposals is that all of them realize the need for cross-border mechanisms for deliberating, consulting and deciding on a variety of issues concerning both sides of J&K. Even as there has been a heated debate on the issue of joint management of resources and certain mutually agreed upon sectors of governance and what it entails among other things (whether this means joint control or joint management etc.), what is pertinent to note is that the key stakeholders have realized that this is one possible way ahead in a world that is quickly going past the confines of borders not just for peace but also for benefits of a great variety. Interestingly, let us remember that both Manmohan Singh and Pervez Musharraf apart from Sajad Lone, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and PDP have endorsed this idea. Despite such huge high-level support for this proposal, this truly great idea is lies mired in obscure details. The third important, if not entirely common, factor in these proposals is the emphasis given to sub-regional problems and aspirations. Valley politics and discourse, by default or design, tends to dominate over most other pressing problems in the whole of J&K state, including on the Pakistani side of the border: issues relating to Jammu and Kashmir have come to identify solely with what happens in the Kashmir valley. It is necessary, therefore, to address and attend to such regional aspirations and problems be it regional autonomy, highlighting their differences with the valley or addressing governance related issues in the peripheral regions. The fourth issue addressed by most of these proposals is also the much debated issue of demilitarization in J&K. While many actors are chary of addressing the issue, some have looked at it openly with a willingness to discuss it. Despite the differences in this regard due to its politico-strategic sensitivity, there seems to be some agreement on phased demilitarization. Demilitarization when adequately phased and timed well with a reduction in terrorist violence, even the hawks within the government of India would be fine with it. Another equally important common factor seems to be the need to accord the state a lot more autonomy regarding financial matters, recruitments into civil services etc. While much of this is easy to do, this involves a great deal of trust and flexibility apart from political will from the part of the government in Delhi. Implementing the common themes pointed out above would require a lot of political will, courage, wisdom, flexibility and deliberations. The primary responsibility in this regard lies with the separatist leadership who has to think together to put up a common set of demands for J&K. Let us not forget that it is easy to rule when the opposition is divided. New Delhi would also need to bring itself to accept the need to think out of the box on Jammu and Kashmir.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, February 6, 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=6_2_2008&ItemID=6&cat=11)

The Ideal versus the Achievable

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

After all Kashmiris have to think within the limits of achievability onflicts tend to go through certain phases, so do pro cesses of conflict resolution. Whether or not the stakeholders and observers like it, the phases of a conflict are linear, dynamic and irreversible. The road from conflict to reconciliation typically goes through initial romanticism, hard-line posturing and armed struggle to conflict fatigue, erosion of leadership and lessening popular support, and then to the setting in of realism and the willingness to negotiate with the opposition (unless and until the conflict itself benefits the stakeholders). Therein lies the difference between the ideal and the achievable. For the parties to the conflict, each of these various phases would call for different strategies: strategies usually used in the initial phase are inappropriate in the third phase. The political maturity and relevance of any party to the conflict lies as much in identifying the phase of the conflict as is in understanding what strategies to adopt during the various phases of the conflict. The story of Kashmir is no different. The conflict, say observers and most parties to the conflict alike, has now reached a defining point, a point of no return. The option in Kashmir is no more between independence or no independence, with India or with Pakistan, rather it is about identifying the optimum outcome for all the parties to the conflict. Most parties to the Kashmir conflict seem to have understood this point. Some who haven’t understood this moral and mood of the milieu continue to talk about winning a bloody war in Kashmir or becoming an independent nation, only to be cast away by the radical transformation that the region is currently going through. More importantly, positioning or repositioning one’s options according to the mood of the milieu and the nature of the conflict dictated by the respective phase of the conflict is no opportunism: that shows the prudence and fortitude of a responsible leader. So, what is that one element of wisdom that most of the responsible parties to the Kashmir conflict seem to have realized? From the elected leadership in India and Pakistan to the separatist leadership in J&K, most of them seem to have realized the need to surpass the borders in J&K in order to achieve peace. It is in this context that the set of proposals put forward by J&K People’s Conference needs to be looked at seriously and with an open mind. The very fact that People’s Conference Chairman Sajad Gani Lone talks about ‘achievable’ nationhood makes his argument a serious one, despite the flows it has. ‘Achievable Nationhood’ (title of the document) talks about shared sovereignty between India and J&K and Pakistan and PoK. The following are the most important aspects of this plan. First of all, Indian and Pakistani governments will have jurisdiction over defence, foreign affairs and currency in J&K and PoK respectively. Secondly, both sides of the J&K state (the erstwhile princely state) will have independent relationships with each other making it “a neutral, peace zone”. Thirdly, and very significantly, there will be a J & K Economic Union, Joint Immigration Control for Movement of Residents the whole state within the state, Joint Management of Natural Resources, and Sector Specific Cooperation, Coordination and Consultation. Finally, new institutions will be created to coordinate affairs among the four entities (India, Pakistan, J&K and PoK). ‘Achievable Nationhood’ has been criticized for a variety of reasons most important of them being its emphasis on ‘Muslim Kashmir’. While this regional and religious emphasis is not one of the document’s key assertions, the communal ‘after-politics’ of this otherwise serious document deserves to be criticized. That said, there are many compelling reasons why this document deserves critical acclaim which a lot of serious-minded experts are giving it already. First of all, Sajad Lone represents the new vision and courage that the Kashmiri leadership has started showing in bringing peace to Kashmir. His party’s courage in bringing out this document even as many other leaders in the valley are still unwilling to specify their preferred path to peace needs to be appreciated. Secondly, ‘Achievable Nationhood’ fits in well with the mood of the milieu and aspirations of a large section of the people of the erstwhile J&K state. At a juncture in history when the discussion is about inclusiveness, co-existence, and common destinies for the region, it would be out of place to talk about exclusivity, separation and carving out new states. When the statesmen of the region are busy strategizing how to surpass borders to chart out common destinies for their people, it would be no prudent politics to talk about creating new ones. Thirdly, ‘Achievable Nationhood’ not only links the critical gap between the ideal and the achievable, but also manages to chalk out definite proposals to achieve ‘what is achievable’. Finally, it is important to note that that one of the core arguments made by ‘Achievable Nationhood’ is in sync with article 370 of the Indian Constitution (that Indian Parliament’s legislative power over the State be restricted to three subjects - defence, external affairs and communications). Instead of communications, Sajad talks about currency. His idea of common institutions and joint mechanisms is another aspect that is gaining currency in the Kashmir discourse in the two countries. The emerging Kashmir politics and discourse is no more characterized or defined by outdated stances of irrelevant ideological imaginations, but by ideas that can travel the critical distance linking the achievable with the ideal. ‘Achievable Nationhood’ should be complimented for being the first committed separatist voice that is willing to take this road less traveled.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, February 20, 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=20_2_2008&ItemID=6&cat=11 )

India Needs a New Regional Grand Strategy

Foreign policy making in ‘New Delhi’ has often been accused of being rooted in mere ad hocism, and bereft of any clear strategic thinking. Lack of political cohesion and will, bureaucratic inertia and institutional problems have often been held responsible for this. Even as it is possible to identify and define some strands of strategic thinking running through post-independent India’s foreign policy formation, they are more of an exception than a pattern. India’s policies towards Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan and Afghanistan (strategy towards northwest) have often been ill-conceived, ill-timed and ill-managed. Can India make good its past mistakes and tread a new path of foreign policy formation towards its northwest? Does its leadership have the statesmanship and willingness to tread this path less traveled? It is crystal clear to even the most cursory observer of the North Western region of India that it is at a historic juncture and is undergoing unprecedented geopolitical transformations. The region could go either way: it could either become the epicenter of peace or that of conflict. In other words, a historic moment in making peace in the region has presented itself before us: if we miss it this time, we miss peace in the region for long years to come. The good news, however, is that there seems to be elements of a new grand strategy formation in India towards the region which of course needs a lot more refinement, political will, articulation, consistency and wisdom. What should the major pillars of this nascent grand strategy formation in India towards the northwestern region? Such a strategy should, ideally, comprise the following four pillars. Economic interdependence should be the primary pillar of this strategy. Even as I am no die-hard believer in the neo-liberal peace thesis, the theory has some significance for the new politics of the region. Trade to avoid wars, and let your enemies have stakes in your existence so that economic interdependence leads to security spillovers. Between the two sides of J&K, India and Pakistan and Afghanistan, regional trade linkages and stakes should be promoted and built. The bold and unprecedented move by the J&K Bank to propose to open branches in Pakistan should be considered to be just a forerunner to a long list of things to follow. Secondly, it is important that India takes the initiative to build on the already existing regional efforts at connectivity and linkages such as reinventing the Silk Route to revive the ancient trade links and access to the Central Asian region, actively promote the proposed Asian Highway network, pursue access to Afghanistan and to Central Asia through Pakistan apart from being steadfast in the efforts to promote more linkages between India and Pakistan. This also brings up the concept of ‘cultural and religious’ Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). CBMs in the South Asian context have almost always been ‘non-Asian’ in its essence and approach. One of the reasons why many standard and archetypical confidence building initiatives by the governments and other non-governmental organisations in the region have not produced the desired results so far is because such initiatives, as a rule, are conceptualized, designed and implemented in a ‘non-South Asian’ manner, that is, without taking into the regional realities of South Asia into consideration. CBMs shouldn’t merely consist of hotlines, flag meetings, and early warnings but should reflect the religious and cultural ethos and realities of the region be it Punjabiyat, Kashmiriyat, Islam or Hinduism. Thirdly, India should ‘assist’ (however like a ‘regional big brother’ it may sound) Pakistan catch up with democracy and help it realize the vision of its founding father Mohammad Ali Jinnah to create a modern, tolerant and democratic Pakistan. Pakistan today is finding itself at the receiving end of a flawed grand strategy, and is in a desperate need to resurrect itself from this situation of near total collapse. Any effort by India to make use of this situation by pushing Pakistan further into chaos will do no good for regional security and for future India-Pakistan relations. On the contrary, if Indian policy makers can have the sensibility and statesmanship to stand by Pakistan its search for democracy and peace like a good neighbour, the strategic dividends of such an approach would be far reaching. Policy makers in New Delhi should not miss the woods for the trees. Finally, all the policy initiatives pointed put above depend upon a key regional grand strategic approach that India needs to adopt: strategic altruism. India should be willing to show a high level of ‘enlightened and self-interested strategic altruism’ in its dealings with its neighbors. But why India of all the countries in the region? Has India not been a target of hatred and violence for such a long time? So why bother when other countries are in trouble? First of all, whether or not India intends to be the regional hegemon, India is the preponderant power in the region by default and that has traditionally instilled fear, suspicion and even hatred in the minds of its neighbors. India should make use of this opportunity to dispel such fears and demonstrate to its neighbors that it is a well-meaning country. More importantly, it is in India’s interest to invest in peace in the region. India’s internal stability, rise to great power status and economic growth depend a great deal in stable peace in the region.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, March 5, 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=5_3_2008&ItemID=8&cat=11 )

Undoing J&K’s Artificial Existence

Undoing J&K’s Artificial Existence - STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

Working towards creative interdependence is one of the fundamental steps to conflict resolution. Economic, cultural and emotional interdependence among conflicting regions will undoubtedly go a long way in resolving their problems and history is witness to this fact. One might argue that creating interdependence in J&K (the erstwhile J&K) isn’t any political solution rather a way of avoiding the real problem. There is some merit in such an argument but one could also argue that Jammu and Kashmir suffers less from a lack of territorial readjustment than from a host of other problems which are related to economy, resources, violence and alienation etc which can best be addressed by the creative tools of interdependence. As this author has pointed out in one of the earlier articles, even the political climate in J&K and in New Delhi and Islamabad both among the mainstream politicians and dissident camp is also very much in favour of pushing for more and more linkages between the two sides of the erstwhile princely state. Linkages among the two sides of J&K, all of them realize, can not be avoided and it is a matter of time that their respective constituencies would hold them responsible if they don’t push for it. More importantly, the logic behind the demand for increased collaboration and cooperation between the two sides is that the state is currently in a state of artificial existence: the natural links have been frozen in time. So what is this interdependence and collaboration that we are talking about? Item number one in a possible laundry list of mutual collaboration would be trade. From establishing LoC markets to trading in handicrafts and local goods to establishing contacts among the four chambers of commerce and industries in the state, the possible initiatives could be long. The next item would be promotion of tourism on both sides of the state and implementing collaborative approaches to that. While on the one hand, MoUs could be signed among tourism associations and hotel industries, religious and cultural tourism for the people of the state is one something that could be undertaken right away. The first step in this direction would be easing of visa restrictions. The third important item would be the great potential of collaboration among educational institutions. Both universities and vocational training institutes on both sides of the state could initiate exchange programmes for students and faculty besides signing MoUs among institutions for such purposes, holding joint conferences and workshops on issues of mutual concern (why do Kashmiris, and Indians and Pakistanis have to meet in a neutral territory all the time?) and most importantly establishing scholarships and reserving seats from students from the other side. Wouldn’t it be a good idea if the Islamic University of Science and Technology in Awantipur holds a conference on Islam with scholars from the South Asian region especially from the other side of J&K? Partial efforts are already being taken in this regard: University of Jammu’s Business School is in the process of signing an MOU with the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS). The fourth issue of crucial importance here is the necessary collaboration by he two sides on disaster management, considering the fact that the region is understood to be disaster prone. It would prove to be a prudent step if there could be initiatives towards establishing coordinated efforts at disaster management and relief. The past example of Pakistan refusing to accept India’s offer to help at the time of the earthquake in Kashmir should prompt the two countries to look for establishing a modus operandi for collective action at the time of such disasters. Another issue of crucial importance is collective efforts at natural resources management in J&K. Setting up consultative mechanisms for this purpose would be the first step in this direction. External funding agencies could be included in environmental rehabilitation and promotion of sustainable development. The Indus Waters Treaty that has stood the test of time is an example that should be emulated when dealing with water, forest, ecological and other such resources. Reopening the roads and thereby facilitating transport between the two sides is the sixth issue that needs urgent consideration. Some roads are opened but hardly anyone can travel through them thanks to the many restrictions. Permission to travel should be extended more people than those from the divided families. Many roads still remain closed and they need to be reopened. Train and air connections between the two sides are some options which could be explored. A related issue is that of establishing communication between the two sides. Telephone connection between the two sides needs to be reinstated and one could even think on the lines of setting up common TV and radio programmes apart from a common website for common purposes. The last but not the least in this list would be the financial and economic linkages such as opening of branches of the J&K Bank on the other side and vice versa. Even though this many not achieve so much in the beginning, the symbolic significance this would have for people in the state is tremendous. But do we have the political will to initiate such measures in the state? This seems to be lacking in both the countries. What the mainstream and dissident leadership in the state as well as in India and Pakistan should realize is that if they do not learn to read the writing on the wall, people will hold them accountable for ignoring their aspirations.
(Source: Greater Kashmir, March 19, 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=19_3_2008&ItemID=7&cat=11 )

Islamabad Diary

Islamabad Diary

Thus breaks a new dawn in Pakistan

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB
Pakistan is changing, primarily due to its latest experiment with democracy. The change is also the result of a variety of other related factors: the global war on terror and its impact on Pakistan and Afghanistan, the rising economic, political and social costs of a grand strategy – against India and Afghanistan – gone astray, the burning North West Frontier Province, and a host of other factors. Pressing regional security concerns, fear of an internal breakdown of law and order, international suspicions, disturbing levels of American interference, pangs of political transition: Pakistan has its hands full. What we will witness in Pakistan in the next few months is a radical policy shift, all over again. The direction of that shift is likely to be guided by enlightened moderation and demands of necessity. What does this shift mean to Kashmir and India? Will the new political dispensation in Pakistan review and reverse all that was done by Pervez Musharraf? It is bad news, if it happens. Review they will the Musharraf policies but are unlikely to reverse them, at least those pertaining to India and Kashmir. Musharraf’s Kashmir policy is not only popular but also seems to have taken a life of its own. Instead of abandoning the new policy and the peace process in general, the patrons of the new dispensation are likely to own them up claiming it as their own. My visit to Islamabad for the Pugwash meeting during the last weekend did coincide with the emergence of a new Pakistan with a new set of leaders and policies. Our meetings with the political leadership, retired officials, journalists and academics strengthened our understanding that the new course that Pakistan is taking today will not only determine Pakistan’s future but will also have lasting impact on the region as a whole. The Pakistani state and nation is rattled from many fronts today – Afghanistan, NWFP, Kashmir policy and relationship with India, Balochistan, religious extremism, and political uncertainty. Pakistan needs to find solutions to all of them, and find them really soon.
Zardari the Businessman Asif Ali Zardari, the husband of the late Benazir Bhuttoo, is arguably the most powerful politician in Pakistan today, and he knows it. From being dismissed as a mere ten percent of Pakistani politics to being the kingmaker in Pakistan, Zardari has come a long way: today he refers to Pakistanis as ‘my people’. Even as he is fast learning the art of politics, he remains to be a ruthless and dispassionate businessman by instincts and temperament. He understands ‘profit’ and ‘benefit’ and is willing to do business in and on Kashmir with India. Impulsive though he is as Musharraf, it was evident to me when I called on him at the Zardari House in Islamabad that his business instincts will serve him well in weighing Pakistan’s foreign policy options in the days to come. One can confidently bet on the fact that Zardari will not act on the basis of mere emotions, rhetoric, and ideological baggage for he doesn’t understand them and wouldn’t abide by them if he ever understands them. This needs to be seen as a welcome sign for India and Kashmir.
Attique the Visionary? Sardar Attique Ahmed Khan has changed a lot ever since he became the Prime Minister of Pakistani Kashmir. The reserved and quiet Attique has become a much more forthcoming, engaging and decisive statesman today. He seems to have a vision for Kashmir and was willing to stick his neck out when he was asked about his opinion on Musharraf’s policies on Kashmir. He not only said that whatever good has been achieved between India and Pakistan on Kashmir will remain in place but also said that the peace process will be taken to its logical conclusion. The willingness and the realization of the need to do business on Kashmir were evident to us during our conversation with him at his Islamabad office. One only hopes that this enthusiasm and political will last through the years to come.
The Way Ahead While the exact contents of ‘new’ Pakistan’s new Kashmir policy are yet to be formed, as is the case with political dynamics itself there, there is nothing to be unnecessarily cautious about it either. Indian government should now get out of its over-cautious wait and watch (ad nausium) approach and reach out to Pakistan’s new political masters. Any delay in doing so will only make things worse between the two countries. Manmohan Singh and his government should now stop wasting their time on the Indo-US nuclear deal and reach out to its extremely important neighbor.
The Wildcard The Pakistan army is unlikely to rock the political boat in Pakistan for at least some time to come. Musharraff is the most disliked man in today’s Pakistan and is on his way out. From the politicians to academics to the cab drivers, everyone dislikes him in Pakistan. This will give more leverage to the political forces in the country. What remains to be seen is the conduct of the ISI which depends upon whoever controls it. One question that no one seems to have an answer to is who is going to be in control of the ISI: is it the Army Chief, the President or the Prime Minister? A lot of what might happen in the future depends on this crucial factor.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, April 2, 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=2_4_2008&ItemID=57&cat=11 )