In the name of Khan

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

The recent controversy and the politics thereafter in the name of Shah Rukh Khan was triggered by an article entitled “Being a Khan” that the Bollywood actor wrote in the Outlook magazine in January 2013. Pakistan’s half-witted Interior Minister Rehman Malik, obviously without having read the article, offered an unsolicited piece of advice to the Indians: “He (Shahrukh) is born Indian and he would like to remain Indian, but I will request the government of India (to) please provide him security”. The actor clarified saying that he is safe and secure in India. The Indian Home Secretary responded to Pakistan, “We are capable of looking after the security of our own citizens. Let him (Rehman Malik) worry about his own.” To add fuel to fire, the Chief of Jamiat Ulema-I-Hind, Mahmood Madani said, “It is better to die than to live a life with the support of Pakistan.”

This might look like a straightforward and sequential narration of a recent controversy that is no more the headline of the day. Since this column is late by a day this week, I have had some free Sunday time to deconstruct the politics that lies beneath this otherwise inconsequential controversy. Of course, I am reading into it, but then that’s what I do for a living. 

The politics of competitive protection
The Khan controversy is nothing new in the India-Pakistan context. A considerable amount of Indians and Pakistanis revel in pointing out that the minorities on the other side of the border are unsafe, that they would be better served if they were elsewhere (meaning if they crossed over), and often offering unsolicited protection to those “persecuted” by the other side. Of course, those indulging in this politics of competitive protection do not bother with what might happen to the minorities once they become the enemy country’s object of protection. The Pakistani offer of protection to the Indian Muslims and the return offer to Pakistani Hindus by the Indian side have only made their lives worse. More importantly, there is a need to take a step back and ‘read further into’ this protection offer from a sociological point of view. Legendary historian Charles Tilly argued that governments are in the habit of running ‘protection rackets’. Governments extract resources from people in exchange of giving them protection from dangers which, Tilly famously observes, are often imaginary or are created by the governments themselves by their own activities. Those Indian and Pakistani leaders who are in the ‘business of offering protection’ to select audiences on the other side should consider for a moment whether their own actions are contributing to insecurity and danger for those they are offering to protect. 

Politics of ownership
There is also a politics of ownership that is being played out here. When the Pakistani statesmen talk about protection for Kashmiris and other Muslims in India and when Indians talk about the need to protect Hindus in Pakistan, what they are actually doing is symbolically crossing the border to own a part of the other country’s construction of the self. Making sure that the objects of their concern, Kashmiris, Muslims and Hindus, are indeed safe is really not their objective, and we know that for sure from history. Consider, for instance, the fact that both India and Pakistan have killed scores of Kashmiris in the name of protecting them! 

Politics of hate 
Lurking under the politics of protection is also the politics of hate. The Shiv Sena which lost no time in responding to Rehman Malik, has in the past threatened Shah Rukh Khan, more than once. In 2010, for instance, when Shah Rukh, himself a IPL team owner, argued that Pakistani players should allowed to play in IPL games and that 'Mumbai belongs to all Indians', the Shiv Sena asked Shah Rukh to apologise or face the consequences. How ironical it is then that they are today claiming that “the Indian government is capable of protecting its citizens”. Wonder who will protect Shah Rukh from the Siv Sena! 

On the other side of the border the Jamaat-ud Dawa (JuD) chief Hafiz Saeed invited Shah Rukh back to his ‘original homeland’ so that he could be safe there. That this comes from a man whose ideology and designs have killed scores of Indians and Pakistanis, including Muslims, shows the irony of the politics of hate.

Politics of symbolic protection
Another famous American historian, Frederic Lane, examining the interlinked development of war making, state making, and capital accumulation, argued that the “governments are in the business of selling protection ... whether people want it or not”. Indeed, this is precisely what we are seeing today where some overzealous and over-concerned Pakistanis are offering protection to Shah Rukh Khan, Indian Muslims and even to the Kashmiris even when the ‘objects of their protection’ do not want it. 

The government of India justifies the stationing of the Indian armed forces in Kashmir and the continuation of special legal provisions such as the Public Safety Act, Armed Forces Special Powers Act and the Disturbed Areas Act on the basis of the need to provide protection to the people of Kashmir when the Kashmiris do not need or want such protection, and have consistently made that argument clear to the government in New Delhi. The problem is that governments, including the one in New Delhi, are so used to the logic and rationale of ‘protection business’ that they ‘force’ protection on people without bothering to ask the people what their real aspirations/needs are. What is even more unfortunate is that this “uncalled for” protection itself is responsible for the insecurity of the Kashmiris.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, February 5, 2013. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Feb/5/in-the-name-of-khan-16.asp )

Verma Committee’s AFSPA Rrecommendations

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

Kashmiri leaders, both mainstream and dissident, have hailed Justice J. S Verma Committee’s report on Amendments to the Indian Criminal Law, and rightly so. While human rights violations in Kashmir in general and molestation of Kashmiri women in particular hardly provoke the conscience of the Indian middle class, the Verma Committee, constituted to pacify the anger of the powerful Indian middle class, has brought to light the need to be concerned about the dignity of women in conflict areas such as Kashmir and the immorality and irrationality of legal instruments like the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). 

I have just finished reading the 600 plus-page long report submitted by the Verma Committee and I hope that this is indeed the beginning of a number of much-needed legal, judicial, administrative and police reforms in this country. The only concern is that numerous commissions and committees in the past have submitted reports and recommendations to the Government of India on each of these issues but not many recommended reforms have been carried out. Commissions and their recommendations are often used as time-buying strategies by the ruling regimes, and the people of Kashmir are well aware of that. 

On the question of AFSPA the Verma committee makes the following important observations: “At the outset, we notice that impunity for systematic or isolated sexual violence in the process of Internal Security duties is being legitimized by the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which is in force in large parts of our country. It must be recognized that women in conflict areas are entitled to all the security and dignity that is afforded to citizens in any other part of our country….There is an imminent need to review the continuance of AFSPA and AFSPA-like legal protocols in internal conflict areas as soon as possible. This is necessary for determining the propriety of resorting to this legislation in the area(s) concerned”.  A close and careful reading of these statements would reveal that this is a clear indictment of the atrocities committed in placed like Kashmir in the name of national security. 

The politics behind AFSPA abolition 
Over the past few years, the issue of AFSPA abolition has become the centerpiece of political debates in Kashmir. More so, it has also become a bargaining tool in the hands of politicians and various institutional interests in New Delhi and in the Valley. In 2011, when P. Chidambaram was still the Home Minister, there was a great deal of support in New Delhi to do away with the draconian legislation. Both the Home Minister and the Prime Minister seemed to be in favour of removing it from Kashmir while the Defense Minister, keen to pander to the parochial and institutional interests of the Armed Forces, was the only political leader opposed to it (of course, this does not include the Congress leaders in Kashmir such as Saifudeen Soz who have argued in favour of continuing with the controversial piece of legislation). 

What is unfortunate is that even though the infiltration rates have come down from the 2011 levels, New Delhi is still not serious about removing AFSPA from the valley. More so, there is more opposition to the removal of AFSPA today than there was in 2011. With Sushil Kumar Shinde, the new Union Home Minister, arguing during his visit to Kashmir late last year that “I know that peace has returned in Jammu and Kashmir with the consistent efforts of people. But this doesn’t mean that we can take risk and remove the AFSPA immediately”, it is now clear that the opposition to removing AFSPA has yet another strong opponent in New Delhi along with the Defense Ministry and the armed forces. Thanks to the recent LoC flare-up, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is unlikely to say anything in the near future about removing AFSPA. 

Talk is cheap
From Barack Obama to Rahul Gandhi to Omar Abdullah, one thing seems to be common: “preach about change all the time, but never practice it”. Greenhorns in politics tend to climb the political ladder by playing to the revolutionary fantasies of common people. Chief Minister Omar Abdullah’s occasional statements on AFSPA peppered with anger and outrage, carefully calibrated and nationally televised, should be seen in that light. It is easy talk about the removal of AFSPA as it is easily one of the most popular things to do in today’s Kashmir, but it takes a great deal of political courage to actually do something about it. Omar Abdullah should use all the bargain tactics in the trick book of coalition politics and force the Congress party to heed to the voice of the Kashmiri people. Come the next Assembly election in J&K, there is no doubt that the AFSPA issue will be single most important litmus test of Omar Abdullah’s government’s performance in the state. Or is it that the Abdullah scion is waiting for the elections to approach in order to increase the heat on the AFSPA issue? Wouldn’t that be a bit too late? 

AFSAP, let us face it, continues to be a tool of human rights violations in the valley and it is now duly confirmed by a (Verma) high-level Panel appointed by the Government of India. Late last year, a well-researched report entitled “Alleged Perpetrators - Stories of Impunity in Jammu and Kashmir” put out by the International Peoples Tribunal on Human Rights and Justice in Indian-Administered Kashmir [IPTK] took pains to examine the issue in great detail. Politicians in New Delhi and Srinagar should read these reports carefully and take steps to remove AFSPA from the valley once and for all.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, January 27, 2013. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Jan/27/verma-committee-s-afspa-rrecommendations-57.asp )

Shootout at LoC: In perspective

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

The recent India-Pakistan conflict on the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir and the war of words have grave implications for the future of the bilateral ties for the two countries. The conflict along the LoC, while not unprecedented since scores of them take place every year, has escalated due to a combination of factors: the hawkish claims of the Indian media, increasingly outspoken Indian armed forces, the Congress government which is unclear which direction to take the India-Pakistan dialogue process and the characteristic denial of the Pakistani state of what has been done to the dead bodies of the Indian soldiers. While the Central government, unwilling to articulate a clear policy towards Pakistan and follow it up with conviction, is on the back foot on the issue, it is the Chiefs of the Indian Army and Air Force along with a collection of retired military officers, egged on by the media, who seem to be articulating an Indian response to the Pakistani aggression on the LoC.  

New Delhi wanted to continue with ‘business as usual’ with Pakistan, but the Indian military and the overzealous, if not militant, media stalled those plans. This is a clear indication that New Delhi’s Pakistan policy lacks direction, conviction and courage. 

Dangers of conflict escalation
That the senior most military officers in India have chosen to convey to Pakistan that India would not mind “escalating” the conflict if Pakistan does not stop engaging in ceasefire violations is both puzzling and disconcerting. The BJP went on to ask the government to engage in “controlled military response” against Pakistan!” Former BJP minister Yashwant Sinha argued, “Who says that if you have a limited controlled military response then it will necessarily result in war?” These arguments by the military and the Chief opposition party in India seem to sum up the conventional wisdom in the country on the utility of flexible responses in responding to Pakistan in times of crisis.  

Anyone with an elementary understanding of conflict escalation under nuclear conditions would surely refrain from articulating such views for the simple reason that the escalation dynamics under nuclear conditions would be inherently unpredictable and unstable, especially when high-running nationalistic passions dictate defence policies. The fact of the matter is that in nuclear South Asia, flexible options without the risk of a nuclear catastrophe are simply unavailable. The biggest challenge for the leaders of the two sides today is to put in place robust mechanisms that can ensure crisis stability – strong incentives not to carry out a preemptive attack on the adversary in times of crisis of this kind. 

The flag meeting that took place between the two armies is an excellent mechanism to ensure crisis stability so is the hotline between the two DGMOs. However, there is a need to think of more innovative ways of maintaining crisis stability in the region. 

The costs of conflict
While it is clear that there are no winners in this kind of a confrontation, there are clear losers in unfortunate events such as this. In short, what happens in conflicts such as this is the following: minor skirmishes or misunderstandings lead to a militarized crisis, media then drives passions, CBMs are suspended and a war of words ensue, and eventually the conflict is deescalated. Finally bilateral relations are back to how they were before the crisis begun minus, of course, the CBMs that were suspended during the crisis. It takes yet more rounds of negotiations for the CBMs to restart and trust to be built. This ‘one-step-ahead-two-steps-backward’ sequence of events seems to characterize India Pakistan bilateral relations.  

To my mind, India loses from this kind of conflict far more than Pakistan. Why? The fact is that if India wants to become the global power that it would like to, it has no option but to stabilize its fronts. India’s economic growth and rise in its global political power will be severely hampered by what happens in Pakistan and as a result in Kashmir. Hence India would be shooting at its own foot if it tries to break off the peace process and sever relations with the civilian government in Islamabad. The fact is that New Delhi needs Islamabad and GHQ to reign in the terror groups in Pakistan. 

India has also gained more from the ongoing (?) peace process than has Pakistan. There is already a strong feeling in Pakistan that the peace process is more in favour of India than Pakistan and it is being taken forward on India’s terms and conditions. The argument is premised on the facts that the traditionally core issue of political resolution of Kashmir and demilitarisation of Siachen, something that Islamabad and GHQ are very keen to see resolved, are relegated to the backburner and ‘secondary’ issues like trade and easing of visa restrictions, important from the Indian point of view, are being pursued. 

If this argument is true, that is Pakistan has no great interest in seeing this peace process survive in which India has great stakes, then we should recognize that it would be foolish for New Delhi to even consider severing the dialogue process with Islamabad. 

Moreover, if India wants to see genuine political transformation in Pakistan, it should make sure that the hands of the civilian government in Islamabad, one that is going to complete its full term for the first time in the country’s history, is strengthened, rather then weakened, by its actions.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, January 20, 2013. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Jan/20/shootout-at-loc-in-perspective-30.asp )

The mindless LoC killings

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

The tit-for-tat barbarian killings of the Indian and Pakistani soldiers by each other along the LoC and the passions running high on each side spearheaded by the ultranationalist media is straight out of a medieval military mindset. Not only has the media on both sides been asking for more and more blood to trump up their TRP ratings, but a prominent Indian news channel, absurdly, also argued it was OK for the Pakistani army to kill Indian soldiers: “Retaliation OK, but mutilation unacceptable”! 
The ongoing Indo-Pak killing spree is unfortunate and will undoubtedly be a major set back for the India-Pakistan peace process. But before we get to that, let us look at the barebones account of what happened/is happening.

Facts and FictionThere seems to be a great deal of misunderstanding among the general public that this is the first ceasefire violation that is happening along the LoC. That is inaccurate as every year tens of such violations take place. Indeed, in 2011 alone there were around 120 ceasefire violations. The fact is that these violations take place quite regularly, and sometimes even lives are lost. Secondly, media on both sides of the divide seem to project that only soldiers belonging to their respective side have lost lives. Again, as we know both Indian and Pakistani soldiers have lost their lives as well as villagers in Kashmir, and that is unfortunate: a life lost is a life lost, Indian, Pakistani or Kashmiri. The third fact to consider is that soldiers, all over the world, when seeking revenge for the killing of their colleagues, do engage in the torture of enemy soldiers. While it is the Pakistani side that has engaged in this barbaric act this time (in retaliation to the killing of one of their soldiers by the Indian side), let us not fool ourselves in thinking that the Indian side has never engaged in such acts. The Pakistani media has often carried stories of Indian brutalities. 

Is there a Pakistani strategy behind all this?
An important question to be asked at this point is whether the Pakistani side has any clever strategy behind the present ceasefire violation that has led to this crisis? Frankly, I don’t think so. I can’t see any political, diplomatic or military benefit that Islamabad or Rawalpindi can get out of this. Was it a strategy to put pressure on the Indian side to resolve the Kashmir conflict? Unlikely, as Pakistan knows by now that such a strategy would never lead to the resolution of Kashmir. Was it a repeat of Kargil type stealth strategy wherein Pakistan was trying to sneak its soldiers into the Indian territory and then fight to retain it? Such a scenario is also unlikely as lessons from Kargil have convinced Pakistan that such a strategy would not work. 

Or is it the Pakistan Army’s way of showing its displeasure with the ongoing peace process between New Delhi and the civilian establishment in Islamabad and thereby indicating that it wants the peace process to be suspended? Again, this to me does not seem to be the logic since Pak army has recently been making noises about the need to confront the internal ghosts rather than worrying about India. More importantly, a charitable explanation would suggest that letting the peace process go on would give the Pak army the necessary time to focus on the internal problems, recuperate and then focus on India, if need be, when the internal issues are settled. But the fact is that its internal problems are far from over. Indeed, they are constantly increasing. 

If anything, this event will frustrate Pakistan’s ‘normalisation’ process and its much-needed focus on domestic issues. The peace process is in Pakistan’s interest as much as it is in India’s interest. Hence, Pakistan will stand to lose from this crisis as much as India would. 

What about the return of Tahir-ul-Qadri who has been challenging the Pakistani establishment since his return from Canada? Has his return to Pakistan, the wide publicity he is receiving and the fear that he may, at this rate, influence the outcome of this year’s elections in Pakistan prompted Pakistani establishment to engage in a classic diversionary tactic? Again, I don’t think that is the case purely because the sequence of events does not suggest that. Qadri returned to Pakistan on the 23rd of December and the roots of this crisis predate that. 

Implications
What are the long-term implications of this crisis? Clearly, the ongoing crisis has shown how fragile the Indo-Pak dialogue peace process is. If this kind of an incident has the potential to deeply frustrate the Indo-Pak dialogue, what would be the result of a repeat of Mumbai? Secondly, the many CBMs between the two sides are likely to be stalled. Pakistan has already suspended the Srinagar-Muzzaffarabad bus. The cross-LoC trade between India and Pakistan in Kashmir is put on hold due to the crisis and the traders are losing huge amounts of their investments. Finally, this crisis shows the how much each side distrusts the other. 

What is ironical is that while India does not trust any inquiry conducted by Pakistan into the mutilation of the bodies of the Indian soldiers, it also does not accept any international inquiry since it does not want to internationalise the issue. And what is unfortunate is the manner in which Pakistan goes about denying that its soldiers have actually crossed into India and did what it did. It’s perhaps time to think of innovative ways of resolving the crisis.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 13 January, 2013. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Jan/13/the-mindless-loc-killings-10.asp )

India’s Regional Dilemmas

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

India has long been accused of being the regional hegemon that often tries to intervene in the internal affairs of its smaller South Asian neighbours, or bully them into doing its bidding. Many of the country’s neighbours maintain that the various Indian institutions, especially its bureaucracy, continue to think and behave like the erstwhile British Empire. While there may or may not be some truth in that, recent developments in the region tell a different story altogether. 

The Maldivian government recently decided to declare the multi-year contract that it had signed with the India-based G. M. Rao Group to run their international airport, and did so unilaterally without heeding to requests from New Delhi to reconsider its decision. India’s new External Affairs Minister Salman Kurshid’s calls to his counterpart in Maldives did not manage to convince the country to alter its decision. Remember, India provides a great deal of economic and military assistance to the tiny state in the Indian Ocean region. Indeed, last year when the then President of Maldives was dethroned in a not-so-proper manner, he had asked India to intervene and reinstate him as the President. He was widely considered to be close to India, but New Delhi did nothing. It simply did not want to interfere in the internal politics of another sovereign country. Reports now indicate, or least G. M Rao, the head of GMR Group, claims, that ‘foreign hands’ – meaning Chinese – were responsible for the ouster of the GMR Group from Maldives. 

Take the case of Sri Lanka. Developments in the last few years show that the island county, which recently managed to militarily defeat the LTTE, is no more dependent on or tolerant of India as it used to for many decades in the past including officially requesting India to intervene in its internal affairs to defeat the LTTE. India did not even provide Colombo with weapons let alone actively intervening Sri Lanka’s civil war after its intervention there in the late 1980s went terribly wrong. But the Chinese sensed an opportunity and helped Colombo, again. Now, as a result, Colombo and Sri Lanka are getting closer by the day. 

In Myanmar, prior to its ongoing transition phase (of becoming a normal mature democracy), India was asked by the democratic forces there including its leader Ang San Sukyi and the international community, though in indirect terms, to play a role in leading Myanmar towards democracy. India did not do so primarily because of the Chinese closeness to Myanmar’s junta. India feared that if it went against the ruling military regime in Myanmar it would pave the way for an increased involvement of China there which would be against India’s strategic interests. Nor could India make up its mind to support the Junta fearing reprisals from the pro-democracy activists and the international community. As a result, India did not have traction with either of the groups, the junta or the pro-democracy groups. India was losing out either way. Ang San Sukyi said in a recent interview in New Delhi that she had wished that India had done more to help the cause of democracy in Myanmar. 

What do all these mean?  Is India really losing its influence and sway in the region? For the land of Jawaharlal Nehru, who was one of the most respected world leaders of his time, an architect of the Non Aligned Movement and contributed a great deal to resolving many international conflicts, these failures in the neighbourhood can be seen as a historic low. For a country that is so often criticized for its hegemonic behavior in the neighbourhood, it doesn’t even seem to be able to take care of its genuine business interests in the region. 

What explains this incongruence between perceptions and results in the Indian behavior towards the region? There seem to be a number of variables at play here. First of all, there is a clear Chinese angle here which offsets the Indian efforts in the region. China is willing to extend military, economic and other forms of help to the various South Asian states with hardly any preconditions attached. Their fundamental objective is strategic leverage and economic benefit in the pursuit of which they are willing to forgo ethical and human rights considerations. Chinese involvement in Myanmar and Sri Lanka are clear examples of that. This has frustrated the Indian policy in the region since India is constrained by a number of non-strategic and non-economic factors in its foreign policy pursuits. The second aspect is the lack of institutional coordination and the general lack of foreign policy purpose. Often there is no cohesive and consultative foreign and foreign economic strategy making by the various concerned Indian institutions in India. 

Thirdly, Indian foreign policy pursuits and behaviour are severely hamstrung by deeply ingrained normative considerations and moral dilemmas that the country has inherited over many decades of its independence as well as from its own non-violent freedom struggle. For India, its foreign policy decisions and commitments have to pass the test of its moral preconditions and ethical standards. This means that apart from the fact that it would find it difficult to interfere in the internal affairs of another state and support regimes that violate human rights of its people, it would also find it difficult to forgo its peaceful and defensive posturing to engage in force projection outside its borders. These self-perceived moral and ethical aspects are now further ‘complicated’ by India’s openness to and interface with various international normative standards. 

There are no easy answers to any of these dilemmas faced by India especially when there is another actor that is quite willing to operate under a completely different set of standards which gives a certain ‘freedom of choice’ to the many states of India’s neighbourhood.

(SOurce: Greater Kashmir, December 23, 2012. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/Dec/23/india-s-regional-dilemmas-21.asp )

Bon Voyage, Mirwaiz

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

The All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC-M) leadership is currently in Pakistan after a gap of five years to hold discussions with the Pakistani leadership, creating yet another controversy. I have often been critical of APHC’s political course of action despite the personal admiration that I have for the Mirwaz, Umar Faroq, and some of the others in the group. For one, but for the calm and non-condescending personality of Umar Farooq, the coalition of over 20 parties would not have stayed under the same political roof for such a long time. 

Not unsurprisingly, the APHC and the Mirwaiz are being criticized by a number of Kashmiri intellectuals for undertaking this trip to Pakistan: while some of it is valid, most of the criticism is unfair and misplaced. Here’s why. 

Limited agenda and bad timing 
Critics are right that the APHC is visiting Pakistan with a limited agenda and at a bad time. While one wonders why APHC chose to visit Pakistan at a time when Pakistan itself is in deep political flux. Didn’t they know that in politics timing is everything? The elections are around the corner in Pakistan and the present regime there is most likely going to lose power in upcoming elections. The current President may not even be in the country after the elections thanks to the many cases of corruption pending against him. Hence anything that APHC discusses with the current regime will bear limited dividends in the days to come. I think there is some validity in this argument. What about the rationale for the visit? I am not too convinced that the APHC could have asked for anything better under the circumstances. Let me explain. First of all, so much water has gone under the bridge since the 2007 visit of APHC to Pakistan. For one, Indo-Pak relations and the peace process were at their height in 2007 and more so there was a certain peace deal that was being finalized between the two sides with the full knowledge of the AHPC (they may or may not acknowledge that though). Today, the dialogue process is just picking up; the major stakeholders in the region are waiting for the US-NATO pullout to begin from Afghanistan; and nothing in New Delhi and Islamabad will have any political shape or form till the new governments come to power in these two countries. Hence there are far too many variables that need to fall in place for anything concrete to happen on something as vexed as the Kashmir conflict. So under these circumstances, the APHC could have either waited or started mediating: they have chosen the latter.  

More so, the two countries have now seriously begun their talks on all outstanding issues including Kashmir. Therefore, it makes perfect sense for the APHC to insist that the Kashmiri opinion is heard when they talk to each other about Kashmir. 

It’s now or God-knows-when
Secondly, five years, let’s face it, is a very long time. If the APHC does not visit Pakistan now, they might as well wait for three more years since one hopes that by 2015 we might have a clearer understanding of where the region is heading. So it’s now or God-knows-when. 

But then why visit Pakistan at all? Let me quote the Mirwaiz: “The purpose of the visit would be to bring Kashmir to the fore. We would stress on Islamabad to bring Kashmir back on its agenda…we want to clear the impression that the CBMs on small issues like trade are not going to help Kashmir. You have to address Kashmir issue to bring permanent stability in South Asia.”

To do so the APHC will be meeting with Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf, Foreign Minister Heena Rabbani Khar, PML-N Chief Nawaz Sharief, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf leader Imran Khan and leaders form the PAK.

To my mind, for the APHC to have achieved anything more than this is asking for far too much. 

Why it is a good visit
I would go on to argue that there is a symbolic political value to this visit. First of all, by planning and undertaking this important political visit the APHC is proving that they still have the resourcefulness and wisdom to negotiate between the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan which happens to be the primary aim of the coalition. Indeed, this visit should be seen in keeping with one of the declared aims of APHC as laid down in their constitution: “To make endeavour for an alternative negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dispute amongst all the three parties to the dispute -- India, Pakistan and people of the Jammu and Kashmir -- under the auspices of UN or any other friendly countries, provided that such settlement reflects the will and aspirations of the people of the state.”
Secondly, this visit also highlights the distinct and special place that Kashmir has in Indo-Pak relations. What should be noted here is that this visit is being organized with the green signal from New Delhi. 

While APHC’s critics have used this to argue that it is acting under the directions of New Delhi, I would adopt a different line of argument. APHC is not an underground organization and if it has to visit Pakistan to talk to them on behalf of the Kashmiri people, there is no way they can do so without the go ahead from New Delhi. This does not in any way mean that APHC is compromising on their basic goals by deciding to use Indian travel documents: after all, this visit is a part of the agenda to change that very status quo. More so, if the declared objective of the APHC is to negotiate between the two states, how can they do so without visiting, meeting and talking to the two sides? Indeed, if anything, the Hurriyat has to be more proactive in talking to both India and Pakistan. 

In other words, what the APHC’s detractors are missing is the political message and symbolism of this visit. How often do you see a dissident group from India visiting a foreign country to negotiate between the two countries? Never. That is precisely what the Mirwaiz and the senior leadership of the APHC is doing in Pakistan now and that is precisely why they are doing the right thing.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 16 December 2012. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/Dec/16/bon-voyage-mirwaiz-19.asp )

Why death penalty is immoral

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

Killing someone is not an occasion to celebrate. Indeed, rejoicing as a nation at the killing of someone, even if he is a dreaded terrorist or criminal, shows the moral degradation of that society. If anything, the detailed, blow-by-blow account of the events relating to the hanging of Ajmal Amir Kasab, the terrorist who shot scores of innocents in Mumbai on 26/11, and the ensuing ‘widespread celebration’ thereafter, are deeply disturbing and forces one to reflect over crime, punishment and moral progress in our country. 

Death penalty as spectator sport 
Popular reactions and the jubilant media coverage of the ‘secret execution’ of Kasab bears an uncanny resemblance to the use of death penalty as a sport in 18th century Europe, intended for purposes of deterrence and to demonstrate the might of the state. Public execution of condemned prisoners even earned the state some revenue as spectators had to pay to witness the gory sight (there were of course no TV channels that could boost up their TRP ratings then!). The Taliban in Afghanistan as well as some other countries continue to use the method of public execution. Killing of criminals by the state, in public or private, negatively affects the moral core of the society as it clearly violates the sanctity of human life. More so, there is a thin line between the use of death penalty for deterrence and public execution as spectator sport as both the acts end up legitimizing the killing of another human being. What is problematic here is the killing of a human person; legitimate or not depends on the moral order that one lives in. In any case, empirical research has shown that death penalty only kills the criminal, not the crime. There is no correlation between the two and so we have to conclude that deterrence cannot be the logic behind the death penalty. 

Meaning of justice 
One of the major claims made by the supporters of death penalty is that by awarding death to the perpetrator of a heinous crime the state is providing justice to the victim’s families. While this is a powerful argument, one fails to see how killing the criminal can provide justice to the victim’s family. Notwithstanding the fact that the state, as per this line of argumentation, is seen as a ‘contract killer’, what it actually does, on many occasions, by killing the criminal, is ‘compensating’ for real justice that it is unable/unwilling to provide. The EU memorandum on death penalty, for instance, says: “capital punishment should not be seen as an appropriate way of compensating the suffering of crime victims’ families, as this view turns the justice system into a mere tool of illegitimate private vengeance.” In other words, most states limit their provision of justice to awarding death to the criminal instead of a) providing material and psychological support to the victim’s families, b) ensuring that such crimes are not repeated by adopting preventive measures, and c) understanding the sociological, psychological and economic contexts which created the criminal in the first peace and addressing them. 

Killing a criminal is easy, but preventing crime is a complex process that the state is often unwilling to undertake. Theoretically, therefore, it is even possible to see a positive correlation between the extent of a state’s inability to protect the lives of its people and the severity of the punishment meted out to the criminals. 

Society and crime
Those advocating capital punishment often tend to imagine that crime is committed in a social vacuum, and claim that crime is essentially social deviance.  A more sophisticated understanding of criminal behaviour would require us to see it as a result of social conditioning and the moral, political, and psychological conditions that the doer of a particular crime finds himself or herself in. The tendencies to overlook this important sociological aspect of crime and, more importantly, self-righteously isolate the rest of the society from the criminal lead to an unproblematised understanding of crime and criminal behaviour. 

Supporters ofdeath penalty should consider for a moment that those who do good deeds are not born with better genes; they just happen to be exposed to better social conditioning and conditions. The argument here is not intended to deprive individual humans of their moral agency to choose good over evil, but rather to point out that in many cases, social conditioning and conditions have a great role to play in the making of a criminal.  Take the example of Kasab. Much of the information available on the 26/11 terrorist suggest that he comes from a social background where being a jihadi and waging jihad in the name of Islam are seen as laudable. Indeed, the religious indoctrination he was subjected to clearly convinced him that he was engaging in a noble endavour in the name of God. While that does not justify what he did, it certainly enlightens us on where our focus should be if we were to eradicate terrorism from our midst. 

Why modern societies should not kill
If one is persuaded to agree with the argument that societies can not absolve themselves completely of the crimes that criminals commit, then it is only logical that societies should not only take part of the blame but also should adopt such methods to rehabilitate criminals which does not involve the violent removal of the criminal from the society. Moreover, states and societies have no right to play ‘God’ not just because societies have to accept part of the blame for the crimes in their midst but more importantly because by giving the state the right to kill individuals, we are erroneously awarding the state absolute power over our lives which in the long term would have significant negative implications. Gone are the days when we thought that our rulers and governments were infallible; today we know that they habitually make mistakes. 

Fighting terrorism
It is increasingly understood today that the phenomenon of terrorism symbolizes the moral, political and philosophical challenges that our societies face; the gun-wielding terrorist is a symbol of a larger socio-political malady. The only way to defeat terrorism or extremism is to fight it politically and with the power of ideas. By merely killing the individuals who are, in a sense, as much victims of their ideology, we will not be able to defeat terrorism. It’s time our governments realized that we can’t defeat unconventional and ideological threats such as terrorism and religious extremism using conventional means of discipline and punishment. Our ‘war’ on terrorism has to start its fight from the root causes as well as address the sanctity for violence that exists in our societies that gives rise to terrorism in the first place. Indeed, symptomatic treatment of such a deep-rooted malaise will prove to be counterproductive. 

India and the global norms India as a nation has always prided itself in being one of the few islands of liberalism, tolerance, enlightenment values and non-violence in the developing world. Practice of death penalty is undeniably one significant blot on the collective conscience of such a forward-looking society. At a time when most of the contemporary international community is moving towards delegitimizing death penalty, India, by executing Kasab, seems to be going against the world opinion. Moreover, by hanging Kasab, we have discarded our own self-imposed moratorium on death penalty. A country that has long struggled to advocate a moral international order, based on the visions of Gandhi and Nehru, and one that now wants to be a major norm maker of a reformed and egalitarian international system should have a more liberal and humanitarian approach to crime and punishment. Fyodor Dostoyevsky once observed, “The degree of civilization in a society can be judged by entering its prisons”. The continued presence of archaic forms of punishment, including death penalty, can also tell us a lot about the moral character of our societies. Regrettably, India failed to be on the side of nations that voted to adopt a recent UN Resolution asking states to put in place a moratorium on executions in order to eventually abolish the death penalty. 

The politics of Kasab’s hanging
The Congress party, under whose rule both the 26/11 carnage and the hanging of Kasab took place, has not, thankfully, exhibited any triumphalism after sending the Pakistan-born terrorist to gallows. While that is commendable, what is missing from the debate generated by the hanging of Kasab are questions such as how 26/11 was allowed to happen in the first place and what improvements have hence been put in place in the national security management of the country to take care of the crucial lapses that made 26/11 possible. The Mumbai police and the Union Home Ministry had claimed after the 26/11 attacks that they would make the Indian coast impenetrable to the country’s enemies. Clearly, nothing much has happened on that front, various media reports suggest that. If we think that by hanging Kasab we have taken care of our national security, we are sadly mistaken.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 09 DECEMBER 2012. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/Dec/9/why-death-penalty-is-immoral-4.asp )