Monday, April 21, 2014

Return Tosa Maidan to J&K

The Indian Army’s Tosa Maidan lease expired on the 18th of this month after 50 years. But the army continues to hold on to the 3000 kanals of land in flagrant violation of legal, moral and democratic norms. This is unacceptable.

The J&K government should show the courage to ask the Indian army to return Tosa Maidan to the people of the state, Defence Minister A. K Antony should show the sensitivity, at least in his last days as the country’s defence minister, to tell the men under his command to hold their fire, and the Indian Army should show the sense to get out of Tosa Maidan. But then, I don’t think it’s the army’s call whether or not to insist on retaining Tosa Maidan: it’s the civilians, in Srinagar and New Delhi who should show some respect for the sentiments of the people of J&K and rule of law. 

Shocking facts 
The Indian army was leased 3000 kanals of land in the Budgam district in 1964 by the state government which has now expired. Over the last five decades around 63 people from the nearby villages have lost their lives and around 43 have become disabled thanks to the irresponsible handling of the ammunition by the army. This is notwithstanding the amount of nuisance that this has been creating for the people of the locality for many decades now. The Indian army or the government has not paid a penny till date as compensation for the lives lost or for medical expenses to those injured. 

But the army continues to hold the land arguing that it needs the land for artillery training and drills. Only the uninitiated amongst us would think that there is some rationale in this argument of the Army because their demand does not really stem from a shortage of firing ranges in J&K but from their unwillingness to give up what they hold: it is no less than the arrogance of brute power and an example of settler mentality. The army’s claim that they can’t do anything about the deaths due to unexploded also ammunition makes no sense. The army spokesperson Colonel Naresh Vij argued the other day “We have disposal units that are tasked with clearing the area, but then some shells and bombs fall outside the firing range or are lost. This is what creates the problem. People step on them and are harmed.” Such an explanation is not good enough. If the army conducts firing practice near civilian areas, they better have the mechanism to clean up the place.

Lets look at the army’s argument that it needs to have an alternative firing range if it is asked to vacate Tosa Maidan. Even this demand makes no sense. Don’t they have 11 more places in the state of J&K where they can conduct their exercises? Indeed, as some analysts have pointed, out of the 66 firing ranges in the entire country, 12 are in the state J&K!

Systemic problem 
The issue is not just about Tosa Maidan. Tosa Maidan is only one small bit of the large tracts of land that the Indian armed forces have kept under their control in the state of J&K including in some of the best locations in downtown Srinagar. What is even more shocking is the amount of land that has been illegally occupied by the Indian army in J&K. According to the official records of J&K government, Army and paramilitary forces are currently in the illegal occupation of no less than 66,690 kanals of land in J&K. It is one thing for the army to demand that the Tosa Maidan lease be renewed but it is an entirely different thing to be in the illegal possession of 66,690 kanals of land (belonging to the government and private individuals).  

If the Indian armed forces are in the illegal custody of so much, and buildings, in J&K, how can anyone blame the people of J&K when they say that they live under the occupation of the Indian army? But even more importantly, how can the democratically elected government in New Delhi allow its armed forces to run riot and violate the rule of law? Don’t’ the laws of the land apply to the Indian armed forces? 

When I used to teach at the University of Jammu many years ago, there was an army camp on the University land which mostly housed living quarters of the Indian army personnel.  The university of Jammu had made a number of requests to the Indian army to return the land but the defence ministry refused to let that happen. If this is how the army and the defence ministry treat requests from other official institutions, one can imagine how they would treat the popular demands from the locals living around the Tosa Maidan area. 

Even if the army has deep-seated real-estate interests in holding on to the land it was once given on a temporary basis, why don’t the civilian authorities take it upon themselves to ensure that the law of the land is respected and the demands and requests from the state governments are heeded to? Has the ministry of defence in New Delhi become a law unto itself? 

New Delhi’s settler mentality in Kashmir should end. Only then can there be any meaningful reconciliation and peace-building possible between the people of Kashmir and the government of India.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, April 20, 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Apr/20/return-tosa-maidan-to-j-k-8.asp)

Wednesday, April 16, 2014

On the desirability of NFU

Ever since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) released its election manifesto ahead of the ongoing general elections, there has been a great deal of speculation in New Delhi’s strategic circles that if indeed the rightwing party forms or leads the next government in New Delhi, it will give up on the no first use (NFU) pledge of its nuclear weapon posture. Even though the BJP manifesto only talks about the need to “revise and update” the country’s nuclear programme, Indian and Pakistani media have generated a great deal of unnecessary speculation on the issue by drawing from the hawkish wisdom found in abundance in the national capital. That said, this media speculation has been generated in the context of a persistent belief in the country that the Indian nuclear strategy, both its doctrinal and material elements, are not designed to respond to various threats that the country faces today. Specifically, the argument is that Indian nuclear strategy has proven time and again to be unable to respond to Pakistan when the latter repeatedly probes Indian defences. But before we examine how accurate such a claim is, lets try and understand a bit more about the Indian NFU claim. 

The reality is that India’s NFU posture is a drastically watered down one. The 2003 Indian nuclear doctrine states that although India abides by the “Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states”, “in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons”. There have been consistent demands for a revision of India’s NFU. For instance, in 2009, the then Army Chief demanded that India should revisit the NFU pledge.  The opposition BJP leaders have also demanded in the past that NFU be scrapped  (even though they were in power when NFU was adopted by India).  
Will giving up India’s limited NFU help it to respond to Pakistani sub-conventional aggression or nuclear blackmail if at all such fears are prompting Indian strategists to consider abandoning NFU? First, a first use policy will have little effect on the sub-conventional aggression (state-sponsored or otherwise) that Pakistan uses against India (a la 26/11). The sub-conventional aggression may be an act of a non-state actor which will not be deterred by nuclear retaliation and even if the Pakistani state is behind such an attack, it will deny any responsibility and even more importantly, it would be foolish on India’s part to use nuclear weapons in response to terror attacks. Secondly, even if Pakistan deploys tactical nuclear weapons and threatens to use them in case of an Indian conventional aggression - which, in response to a Pakistani sub-conventional provocation against India, might take place - how does maintaining a first use policy give India any operational, doctrinal or deterrence advantage? Would India want to use a strategic weapon on Pakistan even before Pakistan unleashes a tactical nuclear weapon on India? And if that is to be ruled out, which I would, then there is no point in giving up its NFU. 

From a doctrinal point of view, maintaining the first use of strategic nuclear missiles policy will not have any impact on the Pakistani behavior regarding the use of sub-conventional attacks. That New Delhi will decide to use its strategic nuclear weapons on Pakistan in anticipation of Pakistan’s nuclear use on itself, tactical or otherwise, is also highly improbable and lacks credibility even if one were to discard the reputational and other international costs involved in it. 

If anything, maintaining a first use policy of India’s strategic weapons will only go on to destabilize whatever deterrence stability that exists in the South Asian context. This will also additionally mean adopting a launch on warning posture and maintaining hair-trigger alerts leading to possible miscalculation and accidental launches. 

What if India were to revise its NFU policy as well as develop tactical nuclear weapons? That, I would argue, places India and Pakistan in similar strategic posture. If the argument is that the current Pakistani nuclear posture (first use policy plus deployment of tactical nuclear weapons) is highly destabilizing, then if India also adopts the same posture, it is going to make the Indo-Pak equation even more destabilizing with the chances of miscalculation and accidental launches increasing many times over. Does India really benefit out of such a posture? 

In short, what I am suggesting is that giving up NFU or even developing and deploying tactical nuclear weapons in response to Pakistan’s first use policy or tactical weapons is not a useful policy because India’s worry is not really about not matching Pakistan’s nuclear posture, something that is widely considered to be destabilising, but how to respond to Pakistan’s sub-conventional aggression. First use posture or developing tactical nuclear weapons will not resolve that. More importantly, additional Indian dilemmas such as the possibility of Pak-based terror groups getting hold of nuclear weapons or rogue elements within the Pakistani armed forces launching an attack against India or even of accidental launch of nuclear weapons can no way be addressed by adopting a first strike posture or developing and deploying tactical nuclear weapons. To address such concerns India will have to explore other options such as, perhaps, a limited Ballistic Missile Defence Shield (BMD).

(Source: Greater Kashmir, April 13, 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Apr/13/on-the-desirability-of-nfu-5.asp)

Tuesday, April 8, 2014

When Justice is Subverted

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB


Whenever someone is arrested or accused of having committed a crime, we are told that the law will take its own course and justice will be done. We hear it, believe it and leave it at that. We neither concern ourselves with what happens thereafter nor do we inquire what kind of “course” that the law takes subsequently. We are told to trust in the “course” and so we don’t try and understand this “course” till, of course, something goes terribly wrong. Even then we think what has gone wrong is really an aberration and not the usual practice.  

The other day I was attending a meeting organized in JNU on illegal detention and anti-terror laws in India which had at least three speaks who were accused of by Delhi and Maharashtra police of engaging in terrorist activities and imprisoned for years together. One of the speakers, Arun Thomas Ferreira, an alleged Maoist, recounted how it took him close to 6 years to be fully acquitted by the courts after the police slapped over ten cases against him. Each time he was released by the court, he would be picked by the police on another charge right outside the prison premises. There was another young Muslim man, Mohammad Amir, who emotionally narrated his ‘kidnapping’ by the Delhi police when he was just 18 years old and put in prison for 14 years before being released by the court. The National Human Rights Commission wrote to the Delhi police earlier this year seeking an explanation for what it did to Aamir. How can anyone compensate Aamir, whose father passed away and mother became paralaysed while he was still in jail, for 14 years of terror, shame, stigma and pain? 
Kashmiris are not new to such stories, I know. The story of Syed Maqbool Shah who was acquitted by a Delhi court in the Lajpat Nagar bomb blast case after spending 14 years in jail is just one of the too many stories you would remember. I simply cannot imagine what Shah must have gone through after being picked up by the police at the age of 17 and thrown into jail! 

While we talk about the need to give the country’s police forces more autonomy from the corrupting influence of the politicians, we often forget to think of the innumerable wrongdoings by the police forces in this country. Police officials, like many in the armed forces, recklessly engage in the framing of innocents in order to “solve” cases and get rewards and promotions. What is shocking is that such rewards and promotions are hardly ever withdrawn even when the court finds the arrested person innocent and that he/she was wrongly accused in the first place. Moreover, because the police officials do not want to be seen as having framed an innocent person, they continue to re-arrest the person for new cases even after being declared not guilty by the courts. The way innocents are arrested (or ‘kidnapped’, to use Aamir’s phrase), how evidence is planted, how they are thrown into jails and being called terrorists and then rearrested show that this is nothing short of state condoned violation of human rights.  We must think twice before granting ‘complete autonomy’ to organisations that exhibit disregard for the rule of law and human rights. 

The judiciary should also accept its share of blame. It often looks to an ordinary citizen that the courts in the country spend more time on long vacations and handing down contempt sentences than dispensing justice. Some of those who spoke at the meeting recollected how the trial judges were simply not interested in listening to the version of the accused. They would listen to the police and the public prosecutor and extend police custody, in total violation of rules. They also recollected how the judges are often unconcerned about complaints of third degree torture by the police while in custody. It is deeply puzzling as to why despite such power at their disposal the judges do not show the courage to clamp down on police excesses. Lack of accountability is also a problem that is plaguing the country’s judiciary.  

Sometimes even when the courts issue release orders, they do not reach the prisoners lodged in far away jails and they continue to be incarcerated without knowing that they have actually been exonerated by the court. Who, one wonders, will take the blame for such serious lapses of justice and violation of human rights! 

The politicians are hardly ever concerned about what happens in the country’s lock-ups, jails, or courts except when one of their own has to go through such experiences. Without bothering with judicial or police reforms, they continue to say that the law will take its own course! The fact is that the ones with influence, power or connections will end up getting a better deal and most others are given a less than satisfactory deal by the country’s legal system. The media declares the accused as guilty from the moment the police says so and the general population, people like you and me, think that they deserve what they are getting. Some of us even initiate a social boycott against the accused. Our media celebrates the arrests but almost never looks at who made the mistake when the court finally release someone.  In our naive minds, anyone accused of any crime is already a criminal. While most of the not-so-well-to-do people end up getting a raw deal, those from the minority communities get a worse deal. 

(Source: Greater Kashmir, April 6, 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Apr/6/when-justice-is-subverted-5.asp) 

Sunday, March 16, 2014

The questions we don’t ask

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB


The Aam Aadmi Party chief Arvind Kejriwal is asking the right questions even though his charge about the entire media being sold out to BJP’s Narendra Modi may be an overkill. But then sometimes you have to exaggerate in order to emphatically make your points. Though the argument that the ‘entire’ media is sold out to ‘Modi’ will not stand the scrutiny of evidence, reason or commonsense, there is some wisdom in what Kejriwal is trying to say: that we simply don’t ask the uncomfortable questions, more often than not. We shy away, hide away and look the other way when we should ask those unsettling questions. 

By using the words that he used, Kejriwal was shooting the messenger, argued the no-nonsense Express patrakar Shekhar Gupta in the Indian Express yesterday. Was he? Is the Indian media merely the innocent, stakes-free, messenger which promotes no (one’s) interests or agenda in the public sphere? Does the Indian media simply “convey the message” to the common people from the sites where news is generated? You and I know that it is not the case: the media actively promotes certain arguments, interests, lines and agenda over the others. It does take political positions and supports or denounces various political parties and leaders. If so, how can the media call itself the neutral, equidistant messenger of news?  It simply is not. 

Be that as it may, the point Kejriwal raised is even more serious: how often do we, in general and the media in particular, ask uncomfortable and deeply disturbing questions? We rarely do and that is why his statement, even though it borders irresponsibility, is a courageous one. Remember, he is the same person who has been challenging the means used by Mukesh Ambani’s Reliance Industries to become the richest business house in the country. Kejriwal has further argued that Narendra Modi is a property dealer for the Ambanis and other corporate houses. Forget the politically charged language for a moment, the fact is that it is easy to recognise that there is something substantive in what he is saying which most of our media is clearly silent about. A lot of us perhaps wanted to ask these questions but did not find enough courage to do so. The fact is that most of our media outlets simply don’t question the country’s powerful corporate houses such as the Reliance Industries. In fact, they don’t even publish news that could potentially damage the Ambani family’s reputation. 

In December 2013, for instance, some international news agencies and news outlets carried a story about the crash of a Reliance Industries-owned Aston Martin car in Mumbai which was speculated to be driven by the son of Mukesh Ambani. The investigations are currently ongoing and it is now being reported that there is not much evidence suggesting that Ambani’s son was driving the car. While the Forbes magazine and the UK-based Daily Mail reported the story, most of the Indian media maintained a stony silence about the story. Would the Indian media have kept quiet had the person driving the car been someone else?  Most probably not. If so, how can the media claim that they are merely the neutral messengers of what happens in the world? 

That takes me to the root of what Kejriwal asked: what is the nature of the media-corporate-politician nexus in India? We do see on a daily basis how the Indian media plays up a particular news item over another or ‘favourably’ covers news relating to a particular political party over that of another. It is not unknown to us that the media houses have their own political favorites who they support in their news coverage. More importantly, while TRPs do matter, what matters more is the financial support of the corporates who either own the media houses or provide the crucial support of providing advertisement revenues without which the latter simply would not be able to exist. What about the interests of the corporates?  Is anyone suggesting that the corporate houses have no political favorites? Corporate houses have traditionally supported one party/leader or another whose coming to power will enormously benefit them. 

In this context Kejriwal’s question as to whether the Indian media has done enough to show the real picture of development in Modi’s Gujarat is a pertinent one. His argument is that Modi and the corporates who support him have managed to create a certain myth and manufactured consent about good governance and development about Guajrat  which the media is unquestioningly propagating. While the media has celebrated the ‘Gujarat model’, they have not done enough to expose the shortage of basic amenities and facilities in rural Gujarat. 

In short, if the corporate houses have a financial hold over media, they would certainly try to influence the latter’s editorial and news coverage decisions. Are we to assume that the corporates who fund them have absolutely no interest in making the editorial decisions or have never tried to do so? This is no rocket science. This is exactly how news is made and unmade in almost every country. If that is so, why are some people so unhappy about being told that this is the reality? Why are they feigning that they are nothing but messengers? If anything, Arvind Kerjiwal is the messenger here, who has shown the courage to tell the fellow citizens that there is indeed a nexus between the corporates, media houses and politicians which needs to be exposed.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, March 16, 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Mar/16/the-questions-we-don-t-ask-5.asp)

Monday, March 10, 2014

Why not cheer for the Pakistani team?

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB


Like many of you, I was deeply shocked when I heard about the U.P government’s decision to file sedition charges against 167 Kashmiri students of the Meerut-based Swami Vivekanand Subharti University for cheering for the Pakistani cricket team when it won a cricket match against the Indian team last week. As an aside, the funny thing about Article124a of the Indian Penal Code is that it talks about offenses against the ‘government’ (Whoever brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards the Government), as opposed to the ‘state’: going by this definition, most of the political leaders should be in jail!

Most of us tend to agree that this was unquestionably unjustifiable, no question about that. There will also be an inquiry by the UP government (based on which, of course, nothing will happen) and the Kashmiri students might even be allowed back into the University campus to complete their studies. So we can be happy that we have collectively (the Omar government, human rights activists etc. etc.) defeated the nefarious designs of the U.P police and its archaic mindset. To me though, the matter does not end there for there is a deeper issue here: did the Kashmiri students who cheered for the Pakistani team, which some of them now say was not the case as they were only cheering for the spectacular Shahid Afridi and not the Pakistani team, do any wrong? Is it wrong to cheer for the Pakistani team on Indian soil when they play against the Indian team?

While there seems to be a laudable unity of opinion amongst us on the undesirability of invoking sedition laws against these students, there is no such unity on whether or not they did the right thing by cheering for the Pakistani team.  What is notable in this context is that many of our pro-Kashmiri leaders and national media houses argued that is while the sedition charges were harsh and uncalled for, the students have also done something wrong by cheering for the Pakistani team, or least they have been irresponsible in their conduct during the cricket match. When simplified, this would mean that they did something wrong by cheering for Pakistan, but they should not have been punished. It is likely that many of us – including the well-meaning ones – may have instinctively said about the incident “but what the Kashmiri students did was also wrong”. For that matter, I cannot guarantee that the students in my progressive university – JNU - would not have objected to Kashmiri students cheering for Pakistan!  

The J&K Chief Minister did not approve of what the students of his state did. That’s why he tweeted three days ago: “I believe what the students did was wrong & misguided but they certainly didn't deserve to have charges of sedition slapped against them”. There you go. We must thank him for his small mercies. I also heard a prominent Kashmir woman lawyer declaring on TV that what the Kashmir students did was “irresponsible”. 

But I, for one, simply fail to understand the foundational difference between the following arguments which are apparently used in a contrasting manner: “the Kashmir students engaged in some wrong doing, but they should not be punished” and “if they did something wrong they deserve to be punished?” To my mind, there is no big difference between these two arguments even though the former argument is held by a number of well-meaning and pro-Kashmir people, including the Chief Minister, and the latter being held by the more conservative amongst us.

Why shouldn’t we cheer for Pakistan?
That said, why is cheering for Pakistan irresponsible or wrong? Some argue that given the context of adversarial relations between India and Pakistan, we should not cheer for Pakistan. In other words, Indian citizens should constantly read up on the international situation and India’s relations with other countries to make sure that their appreciation for another country’s cricket/football/baseball/hockey team does not come in conflict with the nature of India’s relations with that country! 

The other argument is that the majority of people watching the Indo-Pak cricket match will feel hurt if you cheer the Pakistani team. So what? And since when has majoritarianism become the basis for right and wrong in this country? 

Yet another argument is that we should not cheer for the enemy nation’s cricket team because that is not a patriotic act. But then who decides what is being patriotic and what is not? In any case, the construction of patriotism is almost always undertaken in the context of a majoritarian consensus and since the majoritarian consensus in this country demands that cheering enemy nation’s cricket team is unpatriotic, it is deemed so. But I would say that the rejection of majoritarianism in a country like India is a deeply patriotic act.

Or is it because they were Kashmiris, the lesser citizens, the ones who have to prove their nationalism over and over again, that we tend to say that they did not do the right thing by cheering for the Pakistani team? In other words, would the government have dared to invoke sedition laws if a bunch of enlightened intellectuals sitting in the lawns of the India International Centre were to cheer for the Pakistani team (in the spirit of sportsmanship, of course)? I don’t think so.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, March 8, 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Mar/9/why-not-cheer-for-the-pakistani-team--8.asp)

Need for Defence reforms in India

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB


The tragic accident on board INS Sindhuratna, which killed two young Indian Naval officers in the most horrible manner, should be examined in the context of the sad state of civil-military relations in the country. Moreover, this tragedy, coming close on the heels of the INS Sindurakshak accident which killed 18 Indian sailors last year, is indeed the most appropriate time for some much-needed introspection among the mandarins of the Ministry of defence and the politicians managing the country’s defence preparedness. 

The Indian higher defence system goes strictly in line with the age-old dictum of Carl von Clausewitz, the legendary German general and military theorist, who argued that “war is a mere continuation of policy by other means”. In India, political priorities, visions, objectives and mandate prescribe how the armed forces are funded, manned and managed. The Armed forces have almost no role to play in the formulation of the country’s higher defence decisions. Given the fact that a number of newly de-colonised states became dominated by their armed forces, including in neighbouring Pakistan, the experience of India, where the military is subservient to the civilian bosses, is a welcome change. So far so good. But this traditional decision to keep the armed forces at an arm’s length while making the country’s defence policies have led to a number of structural issues and the Sindhuratna tragedy should be seen as a result of this flawed structure of the Indian higher defence management. Indeed, the civilian suspicion of the armed forces have led the country to more than one strategic disasters. The most outstanding of them is the unilateralism of the political bosses in the run up to the 1962 war with China and the country’s humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese. 

This traditional civilian/political suspicion of the armed forced in conjunction with the post-Independent Indian state’s aversion to the use of force meant that there was a tendency to undermine matters military. This speaks directly of the Indian state’s strategic culture which clearly relegates military matters to the second order of things. More importantly, the civilian/political reluctance to give importance to the professional opinions of the Indian military leadership has led to the sub-optimal utilization of the country’s military prowess, as well as insufficient strategic thinking and planning. 
The Indian military and its strategising also takes place in a strategic vacuum thanks to the absence of any structured defence planning process between the civilian/political and military leadership in the country. There has been a consistent demand for security sector reforms in the country but successive governments have initiated no serious reform efforts yet. There is hardly any inter-service integration in the country nor is there an attempt to create the institution of the Chief of Defense Staff. Also what is urgently required in the country for proper defence planning is the merger of Armed Forces Headquarters with the Ministry of Defense which can then engage in defence policy planning in an informed and cohesive manner. 

In the absence of such institutional reform there is unlikely to be any major improvement in the country’s defence planning procedures.  The political bosses of the country, who are supposed to be manning the country’s defence planning with help from the civilian bureaucracy, are almost always preoccupied with political issues which are far too many in a country like India. Moreover, most of them do not have any interest or expertise in managing the various intricate issues relating to national defense or military matters. Under such conditions, it is the civilian bureaucrats of the MoD who end up doing much of the planning, thinking and managing of issues relating to the country’s defence planning and execution. How qualified are the generalist civil service officers of the country in managing the complex and high-stakes defence-related issues of the country? Someone with no prior strategic or specilised defence related training would find it extremely hard to get into the nitty-gritty of such issues especially if they don’t stay in the ministry for a considerable period of time. They would, as a result, end up either neglecting various serious aspects of the country’s defence or making status-quoist decisions which the Raksha Mantri will endorse given the proximity that the bureaucrats enjoy with the minister. 

The latest Naval tragedy should serve as a wake-up call for the country’s civilian leadership to introspect so as to realise the need for urgent reforms not only in defence procurement rules and policies but also the higher defence management systems. The current system of higher defnce management in the country is extremely archaic, to say the least. The resignation of the Navy Chief, who by doing so has assumed a certain moral high ground, and the prompt acceptance of his resignation by the Defence Minister are clearly inadequate to bring about accountability to the Indian defence management system. Why is that the Minister of Defence is unwilling to make any substantive or thoughtful political statements about these issues beyond uttering a few sentence with touch upon almost nothing? Why is it that we hear nothing about defence modernization from the Ministry of Defence which, at the end of the day, does much of the defence planning in the country? It would be self-defeating on the part of the civilian bosses to think that by putting the focus and the blame on the Navy, they can avoid major lapses and loss of the Indian soldiers in future.

(Greater Kashmir, March 2, 2014. IRL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Mar/2/need-for-defence-reforms-in-india-30.asp)

The unmistakable negativity

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB


I have always been puzzled by the Government of India’s unmistakable negativity towards track-II initiatives and conferences especially when Indian track-II interlocutors talk to their Pakistani counterparts. Given the fact that one of the major objectives of track-II initiatives is to feed into the official, track-I, thinking on key issues, the unreasonable reluctance of the Indian government to stay clear of track-II initiatives is frustrating. Don’t get me wrong, I am simply not arguing that the governments should play an ‘active’ role in the running of track-IIs, which will indubitably make them useless as they would invariably be accused of being “remote-controlled” by the government. What I am concerned about is the tendency of our babus to turn a blind eye towards the existence of track-IIs and their findings and even dissuade them from initiating any contact whatsoever with the other side. 
The Indian government’s hesitation regarding track-two meetings manifests not only in its reluctance in recognizing their existence but also in, at least sometimes, actively discouraging their ability to function. They range from not granting visas to the participants from the counterpart country to sometimes instructing some of the participants, who are close to the government, to not participate in such meetings. In the last one decade that I have been part of various Indo-Pak track-IIs, I have come across a number of instances of this kind. 

On the contrary, Pakistan has consistently been very forthcoming in accepting, promoting and being attentive towards various track-II initiatives. They have regularly provided hospitality for high-level track-II delegations from India. I remember visiting Pakistan in 2005 when Gen. Musharraff was at the height of his power there. He not only invited the entire Indian delegation to the Presidential Palace and discussed his formula for Kashmir for almost two hours but also readily granted our request to let us travel to the Pakistani side of Kashmir without a visa! That is smart diplomacy. 

But what explains the Indian hesitation about favorably looking at track-II initiatives especially those between India and Pakistan? First of all, the Indian policy making systems, our famed babudom that is, are rife with nauseating levels of hierarchy which demonstrate extreme reluctance to part with information and summarily reject feedback from non-traditional sources. Add to it another drawback that plagues the Indian system – excessive levels of secrecy which prevents meaningful interactions between those in the bureaucracy and those outside. As a former insider puts it: “we respond and give information to only those writing our ACRs and who have the power to post/transfer us”. 

India has also exhibited a traditional unease towards all sorts of “third party intervention” (even though it has tired to mediate between conflicting parties i.e. the Indian mediation during the Korean war). Be it the UN or the Americans, New Delhi makes it abundantly clear: no mediation is welcome. Indeed, despite the Indian concern about the infiltration of Pak-based terror groups into India and the regular violations of the ceasefire, New Delhi has consistently refused to accept the Pakistani demand to ask the UNMOGIP to investigate such issues. Post-colonial sensibilities are also part of the problem: how can the whites tell us or fund track-II people to tell what to do and what not to do! Finally, the Indian system of not allowing lateral entry into the ranks of the country’s bureaucratic decision-making process also prevents a healthy exchange of ideas between those inside the government and those outside: the government simply believes that there is no expertise outside of it! 

Pakistan, on the other hand, has always wanted to tell the world of its diplomatic positions through whatever means available to it, be it third party mediation, public diplomacy or track-two initiatives. Moreover, there is a dynamic relationship between those inside the government and those outside of it. We get to see many more prominent and expert Pakistanis from outside the government and bureaucracy being appointed to important positions. Moreover, Pakistan suffers from less colonial hangover when compared to India. 

For sure, this pig-headed Indian approach to track-two initiatives has been to India’s disadvantage. Indian diplomacy is often seen as arrogant, unwilling to be creative, unable to communicate and inadequate to take advantage of the newer mediums of modern day diplomacy. 

But why should we focus on track-II diplomacy? Has it made any difference to anything at al? Let me give one example of how track-II diplomacy can make a difference. I was in Colombo this past week attending two sets of track-II meetings on India-Pakistan nuclear issues as well as military CBMs. The discussions were clearly not on political resolution of the outstanding conflicts but on the practical aspects of conflict management. There was a clear shift in favour of doable CBMs from political rhetoric and puritanical positions. Part of this focus on practical solutions and the nitty-gritty of conflict management come from the nature of the projects as funded by various international funding agencies or governments. Funding agencies and governments are not interested in participants restating their states’ held positions, but what these meetings can achieve on the ground. This is in sharp contrast to what the two governments often do – engage in meaningless reiteration of their stated positions, which they have been doing for many decades! This to me is an eminent achievement of the ongoing track-II initiatives in the region. 

I am not in any way suggesting that political resolution of outstanding conflicts is unimportant but that it is often useful to focus on the practical aspects of conflict management to travel towards the eventual political resolution of conflicts.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 23 February 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Feb/23/the-unmistakable-negativity-10.asp)