Monday, October 27, 2014

Civilian supremacy and defence reforms

HAPPYMON JACOB
COMMENT (39)   ·   PRINT   ·   T  T  


India should not wait for another crisis to recognise the pressing need for higher defence reforms. There are sufficient studies, reports and recommendations that the government can depend on while planning the restructuring process. It can also consider an Act of Parliament to offset the existing resistance to defence reforms

Prime Minister Narendra Modi should appoint a defence minister — a full-time one — and demonstrate a great deal of administrative acumen and political will if he is serious about his declared intent to strengthen India’s national security and defence preparedness. Indeed, the absence of a full-time defence minister is merely symptomatic of a larger set of serious structural problems being faced by the country’s higher defence management today, which is in urgent need of innovative reforms and radical restructuring. Mr. Modi’s address to the Combined Commanders Conference in New Delhi on October 17 found no mention of structural reforms in higher defence management whereas his predecessor did mention it from time to time even though the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government had sidestepped implementing the crucial reforms.
The disturbing reality today is that in the absence of a full-time defence minister and by not introducing defence reforms, it is the civilian bureaucracy — having generalist IAS officers whose expertise in defence matters is questionable — that has a major say in the country’s defence planning and decision-making. This needs to change.
Committee recommendations

The demand for reforms in India’s higher defence management is a long-standing one and has grown in strength ever since the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) recommended a number of reforms. In 2000, the then National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government appointed a Group of Ministers (GoM), with four task forces on intelligence reforms, internal security, border management, and higher defence management, to review the country’s defence preparedness in the light of the KRC’s recommendations. Many of the recommendations made by the GoM were only partially implemented. And the most important one, of creating the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), was ignored.
It is the civilian bureaucracy that has a major say in the country’s defence planning and decision-making. This needs to change.
As a result, it has been widely perceived over the past decade or so that the country’s defence sector needs further restructuring. In response, the UPA government appointed a task force on national security under the chairmanship of Mr. Naresh Chandra in 2011; it submitted its report a year later. Although classified, some of its content has been leaked to the press. Many of its recommendations were not to the liking of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Defence Minister. As a result, the UPA government lost an opportunity to introduce crucial reforms. The report was to have been taken up by the Cabinet Committee on Security in February this year — after the government sat on it for no less than one-and-a-half years, but it was too late by then as the UPA government felt that it should not take key national security decisions in its final days in office. It’s now the turn of the NDA government to act.
Key issues

One of the key issues that should be addressed by the Modi government is the GoM’s recommendation to appoint a five-star military officer to serve as the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) who then will be the single-point military adviser to the government. The CDS will chair the meetings of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC) and smoothen the process of military planning, streamlining budgetary requisitions and effecting coordination between the three services. This proposal was earlier shot down by the MoD as it feared that a “super general” would bypass the civilian bureaucracy in defence decision-making. There has also been opposition to the idea from within the military, by the Indian Air Force (IAF). The Chandra committee, being cognisant of the bureaucratic opposition to the CDS proposal, watered down the authority of the CDS and instead recommended the creation of a four-star permanent chairman of the CoSC. According to reports, this chairman, to be appointed on a two-year tenure on a rotational basis among the three services, will not only coordinate various inter-service issues but will also be in charge of the country’s tri-Service Commands: the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) dealing with India’s nuclear forces and the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC). This too was put on the back burner after opposition from the MoD.
Another issue is the creation of tri-service theatre commands. While the future of warfare lies in joint planning and operations, the Indian defence establishment has ignored it. As a result, the country’s defence planning is deeply reflective of service-specific strengths, weaknesses and visions. Issues that should be addressed jointly by all three services are hardly ever the priority of any of the services. Without a common leader, each service chief tends to be the spokesman of his own service. The primary concern is about a protection of autonomous turfs, and not in promoting jointness as it is bound to challenge claims of autonomy. The IAF’s opposition to the establishment of tri-service theatre commands is one such example.
Building expertise

The other area of concern is the absence of synergy among the various arms of the state dealing with defence and national security: the armed forces, the MoD, the Ministry of External Affairs and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). An attempt at synergy was made in 1986 when the Directorate General of Defence Planning Staff (DGDPS) was formed, but it never got anywhere because civilian officers were not keen on working in the DGDPS which functioned under the CoSC. Post-Kargil, the KRC report had proposed the integration of the armed forces headquarters with the MoD, as doing so would have led to more cohesion in the country’s defence planning. Instead, the government created the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) — run by three-star officers and with hardly any role in the defence decision-making. It does not fulfil any of the intended purposes. In June this year, Union Defence Minister Arun Jaitley laid the foundation stone of the IDS building in New Delhi. He emphasised the need to develop “synergy between the services to achieve optimum force application”. But the IDS, Mr. Jaitley should know, is a stillborn institution and cannot contribute to synergy among the forces.
The GoM and Chandra committee reports strongly recommended the posting of military officers to important posts in the MoD to improve defence planning. Generalist IAS officers who spend one or two years in the MoD are unlikely to understand the highly complex nature of defence issues and strategic planning. This is the result of an unhealthy tendency in the government to prioritise routine administrative management over strategic planning based on specialised domain knowledge. It is time the government realised the need for specialised knowledge and expertise in the MoD. This can be taken care of by encouraging civilian officers to build expertise in strategic affairs and involving the services in strategic decision-making.
Standing committee reports

It is not as if politicians are unaware of what ails India’s higher defence structures. Various defence related parliamentary standing committee reports have not only supported reforms but have often expressed displeasure over the lack of their implementation by the MoD. In 2007, one such report, on the CDS, said that “the Government should take the GoM’s recommendations as well as this Committee’s concern in this matter seriously and take the final decision on CDS at the earliest.”
In 2009, another standing committee on defence (SCD) said that it is “of the considered view that the creation of an additional post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to act as Chairman of the CoSC is essential to ensure optimum level of jointness among the different wings of the Armed Forces and to provide single-point military advice to the Government.” Parliamentary committees have also been critical of the Defence Ministry’s unwillingness to implement the required reforms. The second SCD report of the 15th Lok Sabha said: “Merely writing letters even from the level of the Defence Minister is not sufficient. There is an urgent need to use the various fora of interaction with the leaders of the political parties … The Committee expects the Ministry to take the effective steps as suggested above so that the institution of CDS is set up expeditiously.”
The Defence Ministry’s favourite excuse for not carrying out defence reforms is that there is no political or inter-service consensus on what shape the reforms should take. The reality is that it has never been serious about creating such a political consensus, and it will remain a pipe dream. The lack of inter-service agreement on defence reforms is not difficult to overcome. Today, there is clear consensus among the services on the issue of the CDS even though such consensus has still to be arrived at on the issue of tri-service commands.
The other excuse is that keeping the military out of decision-making strengthens civilian supremacy over the armed forces, a flawed argument for a number of reasons. One, while civilian supremacy should imply the supremacy of the political leadership, in India it translates into the overlordship of the civil services over the armed forces given that political bosses hardly have any time to manage defence related issues. As a result, the defence secretary, a generalist IAS officer, is the one who advises the minister on defence issues besides “managing” the armed forces. Second, since generalist bureaucrats in the Defence Ministry are not experts in the defence sector, they are either reluctant to carry out reforms whose importance they don’t understand, or actively obstruct them fearing the loss of the authority they have traditionally enjoyed. Creating a special cadre of defence specialists is one way to overcome this problem.
India should not wait for another crisis to recognise, all over again, the need for higher defence reforms. There are already sufficient studies, reports and recommendations that the government can depend on while planning the restructuring process. The government could also consider an Act of Parliament to offset the existing resistance to defence reforms.
(Happymon Jacob teaches at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. E-mail: happymon@gmail.com)
(Source: The Hindu, October 28, 2014. URL - http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/lead-article-civilian-supremacy-and-defence-reforms/article6538744.ece?homepage=true)

COMMENTS(39)
  • shaurya  
    The solution does not lie in passing the baton to a single person. Here again decentralisation is important. Generals, admirals, air marshals should prepare a list of equipment and technology needed to match global progress. Like corporate sector meetings, their proposals should be discussed with defence secretary and minister and passed after conducting pilot projects. we donot need to create specialists in every field as there are plenty, the only thing needed is stengthening the existing.
    Points
    155
    2 days ago ·   (0) ·   (2) ·  reply (0) · 
    ranjit  Down Voted
    • Rameshwar Kalel  
      IAF should consent to structural reforms of CDS in defence. It will improve coordination between three armed forces.
      3 days ago ·   (1) ·   (0) ·  reply (0) · 
      • Col.JB Singh  
        Time is not far when China will teach us a lesson once again, so will the mujahids and the Taliban.The ostrich has to take its neck out of the sand and realize the ground reality. Babu will never be held responsible / accountable.Fauji has to inculcate the confidence in the PM and assure him that we only mean good of the country. Time is running out, the Faujis will also start saying its not only my job to defend the nation and rescue flood-hit at the same time. Pakis will have a big laugh, reading all this, as they always do on TV channels.
        3 days ago ·   (1) ·   (1) ·  reply (0) · 
          Down Voted
        • Rajiv  
          Ultimately, there has to be transparency. If there is no transparency, there can be malfeasance. We are literally on the horns of a dilemma. We need things desperately for the betterment of our nation.
          Points
          170
          3 days ago ·   (0) ·   (0) ·  reply (0) · 
          •  Virender Kumar Singla  
            What was mentioned by earlier Naval Chief Admiral Joshi is very important. If he has no authority to procure even small items how such a big network can survive. Immediate reforms are required.
            3 days ago ·   (1) ·   (0) ·  reply (0) · 
            • Parveen Thakur  
              At present Indian defence services are using age old machinery and equipments, modernisation at faster pace is required. Appointment of chief of defence staff alone could not solve the problem which defence services are facing. But this is good opportunity for new government to start from here .
              3 days ago ·   (5) ·   (1) ·  reply (0) · 
              • Col A  
                Need of the hour is & has been to have CDS- single point adviser to a civilian govt in a parliamentary/ Prez form of governance. Security of the country is too important & professional advice is needed on military matters.
                3 days ago ·   (5) ·   (0) ·  reply (0) · 
                •  Kantesh Kantesh  
                  We need a full time Defence Minister.At a time when Pakistan is frequently violating the truce and China is regularly demonstrating it's expansionist mindset,we are craving for a competent person at office for parrying these threats.
                  Points
                  455
                  3 days ago ·   (6) ·   (0) ·  reply (0) · 
                  anvikk  Up Voted
                  • s. ponnusamy  
                    Need of the hour is a combined command structure where the chiefs of the defence wings report to one single commander - give it any name you want - who will have the knowledge in all three wings. There should be a meeting every fortnight and security situation on the entire border discussed with decision taken on precision action . The body should have its own intelligence in states and should take into account their report including that of any media reporting. No religious sentiments shall be allowed to whipped up and if so deal with such elements too in an effective manner no matter of any political pressure or so called human rights pressure. Nation's security is important and that should be the prime motto of this structure. The armed forces preparedness with the effectiveness of available arms and ammunition also should be periodically reviewed and the forces given frequent training.
                    Points
                    1975
                    3 days ago ·   (6) ·   (0) ·  reply (0) · 
                    • venkatesh  
                      The author has failed to underscore the significance of bureaucrats,though generalists but committed and well acuminated, and modernisation of defence equipment.Advocating for the establishment of "chief of Defence Staff" , would serve the much needed synergy among the forces but lead to wider repercussions in the morale of defence staff.Furthermore,the centralisation of defence forces bypassing the civilian supremacy would undermine the democratic set-up in India.One should learn lessons from the neighbouring Pakistan in which powerful army always try to destabilize the democratically elected government. As a final point, the recent grounding of the entire Sukhoi fighter aircrafts and also the recent protests by the wives of Air force officers reveal the dire status of our defence equipment,need to be modernised at the earliest to prevent further loss of precious lives.
                      3 days ago ·   (6) ·   (4) ·  reply (0) · 
                      anvikk  Up Voted
                      • Vida  
                        This is a timely article. However the BJP has shown a stronger image and taken stronger actions against a nasty neighbour like Pakistan. The UPA was soft and allowed Pakistan to do as they wished on the border and meeting the Hurriyat in Delhi. But onto the main subject, yes a Defence Minister is necessary who has to thoroughly plan the upgradation of India's armed forces and also plan tactics to permanently stop Paki aggression on the border and to eradicate the terror camps in POK. Chinese threats to Indian terrirotry also has to be addressed urgently.
                        Points
                        18275
                        3 days ago ·   (25) ·   (34) ·  reply (0) · 
                        • Ananthanarayanan  
                          At present, India's internal threat is greater than external one. In the absence of strong policing, there should be synergy between para-military and military for applying optimum force on civilians.
                          3 days ago ·   (8) ·   (1) ·  reply (0) · 
                          •  Ravinder Brar President at Lal Bag Welfare Society 
                            The article's focus on full time defence minister and substituting civilian supremacy with 'professionalism' deserve endorsement.
                            Points
                            135
                            3 days ago ·   (7) ·   (0) ·  reply (0) · 
                            •  Ravinder Brar President at Lal Bag Welfare Society 
                              The article is well researched on "defence reforms".Civilian supremacy has outlived its generic performance in defence sector;Professionalism n expert committees can take us to higher level of defence sector.A full time defence minister is must.We spend far less on defence than china.Hence,FDI n refroms-a top priority
                              Points
                              135
                              3 days ago ·   (4) ·   (0) ·  reply (0) · 
                              • V.  
                                This is a timely paper, especially about the CDS. No one in his senses will fear an armed forces coup against the civilian government. A ‘cadre of defence specialists’ may turn into an ‘Indian Defence Service’, which is not altogether undesirable. Such a cadre should provide for lateral entry of outsiders at all times and at all levels without restriction of age or qualifications but concentrate on personal suitability seen from their work and expertise. There needn’t be an age of retirement: one works as long as one is fit and able to contribute. This will ensure availability of specialized counsel at all times, while younger people should be groomed and built up all along the line, not shutting one’s eyes to complete outsiders. Retiring officers of defence services should be encouraged to remain associated and to take close interest in decision-making. Greater interaction with universities and think tanks will be wholly desirable.
                                Points
                                325
                                3 days ago ·   (4) ·   (0) ·  reply (0) · 
                                • Rahul  
                                  It is time we put aside lordship IASs and boasting of minister about Defense Portfolio and start taking decisions in the interest of National Security and Armed Forces.
                                  Points
                                  3160
                                  3 days ago ·   (4) ·   (0) ·  reply (0) · 
                                  • umesh  
                                    In any country an important role is being played today by the defence forces. Had our defence personnel not been on the Pak. border, Pak. would have already taken not only J&K but the rest of the country from us. But the defence forces also need to upgrade themselves with the rest of the world. Once in a decade, testing that too to 50 success by the DRDO can't alone solve the problems of the defence personnel who protect our borders with the most aggressive neighbors. Defence reforms are the most important thing today with China and Pak flexing their muscles on a daily basis.
                                    Points
                                    930
                                    3 days ago ·   (3) ·   (0) ·  reply (0) · 
                                    • Prashant Talluri  
                                      The lack of willingness ,to initiate defense reforms at both political level and bureaucratic levels has placed national security at high risk. Many committee reports submitted, but no action, or impartial implementation of recommendations . This indecisiveness has created a precarious security environment, where our weapons systems are becoming obsolete, threat perception has increased many folds and our procurement cum decision making process is a turtle walk However, ever since NDA regime has been voted to power, decisions are taken at a brisk pace and projects worth 1Lakh cr. were approved. With PM indirectly monitoring the pace of defence projects and meeting military chiefs atleast once a month. The new system devised, shares the burden of a part time defence minister and provides confidence to defence forces. Modi government has its task cut out with filling the chinks in the armour and later sychronize the babus at MOD and defence forces. The change has just begun.
                                      3 days ago ·   (4) ·   (0) ·  reply (0) · 
                                      • Rajiv Sharma  
                                        Despite observing a considerable increase and up-gradation in defence sector, author seems to be seeking for more defence reforms. He must be knowing that the very extravaganza and lavish spending on defence sector is actually making the locals to suffer. They equally have the right to have social reforms and on this government money. Defence must not be the only sector to be developed. Our social infrastructure is badly rupturing because of poor government policies and social reforms.
                                        3 days ago ·   (3) ·   (12) ·  reply (2) · 
                                        MG-Rao · MG-Rao · ram  Down Voted
                                      •  Sajal Liza  
                                        I think there is a big vacuum in Indian states planning and defence craftsmanship. Despite spending too much on defence sector, we are still not satisfied with our defence credentials. The lack of decision power in defence is only due to the reason that we don’t trust Indian defence or forces; this is the basic reluctance which made us least devoted to make changes. We are afraid of military coup that’s why wanted Army to be dependent on politicians. Those very politicians who just nod their heads to trigger border tensions. Very recently, Chinese leader visited India during standoff on borders. So-called statesmen are self-interested.
                                        Points
                                        215
                                        3 days ago ·   (4) ·   (0) ·  reply (0) · 
                                        •   
                                          Respected Sir, you have made very valid point about reforming the macro issues facing the services.But at the ground level situation is alarming at best. In the name of modernisation, weapons and machinery are getting inducted but training is not imparted properly to the soldiers. Instead of training, soldiers are just doing cleaning of those weapons and the weapons are kept always ready for'' inspection'' purpose.Officers from lower to higher levels are just busy in giving presentation to their superiors.If you do not believe in me then just go and see to any Army training school where new weapon systems are getting inducted.Soldiers are made to work like slaves and are treated badly. They neither get adequate exposure to the equipment nor proper rest to get the skill to handle it.When any '' VIP'' visits to them, before that they are threatened not to open their mouth, otherwise they will face the consequences. Commanding Officers of these Units are also indulging in huge corruption.
                                          3 days ago ·   (7) ·   (1) ·  reply (1) · 
                                        •  Aazar Kund Senior Research Associate at Researcher 
                                          What is threatening about Indian defense is that Shive Sina, violent group is more close to policymaking body. Even RSS is active and influential in BJP's decision making center. That's why Mr Modi has not handed over Defence Ministry to any other person. He is dealing aggressively which shows political immaturity.
                                          Points
                                          280
                                          3 days ago ·   (8) ·   (14) ·  reply (0) · 
                                          raj · raj  Down Voted
                                          •   
                                            Apart from the point of full-time defence minister , other points are quite acceptable. Coordination among the institutions is really very important for internal security or at borders.
                                            Points
                                            1195
                                            3 days ago ·   (1) ·   (0) ·  reply (0) · 
                                            •  captainjohann Samuhanand Independent Aviation & Aerospace Professional 
                                              The single important reason for not having a COSD is due to fear that the military can take over. This became all the more important when General V K Singh did some sabre rattling on his own and even carried out his ow Intelligence operation. With Americans and Europeans getting into the defence sector through private sector this threat becomes very real.
                                              3 days ago ·   (1) ·   (1) ·  reply (0) · 
                                              •  Mukul Singh Sr. Engineer at GAIL 
                                                Well I may be wrong but perhaps one of the reasons for keeping civil supremacy over defence is that India never wanted things like coups that have happened in various other countries which became independent after World War 2 . Former PMs and bureaucrats were not fools and saying that they did it just because they didn't want to lose power is very narrow thinking.
                                                3 days ago ·   (2) ·   (2) ·  reply (0) · 
                                                MG-Rao · MG-Rao  Down Voted
                                                • Dhruv Gurjar  
                                                  It is wrong to claim that the defence secretary or other officers in MoD are incompetent or reluctant. Expertise is gathered with experience and Indian bureaucracy has stood the tide of time in every field (including defence) and empowering military generals beyond a point will have its own consequences. Defence planning may also include other aspects like budgeting where our generals may fail to deliver. Indeed, increased cooperation between the three forces, MoEA and MoD is the need of the hour but I differ with his proposition. Let the NSA chair the proposed committee and I only have one question: If not IAS officers, then who?
                                                  3 days ago ·   (2) ·   (2) ·  reply (1) · 
                                                  MG-Rao  Down Voted
                                                  • MG Rao  
                                                    Expertise gained on paper is not enough. A board of Senior Defence Offiers will suffice --- Gopi
                                                    a day ago ·   (0) ·   (0) ·  reply (0) · 
                                                  • dhiru  
                                                    There should be balance between civilians and defence personnel in MoD. Dominance of anybody will not bring good days for the nation.
                                                    3 days ago ·   (0) ·   (0) ·  reply (0) · 
                                                    • Venkata Govindasamy  
                                                      The concern expressed on civil bureaucratic overplay in the decision making process of defence establishment is a well founded thesis that deserves fullest attention of all the stake holders who are involved in the affairs pertaining to defence. It would be better should there be more number of officers in higher defence management were to be from uniformed class rather than babus class.In the interests of soverign, to preserve the external supremeness the era of civil bureaucrats' high-handedness should make way for defence specialists by an enactment of an appropriate legislation.One expects that NDA dispensation would do well to introduce a bill that seeks to reform the existing structure of defence management hierarchy and ensure it gets passed in both Houses sooner than later.
                                                      Points
                                                      480
                                                      3 days ago ·   (1) ·   (0) ·  reply (0) · 
                                                      • venky  
                                                        I think the biggest issue here is the politics that goes on at the top of the Army. My friends who are Generals and commanders in the Army have often quoted that there is high level of politics involved at the top of the chain. Adding to this, as the writer points out is the issue of lack of defence experts as secretaries. If not appointing a 4 star or 5 star officer, Defence Ministry can empower people in the IDS and begin a new empowered way of working. As the author himself said, Chief of Staff will have 2 year tenure and has already created some friction with the Air Force. If heads of defence sectors themselves are not in line, how can we expect the government with mere IAS officers to do something? Even the Army people must be loathing at the inexperienced IAS officers, let alone anyone else.
                                                        Points
                                                        1875
                                                        3 days ago ·   (12) ·   (0) ·  reply (0) · 
                                                        • Anthony Illuri  
                                                          In view of 'string of pearl' and other international circumstances, we are already late for the structural changes in the Defence reforms
                                                          3 days ago ·   (10) ·   (0) ·  reply (0) · 
                                                          • AMIT  
                                                            The author is missing the point that in case of full time Defence Minister also, still he will be advised by the defence secretary! Its upto the PM to take the decision. I think Rs 80,000 crore sanction for the defence sector wouldn't have been easily done if the defence minister and finance minister were not the same. Actually it helps in smoothing the process.
                                                            Points
                                                            750
                                                            3 days ago ·   (232) ·   (1) ·  reply (0) · 
                                                            • S  
                                                              The Congress Party was against the Defence Forces from Nehru's days.Indira Gandhi realised it's importance after the 71 war. Due to the antics of the military in Pakistan there is a lurking fear that the same may happen in our country. The Defence Forces have ben loyal to the country in spite of being cheated by the bureaucrats on Pay Commission recommendations and indirectly not being allowed to vote in elections. In fact as per rumours when Mrs,Gandhi lost the election after the Emergency she asked the COAS to take over which he refused. All that the Congress did was it used Defence to make money for the Party and individual members. In between there were even efforts to cut down the size of the Army. The last straw was when the 3 Chiefs were brought down in the protocol seniority. In today's environment since more and more sophisticated weapons systems are being used there is a crying need for technically qualified officers in higher management. The Soviet Army has engineers on top
                                                              Points
                                                              990
                                                              3 days ago ·   (16) ·   (1) ·  reply (0) · 
                                                                Down Voted
                                                              • pradeep  
                                                                I agree with author, and I have pointed out myself in several comments - role of IAS officers has been detrimental to the progress on many fronts where decision requires expertise beyond general and routine administration. Defence is key area, but there are others. Science and Technology is another area. Where their presence and interference has hurt most is in areas of education and development. How would you expect an IAS to develop understanding of what a villager requires or what a modern village looks like for example? Similarly they have no idea workings of market forces, but they run finance ministry like their fiefdom. It is not an attack on individuals, it is the institution, it exists to perpetuate itself, not the country. Equally well put is author's premise that generals are answerable to elected leaders, not IAS. Our defence policies should come from generals, answerable to elected officials, not some babu sitting in MOD.
                                                                Points
                                                                245
                                                                3 days ago ·   (9) ·   (2) ·  reply (0) · 
                                                                raj · raj  Up Voted
                                                                •  Hariharan Pv at Sumangali Seva Ashrama, Bangalore 
                                                                  The conclusion, "India should not wait for another crisis to recognise, all over again, the need for higher defence reforms ... The government could also consider an Act of Parliament to offset the existing resistance to defence reforms", is apt. The various studies and inferences are kept as records covered in accumulating dust. India's important need of a sound, independent dynamic Defence management system is continually being sidelined. We have an excellent Election Commission; Collegium of Judges, and various other performing systems for a Dynamic Democracy to function; but we still continue to be guided by a "note-put-up and submitted" culture of the IAS obsession and obsolescence in our security/defence management. The answer is to have a central Authority that would include a Five star Officer, a supreme court Judge, a Bharat Ratna, and a prominent personality, presided over by the PM as Chair as an independent Defence Authority. The need to act is now
                                                                  Points
                                                                  740
                                                                  3 days ago ·   (2) ·   (0) ·  reply (0) · 
                                                                  • Lak  
                                                                    One thing I agree is there should be a full time Defense minister. I dont know why Modi has decided to continue this uncertainty.
                                                                    Points
                                                                    7305
                                                                    3 days ago ·   (11) ·   (0) ·  reply (0) · 


                                                                  Tuesday, September 2, 2014

                                                                  Negotiating an Indo-Japan Nuclear deal

                                                                  Statecraft

                                                                  HAPPYMON JACOB


                                                                  Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ongoing visit to Japan is his first bilateral foreign trip outside the region which, in a sense, demonstrates the importance New Delhi attaches to the bilateral partnership with Japan. Though a number of issues, ranging from “bullet train” to defence deals, are likely to figure in the bilateral consultations during Modi’s visit to Tokyo, the likelihood of a possible nuclear deal between the two sides has attracted the most attention. New Delhi and Tokyo have been in consultations for a number of years to finalise a nuclear agreement which will enable the former to buy nuclear technology from Japanese companies. Even though these negotiations have not been as strenuous as the Indo-US negotiations were, India’s status as a nuclear outlier state has been a major stumbling block in inking the deal. Japanese reservations about the deal come from its tragic history with nuclear weapons, whereas New Delhi’s urgency in signing a deal comes from its urgent need for nuclear energy. 

                                                                  Why is it important for India?
                                                                  India’s desire for a civilian nuclear deal with Japan comes from material and symbolic considerations. From a material point of view, New Delhi needs Japanese nuclear technology in order to advance its massive nuclear energy expansion plans, something that the Modi government has been very keen on. More importantly, India’s nuclear deals with US and France would also be inadequate without a nuclear agreement with Japan since Japanese firms such as Toshiba Corporation and Hitachi Ltd have major stakes in US and French firms such as Westinghouse Electric Co. and Areva. New Delhi’s plans to buy nuclear reactors from these firms can actualise only after a nuclear deal is signed with Japan. 
                                                                  An Indo-Japan nuclear agreement is also useful to New Delhi for a variety of symbolic reasons. First of all, we need to understand that this is the first time that Japan has engaged in a sustained dialogue with a non-NPT country to conclude a civilian nuclear agreement, even though Japan has been highly critical of India’s nuclear weapon programme. Thus nudging Tokyo to go past this psychological barrier is itself a great victory for New Delhi. Secondly. Japan is a major pillar of the contemporary global nuclear order and has been very active in demanding a nuclear weapon free world. Japan is some sort of a normative gatekeeper of such an order. Therefore, being able to sign a nuclear deal with it will not only enhance India’s standing in the nuclear order but is also likely to smoothen its attempts at further integration with the global order. Besides Japan, the other deal that is in the pipeline is the one with Australia, which is likely to be concluded in the first week of September when the Australian Prime Minister would come to New Delhi. If New Delhi is indeed able to finalise these two deals, it will clearly improve its legitimacy and standing in the global nuclear order. 

                                                                  Why the deal is important for japanThe nuclear deal is also very important for the Japanese government.  First of all, there are high stakes involved in it from a commercial point of view given the fact that billions of dollars are riding on potential nuclear trade with India. The Japanese firms are looking to get a major share of that money especially at a time when nuclear energy has suffered a major setback in Japan thanks to the Fukushima incident.  Secondly, Japan is also conscious of the importance of strengthening its ties with India so as to checkmate the Chinese aggression in the region. While the Modi government is most likely to reach out to the Chinese leadership, the reality is that there is no love lost between China and India. In the Japanese understanding, then, “enemy’s enemy is a friend”! 

                                                                  Then there are alliance considerations. Tokyo has also been encouraged by Washington to enter into the deal with New Delhi since many American firms, controlled in turn by the Japanese majors, would not be in a position to sell reactors to India without the nod from the Japanese government. 

                                                                  What are the stumbling blocks?
                                                                  And yet there are a number of issues that can create major hurdles in concluding an agreement. The anti-nuclear lobby in Japan is critical of a nuclear deal with India. But more importantly, given India’s status as a country that has not signed either the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty (CTBT), the Japanese government is faced with a moral dilemma when it comes to signing a nuclear deal with New Delhi given its activism against nuclear weapons. The other issue is the Japanese concern about future nuclear tests by India. It has been insisting that the Indian government should provide a guarantee that it would not conduct any more nuclear tests in future thereby closing the possibility that India might conduct a thermonuclear test to strengthen its nuclear deterrence with China.  Moreover, Japan is also keen on including in the agreement certain clauses that will enable it to conduct inspections to ensure that the material supplied by it is not used for weapon purposes by India. 

                                                                  Likely Indian responses 
                                                                  On the eve of his departure for Japan, Prime Minister Modi held a meeting with Japanese journalists in which he tried to alleviate some of these fears. On the question of whether or not India will test again, he said, “We are committed to maintaining a unilateral and voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing”. However, it is very unlikely that he would be willing to give any documentary undertaking in this regard. India is also unlikely to agree to sign the NPT or the CTBT. However, post-1998, New Delhi has not ruled out the possibility of adopting a more positive approach to CTBT should the American and Chinese governments sign and ratify the treaty. On the question of potential diversion of nuclear material, Modi government is unlikely to concede to any more than what it has agreed to in the agreement that it has signed with the IAEA. 

                                                                  That said, Modi has far more legroom to finalise a nuclear agreement with Japan unlike his predecessor Manmohan Singh whose government went through a number of existential crises when negotiating the nuclear deal with the Americans.

                                                                  (Source: Greater Kashmir, August 31, 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Aug/31/negotiating-an-indo-japan-nuclear-deal-15.asp) 

                                                                  Saturday, August 30, 2014

                                                                  Regulating India’s nuclear estate

                                                                  HAPPYMON JACOB
                                                                  COMMENT (12)   ·   PRINT   ·   T  T  

                                                                  For the country’s nuclear energy sector plans to be effective, the government should lift the veil of opaqueness surrounding its civilian programme. The first step would be to establish an autonomous, transparent and accountable regulatory institution

                                                                  The 2014 Nuclear Materials Security Index prepared by the Washington-based Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) has ranked India 23rd out of 25 countries with weapons-usable nuclear materials. While the NTI ranking has been criticised for a variety of reasons including inadequacies in its methodology, it has rightly pointed out the absence of an independent nuclear regulatory mechanism in India with the mandate to ensure that high standards of safety and security are observed in India’s civilian nuclear facilities. Even though many Indian analysts and officials dismiss the NTI ranking as being uninformed, New Delhi needs to take such criticism seriously given its long-standing desire to mainstream itself into the global nuclear order including gaining membership to key international export control cartels such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Given this context, there is a need to take a critical look at the proposed Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority.
                                                                  Background to the Bill

                                                                  Currently, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), established in 1983 through a gazette notification, is tasked with regulating the safety and security aspects of the country’s civilian nuclear facilities. However, it is not an autonomous body as it depends on the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) for all practical purposes. It has, as a result, been unable to perform its regulatory functions effectively. The demand for establishing a truly autonomous nuclear regulatory authority has been a long-standing one. In 1997, the Raja Ramanna Committee report had recommended that the Atomic Energy Act (1962) should be amended to enhance the effectiveness of the nuclear regulatory system in the country. Even though the Union government, in 2000, had directed the DAE to suggest the necessary amendments to the 1962 Act, nothing substantial happened for almost a decade. Finally, it was the Mayapuri radiation accident (New Delhi) in 2010 and the Fukushima disaster (Japan) of 2011 that served as a wake-up call for the DAE.
                                                                   “Since the NSRA Bill will now have to be reintroduced in Parliament, the Department of Atomic Energy should try and accommodate the eminently useful suggestions given by the standing committee and other independent experts” 
                                                                  In 2011, the Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority (NSRA) Bill was drafted by the DAE and submitted to the Union Cabinet for approval. The DAE note that sought approval from the Cabinet to introduce the Bill in Parliament had cited both the Mayapuri and the Fukushima accidents as the factors that contributed to the urgency to strengthen the country’s nuclear regulatory mechanism. However, even the NSRA, as currently envisioned by the DAE, does not propose the establishment of a truly autonomous regulatory authority. The Bill, first introduced in the Lok Sabha in 2011, has now lapsed and will have to be reintroduced in the new Lok Sabha. Before the NSRA Bill is reintroduced in Parliament, there is a need to strengthen the powers of the regulatory authority that it proposes to set up.
                                                                  CAG and Committee reports

                                                                  Even as the DAE was preparing to table the NSRA Bill in Parliament, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India had undertaken a “Performance Audit on Activities of Atomic Energy Regulatory Board.” The CAG report, tabled in Parliament in August 2012, concluded that “the legal status of AERB continues to be that of an authority subordinate to the Central Government, with powers delegated to it by the latter,” and recommended to the government to “ensure that the nuclear regulator is empowered and independent. For this purpose, it should be created in law and should be able to exercise necessary authority in the setting of regulations, verification of compliance with the regulations and enforcement of the same in the cases of non-compliance.”
                                                                  Following the CAG report, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament also produced a report in 2013 entitled “Activities of Atomic Energy Regulatory Board” in which it agreed with the view taken by the CAG on the functioning of the AERB. The PAC also highlighted the observation made by the “Parliamentary Standing Committee on Science and Technology, Environment and Forests” in 2012 that the NSRA lacks autonomy. The PAC, in the light of the observations made by the standing committee and the CAG, was critical of the functioning of the AERB as well as the proposed NSRA Bill and stated in its report that the “DAE should seriously re-examine the provisions of the Bill and take necessary steps urgently so as to ensure that the nuclear regulator becomes an independent and credible body at par with similar regulators in other Countries.” In other words, the NSRA Bill, as it stands today, is far from satisfactory even though the DAE has made the assurance that the Standing Committee’s recommendations would be seriously considered.
                                                                  Issue of authority

                                                                  The Council of Nuclear Safety to be established by the NSRA Bill — with the Prime Minister as the Chair and mostly government representatives as members — will be a very powerful body with the power to appoint the chairperson and members of the new regulatory body. This will diminish the powers of the regulator since it will be subordinate to the Council chaired by the Prime Minister. We will, as a result, end up having a government-controlled regulator all over again. The NSRA Bill is explicit on the ability of the government to control the regulator: “the Central Government may, by notification, supersede the Authority for such period, not exceeding six months, as may be specified in the notification.”
                                                                  The NSRA also does not say which facilities would be put under the new authority — currently, the AERB can only oversee the civilian facilities. The Bill states that “the Central Government may, for the purposes of national defence and security, exempt any nuclear material, radioactive material, facilities, premises and activities; the premises, assets and areas associated with material and activities from the jurisdiction of the Authority.” So, the question is this: who will oversee the safety and security of the strategic facilities and programmes for which there is currently no regulatory authority? The Bill mentions that new regulatory bodies can be created to regulate the strategic programmes. The Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee had recommended the creation of other bodies to do so. However, there has not been any movement so far on that front. Another issue is the exclusion of the NSRA from the purview of RTI Act, thereby reducing the requirement for the regulator to be transparent.
                                                                  This is not to say that the NSRA Bill is not an improvement from the existing AERB. Clearly, there are significant differences between the two. For one, while the AERB was set up by a government order, the new regulator will be established by an Act of Parliament, thereby making it more powerful. More so, while the AERB reported to the AEC, the new authority will not report to the AEC but will submit its report to Parliament.
                                                                  Way ahead

                                                                  It is unknown how many of the amendments suggested by the standing committee have been incorporated by the DAE. Since the Bill will now have to be reintroduced in Parliament, the DAE should try and accommodate the eminently useful suggestions given by the standing committee and other independent experts. The new government should encourage the DAE to carry out at least the following three amendments: one, the new regulatory body should be given complete financial, administrative and institutional autonomy from the Central government and made accountable to Parliament; two, the new regulatory body should also include persons from outside government such as scientists, civilian auditors, environmentalists and independent experts; three, given the crucial role that the NSRA will play in the years to come, the selection of its members should be done by a body comprising the Leader of the Opposition and the Speaker of the Lok Sabha.
                                                                  If India’s plans to drastically expand its nuclear energy sector have to be effective, and acceptable to the people at large, it should bring the country’s civilian nuclear establishment out of the thick layers of secrecy and opaqueness within which it has traditionally operated. The first step in that direction will be to establish a genuinely autonomous, transparent and accountable institution that is capable of regulating the country’s “nuclear estate.”
                                                                  The words of Professor Kiyoshi Kurokawa, who chaired the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission are eminently appropriate in the Indian context as well: “What must be admitted — very painfully — is that this was a disaster ‘Made in Japan.’ Its fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture: our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question authority; our devotion to ‘sticking with the program’; our groupism; and our insularity … nuclear power became an unstoppable force, immune to scrutiny by civil society. Its regulation was entrusted to the same government bureaucracy responsible for its promotion.”
                                                                  (Happymon Jacob teaches Arms Control and Disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. E-mail: happymon@gmail.com)
                                                                  (Source: The Hindu, August 29, 2014. URL: http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/lead-article-regulating-indias-nuclear-estate/article6360984.ece)

                                                                  Sunday, August 24, 2014

                                                                  Playing Chicken with Pakistan

                                                                  New Delhi’s decision to call off the August 25 Foreign Secretary level talks with Islamabad in response to the latter’s unwillingness to stop consulting the Kashmiri separatists is counterproductive and short-sighted even as such a populist act makes perfect electoral sense for the BJP in the run up to the Assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) where it looks to make unprecedented electoral gains. 

                                                                  On the face of it, New Delhi’s argument for calling off the talks might look logical and based on national interest. But a deeper analysis would show that there are a number of problems with the rationale for doing so. First of all, discussions between the separatists and Pakistani diplomats/politicians have never led to anything. For the most part, these discussions have been symbolic and at best, an irritant. More importantly, ever since Pervez Mushrraff gave a new direction to Pakistan’s Kashmir policy, Pakistan has been cold-shouldering the Kashmiri separatists, especially Ali Shah Geelani who, as a result, has become very critical of Pakistan’s new Kashmir policy. And the Kashmiri separatists have also often reminded Pakistan that there is a need to discuss the situation in Pakistan Administered Kashmir as well. Now, with one strike, New Delhi has undone all that and forced a new friendship between the separatists and Islamabad: a classic diplomatic self-goal.

                                                                  BJP’s ‘Mission Kashmir’This sudden move by the Modi government should also be seen as an important piece in BJP’s evolving electoral strategy for winning a significant number of seats in the upcoming Assembly elections in J&K so as to play a major role in the government formation in the state. Finding potential partners in Kashmir, which it is currently engaged in, is a major part of this mission. Consolidating the non-Muslim vote in J&K is another major part of this strategy. In this context, the earlier statements by BJP on Article 370 and the return of Pandits to Kashmir, and now calling off the talks with Pakistan form part of a well-considered strategy to increase the party’s popularity in Jammu and even in parts of Kashmir. 

                                                                  On the other hand, in Kashmir, denial of its ‘representative role’ by New Delhi will force the separatists to strengthen their poll boycott calls. The boycott call by the separatists, and BJP’s increasing popularity in Jammu and Ladakh, could lead to the emergence of BJP as a key player in post-poll J&K. This then is a game being well played by BJP. 

                                                                  Implications for Kashmir New Delhi’s relationship with Kashmir’s separatist leadership is far more complex than it is often recognized. Both India and Pakistan have funded separatist groups in the Valley, promoted one over the other depending on the political climate, played one against the other, and engaged in overt and covert negotiations with them. Indeed, New Delhi, over last two decades, has understood the ‘importance’ of the Kashmiri separatists, especially the moderate ones, and as a result they have been a crucial part of New Delhi’s containment strategy in the valley.  Over the past few years, however, the influence of the moderate Kashmiri dissidents in the valley has been steadily diminishing among the valley’s alienated youth even as Geelani’s, the most hawkish of them all, popularity has only increased. New Delhi’s objection to the meeting between the Pakistan High Commissioner and the separatists will only improve Geelani’s standing in the eyes of the Kashmiris. This will be damaging for New Delhi’s long-term strategy to contain the Kashmir insurgency. 

                                                                  Kashmiri separatists have consistently argued that there are three parties to the Kashmir conflict: New Delhi, Islamabad and Kashmiris, an argument vehemently rejected by New Delhi. Now, by engaging in a public spat with Islamabad based on the logic “either us or the separatists”, New Delhi has not only pitched itself and the separatist leadership at the same level but also unwittingly admitted that the separatists are a party to the Kashmir conflict. 

                                                                  Portraying Kashmiri separatism through the political articulations of Geelani, in a sense, does help the Indian state in arguing that Kashmiri separatism is essentially anti-India and Pro-Pakistan (which is fundamentally misleading). However, such arguments tend to paint Kashmir’s non-mainstream politics with the same brush and silence the reasonable voices of Kashmir’s moderate dissidents. This, as a result, delegitimises the genuine demands of the Kashmiris in the eyes of the Indian public and help fan separatist passions in the Valley. The reality is that, whether or not one likes it, the Indian state needs the Kashmiri separatists if it wishes to bring about genuine peace and reconciliation in the valley. 

                                                                  Implications for Indo-Pak relations
                                                                  By calling off the meeting between the two Foreign Secretaries, the Modi government has convoluted a bilateral dialogue process that was beginning to take a positive direction after the ‘historic’ meeting between the two Prime Ministers. There is no clarity as of now whether or not the other scheduled Indo-Pak engagements will take place. Given that the Modi government has indirectly set a pre-condition for future talks, it will be perceived as fickle-minded if future interactions indeed take place without Pakistan having conceded to the Indian demand vis-à-vis Kashmiri separatists. On the other hand, if the “Islamabad should only talk to us or we won’t talk at all” logic applies to future interactions as well, New Delhi will eventually be forced to get down from its diplomatic high horse or risk not having a dialogue process with Islamabad at all. 

                                                                  It is indeed a bizarre logic to argue that a bilateral Indo-Pak dialogue process is only useful for Pakistan, not India. The reality is that India needs a dialogue process as much as Pakistan needs it. In reality, no government in Pakistan can become popular by talking to India, but every Pakistani government does so because they realize its importance. New Delhi, therefore, needs to shed the illusion that by engaging in a bilateral dialogue, it is doing a favor to Islamabad. In any case, Islamabad has not been too pleased with the ongoing dialogue with New Delhi as the former thinks that the talks are progressing on terms set by the latter. For instance, the contemporary Indo-Pak dialogue has three broad focal areas: acts of terrorism against India, trade and transit, all of which are important for New Delhi, not so much for Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan would like more progress on finding a political solution for Kashmir and resolving the Siachen standoff both of which are not emphasized by the current dialogue process. So how is it that India is in any way ‘hurting’ Pakistani interests by calling off a dialogue which Islamabad thinks is going in India’s favour?  

                                                                  From a long-term strategic point of view, attempts by New Delhi to achieve stability in Kashmir without giving Pakistan an honorable exit will not be an enduing one. And that is precisely what Islamabad is looking for vis-à-vis Kashmir: an honorable exit from the mess that Kashmir has become for Pakistan’s life as a nation. The Kashmir formula proposed by Pervez Musharraf was exactly one such honorable way out. Even today, the broad contours of such a formula, minus the Musharraf tag, have great traction within Pakistan’s political class.   

                                                                  Moreover, New Delhi’s decision to call off the engagement with Pakistan comes at a time when it needs to proactively engage with Islamabad for a number of reasons. The implications of the NATO drawdown from Afghanistan and the stunning military exploits of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) are still not properly understood even as they are unfolding not too far from India. Therefore, sustaining a stable relationship with Islamabad is important for New Delhi when considering the long-term strategic implications of the geopolitical churning that is taking place in its near abroad.

                                                                  (Source: Greater Kashmir, August 24, 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Aug/24/playing-chicken-with-pakistan-5.asp) 

                                                                  Tuesday, August 12, 2014

                                                                  A Performance Audit of the J&K Government

                                                                  Statecraft

                                                                  HAPPYMON JACOB


                                                                  When Omar Abdullah was sworn in as the 11th chief minister of J&K in January 2009, at the age of 38, in an election that was widely considered as reasonably free and fair, we were all delighted, and hopeful. We continued to be hopeful despite having reservations about an NC-Congress tie-up (with key ministries going to the Congress) because of what NC-Congress tie-ups have done in the past to J&K. It was not an easy job for Omar Abdullah, at least in the beginning, due to the agitations on the streets of Srinagar in 2010. However, the post-2010 years were comparatively calmer, if not entirely peaceful. Unlike the PDP Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, Omar managed to convince the Congress party to give him a full term as the Chief Minister. And the fact that there was a “friendly” government in New Delhi was an added advantage. More importantly, the government was led by a well-meaning man, Omar Abdullah, who is personally not corrupt. This was a truly historic opportunity for the “young and dynamic” Chief Minister to prove his mettle as a leader, for the National Conference to redeem its sins of the past, and for the State of J&K to go past its many miseries. Has the NC-led government managed to live up to the expectations or have they have wasted a truly historic opportunity? 

                                                                  AFSPA faux pas
                                                                  The continued existence of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) is a shameful testament of NC’s political inability, and Omar Abdullah’s personal failure, to persuade their ally and coalition-partner, the Congress party, to revoke the much-hated Act from J&K. The UPA government in New Delhi, as usual, engaged in all kinds of political tactics – including hypocrisy, conveying half-truths, taking contradictory positions, among others – to wriggle out of having to even dilute the controversial Act. The J&K government claims it did everything to persuade New Delhi to concede to its request, even as New Delhi claims that the J&K government never gave its request officially, in writing (as if it would have made any difference!). If only the J&K government had managed to get AFSPA out of the way, Omar could have stood in Lal Chowk, with his head held high, and claimed that he is capable of taking the legacy of his grandfather, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, forward. But he has missed the bus. I don’t even want to talk about the grand claims Omar made about a so-called “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” which, according to the NC manifesto (2008) would “suggest ways to redress the wrongs, compensate the affected and punish the guilty.” It further says,  “we owe it to the people so they all know what went wrong and where”.  Yes, you do! 

                                                                  Forget AFSPA for a moment: will the Chief Minister please explain why he could do nothing even to revoke the Disturbed Areas Act and the Public Safety Act from the state? The 2008 Election Manifesto of the National Conference refers to these laws as ‘anti-people’, by the way! 

                                                                  Decentralization of power The much-hailed Panchayat elections in the state were seen as a way to decentralize power and ensure that the people had a say in how they should be governed. However, the Panchayat Raj system in J&K has essentially made a mockery of the concept of decentralization of power. The local bodies and their representatives continue to be deprived of the necessary powers including financial autonomy and sufficient resources to bring development to their areas. Panchayat development funds are often channeled by the state government through MLAs which defeats the whole purpose of the local bodies. As a result, those elected to the local bodies have lost their credibility in the eyes of the common masses. 

                                                                  “Bijli, Sadak, Paani” 
                                                                  NC’s 2008 election manifesto also goes on and on about the need to provide “Bijli, Sadak, Paani” to the people. It breaks my heart to see the state of “Bijli, Sadak, and Paani” in the state of J&K. There are hardly any roads in Srinagar city, forget about any in the far-flung villages. The general infrastructure in the state is in such ruin that one could mistake Srinagar for a 16th century township. The government has not done anything to ensure that there is timely payment of electricity tariff by the consumers without which it would not be able to buy electricity from the NHPC: a state that can not collect taxes will eventually be in deep financial trouble. And that is exactly what is happening to J&K. There is no point is shouting from the rooftops that the electricity generated in the state is consumed by other states, without having ensured that a proper payment mechanism is put in place. Nothing comes free, including electricity. 

                                                                  Industrial development 
                                                                  Kashmir is alien to industrial development. Hardly been any new industrial projects have come to the state in the past 5 years. When the government organized star-studded functions in Srinagar with Ratan Tata, Rajiv Bajaj and Kumaramangalam Birla in October 2012, there was great hope that this was going to be a grand beginning for the state’s economic development. Barring a few pharma companies, none has set up shops in the state ever since the much-publicised road show of 2012. 

                                                                  State of Human rights 
                                                                  Human rights violations continue unabated in Kashmir. Hardly anyone is held accountable when innocent youngsters get killed at the hands of the authorities.  What has the government done to ensure accountability for what happened in 2010 when more than 120 young Kashmiri lives were lost? Whatever happened to the Omar government’s repeated pledges that the guilty will be brought to book? 

                                                                  What about the many unmarked mass graves found in Kashmir? The government refused to conduct DNA tests to find out the identity of the persons buried in those graves because doing so was considered to be impractical! Sure, ensuring human rights is never easy. But then that’s part of your job.

                                                                  (Source: Greater Kashmir, 10 AUGUST 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Aug/10/a-performance-audit-of-the-j-k-government-25.asp) 

                                                                  Countdown to the Battle for Srinagar

                                                                  Statecraft

                                                                  HAPPYMON JACOB


                                                                  State Assembly election in J&K is not a local event: it is not only analysed by national and international Kashmir watchers and pundits but also has implications beyond the confines of the state. Elections to the state assembly are not declared, and yet the political rumblings have already begun in Kashmir. The ruling coalition fired the first shot by agreeing to enter into a divorce of convenience. The National Conference (NC) does not want to be seen in the company of the Congress party anymore, because the latter, for a lot of Kashmiris, represents the arrogance of New Delhi, and rightly so. Congress party comes to Kashmir with a heavy burden of the past, of terrible and unforgivable mistakes. The NC, which was often at the receiving end of the Congress party’s soulless politics in Kashmir and the brazen tactics used by it to gain power in Srinagar, clearly does not want to go to the people seeking votes with the Congress in tow. But after a neat political arrangement that benefitted both sides for close to six years, even as it did not benefit the state, can the two now really keep this relationship off the minds of the Kashmiri voter? 

                                                                  For the Congress too, this divorce makes a lot of sense. While both the Congress and the NC presided over an unabashedly corrupt regime in Srinagar for six years now, the Congress gets to point fingers at the NC especially when it gets down to electioneering in the coming months. And it can state with such innocence: ‘we are not responsible for the rampant corruption in the state because the NC was running the government’! Or so it hopes. 

                                                                  Moreover, given that it sees itself as the only party that can put up a serious fight against BJP in the Jammu province (which has 37 seats), it would benefit the Congress to go to the Jammuites “minus” the ‘taint’ of Omar Abdullah’s well choreographed and widely televised outbursts on Article 370 and ASFPA. This “running with the hare and hunting with the hound” strategy that the Congress is likely to use in Jammu, combined with the usual arguments about ridding J&K of corruption (for which, of course, NC is responsible!) and deterring the spread of RSS fascism by upholding the values of secularism in Jammu (which only Congress can do!), the Congress leadership in the state believes, will increase its gains in the upcoming election.  

                                                                  My word of advise to the Congress party is this: whatever may be the final outcome of the 2014 Assembly elections, they should try hard, however difficult it may be, to resist the temptations of grabbing power in Srinagar, just like it did after the two previous elections in the state (and many times previously). Congress party’s devious designs to grab power in the state are legendary and have greatly contributed to the current state of affairs in J&K. Congress should keep itself out of office, and support, if need be, a truly local party to form the next government in J&K.

                                                                  Can the separatists rethink their politics? 
                                                                  The political decisions of the Valley’s separatist parties would make a significant difference to the electoral outcome in the upcoming elections. They have a number of political choices before them, both constructive and unproductive. Just like they did in previous years, they can completely shun the process and give a boycott call, extend some under-the-table support to individual candidates, or alternatively articulate a political choice and back it up with a sound political rationale. Clearly, the support base of the separatists are eroding by the day and, as a result, their politics will soon be irrelevant in the larger context of Kashmir’s political future. The only way, to my mind, they can continue to be relevant to the emerging political landscape in Kashmir is by clearly articulating their support for one or the other mainstream political parties in Kashmir, without giving up their essential stance, of course. Even better, they could decide to contest a few seats from their strongholds in Kashmir. But I don’t think they will do that.  

                                                                  The real question is how long can the Mirwaizes and Yaseen Maliks remain outside the mainstream political developments in Kashmir and how long, by doing so, can they keep their politics alive. I suspect not too long. Hence the upcoming election is an opportune moment for them to take a relook at their brand of politics and its future. The reason why BJP is steadily increasing its vote share in J&K is because the Kashmiri separatists nudge their supporters not to vote in the elections. Given that the BJP is seriously readying itself to come to power in Srinagar, by any and all means, the separatists should make up their mind now or by the time they decide to stop the saffron tide towards Srinagar, it would be too late to do so.

                                                                  (Next Week: “A performance audit of the National Conference Government”). 

                                                                  (Source: Greater Kashmir, 03 AUGUST 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Aug/3/countdown-to-the-battle-for-srinagar-16.asp)


                                                                  Sunday, July 6, 2014

                                                                  A Blueprint of Modi’s Kashmir Policy

                                                                  Statecraft

                                                                  HAPPYMON JACOB



                                                                  Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Kashmir was uneventful: he returned to New Delhi without making any radical policy announcements, ‘positive or negative’. Indeed, it may be too early to predict his Kashmir policy and one visit may simply be too little to gauge what Modi’s policy towards Kashmir will eventually look like.

                                                                  That said, what is abundantly clear is that Modi’s visit was nothing more than a ‘business trip’ to Kashmir and an analysis of this may give us some insights into the kind of Kashmir policy that Modi has in mind. His immediate predecessors, UPA’s Manmohan Singh and NDA’s Atal Behari Vajpayee, had also made ‘business trips’ to Kashmir, but what distinguishes them from Modi is that they also had their own political visions for Kashmir, which they articulated during their visits to the Valley. Modi’s just concluded visit did not articulate any political roadmap for Kashmir even as he looked keen on addressing the various economic issues plaguing the state. Modi did refer to his BJP predecessor Vajpayee in his address: “I want to give a message to the people of Jammu and Kashmir that the journey started by Atal Bihari Vajpayee in the state will be taken to its logical conclusion”. But this mention seemed more like an attempt by BJP’s new Prime Minister in claiming the much-eulogised Vajpayee legacy, than adopting the political strategy Vajpayee promised to address Kashmir with, as epitomized in his “insaniyat ke dayirae mein” speech in Kashmir.

                                                                  But he does seem to have a certain vision for Kashmir, though this may not be to the liking of many Kashmiris. ‘Economic development’ clearly tops the list of to-do things that Modi has vis-à-vis Kashmir: “My objective is to win the hearts of the people of Jammu and Kashmir through development, and this intention for the welfare of the people has nothing to do with politics.” This statement by Modi is spot-on: its development, and not politics that will be the focus. But then, the so-called economic development of J&K was given priority to by all governments in New Delhi, at least in theory. If all this time they were so focused on economically developing J&K, one wonders, how come the state continues to remain so underdeveloped. Unless, of course, it was only a convenient ‘political’ slogan.

                                                                  The second element of Modi’s evolving Kashmir policy seems to be on de-emphasising the role of ‘Kashmir politics’ in J&K. The major part of this agenda would be to do away with, or at least try to, the special status given to the state through Article 370. Clearly, it affects Kashmir more than Jammu, as Jammuites are mostly unconcerned about Article 370. The second part of this plan would be to make Jammu the focal point of New Delhi’s engagement with Kashmir. There are a number of reasons behind this: New Delhi finds it easier to deal with Jammu than Kashmir; BJP’s influence is stronger than ever in Jammu today; Pak-sponsored militant infiltration into Kashmir is at an all-time low and so the security concerns vis-à-vis Kashmir are bound to recede; and Jammu is likely to play a major role in Srinagar after the State Assembly elections, which is likely to see BJP gaining massively in Jammu, and so there is a need to promote Jammu region’s interests.

                                                                  The third element of Modi government’s Kashmir policy is likely to revolve around the return of Kashmiri Pandits (KPs). For sure, KPs must return and they have a right to do so, with respect and honour. But merely focusing on the return of KPs to their rightful home in Kashmir without any talk whatsoever about doing justice to Kashmiris is an exercise in selective justice.  More so, New Delhi must be very careful about its plans for creating separate settlements/rehabilitation zones for KPs in Kashmir as doing so could potentially create social tensions. Ideally, KPs must be given their homes and lands and not rehabilitation zones, which, in all likelihood, will eventually have habitats worse than those in Jammu’s Muthi camp where thousands of Kashmiri Pandits live in squalor. To start with, New Delhi should make the living conditions of such camps more humane.  In the long term, Kashmiri Muslim leadership should be engaged to ensure that KPs return to their homes without any fears and concerns. In other words, resettlement of KPs should be a joint effort of the government and the civil society in Kashmir. Any attempt by New Delhi to bring back the KPs through the use of rehabilitation zones will not be a lasting solution.

                                                                  In New Delhi’s political imagination, under the new Prime Minister, Kashmir issue is a thing of the past. New Delhi will continue to play the waiting game, which it has been doing for a long time; but now with increased confidence, to finally normalize and win back Kashmir. New Delhi realizes that the time is ripe for changing the discourse in Kashmir. In the 1990s and early 2000s, high profile visits from New Delhi to Kashmir would be welcomed with terror attacks or bomb blasts. Today, such visits meet shutdowns. This is a huge change, whether or not we realize it.

                                                                  (Source: Greater Kashmir, July 7, 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/jul/6/a-blueprint-of-modi-s-kashmir-policy-25.asp)