Strategic Implications of the Indo-US Standoff

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

Will the Devyani Khobragade incident have serious strategic implications for the Indo-US strategic partnership which the American President Barack Obama once described as the ‘defining partnership of the 21st century’? Or will the relationship limp back to normal once the din and noise settles down on the incident? Most Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) mandarins and veterans, journalists manning the foreign affairs beat and politicians in New Delhi seem to see this as an occasion to teach the Americans a lesson in response to what has been meted out to the Indian VIPs for such a long time. The American side seems to be loosening up a bit albeit still surprised by the “unprecedented” reaction from the Indian side. With the US not overreacting to the India’s retaliatory expulsion of an American diplomat from New Delhi, it is likely that the crisis is mostly over for the MEA and the Department of State, though certainly not for the diplomat involved in the mess. Not only that she may not be able to go back to the US, where her family lives, but she has also come under the scanner for a number of other reasons including the Adarsh flat she owns. While one hopes that the Indo-US relationship is not seriously harmed by this, what are the likely implications should the relations not recover quickly? 

Like a number of other analysts who have made this point earlier, I also think that the Indo-US partnership has been undergoing great stress in the recent past. The grandeur of the Indo-US relations was lost somewhere during the first term of Obama’s presidency. While George Bush was personally committed to improving the relationship, Obama is not. Once the Bush-Manmohan honeymoon was over, the Americans were looking for substance, that is, deals that would give them money. And New Delhi did not live up to their expectations. First came the MMRCA snub – India’s decision not to shortlist the American bids for the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition to supply 126 multi-role combat aircraft to the Indian Air Force (IAF). Then came the Indian Nuclear liability law, not to the liking of the United States (or for that matter to the liking of anyone), which imposes heavy fines on suppliers in case of a nuclear accident. 

Moreover, Washington also understands that New Delhi may not play to its tunes to balance Beijing’s muscle flexing. And given the rapprochement underway between the US and China, American dependence on New Delhi to checkmate China is drastically reduced. In other words, in an objective American cost-benefit analysis, from an American point of view of course, the Indo-US partnership has not really benefitted the Americans, as there are no deliverables or results in sight. This perhaps explains the low political priority attached to the relationship now and also perhaps why the White house was almost completely silent on the Khboragade affair. 

The Indo-US partnership, in other words, is going through a very bad phase and there aren’t many credible reasons why the relationship might improve in the near future. This has significant implications for both India and the United States. For India, this clearly means that the Indo-US honeymoon is over and New Delhi’s insistence on “reciprocity” on the diplomatic front will encourage the Americans to now seek reciprocity from India on the many other fronts where Washington thinks New Delhi has been free-riding on it. If New Delhi wants American help in securing the memberships of important global nuclear-trade related groups such as NSG, Australia Group and Wassanar Arrangement etc., it may have to show some reciprocity to the US. Similarly, the American support in India’s quest for a permanent seat at the UNSC may not come unreciprocated either. If New Delhi wants to be counted on the world stage, it would have to show its importance on its own, the US may not lend its feet for India to stand on. 

Not that the diplomatic standoff would have not implications for the United States. Indeed, in the longer run, the Americans would need India as much as Indians would need the US for a variety of strategic reasons. First of all, given the state of US-Pakistan ties, the Americans would be left with hardly any allies in the region at a time when the US-led NATO forces are on the verge of withdrawing from Afghanistan. China, Iran and Pakistan cannot be counted as allies by the US when thinking of stabilizing post-2014 Afghanistan. US would most certainly have to count of the Indian efforts there. The uncertain nature of the ongoing American rapprochement with Iran could go in any direction and India could still play a significant role in dealing with the Iranians on a variety of issues. Finally, despite the Sino-US rapprochement, the relationship between them is still one that is born out of the necessity of mutual accommodation. Hence by losing out on the only strategic partner that it has in the region, the Americans would be doing great disservice to themselves. 

Both the United States and India should bring the Khobragade controversy to a closure and explore ways to reinvent the relationship. 

(Source: Greater Kashmir, January 12, 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Jan/12/strategic-implications-of-the-indo-us-standoff-4.asp ) 

Dr. Singh’s Pakistan Policy: An Assessment

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

Addressing a press conference in New Delhi two days ago, the Indian Prime Minister, in response to whether India and Pakistan were on the verge of signing a historic deal on Kashmir, said “I have tried to improve relations with all our neighbours to the best of my ability and on one time it appeared that important breakthrough was in sight…Events in Pakistan for example that General Pervez Musharraf (former President) had to make way for a different set up. I think that led to the process not moving further....”. Though it might look like a statement that does not say much, those who were following the Indo-Pak negotiations from 2004 to 2007 would certainly realize that Dr. Singh is talking about the missed opportunity to finalise a political deal on Kashmir, one that had supporters in both capitals and Kashmir. More so, consider the fact that Dr. Singh has a habit of understating everything, and indeed his press conference was full of understatements!

I can feel a sense of loss in the PM’s words, rightly so. Manmohan Singh could have gone down in the history of India for having achieved yet another historic task (apart from finalizing the Indo-US nuclear deal which now seems to be facing a lot of hurdles) had he shown the courage to make that trip to Islamabad to finalsie the Kashmir deal with Musharraff in 2007. Dr. Singh was too risk-averse to take that giant leap of faith (even under reasonable circumstances) to end the conflict over Kashmir. He certainly was/is not a courageous political leader (well, for that matter, he is not even a political leader): radical decisions can only be made by leaders with courage and conviction.  

But for a man who showed exceptional grit in negotiating and finalizing the nuclear deal with the United States, thereby initiating India’s integration into the international nuclear order ending the country’s nuclear isolationism, Dr. Singh did not show any determination in ending the Kashmir conflict with Pakistan. Perhaps he was not convinced about it or his advisors were scared that Pakistan would do a ‘Shimla’ by reneging on the promise once Musharraff went out of power in Pakistan. But all indications to this day show that such a reversal would not have happened for Pakistan continues to await an honorable exit route from Kashmir. Many people in India may or may not accept this argument but this, to my mind, is simply the reality. It is also possible that Dr. Singh was not in a position to focus his administration’s energies on the Kashmir deal which unlike the nuclear deal would have had much more political repercussions at home. After all, Pakistan is India’s favorite enemy of all times. But history will judge Dr. Singh unfavourably for we love and respect leaders who can make strong decisions (no, there is no veiled reference to Narendra Modi here!) and we hate weaklings. So if the chroniclers of the UPA government point out one fault in Dr. Singh, it would be lack of courage. 

In short, Dr. Singh was unwilling to do anything radical that could have potentially transformed the India-Pakistan rivalry. But he skillfully managed a number of unpleasant situations by not letting things go out of control unlike the previous regime headed by Vajpayee. Many in India think that Dr. Singh’s pussy-footed policy towards Pakistan was unwise and that not responding to Pakistan with resolve was the biggest shortcoming of Dr. Singh’s Pakistan policy. But not letting the relationship with Pakistan boil over was his single biggest achievement, in my opinion. I start with the assumption that an aggressive policy towards Pakistan would not have led India anywhere other than prompting the international community to re-hyphenate India and Pakistan and thereby consider India to be another irresponsible power in the region. Handling Pakistan and the relationship with it takes diplomacy of a higher kind, and Dr. Singh’s government partly exhibited that by refusing to employ aggression to deal with Islamabad. Where he failed was in not showing the courage to employ such diplomacy to its fullest. 

In other words, UPA’s foreign policy, while it did not take us to war, was a celebration of the status quo. Dr. Singh often did not have the backing of his leader Sonia Gandhi and that of the Congress Party, a party that has historically exhibited an unimaginative Pakistan policy, to translate his visions into reality. He did enunciate a number of visions capped by his articulation that he was in favour of making the borders in Kashmir irrelevant. But when the time came for ‘making the borders irrelevant’, he did not want to put his head on the block. 

He also did not have the courage to deliver on increasing the trade with Pakistan despite this being an issue that is positively looked at by a lot of Indians and Pakistanis. Dr. Singh’s government could not put in place a robust system of crisis prevention measures, in the form of CBMs, to ensure that crises situations between India and Pakistan do not escalate to major standoffs. What about other issues such as Sir Creek and Siachen? The Indian and Pakistani interlocutors, track-1 and track-2, kept saying that these are really low hanging fruits, ready to be plucked. But even on those issues there has been no progress in the 10 years of Dr. Singh’s rule. Apart from all the other reasons that I have pointed out earlier in the article, I think his inability achieve anything substantive with Pakistan also came from the fact that he simply did not visit Pakistan despite multiple invitations from Islamabad. 
As Dr. Singh said in his Press conference two days ago, history might judge him kindly for he made sure that India did not get into any disastrous situations with Pakistan, but for now we have to say that doing so was not enough. He should have done better things given the ten years that he had to better the Indo-Pak relationship.

(SOurce: Greater Kashmir. January 5, 2013. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Jan/5/dr-singh-s-pakistan-policy-an-assessment-7.asp)

My new book on Kashmir

Kashmir and Indo-Pak Relations, Politics of Reconciliation offers a no-holds-barred account of the developments in Kashmir politics and India-Pakistan relations as they unfolded between 2008 and 2013.Culled out from the author’s popular Sunday column in the Srinagar-based Greater Kashmir newspaper “statecraft” and other Op-eds, the book promises to take the reader beyond the traditional narratives on Kashmir and India-Pakistan relations. Provocative and deeply engaging Politics of Reconciliation aims to challenge the commonsense wisdom on the Kashmir question and Indo-Pak relations. Section I of the book, divided into six chapters, deals with the fast-changing nuances of the conflict transformation processes in and on Kashmir. Section II of the book, divided into five chapters, deals with the intricacies of India-Pakistan relations and the potential pathways towards peaceful coexistence.

http://www.samskritibookshelf.com/bookshelf/international-affairs/kashmir-and-indo-pak-relations-politics-of-reconciliation/

Demythifying Article 370

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

The Bharatiya Janata Party has clearly changed, or at least nuanced, it’s traditional stand on Article 370 by arguing that there should be a debate on the controversial constitutional provision. While Mr. Narendra Modi’s statement has provided us with an occasion to think about it, there are other equally important reasons why we must reflect on the Article. The most important of those reasons is that there are far too many myths surrounding it. Let me try and demythify some of them.

 
The myth about “special status”
The most prominent myth surrounding Article 370 is that as a result of its existence the J&K state has been “enjoying and benefitting from” some kind of special treatment.  It is widely believed that the special provision, which mandates that the Central Government cannot makes legislation for J&K except with respect to Defense, Foreign Relations and Communication, discriminates against other states. Is this the correct interpretation of Article 370? First of all, the Article today is a poor shadow of given the fact that New Delhi, in collusion with various government in J&K, has managed to chip away most of the provisions of the Article. So, in reality, the special status exists mostly on paper. What if the Article were to exist in its original shape and form today? Would it then mean that other Indian states are discriminated against? To my mind, that is really the wrong question to ask. Different Indian states are endowed with different historical, cultural, political and material realities which are part of their very essence and existence. Likewise, J&K has a special history in which it decided to join the Indian union. Article 370 is the result of that special history. It’s ironical that those who argue that since Article 370 is supposed to be “temporary”, it should therefore be done away with tend to forget another historical reality – the promise of plebiscite made to J&K by India. Is it not hypocritical then to talk about Article 370 and maintain a stony silence about the Plebiscite question?

‘Special provisions are only for Kashmir’ 
The other myth about Article 370 is that J&K is the only state with special status/provisions. There are many Indian states that have been given special provisions by the Indian constitution even though J&K can be considered as ‘enjoying’ the most amount of special provisions. Indeed, special laws/provisions are applicable to a number of states in India. If someone from Delhi or Punjab has to travel to Nagaland, for instance, he/she will have to first obtain an “inner line permit” to do so or will be denied entry into the state. In some parts of India, people from other parts are not allowed to buy land. Hence to argue that J&K is the only state that has been given special constitutional provisions is a factually incorrect argument.  

This leads me to a related point about why it is perhaps necessary in a country like India to have special constitutional or legal provisions for different regions, states and peoples. Some of those arguing against special provisions also point out that such provisions are inherently divisive and will create long-lasting problems in the achievement of national unity. Again this is a misleading argument for it privileges uniformity over unity: national unity does not require “uniformising” the country. More so, it’s the attempts at formulating uniform rules that can lead to problems in the country since most supporters of uniformity would insist that cultural, religious and other differences should be done away with. 

Those who worry about India’s integrity and the impact of Article 370 on it should take a look at China. While there is only one Chinese state, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan continue to have their own distinct economic and political systems. To my mind, it has only contributed to the national integrity of China. 

'Article 370 fuels separatist tendencies'
The other myth about Article 370 is that it has led to an increase in Kashmir’s separatist tendencies. Is that really the case? Is it the existence of Article 370 or it’s watering down by the Indian state that has contributed to separatist tendencies in Kashmir? Anyone with some familiarity with the history of J&K would know that New Delhi’s dubious, and successful, attempts at watering down Article 370 has been a major cause of disillusionment among the Kashmiris. In any case, those making the argument that Article 370 fuels separatism are conveniently forgetting the rampant violation of Kashmiris’ human and political rights that have most definitely increased the separatist tendencies in the state. 

'Poor people do not benefit from Article 370'
I don’t think all benefits are economic or material in nature, some benefits are political too. However, let me just say that a lot of poor people in J&K state would have lost their land by now had it not been for Article 370. Let me come back to the earlier point. It is dishonest to argue that only what benefits you materially and economically is useful. The point I am making is that everyone, poor or rich, equally deserves self-respect and political rights. To say that Kashmir’s poor do not bother with special political/constitutional rights is equivalent to saying that poor people are politically inadequate.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, December 8, 2013. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Dec/8/demythifying-article-370-5.asp)

Questions from Kashmir

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

I was in Srinagar last week to attend the release function of my recently published book, Kashmir and Indo-Pak relations: Politics of Reconciliation, organized by this newspaper, and to participate in a book discussion at the Kashmir University. I faced a number of intellectual challenges and well-thought-out questions both at the Institute of Kashmir Studies and Hotel Grand Mumtaz, where the book was released. Questions and challenges can unsettle and, sometimes, frustrate us. But they can also help us reflect and introspect. I chose to reflect and introspect, rather than be frustrated. Here’re some of the important issues/questions that came up during my interaction in Srinagar. 

Indian narrative? 
More than once was I asked whether my book was yet another ‘Indian’ narrative on the Kashmir question and if yes what would be the utility of such an exercise. A related question was about my acknowledgement in the book about my own inherent biases. It was pointed out to me that academics and analysts should be neutral and not biased. I clarified that mine is an ‘Indian narrative’ in so far I am an Indian, but it stops there. Not only that my views do not reflect the Indian state’s view on Kashmir, but more importantly, my views often present a counter-narrative to the Indian state’s traditional discourse on Kashmir. And yes, I am biased both by necessity and as a conscious choice. It’s a necessity because I don’t think biases can be done away with (we can only recognize them); it’s a conscious choice because column-writing, to my mind, involves a certain level of political activism, and discussing Kashmir from a particular political and ideological standpoint is a conscious choice I have made. Just that in this case, I have strong pro-Kashmir biases, whatever that means. 

The problem with inherent biases that we are not conscious of is that they create deeply embedded redlines in our intellectual pursuits. For instance, many Indian writers on Kashmir tend not to cross certain redlines on the Kashmir issue, redlines that are informed by the powerful pulls of the state propaganda. Hence, even those self-proclaimed liberals do not go beyond a point in critiquing the Indian state’s Kashmir policy.  This is not to negate another view that I hold about the Indian media: that the Indian media has also acted as an agent of change in so far as India’s new approach to Kashmir is concerned by virtue of promoting a certain multi-vocality on the Kashmir question. At the least, they have managed to demolish certain certitudes Indians had about Kashmir. 

The centrality of Kashmir in Indo-Pak relations
One of my fellow columnists in Greater Kashmir, Mehmood ur Rashid, reaffirmed, during the book discussion at the Kashmir University, a view that I have held for a very long time: if you ignore the centrality of Kashmir in the Indo-Pak conflict, you would be looking in the wrong place for a resolution for the India-Pakistan standoff. Kashmir is central to Indo-Pak reconciliation: there is no other way of making sustainable peace between the two nuclear-armed rivals. India and Pakistan have tried to freeze the Kashmir issue, sidestep it, ignore it, and undermine it by talking only about CBMs: nothing seems to have worked. The simple fact is that the Kashmir issue continues to create problems on the highroad to bilateral reconciliation because the demands and aspirations of the Kashmiris have been relegated to the backburner. That is simply not the way make peace between India and Pakistan. 

The ‘democracy bias’
Another question posed to me was on the elections in Kashmir. While some pointed out that most of the elections were not ‘genuine elections’, others pointed out that New Delhi seems to promote elections as a symbol of normalcy in Kashmir. I agree. Whenever Kashmiris come out to vote in great numbers, which happens especially during elections to the local bodies, Indian commentators see it as a sign of normalcy in Kashmir. This ‘democracy bias’ not only distorts serious analysis of the problem but also prevents the potential resolution of the issue. This ‘democracy bias’ also stems from a deep-seated Indian misunderstanding of the Kashmir conundrum: that the Kashmir conflict is simply about the electoral frustrations of the Kashmir people. 

The ‘governance trap’
The Indian (mis)understanding of the Kashmir problem also puts disproportionate focus  on the importance of governance in addressing the conflict, some others pointed out. Clearly, governance is important to Kashmir as it is perhaps to every other state in India. But to insist that Kashmir conflict is all about malgovernance or that good governance will do away with the Kashmir conflict are both flawed arguments. Conflict in Kashmir cannot be explained by using the ‘governance variable’. More importantly, the governance argument is a trap because once you accept that logic, the Kashmir conflict gets ‘normalised’ in the sense that it becomes just like any other conflict in the country, and there are a large number of governance-related problems in the country. 

My contradictions
Some of my discussants pointed out that there are many contradictions in the book. I agree. The contradictions in the book come from the fact that this book is a compilation of my op-ed pieces in GK and The Hindu over the past 5-6 years. Clearly, my views on Kashmir and Indo-Pak relations have changed over the last half a dozen years. I have evolved as a political commentator and I have no hesitation in saying so. Besides, I am not a great fan of the virtue called political consistency across different historical periods. When milieus change, so should our politics, because politics, at a certain level, is our response to what happens in the wider society around us. Moreover, writers and political commentators should evolve in their views of the world and how they respond to it. 

(Source: Greater Kashmir, December 1, 2013. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Dec/1/questions-from-kashmir-5.asp)

Romancing Pakistan

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

Exactly a week ago, the separatist leadership from the Kashmir Valley met with Mr. Sartaj Aziz, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's foreign policy advisor, in New Delhi. The meeting, first condemned by the BJP and then by the Indian Government, and attended by the major factions of Kashmir’s dissident movement, was no more than a headline-grabbing exercise. However, I must clarify that don’t see anything wrong with such meetings. Politicians, like others, of a country are free to meet politicians and officials of another country. More so, what was the hoopla surrounding this meeting given the fact that such meetings have happened in the past as well? 

If the Kashmiri leadership had time to meet Mr. Aziz, why don’t they meet the Indian officials and leadership as well? Yes, I know the answer: ‘What’s the point of talking to New Delhi when we know that nothing concrete will come out of such meetings as has been the case every time they talked to New Delhi?’ I agree. Talking to New Delhi has not changed the lives or the political destiny of the Kashmiris in any significant manner. But tell me, how on earth is Islamabad different from New Delhi in helping Kashmiris achieve their political aspirations? Has Islamabad been sincere about its support for Kashmir’s azadi movement? In fact, the official Pakistani position on Kashmir continues to be the merger of Kashmir with the former. Now that might suit Mr. Ali Shah Geelani, but would the other dissident leaders be able to digest that?  I don’t think so. 

Of course New Delhi’s politicians have consistently usurped the political rights of Kashmiris and its forces have violated the human rights of Kashmiris, time and again. What about Pakistan? Does it have a better scorecard? Has Islamabad not violated the human rights of Kashmiris? Have they not vitiated the indigenous azadi movement of the Kashmiris? If the Kashmiri dissidents say that Pakistan has not killed Kashmiris but has only provided political and diplomatic support to the Kashmir cause, they would either be delusional or would be bluffing their people. The fact is that Pakistan has not done a better job in Kashmir than India. Both are guilty of violating the rights of Kashmiris (yes, I agree that it is New Delhi, not Islamabad, that has the power to change the lives of Kashmiris for the better if it decides to do so, that is) and it should be said so. Remember, enemy’s enemy is not necessarily your friend; he may as well be your enemy too. 

What came out of the meeting? 

Did something concrete come out of this meeting between the Kashmiri dissident leadership and Sartaj Aziz? The truth is that nothing really came out of this meeting except of course providing an opportunity to the dissidents to show that they continue to have some importance in Kashmir. Pakistan as usual stuck to its position that they would politically and diplomatically support the Kashmir cause, which, we know, doesn’t mean much at the end of the day. Or is anyone thinking of making good use of the strategic ambiguity that would present itself post-2014? The possibility that Pakistan could give some ‘material help’ to Kashmir militancy once the US-led coalition withdraws from Afghanistan certainly exists. But those awaiting such an opportunity should realize that today’s Kashmir is not that of late 1980s and early 1990s: Kashmiris are tired of violence of all varieties, state and non-state included.  

What does Pakistan’s support mean for Kashmir?

Ali Shah Geelani's spokesman issued a statement after the Hurriyat leader’s meeting with Aziz: “Geelani told Aziz that Pakistan should continue to support the Kashmir cause politically as well as diplomatically, besides through other means, and highlight human rights violations in J&K at the hands of the security force”. For sure, Islamabad recently raised the issue at the UN, Shariff told Obama to mediate on Kashmir and of course raised the issue with the Indian side. To what effect? At the UN, let us face it, no one was interested in the Pakistani arguments. Obama’s focus was on the Taliban and Afghanistan, and yes, the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear assets, not on Kashmir. Indian side, as is to be expected, was more keen on Pakistani action of countering terrorism than talking about Kashmir. 

The point I am trying to make is simple and straightforward: In today’s milieu, Pakistan’s support for the Kashmir cause would not lead to anything and won’t mean much not only because of the prevailing international environment but also because of the internal debates within Pakistan about Kashmir. If anything, support by Pakistan would only mean bad omen for the Kashmir cause given Islamabad’s standing in the international system today. A lot of people may not like what I am saying, but to me this is crystal clear.  

More importantly, let me say this at the risk of repeating myself all over again: Kashmir’s dissident leadership should ask themselves whether it is a good idea to premise their azadi struggle on Pakistan and its support for it. I am not suggesting that the Kashmir question has no Pakistan angle but rather that Kashmir’s azadi struggle need not be seen as fundamentally related to the Pakistani state. In other words, the ontological existence and defining characteristics of Kashmir’s azadi struggle should be seen as divorced from the idea of Pakistan.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, November 17, 2013. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Nov/17/romancing-pakistan-61.asp)

The politics of honoring Malala

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

Malala Yousafzai is undoubtedly a brave girl and for having the sheer courage to continue to speak of the need to educate girl children in a place like Swat in Pakistan after having been shot in the head by the Taliban, all at the young age of 15, she deserves praise. Like many of you, I also wish there were many more like her amongst us, that our girl children had the courage to speak out against gender discrimination and that we listened to their dreams and hopes more often than we normally do. And yet I am not deeply saddened by the Nobel Peace Committee’s decision not to award Malala the coveted price this year. Indeed, if the Nobel Committee were to award her the peace prize, it would have convincingly persuaded us to forget about the politics behind honoring the young girl from Swat. Let me explain.

Malala is not the first person to have braved the bullets of obscurantist forces or fought for equality or justice. Many men and women among us have done that, and continue to do so. Picking Malala out of those countless people shows the manner in which the Western media and governments have tried to portray the political situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa  (KPK) in a simplified, black and white manner – the bad Taliban Vs. the good saviors of the West.

The timing of honoring Malala is even more curious – about a year before the scheduled withdrawal of the US and NATO forces from Afghanistan. The truth is that the Western forces are facing the embarrassing situation of having to withdraw from Afghanistan without achieving much success. There is no way that the West’s Afghan campaign can be considered a success. But perceptions and interpretations of their countries’ military campaigns matter a lot in the Western drawing rooms. 

Western governments know they can’t sell the story of ‘Afghan victory’ to their people and yet there is a need to justify the humanitarian angle of their soon-to-end Afghan campaign. It is important to instill a sense of ‘mission accomplished’ belief among people. Human-interest stories sell. Honoring of Malala by the Western leadership and governments has done precisely that.  

Selective Amnesia
Western governments habitually engage in self-imposed selective amnesia. The ongoing discourse about the Taliban brand of religious extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas, for instance, is seriously ahistorical. The Western governments who would like to ‘rescue’ the native women from the clutches of obscurantism and inequality should remind themselves of the dirty role they played in creating the conditions for it. The simple question that the White man (and Woman), charged with high levels of missionary zeal, should ask himself/herself is whether their own governments had a role in bringing extremism to Pakistan and Afghanistan in the 1980s. Not only did the American and other governments fund the Mujahideen war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s with help from Pakistan but also did a great deal to create the necessary social, religious and intellectual conditions for the fight against the Soviets. Pervez Hoodbhoy, a Pakistani academic, says that US grants were extensively used on the intellectual war front.  Large amounts of American money went in to publishing textbooks that blasted Marxism and instilled faith in and fervour for militant Islamism. He picks a crudely comic example from a fourth-grade mathematics textbook to illustrate the weird methods used to influence the mind of the Afghan child: “One group of mujahideen attacked 50 Russian soldiers. In that attack 20 Russians are killed.  How many Russians fled?”

A 2002-report published by the International Crisis Group says that these textbooks were published in Dari and Pushtun, designed by the Centre for Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska, Omaha, under a USAID grant in the early 1980s.  While these books were printed in Pakistan, the university received $51 million for the work it did. They were then distributed in the Afghan refugee camps and Pakistani madrasas.  

Are the natives fundamentally uncivilized? 
The subtext of the Western discourse about the situation in Pakistan’s KPK and Afghanistan is that the people and societies therein are essentially uncivilized and the rest of the world would need to do a lot of work in civilizing them. While not many of us would have a problem in critiquing the kind of religious extremism and social obscurantism that is prevent in some parts of those societies, we would be doing a great intellectual disservice to ourselves if we forget to recall the progressive history of those places. There is enough literature out there providing ample evidence of how progressive Kabul and surrounding areas were in the 1960s and 1970s. There was a time when educating girls was a social norm in Kabul and it was not compulsory for women to wear a veil covering their heads. The CIA-directed Mujahideen war in the 1980s and the rise of the Taliban (helped by the ISI and unimpeded by the CIA) in the 1990s put an end to all of that. It is convenient for the Western governments today to talk about the need to bring about women’s liberation and girls’ education in KPK and Afghanistan and easy for the western media to publish heartwarming stories about Malala. But it would neither be easy nor convenient for them to recall how their own governments played a crucial role in the making of contemporary Afghanistan and KPK.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, October 20, 2013. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Oct/20/the-politics-of-honoring-malala-5.asp)