Nuclear Confidence-building in South Asia

(Statement adopted by the members of the Ottawa Dialogue at their meeting at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, July 6-8, 2011)

The members of the Ottawa Dialogue are heartened by the fact that high-level official talks on nuclear CBMs have begun once again. We encourage the governments to continue them and to supplement them with regular meetings of high-level officials from the military and intelligence fields in order to broaden the dialogue and establish mechanisms to further understanding and prevent escalation of tension. We also encourage the two countries to continue to observe their respective moratoria on nuclear testing.

It is important to note that nuclear CBMs cannot succeed independent of broader steps to ease the relationship. These must include conventional military CBMs/restraint measures and steps to encourage people-to-people engagements. While these broader matters are not in the purview of the Ottawa Dialogue, we recognize that they are essential to the CBMs we are suggesting here. Thus, we recognize that some of the CBMs we advocate cannot be undertaken in the absence of

measures to stabilize other aspects of the relationship. But we believe that others can be and will

contribute to the creation of a “virtuous cycle;” an atmosphere in which progressively more ambitious steps can be taken in all fields of confidence-building.

Finally, there should be an informed public dialogue on the subject of the implications of a nuclear conflict in South Asia, and of the opportunity costs which attend the continuation of an uncontrolled nuclear rivalry. Such a dialogue should also include discussions of the underlying causes of the dispute.

On the subject of nuclear CBMs, we offer the following list of possible CBMs as ones that we believe could be considered by the governments.

Unilateral and/or Bilateral Declaratory Steps:

• Assurances that missiles will not be tested during periods of tension;

• Assurances that “bolt from the blue” surprise nuclear attacks will not be planned for or undertaken;

• Assurances that measures will be taken to prevent un-authorized and unintended launches (such as a mutual commitment to maintain the practice of the separation of warheads from delivery systems);

• Commitment to inform the other side well in advance of tests of new systems; and

• Building on the agreement not to attack nuclear facilities, assurances that sensitive targets will be avoided in the case of conventional conflict.

Strategic Restraint Measures:

• Agreement to develop and adopt a common terminology on strategic issues;

• Regular discussions on doctrinal issues and strategic stability;

• Agreement to include cruise missiles in the Agreement on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles;

• Agreement that missile flight tests will be notified to each side as early as possible;

• Agreement to test missiles only from notified ranges in notified directions;

• Agreement to enter into a dialogue concerning Ballistic Missile Defence in which views of the impact of such systems on strategic stability will be explored; and

• Agreement to enter into a regular dialogue on the impact of the introduction of new technologies on strategic stability.

Communication Measures:

• Agreement to expeditiously set up nuclear risk reduction centres (though possibly not under this name), through a comprehensive agreement, specifying the staffing, communication and functional aspects;

• Agreement to upgrade the existing hotlines to introduce redundant and assured communications which can be activated at the request of either party;

• Agreement to ensure a daily communication exchange when demanded by either party;

• Agreement to harden each side’s communication lines downwards to provide protected and assured communications; and

• Agreement to establish consultative mechanisms as required to implement these CBMs.

Physical Measures:

• Agreement not to deploy tactical nuclear weapons;

• Agreement to retire the Hatf 1 and Prithvi 1 short-range systems;

• Agreement that the Hatf 2 and Prithvi 2 will be designated as conventional-only systems; and

• Agreement to forego MIRVing of nuclear missiles.

Cooperation between the civilian nuclear establishments:

• Agreement to exchange on a regular basis information relating to the management of nuclear accidents;

• Agreement to share different experiences in creating and running Nuclear Regulatory Authorities;

• Agreement (bilateral or regional) on cooperation and exchange of safety related information of Nuclear Power Plants;

• Agreement to cooperatively develop civilian nuclear techniques in the fields of agriculture and medicine in such areas as:

o Plant strains with characteristics of high yield and resistance to pest, disease, drought, and salinity.

o Animal health through improved vaccines

o Extension of shelf life of perishable foods

o Practices for prevention and early detection of cancer

o Practices for treatment of acute radiation sickness

Participants from South Asia at the Palo Alto meeting of the Ottawa Dialogue:

1. Shamshad Ahmad, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan;

2. RN Ganesh, Vice Admiral, retired, Indian Navy;

3. Mohan Guruswamy, Chairman, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Delhi;

4. Jamshed Hashmi, Chairman Emeritus, Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority;

5. Rifaat Hussain, Professor, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad;

6. Happymon Jacob, Assistant Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi;

7. Aziz Ahmad Khan, Ambassador, retired, Foreign Service of Pakistan (former High Commissioner to India);

8. Feroz Khan, Brigadier General, retired, Pakistan Army, former Director Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs, Strategic Plans Division

9. Riaz Khan, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan;

10. Lalit Mansingh, former Foreign Secretary of India;

11. Talat Masood, Lieutenant General, retired, Pakistan Army;

12. Shuja Nawaz, Director of the South Asia Centre, Atlantic Council of the United States; Washington, DC;

13. TV Paul, Professor, McGill University

14. Ramamurti Rajaraman, Emeritus Professor of Theoretical Physics, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi;

15. Najmuddin Shaikh, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan; and

16. Vijay Shankar, Vice Admiral, retired, Indian Navy (former Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Strategic Forces Command)

Members of the Ottawa Dialogue unable to be present in Palo Alto:

1. Shahzad Chaudhry, Air Vice Marshal, retired, Pakistan Air Force;

2. Tariq Osman Hyder, Former Additional Foreign Secretary, Pakistan;

3. Amitabh Mattoo, Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi;

4. Raja Menon, Rear Admiral, retired, Indian Navy; and

5. Abdul Hameed Nayyar, Senior Research Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute.

Waiting to fall in love

States are functional, not emotional entities

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During a nuclear conference that I attended at the Stanford University last week, one retired Pakistani foreign secretary argued, “Lack of trust is the major reason why India and Pakistan are unable to stabilise their bilateral relations. If the two countries have to make peace with each other, a trust-building exercise has to take place”. The argument about trust-deficit sounds pretty convincing and has therefore been widely used by many Indian and Pakistani statesmen, analysts and common people. And yet this otherwise compelling argument suffers from great flaws. It assumes that peace between warring parties depends, to a great extent, on their ability to trust each other and de-emphasises the objective and practical conditions that should exist for conflict resolution.

Consider the following: the most successful peace-process ever in the history of India-Pakistan relations has been the one between 2004 and 2007 and this was led by Pervez Musharraf and the Indian government led by Manmohan Singh. After what Musharraf had done in Kargil – betraying the trust that the Indians put in the Pakistani establishment at the Lahore Summit – it is impossible to argue that the Indian establishment had any trust in the architect of Kargil and yet the peace process turned out to be the most successful one ever. Why? Consider another example before you answer the question: the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) signed 50 years ago has stood the test of time even though India and Pakistan fought many wars between them? That is, even though there were many occasions of extreme mistrust between them, India or Pakistan never tried to break the deal they have on the Indus Rivers. Why?The reason, in my opinion, is simple and is out there for everyone to see: the India-Pakistan peace process during the 2004-2007 period was goal-oriented, properly structured and, very importantly, conducted in a systematic manner. The IWT stood the test of time as well as the challenges arising from the lack of trust because, generally speaking, state actors and parties tend to respect existing agreements, structures and mechanisms. And that is what the IWT is all about, not trust. Countries tend to stand by properly defined and carefully designed structures, agreements, and treaties for fear of condemnation from the international community and domestic audience if they renege on their commitments as well as due to sheer socialisation that happens during state interactions and negotiations.

There are many examples, including that of Kashmir, where the Indians waited for perfect political conditions and complete trust to occur so that it could sign deals with Pakistan but eventually lost out on the opportunity to make peace and sign deals because the perfect conditions never occurred and complete trust never came about. Hence I would argue that it is no prudent statecraft to wait to first to fall in love with Pakistan before India decides to start talking to Pakistan on the various outstanding issues between them in a meaningful manner in order to reach sustainable agreements.Such misleading arguments about trust-deficit have prevented India and Pakistan from addressing many important bilateral issues with significant implications for the entire region for they think that first trust needs to be built before serious issues can be resolved.

One of the important issues that India and Pakistan have not yet seriously addressed in their bilateral context is the nuclear rivalry between them. Ever since the two countries went overtly nuclear in 1998, there has just been one meaningful meeting between them on how to manage the South Asian nuclear situation even as the region is widely and correctly considered to be a nuclear flashpoint. After the 1999 Lahore agreement which contained important declarations about India-Pakistan nuclear relations - many of which have remained unfulfilled - almost every meeting that has been held between the two countries thereafter to discuss nuclear issues were either not result-oriented or have remained inconclusive. Even if one were to assume that the two countries are rational entities and hence may not use nuclear weapons against them in case of a conflict, can we rule out the possibility of accidental use of nukes against each other? Are the two countries adequately prepared for such an eventuality?There is therefore a need to think beyond the bliss of ignorance.

The bliss of nuclear ignorance which the two countries seem to inhabit in is characterised by a number of dangerous myths. The first myth is that nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan will function automatically and we don’t need to bother with it let alone creating mechanisms to prevent nuclear use. This argument is mythical because mere possession of nuclear weapons will not guarantee nuclear deterrence or their non-use against each other: there are other important variables that play a role in the nuclear use or non-use decision of a country. The second myth is that the decision makers are not stupid to use nuclear weapons against each other. Again the fact is that sometimes we might be stupid enough to consider nuclear use. There are enough examples from the Cold War history which suggest that the Cold War rivals had contemplated the use of nukes on a number of occasions. Yet another myth is that our nuclear weapons are safe and if the west can manage their nukes why can’t we do so! T

he fact is that nuclear safety is an issue that needs more detailed consideration in South Asia. Japan is one of those countries that is extremely conscious about the safety standards of its nuclear industry and yet Fukushima catastrophe happened, so was Soviet Union and yet Chernobyl took place. It is living in the fool’s paradise if we believe that we don’t need to bother about nuclear safety and security at all.Pakistan does not have a no-first-use policy of nuclear weapons which simply means that in Pakistan’s strategic thinking nuclear deterrence is an extension of conventional deterrence. There is hence a conceptual dissonance since the two rivals understand the use of nuclear weapons in different ways. Unless the two countries understand and manage to reach an agreement as to what nuclear weapons mean to their bilateral relations, conceptual dissonance will continue to exist and nuclear weapon use cannot be ruled out.

While trust and love are laudable emotions, states do not operate on the basis of emotions. States function on the basis of their socialisation, structures that they are in, and agreements and arrangements they arrive at with others. States are functional entities, not emotional entities and hence statesmen should attempt at creating conducive conditions and structures of peace and cooperation rather than waiting for trust and love to occur.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 17 July, 2011. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/Jul/17/waiting-to-fall-in-love-2.asp)

India’s Afghan Policy

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The endgame in Afghanistan is rapidly evolving even as there is not yet a clear picture of what is the shape of things to come in Afghanistan in the years ahead. In July this year, the Americans will start withdrawing the 30 thousand additional troops that were sent in after 2009 as part of Obama’s ‘troop surge’. France and some other countries will start the withdrawal of their troops in July this year as well. Hence the real impact of the western war efforts in Afghanistan will start coming to the fore in the months ahead. The killing of Osama Bin Laden has further strengthened the resolve of the international community to quicken the ongoing reconciliation efforts in Kabul even as there seems to be no major headway made in that crucial direction. The international community, especially those militarily involved in Afghanistan, seems to be unambiguous about the urgent need to bring to some kind of a closure the ongoing war in Afghanistan and it is clearly headed in that direction.

Even as all of this is happening, New Delhi and the strategic community here seems to be unsure of how to make up its mind vis-à-vis the developments in Afghanistan. Recent statements from the Indian leadership and the thinking within the strategic community do suggest that there has been considerable amount of rethinking in New Delhi about India’s Afghanistan strategy and yet there is a need for New Delhi to make clear, bold and forward-looking policy pronouncements vis-à-vis Afghanistan.

New Delhi and the strategic community here had traditionally adopted a three-pronged strategy towards Afghanistan. One, moderate Taliban is a contradiction in terms; there is no such thing as moderate Taliban, one is either a Taliban or moderate. There should be no attempts at reconciling with the Taliban. Moreover, the talk of moderate Taliban is promoted by Pakistan in order to get their ‘friends’ (read Taliban) back in the power structures in Kabul and thereby control Kabul from Islamabad. This inflexible black-and-white approach now seems to be undergoing some serious rethinking in New Delhi. Not only did Manmohan Singh make it clear during his May 2011 visit to Kabul that India is not against the Western/American reconciliation attempts with the Taliban but even the think-tank community in New Delhi seems to be recognizing the importance of the reconciliation process. The fact is that there is no one monolith called Taliban and hence it is necessary to take the various Taliban groups on board the reconciliation process and negotiate the terms of a settlement with them.

The second aspect of the traditional Indian attitude towards Afghanistan was that Indian stakes in Afghanistan were too precious to give up given the security implications that political developments in Afghanistan have for India. India believed that developments in Afghanistan were of extreme significance for the country and that India needs to actively promote its interests there. During the pre-9/11 days India was actively supporting the Northern Alliance in its fight against the Taliban regime in Kabul as this was seen as a key strategy to secure Indian interests there. While terrorism emanating from Afghanistan was the primary concern for New Delhi, influence in the extended neighborhood and creation of an alternative regime in Kabul that is not under the sway of Islamabad were also important in New Delhi’s strategic calculations. Islamabad’s total control of Kabul and Pakistan’s use of its ‘strategic depth’ against New Delhi were responded to by New Delhi by arming the Northern Alliance and taking out an international campaign against the Taliban regime which in any case was among the world’s most isolated regimes. The hijack of IC-814 and the drama that unfolded in Kabul thereafter where the hijacked plane was taken to and the way India was humiliated by the Taliban and their mentors in Islamabad have always been fresh in the Indian mind. Indeed, India has always tried to forge relations with Afghanistan and this was seen as inimical by Islamabad. India had forged close relations with Kabul during the time of Mohammad Daud Khan as well as in the post-Mujahideen years both of which were seen with deep suspicion by Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan tried to neutralize each other’s role and influence in Afghanistan and Kabul became another theater of Indo-Pak rivalry.

There seems to be a slow but steady change of attitude in New Delhi about the Indian stakes in Afghanistan. It is now increasingly felt in the strategic circles that while Afghanistan remains an important neighbor for India, our stakes there are at best indirect and that there is no point engaging in proxy wars in Kabul against Pakistan. More so, at a time when Pakistan has so obviously reduced the heat in Kashmir, it is important that India does the same in Afghanistan. Therefore, the Indian strategic posture vis-à-vis Afghanistan should be more accommodative and conciliatory towards Pakistan, it is being increasingly understood. After all, Pakistan has existential stakes in Afghanistan and if the reduction of the Indian rhetoric on Afghanistan can encourage Islamabad to decide on a more constructive engagement with Afghanistan, that would have a stabilizing impact on the region as a whole. While the Indian argument that it is not consulted by the Americans in the reconciliation process in Afghanistan my be true, the fact is, as one French diplomat told me recently, that “the Americans don’t keep us informed of the negotiations they are conducting with the Taliban even though we have our soldiers fighting there”.

The third aspect of the Indian thinking on Afghanistan, even though it existed only in some quarters, has been that India should project military force into Afghanistan in order to safeguard our vital security interests there. This line of argumentation is increasingly considered as wishful thinking. The fact is, a lot of people would argue, that New Delhi neither has the military power nor the political willingness and willpower to project force into Afghanistan and sustain it in pursuit of its strategic interests there.

New Delhi’s role in Afghanistan should not be military engagement or force projection. It should involve itself in the conflict resolution process in that war-torn country, first of all, by way of organizing a regional initiative of countries such as Iran, India, China, Afghanistan, Russia and Pakistan to discuss the various aspects of the future of Afghanistan.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 12 June, 2011. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/Jun/12/india-s-afghan-policy-2.asp )

Reclaiming Kashmir’s Centrality

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Kashmir conflict is increasingly becoming a multi-layered and complicated one. Apart from the indigenous anti-India uprising that Kashmir has witnessed for the last many decades, more noticeably in the last two decades, there is an equally important external – read Pakistan – dimension to the conflict. While these, in my opinion, constitute the core of the Kashmir conflict, other minor conflicts/issues have been added to these two primary dimensions of the conflict from time to time by various interested parties. Jammu, for example, many observers, politicians and a lot of Jammuites say, have a problem with Kashmir, so do various other regions of the state, i.e., Ladakh, Kargil etc. It is often said that the developmental and other related problems of these regions and the genuine aspirations of the inhabitants therein have often been ignored and neglected in the larger context of the Kashmir conflict. In other words, the aspirations of the people of Jammu, Kargil and Ladakh etc. have traditionally been sacrificed at the alter of the conflict in Kashmir.

On the face of it this seems to be a perfectly valid argument and it has therefore gained much sympathy in official circles, New Delhi-based think tanks, and mainstream Indian media in general. Most government-sponsored studies and scholarly analysis churned out by research institutes in New Delhi have almost always tried to create a vast canvas of issues when analyzing the contours of the Kashmir issue. While this has certainly brought out the nuanced and complex nature of the (Jammu and) Kashmir problem and has, to a great extent, positively complicated the issue, such analysis also serves to deflect the attention that is due to the core conflict in Kashmir thereby interfering with the process of meaningful conflict resolution in Kashmir. The trouble with this kind of an otherwise genuine all-in-one broad-based argument, couched in democratic terms, is that it ends up becoming a reactionary sentiment.

In order to further explain my point I wish to differentiate between the core conflict in Kashmir and the other issues that have now become part and parcel of the Kashmir conflict. The core conflict in Kashmir is two-fold as pointed out above: the territorial conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and the internal insurgency in Kashmir against the Indian government. The basic nature of this two-pronged conflict is characteristically different from the other ‘add-on’ aspects of the Kashmir conflict. The problems in Jammu, Ladakh or Kargil which are often expressed in terms of malgovernance, lack of infrastructure, lack of devolution of powers, or administrative neglect do not, by any stretch of imagination, belong to the category of the core conflict(s) in Kashmir. They are administrative or governance issues, at best. On the other hand, let us face it, the Kashmir conflict is not about good governance or infrastructure development. Governance or economic issues are neither unique to J&K nor are they of any unique or special nature. These problems are found in all parts of the country and are dealt with by the various levels of government. They are of course important issues but should not be seen on par with the core issues relating to the Kashmir conflict.

While most of the ‘add-on’ aspects of the Kashmir conflict are contemporary in nature, the core conflict in Kashmir has its clearly identifiable historical roots. This is often traced back to the circumstances surrounding the accession of J&K state into India, failed promise of a plebiscite in the state, watering down of Article 370, imprisonment of Sheikh Abdullah, installing of puppet regimes in Srinagar by New Delhi, rigged elections and most importantly rampant violations of human rights of the Kashmiris. Indeed most of these issues are not the concerns of the people of Jammu or Ladakh and yet these very issues form the core conflict in Kashmir.

The team of interlocutors and various other committees appointed by New Delhi in order to address the employment, infrastructure and development situation in the state are mandated to look at not just Kashmir but also other regions and not just the political issues but also the developmental and other grievances of the entire state. And yet these committees are in existence because there is a problem ‘in Kashmir’. But the very purpose of these committees – resolution of the Kashmir conflict - stands defeated right from the start because their attention is divided since their mandate is to look at each and every issue in the state of which the Kashmir conflict is just one of them.

I am unprepared to accept that this conflation of issues is a spontaneous outcome of the natural evolution of the conflict in Kashmir. There is a clear line of thinking or at least an increasing tendency in New Delhi to pass of the problem in Kashmir as a result of malgovernance and lack of economic and infrastructure development. The tendency to ‘crowd out’ the core conflict in Kashmir needs to be seen as part of that well-conceived agenda. Once the Kashmir conflict is reduced to the questions of good governance and economic development, it becomes akin to any other problem in any other part of the country. And questions of development are neither new nor news in a country like India and they will take a long time to be resolved. Let us understand that once the Kashmir conflict is made out to be a complicated and multilayered one, New Delhi can always argue that resolving Kashmir is a very complex and time-consuming process. Moreover, when more and more issues are included in what is understood to be the Kashmir conflict, there will be many more voices, concerns, complaints and considerations competing for attention and resolution and in all that confusion the core issues of Kashmir will be submerged and eventually forgotten.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, May 22, 2011. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/May/22/reclaiming-kashmir-s-centrality-6.asp )

Osama Killing and South Asian Geopolitics

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One of the questions that seems to be puzzling strategic pundits around the world is regarding the nature of planning that has gone into the recent killing of Osama Bin Laden in Abottabad by the US Special Forces. Was it a unilateral American operation or was the top brass of the Pakistani Army/ISI aware of operation ‘Geronimo’? Those who argue that the Pakistanis had prior information about the operation and that they had given their consent to the operation believe that the Pakistani establishment indeed gave up one of their strategic assets as he was found to be no more useful to Pakistan’s long-term interests in Afghanistan as well as for Pak-US relations. Moreover, if Pakistan’s Afghan grand strategy is indeed becoming successful with the blessings of the Americans – exemplified by the impending re-induction of ‘moderate Taliban’ elements into the Afghan establishment and the manner in which Americans are increasingly giving into the Pakistani plan for a post-American Afghanistan – it suits the Pakistanis fine, just as it does the Americans, to get rid of Osama Bin Laden, the face of international terrorism today. Recall that one of the major reasons why the Americans started becoming uncomfortable with the Taliban regime in the first place was the asylum given to Bin Laden by the then Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Hence ‘moderate Taliban’ minus the al Qaeda influence is something that the Pakistanis have been aggressively supporting and the Americans increasingly accepting.

However, on the other hand, if the killing of Bin Laden was done by the US without consulting the Pakistani establishment, we in India should be very worried. Going by the reports that the Pakistanis, learning about the midnight attack in Abottabad, scrambled their fighter jets to prepare for counter-attacks, if necessary, we have no option but to believe that it would have crossed the minds of the Pakistani military leaders, even if briefly, that the Indians were behind the surprise attack. For the two geographically adjacent nuclear-capable enemies whose nuclear weapons are largely meant for targets in each other’s territory with hardly any jointly agreed upon nuclear risk reduction measures in place, a surprise attack on one of the countries, so close to the national capital, by a third country could potentially trigger a dangerous nuclear stand-off between them. Moreover, Pakistan does not have a no-first-use policy of nuclear weapons which simply means that Pakistan could, doctrinally speaking, respond to a conventional attack with nuclear weapons. Isn’t it strange that, in spite of being in ‘close strategic alliance’ with both India and Pakistan, the United States of America did not bother to inform either of the countries about operation ‘Geronimo’ in advance even as it has obvious nuclear implications for the South Asian region?

In fact, even if we assume that the Americans had not informed the Pakistani establishment about the operation in Abottabad, Bin Laden’s death nonetheless suits the Pakistani grand Strategy for Afghanistan, i.e., ‘moderate Taliban’ elements, closely allied with Pakistan, in power in Afghanistan without the undesirable influence of al Qaeda and Bin Laden. The Bin Laden killing will certainly have domestic consequences within Pakistan, as is already being witnessed, and the country will be pushed to a corner by the international community, but in the longer run, Pakistan will surely be placed right in the middle of the American/Western strategy for Afghanistan and the country will be in the driving seat as far as the internal affairs of Afghanistan is concerned.

What does it mean for Indo-Pak relations?

Even though the killing of Bin Laden itself may not have much of an impact on Indo-Pak relations, it would have to be seen in the larger context of the evolving Afghan geopolitics and its implications for the region. Now that New Delhi has revived the dialogue process with Islamabad, Indian strategists should focus on employing a multi-pronged, multi-faceted and differentiated strategy to engage with the Pakistani state. Considering the fact that today’s Pakistani state is a deeply divided one, there is all the more reason to develop creative strategies to engage the multiple actors and power centres within Pakistan rather than waiting for elite and social cohesion to take root there. Hence one hopes that the recent denial by New Delhi that it was in secret negotiations with the Pakistan army in the recent past was nothing but a ‘politically correct’ statement. Why not engage the Pakistan army? Today’s Pakistan is not a typical state, in the modern Westphalian sense of the term, and dealing with an atypical state requires the use of non-traditional diplomatic and strategic initiatives as well as out-of-the-box strategic imagination.

Adopting such a strategy, India should now push for resolving the outstanding conflicts that it has with Pakistan. This is perhaps the most opportune time to strike deals with Pakistan on Kashmir and other issues. Post-Osama, Islamabad’s focus will be on the Afghan border and the endgame in Kabul and will therefore be willing to reduce tensions with India and is likely to agree to less-then-perfect solutions to the conflicts that it has with India. Moreover, with the international community unwilling to accept any more excuses from Pakistan on terrorism, India should push for the resolution of Kashmir and other Indo-Pak conflicts.

Now that the Pakistani focus is on the Afghan endgame, New Delhi should make it clear to Pakistan that it has no direct strategic interests in Afghanistan. Afghanistan may be considered as part of India’s strategically important extended neighbourhood by the Indian strategists and may indeed be significant for us given the manner in which the erstwhile Taliban regime had helped Pakistani designs against India. And yet, Indian gains will be indubitably limited and genuine Indian interests will be severely harmed if India follows a course of competitive relationship with Pakistan in Afghanistan.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, May 17, 2011, URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/May/17/osama-killing-and-south-asian-geopolitics-11.asp )

New Delhi’s Kashmir Interlocutors

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I have been postponing this column on the Kashmir interlocutors appointed by the Government of India for a long time because I wanted to do it once their report is finalized and made available to the general public (also I did not want my ‘cynicism’ to color anyone’s understanding of the issue or obstruct the interlocutors’ work). However, I am going to write about it now for two important reasons: 1) I am puzzled by the feverish high-pitch marketing campaign and the gate-crashing tactics adopted by the interlocutors in Srinagar, and 2) even if their report contains radical ‘recommendations’ to the government of India to resolve the Kashmir conflict, I am increasingly convinced that it is unlikely to create an impact on the conflict per se.

The selection, appointment, and the functioning of the interlocutors are deeply flawed, and inaction and inertia, in all probability, await the group’s recommendations to the government of India. More so, the fundamental logic underlying the formation of this group seems to be that ‘we need a document to be put together by a group of ‘experts’ which can clearly spell out a political solution for the conflict in Kashmir’. This logic is misplaced because we neither need such a document nor do we need a group of experts to tell us and the government in New Delhi as to what should be the solution to the Kashmir conflict: the fact is that we already know what the solution should be and there are enough documents which have in great detail explained what should be the solution. It is not yet another document that we need to finally resolve the Kashmir conflict, but an honorable political process of reconciliation between Kashmir and New Delhi.

Under the supervision of MoH

The Kashmiri separatists, moderates and hardliners alike, made it clear right from the beginning that they would not talk to a low-profile, low-powered team of ‘academic experts’ (no, I don’t use the word ‘academic’ in a derogatory manner!) who are tasked with (merely) ‘suggesting’ ways to ‘resolve the Kashmir conflict’. Why, the separatists asked, would they want to talk to a group of academics/researchers/journalists who would be submitting a report to the Ministry of Home which many Kashmiris see as part of the problem in the first place? That they did not enjoy any decision-making power and that they could only act as the handmaiden to the MoH became amply clear when the Home Minister publically instructed them not to ‘give ball-to-ball commentary’ on their activities to the media.

Indeed, the appointment of this group of interlocutors is a clever move by the MoH because by setting up this group to be functioning under its guidance, which, under ideal circumstances, should be sitting in judgment of whatever the MoH has done in Kashmir for many years, the MoH has managed to assume a moral high ground. If New Delhi’s security forces and the MoH themselves are in the dock when it comes to the Kashmir problem, how can they sit in judgment of the activities of the group of interlocutors let alone bring about a genuine process of truth-finding and reconciliation? The very fact that the MoH has the power to reprimand the group shows that it controls the group and its activities, it can finally decide what to do with their report and that the group lacks the power to point fingers at its own source of origin.

Feverish marketing campaign

Once in Kashmir, the interlocutors claimed that they will not go after the separatists if the latter did not want to meet them and yet the current spate of feverish marketing campaign and the aggressive pursuit of separatists by the interlocutors are painfully demeaning for the very meaning of peacemaking. The one separatist they managed to poach from the dissident camp, Moulana Abbas Ansari, has been ousted from the Hurriyat and while the separatists publicly denounce the interlocutors, the mainstream parties are willing to say in private conversations that they are talking to the interlocutors only due to the pressure exerted on them by the MoH: this is making a mockery of the concept of peacemaking.

Flawed performance

Apart from conducting occasional visits to the state, holding press-conferences and star-studded seminars, and occasional poaching of minor, disgruntled, elements from the dissident camp, what have the interlocutors done? Forget about their ability to bring about an honorable solution to the Kashmir issue, have they at least been able to create a momentum for peace in Kashmir? Not really. Apart from the chiding they are subjected to by Chidambaram from time to time, the interlocutors have also been complicating the issues in the state with their own utterances. For instance, they have been mixing up political problems and governance issues. The group has been dialoguing with people from all parts of the state including Jammu and has said that its suggestions will also give importance to ‘problems faced by all parts of the state’. But the fact is that the political nature of the problem is limited to the Kashmir valley and expanding this problem to the rest of the state is not the best thing to do. Of course, the other parts of the state have their own problems of infrastructure, governance etc. But that is not the ‘Kashmir problem’ which is clearly political in nature. The interlocutors also said during a recent seminar that the security forces are also among the major stakeholders in the Kashmir conflict. How can the security forces be a major stakeholder in the Kashmir conflict?

Life beyond recommendations

Going by the history of the various New Delhi-Srinagar talks and reports generated by official and non-official groups in the past, including the theme-based working groups set up by the Prime Minister of India and the autonomy proposal of the NC, it is unlikely that New Delhi will take the suggestions of the three-member interlocutors seriously. As I wrote in one of my earlier columns even if one were to argue that the interlocutors would end up giving a good set of recommendations to New Delhi in order to politically address and resolve the Kashmir issue, the trouble is that since the separatists are not part of the process they are unlikely to accept them for fear of being considered irrelevant in the resolution of the Kashmir conflict. How can we expect the separatists to accept the recommendations of a group that was not given their legitimacy and blessings in the first place? That would go on to prove that the separatists are irrelevant and dispensable in Kashmir politics.

More so, with the peace-loving Manmohan singh under heavy opposition fire from multiple corruption charges, the UPA government is more likely to go back to its time-tested political position: political status-quoism. The right-wing BJP, with its new-found advantage over the government, is unlikely to let the government do anything radical on Kashmir.

In my opinion, therefore, this group appointed by New Delhi, whose members are widely recognized as learned people, should not be called interlocutors but members of a ‘Kashmir study group’ (copyright to Farooq Katwari’s KSG) at best.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, April 24, 2011. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/Apr/24/new-delhi-s-kashmir-interlocutors-2.asp )