My interview on International Financial Times....

Why Pakistani Army Can’t Stage a Coup Now (EXCLUSIVE)

By BHASKAR PRASAD: Subscribe to Bhaskar's RSS feed

January 18, 2012 1:11 AM EST

Tensions between Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and the military have risen over the SupremeCourt investigation into a purported government memo seeking help to prevent a possible military coup.

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Pakistan's Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani

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Pakistan's military neither has the will nor the ability to stage a coup, says Dr. Happymon Jacob, Assistant Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament at the Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.

In an exclusive interview with the International Business Times, Jacob says the military doesn't enjoy the support for a coup from the opposition, the media and the public at large.

Here are some excerpts.

Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani has won key backing in parliament. Will this put an end to the concerns in Pakistan about a military coup?

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Indeed, the likelihood of a military coup in Pakistan is lessened by this action of the Pakistani parliament. But let me hasten to add that the likelihood of a military coup has not been high right from the beginning. By not staging a coup, the Pakistan army is not doing a favour to Pakistan's fledgling democracy: it is not doing so because it is simply not in a position to do so. Had the same confluence of circumstances existed a decade ago, Pakistan would have already been under military rule.

Things have changed so drastically in contemporary Pakistan that the army realizes that it would be doing great disservice to itself by forcefully taking over the reins of the country. Moreover, the popular mood in today's Pakistan is against any sort of military takeover and in the event of a military coup, the people are unlikely to react positively let alone welcome it. This is clearly unlike the previous occasions when the military staged coups in Pakistan as large amounts of people used to welcome the coup or used to openly invite the military to dethrone the corrupt civilian leaders.

What is happening in Pakistan should be seen as positive and good for the democratic institutions of that country. It is important to note that the ongoing confrontation is not between the Pakistan army and the civilian government but between two civilian institutions: judiciary and the civilian government. That is nothing but the politics of a normal democracy and it should be seen as such.

What will be the role of judiciary in the situation? Does it favor the military over the civilian government?

I don't think that the judiciary is favoring Pakistan military over the civilian government. The judiciary is merely trying to strengthen the law of the land and to assert its rightful role in Pakistan's polity.

In that sense, even if Prime Minister Gilani would have to resign from his post because of the pressure from the Supreme Court, I would see that as good for Pakistan's democracy.

After all, let us fact it, Gilani is trying to cover up the wrongs committed by the Pakistani President, Zardari. While Gilani should be complimented for his courageous stance against the army, no credit can be given to him for challenging the judiciary in the name of safeguarding democratic institutions.

Is Pakistan moving in a dangerous direction with military once again showing its strength to control the country? Does it show the ineffectiveness of democracy in Pakistan?

In fact, I would think that the opposite is perhaps true. The military neither has the will nor the ability to stage a coup. And there is no support for a coup from the opposition, the media and the public at large as pointed out above.

What do you think of the possibility of Gilani completing his term? Is there possibility of an early election?

The jury is still out on that. If Gilani's government writes to the Swiss government for information relating to the graft charges against Zardari, there is a possibility that the court will let him go. But that is unlikely to be acceptable to Zardari and Pakistan People's Party (PPP).

It is possible that Zardari is contemplating his next steps in this game. He may replace Gilani, get close to the army and persuade them to reduce the heat on his government, take the credit for challenging the judiciary and cash on it in the upcoming elections.

If at all there is an election, will it be good or bad for Pakistan? Also which leader could emerge as the winner in such an early election?

One cannot say for sure whether an early election is going to benefit Pakistan, but it is certainly likely, under the circumstances, to benefit the PPP and Zardari. In any case, if the elections take place in the near future, it is possible that the PPP will get more seats than the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) as Imran Khan has suddenly hit a political roadblock. The more the election gets postponed, the more the gains of the PML (N) and Imran Khan will be.

Is it better for Pakistan in the present situation to come under military rule?

Not at all. I think Pakistan has started off on a new political journey and its results are only going to be positive for the country. Consider this: everything that we hear about Pakistan for the past month has been about politics, not jihad or Islamic extremism. That is surely good news.

What repercussion the present events could have on the relation with India? Does India prefer Pakistan to be an unstable democracy or an established military nation?

Not even once during the present crisis has there been an attempt from the Pakistani side to engage in diversionary war tactics against India. I think that a strong democracy in Pakistan is going to be good for India. The problem with military regimes is that if India signs peace deals with them, one can't be sure whether they will be given legitimacy by political parties. This is precisely what is happening with regard to the Musharraf formula on the Kashmir conflict. India-Pakistan back-channel negotiations during Musharraf's period had finalized a mutually acceptable solution for Kashmir, but the civilian government and political parties in Pakistan are unwilling to abide by that today.

URL: http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/283396/20120118/why-pakistani-army-t-stage-coup-now.htm

The scope of hope

All is not ‘unwell’ in Pakistan

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

AN overwhelming amount of research and commentary on the ongoing turmoil in contemporary Pakistan seems to be overly pessimistic in nature and is seemingly reaching the conclusion that Pakistan is on the brink of a political collapse. Are such arguments accurate? Are we not looking at what is happening in Pakistan with an excessive amount of concern and fearful uncertainty primarily because our analytical faculties are so used to perceiving what happens in Pakistan in a negative, critical and pessimistic light? In other words, our traditional understanding that ‘nothing good can come out of Pakistan’ has perhaps shaped our perceptions of that country. I argue that while it is true that the Pakistani state is going through a great deal of internal turmoil and may, indeed, be facing political uncertainty, all is not ‘unwell’ in today’s Pakistan. It is possible to decipher some positive developments from the current political turmoil that the country is passing through.

Let’s try and deconstruct what is happening in today’s Pakistan and figure out the good news from our neighboring country amidst all the bad news that is coming from there.

First of all, let us be clear that by not (yet) staging a coup Pakistan army is not doing a favour to the country’s fledgling democracy: it is not doing so because it is simply not in a position to do so. Had the same confluence of circumstances existed a decade ago, Pakistan would have already been under military rule. Things have changed so drastically in contemporary Pakistan that the army realizes that it would be doing great disservice to itself by forcefully taking over the reins of the country. Moreover, the popular mood in today’s Pakistan is against any sort of military takeover and in the event of a military coup, the people are unlikely to react positively let alone welcome it. This is clearly unlike the previous occasions when the military staged coups in Pakistan as large amounts of people used to welcome the coup or used to openly invite the military to dethrone the corrupt civilian leaders.

Moreover, had the civilian establishment summarily dismissed the military secretary (a former army General sharing a close relationship with the army top brass) and appointed a civilian in his place a decade ago, it would have been almost impossible for the civilian establishment to get away with that. But it seems to be…now!

Second, the immensely powerful Pakistani media also doesn’t support a military coup. The editorial of the Express Tribune (Pakistan) on January 13, 2012 was unambiguously entitled “Not another coup, please”!! The media revolution has transformed the political and discursive landscape in Pakistan. While on the one hand it is promoting multi-vocality in framing political debates in the country, it is also nearly impossible to silence the Pakistani media today: there are too many of them to control and the social media is just not controllable.

Third, take a look at the political discourse in Pakistan in the past month. It’s dominated by debates and discussions on the political future of Pakistan, civil-military relations, strengthening of democratic institutions and the role and jurisdiction of parliament and judiciary in the governance of Pakistan and NOT by discussions on jihadi and Islamic extremism. This is certainly a welcome narrative from Pakistan where Islamic militancy and jihadi discourses have tended to dominate the public sphere for many years now. Siasat is the hot topic in Pakistan today, not jihad!

Fourth, Pakistan’s judiciary has had a history of being subservient to the Political masters or military dictators; not anymore. The judiciary has realized its rightful and constitutionally-mandated role and has started behaving in an assertive manner. Both the military and the civilian government are worried what the judiciary will do next and that is a welcome change and that bodes well for a fledgling democracy such as Pakistan. Clearly, if the Pakistani judiciary behaves in the manner in which it is supposed to, as the guardian of the Constitution, it will further check the abuse of power by the Pakistani civilian government and the military.

Fifth, consider the proliferation of political debates in Pakistan’s Parliament. The growing amount of political debates and arguments in today’s Pakistani Parliament shows that political parties are willing to consider this as an important institution and platform for conducting political business and are not trying to make deals or do business with the generals which used to be the case once upon a time. Moreover, the increasing interest and participation of Pakistan’s youngsters in politics is also an indication of the positive changes to come. The very fact that Pakistanis are eagerly watching the political debates in their Parliament and are following the legal arguments between the judiciary and the executive shows that they are looking in the right direction and right actors to understand the future of the Pakistani nation. In the yester years, Pakistanis would have looked at or towards the army to sense what is likely to happen or would have expected the army to set things right in the country.

Finally, faced with debilitating internal power struggles, state leaders sometimes engage in what is called ‘diversionary war tactic’. Pakistani leaders could have diverted attention from its internal turmoil by upping the ante against India which it has done in the past. But it did not choose to do so this time.

For those who think that politics is a conflict-free and noise-free process need to understand that since politics essentially deals with the distribution of resources and power, it cannot function without the din and noise that is usually associated with it. Looking at contemporary Pakistani politics from such an analytical angle would serve us better in appreciating more fully what Pakistan is going through these days.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 15 January 2012. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/Jan/15/the-scope-of-hope-4.asp )

Chief Minister or Chief Mourner?

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

Empathizing with those who suffer is a virtue worthy of a noble human being. However, when those who are empowered, entrusted and expected to alleviate the sufferings of others make it a political habit to engage in the public display of empathy often in order to cover their failures to do so, it would be unwise for us to call it noble. Similarly, speaking out against injustice is a highly laudable act but when those who are supposed to deliver justice merely talk about justice without doing much to ensure its delivery to the people, we should not shy away from calling it empty rhetoric. Politicians, as a species, are adept at offering condolences, expressing regret, and recommending compensation. They claim that they do so by way of owning up moral responsibility for what happened and to share the sorrow of their people. That’s a lie. These acts are aimed at deflecting public anger and stopping the opposition from making any political capital.

J&K Chief Minister Omar Abdullah too has learned the game - the art of empathizing with the Kashmiris. In 2010, he had not mastered this art and that is why it took 55 days of protests and 49 deaths for Omar to visit the Sher-e-Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences (SKIMS) in Srinagar to visit the injured. This time around – indeed for the first time- Omar didn’t waste any time in visiting the family of Altaf Ahmad Sood in Boniyar who was killed in CISF firing. He called the killing by CISF as murder and told a TV channel “You don’t deal with a genuine protest the way you did… this was not a protest for azadi, this was not a protest for Pakistan. This was a protest for genuine demand that people have for electricity.” Calling the killing “excessive” and “inexcusable”, he demanded justice for the boy’s family. So far so good. So what is the problem?

Consider this: every time a human right violation was committed or the security forces/J&K police killed someone in a fake encounter in Kashmir, Omar has expressed his moral outrage against it. He has demanded that such instances should not take place under any circumstances, and yet they continue unabated. Omar keeps demanding the removal of AFSPA but has failed to deliver. He has repeatedly talked about setting up a truth and reconciliation commission in Kashmir, but no action. He tweeted regarding Afzal Guru sometime back, “If J&K assembly had passed a resolution similar to the Tamil Nadu one for Afzal Guru would the reaction have been as muted? I think not.” But that was it…just words and nothing more. More importantly, the Chief Minister keeps reminding New Delhi and the rest of us that ‘Kashmir is a political problem’, but does precious little about it.

Do not take away their right to grieve!
Sajad Lone wisely remarked when asked to comment on the Chief Minister’s visit to Altaf’s family to offer condolences that the Chief Minister is taking away the right of Sood’s relatives to grieve for their dear one.
Indeed, the Chief Minister of J&K is responsible for maintaining law and order in the state, it’s his job. When his administration fails, he must of course apologize for that. But if he fails unfailingly, then he must rethink his ability to continue in the job. J&K needs a Chief Minister, not a Chief mourner. For one, it defeats the purpose of governance with accountability because the Chief Minister’s job is not to go from home to home morning those killed by security forces but to make sure that his people are not killed by security forces in the first place. Secondly, apart from taking the steam out of people’s anger what can Omar’s rudaali acts achieve? If the excessive and criminal use of force that killed Altaf goes unpunished, what difference does Omar’s home visit make to Altaf’s family?

We also don’t need Omar Abdullah to denounce the policies of the central government (of which his party is a coalition partner) and the irresponsible acts of the security forces thereby playing the centre vs. state game; there are enough people in Kashmir to do that. Indeed, playing the Centre vs. State game has historically been NC’s favorite pastime. It has become fashionable in Srinagar to blame New Delhi for everything that has gone wrong in Kashmir without really contemplating as to what Srinagar could have done differently in order to prevent New Delhi from doing what it did in Kashmir. I keep repeating this but let me say this once again. Gone are the days when the Central government could have forced policy decisions down the throats of the state governments. Today, due to the forces of coalition politics, it is often the case that the Centre needs the states more than the other way round.

Kashmir needs a Chief Minister who can stop the excesses of the security forces and force the Indian Defense Ministry/Home Ministry to give permission to prosecute the erring members of its security forces. In other words, J&K does not need a Chief Minister who reminds Kashmiris what they need but one who can give them what they need. Next time when the security forces target another hapless Kashmiri, the Chief Minister should go and storm the headquarters of the agency that commits the crime instead of rushing to the family of the victim to mourn. Kashmir doesn’t need rudaalis, it needs politicians with guts.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, January 8, 2012. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/Jan/8/chief-minister-or-chief-mourner--4.asp )

Comparative Foreign Policy Decision Making

Introducing a new course in JNU on Foreign Policy Decision Making...see "Comparative Foreign Policy Decision Making"

http://cfpdm2012.blogspot.com/

Defining normalcy in Kashmir

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

December 31st is an appropriate day to take stock of the year that went by – so why not critically examine the claim that Kashmir has had a peaceful year? To me, the argument that 2011 has been a peaceful year for Kashmir is an oxymoron, demonstrates ignorance, and generally defeats the purpose of meaningful and incisive political analysis. But why not consider 2011 to be a peaceful year? After all, this year has witnessed massive reduction in militant infiltration from across the border, highest number of tourists visiting Kashmir in many years, no massive demonstrations on the streets of Kashmir, and no pulverizing bomb blasts as used to be case earlier. That, indeed, is the official version of normalcy and peace in Kashmir. This statist analysis is not completely off the mark because the state always bases its interpretation of normalcy and violence on the basis of a definition that suits its purposes and privileges itself. The problem arises when this statist definition is posited against other definitions of violence and normalcy which privilege human beings and societies rather than the state. In other words, your definition colors your analysis. Let’s examine this further.

What was normal about 2011?
2011 ended with Kashmiris shivering in their homes due to acute power shortages. The state government has been unable to provide a basic necessity such as electricity to the people of Kashmir in sub-zero temperatures. What is even more appalling is that the state bureaucracy and the political class have ‘royally’ (and may I say shamelessly) abdicated their responsibility and shifted base to Jammu where the weather is better, leaving Kashmiris at the mercy of extreme temperatures with no electricity. If the state administrative machinery were to continue to be based in Srinagar, they would at least have tired to make the power situation better.

There has not been any great surge in the development of the state in any sphere in 2011: no new infrastructure development worth mentioning, no sufficient employment generation, and no significant external investment. The dreaded AFSPA has neither been lifted nor amended despite the ruling party’s high-pitched arguments for it and futile grand-standing. Not even once did Kashmir’s ruling party threaten to pull out of the UPA coalition in New Delhi to put pressure on the latter to remove AFSPA from Kashmir. There have been a number of custodial killings and high-handedness by the security forces. Even in 2011 Kashmiris faced the humiliation of having to go through multiple identity checks and unfriendly body frisking by security forces in their own neighbourhood. 2011 also witnessed the still-unraveling story of 2000 odd unmarked graves in Kashmir whose unfortunate occupants and their grief-stricken families still await any form of justice. The Kashmir interlocutors went around in the state talking to various people (excluding, of course, those who matter), wrote an exhaustive report and submitted to New Delhi: not many believe that any action will be taken on the basis of that even as some of the interlocutors claim from time to time that their recommendations are being followed by the government!

Why at least some people tend to call 2011 a peaceful (which literally means ‘full of peace’!) year is because a) as I pointed out above the focus is on what happens to the state and not to the people and, b) because of the problem in the definition of its opposite, violence. When the state defines violence, it takes extra care to address only direct forms of violence and not those indirect and structural forms of violence. Structural violence is widely defined as the “avoidable disparity between the potential ability to fulfill basic needs and their actual fulfillment”. To understand structural violence, one needs t look at mundane things such as availability of electricity, jobs, quality higher education, respect for human rights, ability to live with dignity etc. I don’t need to repeat here the ‘quality’ of human rights protection in the valley! Take another example: Greater Kashmir reported recently that J&K contributes 32% of energy to National Hydroelectric Power Corporation as against 68% by all the other Indian states. And yet, Kashmir seems to suffer from power shortages every winter. Now that’s a form of structural violence, isn’t it?

Normalcy for whom?
Who does the “Kashmir is normal” argument benefit? The ruling dispensation, the Chief Minister and, of course, New Delhi. Claims about Kashmir’s return to normalcy increase the star power of the Chief Minister and makes him even more of a darling of the elite English media in Delhi, it sells New Delhi’s pet story of “Kashmir’s normalization” which it has been choreographing for some time now, and of course the Indian army which can now take pride in the fact that they have ‘defeated’ terrorism! But does this normalcy story of 2011 make any difference to the average Kashmiri or, at the macro level, does it help resolve the political problem in Kashmir? No. Indeed it is true that there was a reduction in the instances of direct violence against Kashmiris in 2011. This opportunity, however, should have been used by the powers that be to address the other entrenched forms of violence rather than busying themselves in fantasizing about the imagined return of normalcy into the Kashmir valley. In short, 2011 will be remembered as a year that was wasted due to the lack of credible, courageous and visionary political leadership.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 1 January 2012. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/Jan/1/defining-normalcy-in-kashmir-8.asp )

Hypocrisy of Kashmir’s alcohol debate

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

Whether or not alcohol and cinema should be allowed in Kashmir is asking the wrong question. The appropriate question to ask, to my mind, is how Kashmiris define themselves and their struggle, and the inter-relationship between the availability of alcohol and films, and their struggle.

However, let me begin by saying that it does not take a great deal of intelligence to understand that Farooq Abdullah is clearly engaging in a customized version of ‘diversionary war tactic’ to divert the undue attention from his party’s failure at removing AFSPA from J&K in spite of being a partner of the ruling coalition in New Delhi. Moreover, liquor and cinema are not the burning problems of today’s Kashmir; there are surely other more pressing issues to be dealt with in Kashmir which his party and government have surely failed in dealing with.

And yet, I maintain that those opposing the ‘re-introduction’ of films and alcohol into the Kashmir valley are fundamentally wrong in their arguments. I realize that this is unlikely to be a popular argument in Kashmir but I believe that my job as a columnist and a University professor is to tell my readers what I think is right and why. So here it is.

Why opponents of cinema and alcohol are wrong

Some critics of the proposed re-introduction of films and liquor in Kashmir have suggested that it is a ploy of the government to push the normalcy argument about Kashmir, i.e., that popular forms of entertainment and free availability of commodities such as liquor will help create an image of Kashmir as a normal place which, consequently, will encourage the government to forget about the political resolution of the Kashmir conflict. This is a flawed argument. Consider this. After the 2008 elections, in which Kashmiris voted in large numbers, many in Srinagar and New Delhi tired to paint a picture of normalcy but the massive uprisings in Kashmir thereafter rendered such arguments about election-induced normalcy in Kashmir completely wrong. This means that trappings of externally-induced normalcy are unlikely to work in Kashmir unless and until the deep political questions are addressed. Same applies to popular forms of entertainment and availability of alcohol. The logical extension of this argument about alcohol and mass entertainment would be that they will somehow interfere with Kashmir’s struggle for azadi. That, in turn, means that the struggle for azadi stands on a very weak foundation. Hence making such arguments will give a bad name to the struggle for azadi.

When Dukhtaran-e-Millat, Hurriyat Conference (G) and Jamaat-e-Islami toe a particular political line, there is every reason to be suspicious. Look at the core argument that they seem to be making: “Kashmir is a Muslim majority state (sic), alcohol and films will hurt Muslim sentiments, encourage unislamic activities and that this is an example of cultural aggression against a muslim majority state.” Let’s face it: these are blatantly communal and majoritarian assertions. This is exactly the kind of arguments that the Hindutwa fascists use in the rest of India against minorities like Muslims since the advocates of Hindutwa speak from a majoritarian standpoint and that, by definition, is a communal position and hence reprehensible. Put simply, should the Indian Muslims accept the Bhagvad-Gita as the official document of the Indian state and Manusmriti as their rule book just because India happens to be a Hindu majority state and the Hindu fundamentalists insist so? No, I guess. In the same way, why would the non-Muslims of Kashmir be asked to abide by Islamic morals?

More so, indeed paradoxically, the Hindu communalists and upholders of the Islamic state in Kashmir are both talking about the need to create a theocratic state as well as the need to purify the society by banning bars, interaction between sexes etc. It would be engaging in plain double-speak when Kashmiri leaders to speak up against Hindu majoritarianism in India and engage in majoritarianism of a different kind in Kashmir.

More importantly, it is necessary to remember that Kashmir’s struggle for azadi is not a religious one; it is a secular, inclusive and political struggle. Hence allowing religious parties and puritan arguments to take over Kashmir’s azadi struggle would be doing a great disservice to the cause of azadi. Indeed, by coloring the struggle for azadi with Islamic formulations Kashmiris will only strengthen those who argue that Kashmir’s struggle is after all a communal one, which, to mind, it is not.

When the sale of alcohol was allowed in Kashmir during the earlier periods, there were kilometers-long queues outside alcohol shops. Were those queues formed by people coming from outside Kashmir? Of course not. That simply means that there are people who want to consume alcohol in Kashmir. Moreover, during all these years when alcohol was not sold in Kashmir, it was never impossible for anyone to get alcohol in the valley. Why deny that reality? Hence, arguing that Kashmiris would not want to have alcohol amounts to hypocrisy and by insisting on an alcohol ban we are helping in the construction of a society of hypocrites.

Moreover, in a liberal society it is impossible and undesirable to decide choices for everyone by using religious arguments or even secular arguments. All that we should do is to educate our children and instill good values in them rather than trying to make choices for them all their lives.

Finally, is it not a ridiculous argument that films represent and promote vulgarity? Some might, but most of them do not. Did 'Inshallah, football' represent vulgarity? Does interaction among sexes promote social degradation? Does the use of facebook/twitter/orkut and internet in general negatively influence people and promote vulgarity in society? They may, or may not. And at the end of the day how a medium is used, for vulgar or decent purposes, depends upon the attitudes of the person.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 18 December, 2011. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/Dec/18/hypocrisy-of-kashmir-s-alcohol-debate-18.asp)

India’s New Kashmir Narrative

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

I am increasingly of the opinion that the Indian – not necessarily New Delhi’s - perception on Kashmir has undergone considerable transformation in the recent past. This new Indian approach to Kashmir can only be comprehensively understood and explained by looking at the various domestic social, political, economic and other related developments within India. Today, my intention is not to explain what this ‘new approach’ is, but analyse, only briefly though due to space constraints, the larger social, political, economic and ideational context which has made the new Indian approach to Kashmir possible. I will try and flag a few ideas regarding the ‘new actors’ and ‘new identities’ in India that have prompted the creation of a new Indian discourse on Kashmir.

New Actors

The first new actor that I would like to identify as having acted as a catalyst, in more ways than one, in transforming the Indian approach to Kashmir is the proactive media in the country. The Indian media has clearly acted as an agent of change by way of flagging newer issues and adopting non-traditional approaches to understanding issues concerning the Indian nation in general and the Kashmir issue in particular. This is primarily achieved by the media by being a mediator and communicator of the multiple narratives on various aspects of the nation’s day today existence, over and above the existing state narrative. This generation and promotion of multivocality by the media has helped the Indian re-imagination of the Kashmir conflict.

Diversified reportage of the Kashmir issue, using varied sources and providing contrasting viewpoints, has led to more politicization, less securitization and further nuancing of the Kashmir issue in India. Free media creates debates, debates create disagreements, disagreements encourage and legitimise differing shades of opinions and that is what was lacking in India’s Kashmir discourse for a long time.

The rise of a bold, new and outspoken, and yet mostly nationalistic, civil society in India has consistently challenged the Indian state on issues ranging from the construction of nuclear reactors in inhabited areas to police excesses to draconian laws such as the MOCACA, AFSPA to human rights violations in Kashmir. Criticism of the government is increasingly seen as healthy and legitimate, and much required for a better India. This has invariably helped the Kashmir cause for those speaking out against human rights excesses in Kashmir are not seen as being unpatriotic. There have been exceptions, I admit.

New Identities

India aspires to be a great power and a chunk of the international community thinks that India could well become one. Has India exhibited appropriate behaviour patterns befitting a rising (great) power? Has its new approach towards Kashmir shown the great power-like behaviour and attitudes of the country?

Great power aspirations of the Indian middle class and the strategic elite have, to some extent, led sections within the country look at Kashmir in a non-traditional manner. One aspect of this argument is an emerging thinking in India that if it has to rise to the status of a great power it should be able to resolve its internal problems.

The other strand of this thinking is that the Kashmir conflict is hurting India and hence it needs to devise new ways of addressing the Kashmir conflict. Vir Sanghvi, former editor of the Hindustan Times, an influential English daily in India, argued that Kashmir is a liability for India and India should let Kashmir go away if it wants to. There are also others, such as Swaminathan Anklesaria Aiyar, who think that Kashmir deserves to have a chance to decide its own destiny. Mind you, these are not the so-called bleeding heart liberals!

Aspirational identity of a great power has also prompted India to constantly look for feedback and reassurance from the international community. It looks out for words that confirm the Indian greatness and more so engages in actions vis-à-vis Kashmir to confirm to the international and great power standards to showcase to the world that it is doing the right things in Kashmir. The open invite India extended to international election observers to come and witness the ‘free and fair’ state assembly elections in 2008 is an example of this.

The constant search for the aspirational great power identity also manifests in the creation of an image of India that is reasonable, caring, and willing to accommodate legitimate Kashmiri demands. Both the leaders and the analysts in India have tried to portray such an image to the Kashmiris in the last one decade or so. Even as India is peeved at the western criticism of its human rights record, it realizes the need to reconcile to the western human rights standards in order to justify its new-found place in the high table of nations that manage the international system.

looked at Bollywood films to understand the portrayal of Kashmir. While in the 1960s and 1970s films mostly focused on the beauty of Kashmir, we see the portrayal of Kashmir as a terrorist-infested and Pakistan-supporting state in Bollywood films in the 1990s. This is now starting to change with more and more films becoming bold enough to challenge the state version of things in Kashmir by depicting human rights violations committed by the Indian security forces there and the plight of the Kashmiris in general. Bollywood films are indicative of the nuances of the popular culture and popular perceptions in India.

For instance, while films such as Barsaat (1994) and Kashmir ki Kali (1964) are set against the beauty of Kashmir valley, films such as Roja (1994), Dil Se (1998) talk about militancy in Kashmir from a statist point of view. Since 2000 or so, some films have been made in the backdrop of Kashmir such as Mission Kashmir (2000), Pukar (2004) Yahaan (2005) Shaurya (2008) Lamhaa: the untold story of Kashmir (2010) and Inshallah football (2010) have tried to depict human rights issues or at least talked about the human face of the insurgency in Kashmir.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 27 November, 2011. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/Nov/27/india-s-new-kashmir-narrative-4.asp)