In the name of national interest

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

‘National interest’ has the ability to mobilize national resources and national imagination in pursuit of the goals of a nation; it can also be the last resort of the ruling class to hoodwink the people. Hundreds of unnecessary wars have been fought, unholy alliances have been forged, human rights have been violated, oppositions have been silenced and numerous indefensible acts have been committed and then successfully defended - all in the name of national interest. Invocation of national interest has been one of the most potent weapons of statecraft and a convenient holy cow used by politicians, bureaucrats, national elites and just about anyone who wants to prioritize a particular interest over the others at a given point of time, often serving anything but the interest of the nation. What is interesting is that while national interest is invoked as if it is an objective category by those who propose it, its contents almost always belong to the subjective realm. It is this essential contradiction inherent in ‘national interest’ that also lends it the quality to be misused by the ruling elites: if something is open to interpretation by the ruling elites which can also be used as a tool to demand loyalty and silence opposition, is that not the most dangerous political weapon that anyone can possess?

Resorting to claims of national interest usually leads to depoliticisation of issues leading to their instant securitization. While politicization of issues engenders participatory public spheres generating debates on relevant issues, when these issues are securitized, there will be a lack of such discussions in the public sphere. And when issues are securitized and defined in the language of national interest, they are not only depoliticized and often readily accepted by the people but also forms the bedrock of assumptions which will then classify what is right and wrong, good for the country or bad, patriotic acts or unpatriotic ones etc. Once these sets of bedrock ‘national interest’ assumptions become, thus, part of the larger social consciousness, it becomes difficult, at times, even for the ruling elites to change it, when they want to introduce newer national interests. Don’t we often hear things like “the government wants to talk peace with Pakistan, but it is concerned about the potential negative reactions from the people”, or “the government wants to adopt a give-and-take policy with the Chinese to resolve their border conflict, but it is unsure of it acceptance domestically” etc.? This happens because when contents of national interest are securitized they tend to assume fixed meanings and when confronted with the challenge of change at a later date, there will be a great deal of resistance. And yet, national interest and its securitization are often co-existent.

That is where the importance of politicization (used here not in a narrow sense of the term that we often see) of national interest and the debates over differing conceptions of national interests in the public sphere become extremely important. The ruling elites will always have the tendency to silence the opposition by invoking the holy cow called national interest, but a political community should always resist such attempts and force the ruling elites to engender debates on what national interest entails like Anna Hazare did recently with regard to the Lok Pal Bill.

National interest and the Kashmir question

A pertinent case in point here is the history of relations between J&K and New Delhi. Successive regimes in New Delhi rigged elections in J&K, time and again, jailed many Kashmiri leaders, installed puppet regimes in Srinagar, floated all sorts of political and other outfits in the state in order to outwit the existing ones only to float newer ones to outsmart the ones floated earlier, violated human rights of Kashmiris, and killed hundreds of people in cold blood - all in the name of “national interest”. New Delhi and the Congress party in particular, believed, perhaps even ‘genuinely’, that given the history of Jammu and Kashmir and its proximity to Pakistan, it had to keep a tab on the political activities there and even try and manipulate it so that Kashmir remains with India. But then, even genuine criminality is not absolvable.

Hence Sheikh Abdullah was imprisoned for years together, Bakshi Ghulam Muhammed was appointed in his place in 1953 who was only too keen to obey New Delhi’s diktats to dilute all the important provisions of Article 370 by accepting the many Presidential and Constitutional Orders New Delhi issued thereafter to that effect. The 1975 Beg-Parthasarathy Accord was signed promising the restoration of Article 370 but a certain interpretation of ‘national interest’ by New Delhi prevented that from happening. The Farooq Abdullah government was dismissed by New Delhi in 1984 for organizing the opposition conclave in Srinagar because the Congress party thought that ‘national interest’ was not being served by Abdullah’s romance with the opposition – an instance where democracy was seen by the ruling elites in clear opposition to national interest. The Congress though found Abdullah in line with national interest when he gave up on the opposition parties and joined hands with the Congress. More importantly, the national interest of the nation was ‘supremely’ served when the two sides signed the ‘Rajive-Farooq Accord’ and thereafter went on to shamelessly rig the 1987 Assembly elections…!!

What is tragic is that the security forces, policemen, election officials and others who rigged the elections at various points of time in Kashmir seemed to believe that they were doing the right thing and were therefore serving the national interest. Through the 1990s, then, hundreds of Kashmiris were incarcerated, tortured and killed and the human rights of thousands more were violated, again in the name of national interest. The public opinion in India, for the most part, was, amazingly so, willing to buy these claims of national interest conveniently framed by the Congress leadership and New Delhi’s ruling class. Even today, what is unthinkable and seen as reprehensible in other parts of the country, and I am not merely talking about rigging of elections, are seen perfectly fine in J&K – in the name of national interest. Much of what is happening in Kashmir today is the result of this narrow, biased, partisan and imprudent understanding of national interest.

(Source: GreaterKashmir, April 10, 2010. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/Apr/10/in-the-name-of-national-interest-2.asp )

).

In the name of national interest

Impressions from a recent Kashmir visit

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

Every time I come back to New Delhi after a visit to Kashmir I feel that that I have gone through yet another experience of being through something that I do not consider to be a normal state of affairs. Every day of a politically conscious visitor’s life in the city of Srinagar reminds him of a story of political betrayals, layers of economic ruin and stagnation, simplicity of campus romanticism, and above all the moral dilemma of trying to be neutral about a political plot horribly mis-scripted by India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri leadership. As an analyst, I should maintain my neutrality and yet in my inability to do so I am comforted by Dante Alighieri’s famous saying: “The hottest places in hell are reserved for those who in times of great moral crises maintain their neutrality.” Hence, as the title reads, the following thoughts are impressionistic, biased, and, often, inconsistent and I am not apologetic about them being so.

In search of a less than perfect solution: There seems to be a growing stream of thinking across the board in Kashmir that Kashmirs need to focus on a practical, achievable and less-than-perfect solution to the decades-long conflict there. This is not something that you get only while talking to the mainstream politicians who would, of course, talk about various middle-of-the-road solutions, but is also something that the separatists are expressing more explicitly than ever. That the overall development of the state, education of the Kashmiri children, and the dreams of Kashmir’s youngsters cannot continue to remain hostage to the conflict in and on Kashmir conflict is something that is now widely recognized and appreciated. At the theoretical level, there are indeed many absolutist positions which, it so seems, will moderate themselves on a dialogue table premised on the possibility of an honorable settlement for all parties involved in the conflict.

Pakistan’s place in the valley: Pakistan is a long-forgotten dream in contemporary Kashmir’s political discourse and social imagination. It is now widely understood that the claims regarding the Pakistani nation being the final resting place for Kashmiri national aspirations are not to be taken seriously or should indeed be actively dissuaded. There are many reasons for this: the constitutional uncertainty faced by Northern Areas, the place of POK (AJK) in the Pakistani body-politic, Pakistan’s failure to portray itself as a model Islamic state for others, its ‘descent into chaos’ and the general lack of identification of the Kashmiris with Pakistan. Even those who once had sympathies for Pakistan are now taking a relook at own their views because Kashmirs have certainly learnt the thump rule applicable, perhaps, in all conflict regions: there is a need to constantly redefine one’s strategies and modus operandi in the light of the new geopolitical contexts and the larger goals one is pursuing.

Interlocutors: Another issue on which there seems to be a general agreement is that the much-hyped work of the interlocutors may, after all, pass off as a non-event in Kashmir. While the mainstream politicians do not say it openly, those on the separatist side do not have any hesitation is clearly saying so. One of the widely held arguments against the Padgaonkar-led group of interlocutors is that the Kashmir conflict is a political one and it cannot be resolved by journalists and academics: there needs to be, in other words, a high-level political process led by leading Indian politicians who can make decisions and not merely make suggestions which may or may not be accepted by the multi-layered and complex bureaucratic establishment in New Delhi. Even if one were to argue that the interlocutors would end up giving a good set of recommendations to New Delhi in order to politically address and resolve the Kashmir issue, the trouble is that since the separatists are not part of the process they are unlikely to accept them however enlightened or encouraging the recommendations may be for fear of being considered irrelevant in the resolution of the Kashmir conflict. In other words, this is a non-starter. More so, with the peace-loving Manmohan singh under heavy opposition fire from multiple corruption charges, the UPA government is more likely to go back to its time-tested political position: political status-quoism. The right-wing BJP, with its new-found advantage over the government, is unlikely to let the government to do anything radical on Kashmir.

Where is the Indian Civil Society? While some Kashmiris express an emotional rupture with the Indian nation, there are others who are sympathetic to the Indian nation and its many dilemmas and yet ask a very significant question: where was the Indian civil society when over hundred young Kashmiris lost their lives by the bullets of the security forces? Barring a few voices condemning and reacting to the loss of lives, many Kashmiris point out, most members of the Indian civil society, who would lose no time in condemning any injustice done in other parts of the country, were not vocal, forceful and empathetic enough in reacting to the killings in Kashmir. Isn’t it ironical that when the gun-culture was more prominent in the valley during the 1990s there were more committed civil society reactions from the rest of India, and now, when the gun-culture is on the wane in the valley, there are not many in the country who seem to care about Kashmir?

Generational Shift: There is a new generation that is taking over the legacy of the conflict in Kashmir and they are serious about creating a new set of narratives about the conflict. While the older generation, increasingly considered by the youngsters as having not done much for the Kashmir cause, had a more romanticized idea of azadi and were also emotional and temperamental in their brand of politics, the new generation not only shows a certain sense of emotional moderation when it comes to articulating the Kashmir cause. There is more clarity and theoretical finesse about their arguments and they are intent on making rational, logical and political arguments rather than engaging in a shouting match. This generational shift also tends to historicize and contextualize the Kashmir conflict even as the new generation pitches its national claims in neatly formulated conceptual categories.

New Delhi’s invisible hand: Everyone in Kashmir is consciously or unconsciously aware of the role of the invisible hand of New Delhi in managing the affairs of the state. Nothing happens in Kashmir, be it electoral results, appointment of the Chief Minister or of the local level officials, or who should be paid how much, without the knowledge of the all-powerful middlemen (another term for the Intelligence agents) of New Delhi in the state. It is not the political establishments in Srinagar or New Delhi that micromanage the affairs of the state but the ‘Intelligence walas’ who often act on their own to fit the reality on the ground to their pet theories.

Dilemmas of the moderates: As I wrote in my last column, the Kashmiri moderates are in an existential dilemma even as the future of Kashmir and the direction of its conflict lie, in a major way, in their hands. As one of them pointed out to me, they are fighting India’s battle in Kashmir for the sake of moderation and sanity and, in a sense, against complete independence of Kashmir from the rest of India. And yet when New Delhi does not deliver on its promises after holding sustained dialogues with them, it makes the moderates feel apologetic and ashamed of what they do. By making them look apologetic and as ‘bought over by New Delhi’ before their own people, New Delhi is only strengthening the hands of hawks like Geelani.

(Source: 20 MARCH 2011, Greater Kashmir. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/Mar/20/impressions-from-a-recent-kashmir-visit-2.asp )

The difficulty of being a Kashmiri separatist

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

SmallerDefaultLarger

Contrary to popular understanding, being a separatist in contemporary Kashmir, which I argue is a far more moderate position today in comparison to being an Independenist, is not an easy political choice to make and to sustain in the longer run. While separatism is the self-embraced political position of a number of political actors in Kashmir, ‘soft-separatism’ is the term used by many nationalist political pundits to dub those whose politics falls midway between extreme positions. Let’s do some terminological clarification first. Within Jammu and Kashmir, political stances and opinions range from ‘independinist’ or ‘extreme separatism’ to ‘extreme pro-Indian nationalism’. Between these two extremes we do have a midway approach. On one side of it lies ‘soft-separatism’ and on the other is ‘soft-nationalism’. While extreme separatism often manifests itself in ‘Independenist’, cultural-chauvinist, and anti-India positions, extreme pro-Indian nationalism, on the other hand, is characterized by exclusivist, chauvinist, pulp-patriotic jingoism. Traditionally, a separatist almost always took extreme political positions. However, I argue that not all separatists believe in exclusivist and partisan politics. Some of them, who, for the sake of terminological clarification, can be called ‘neo-separatists’, tend to make moderate political arguments even as they guard against the attempts to uniformise and standardize. In other words, the traditional political battle-lines are increasingly being redrawn in contemporary Kashmir and hence ‘separatism’ has newer meanings and implications today. While traditional separatism argued for being ‘separate’ from the mainstream, the ‘neo-separatists’ are calling for a new brand of separatist politics in the valley.

Answer to questions such as ‘who is a separatist?’ and ‘what are the various shades of separatism’ depend on one’s definition of separatism and his/her attitude towards it. Personalities ranging from Hurriyat leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq to Academician Amitabh Mattoo have often been called a separatist. While calling Mirwaiz a separatist may not arouse anyone’s curiosity, calling Mattoo as a separatist surely has an agenda behind it. Those elements in Jammu who espouse ‘extreme pro-Indian nationalism’ dubbed Mattoo a Kashmir separatist for his liberal views on Kashmir and human rights. What they did not realize was that being ‘pro-Kashmir’ need not be in opposition to being ‘pro-India’.

People’s Democratic Party (PDP) is often accused of being a ‘soft-separatist’ party ever since the party has come out with a ‘self-rule’ formula for the resolution of the Kashmir issue which argues for the creation of cross-border institutions and eventual economic union of the two sides (Pakistani and Indian) of Jammu and Kashmir. This, the extreme pro-Indian nationalists argue, is nothing but separatism. PDP has refuted this saying that ‘Genuine Kashmiri aspirations are dismissed as separatist’. Since the PDP is dubbed as ‘soft-separatist’, the party has to often bend over backwards to explain its political positions. I do not want to call PDP a neo-separatist party but wish to merely highlight that it does share some of the characteristics of a neo-separatist political party. Similarly, People’s Conference Chief Sajad Lone is often dismissed as pro-India by the extremists in the separatist camp and he is often seen struggling to argue that “fighting elections is a change of strategy not ideology”. This is precisely my point: being a moderate in today’s Kashmir is extremely difficult because many of us have not understood the new meanings of separatism in the Valley.

The difficulty of being a (neo-)separatist
Far from being an opportunist, a Kashmiri (neo-)separatist, to my mind, is someone whose politics is to be seen as a mature and enlightened response to an ever-changing Kashmir politics. It is not an easy position to take because those who take the middle path have always been accused of being without conviction. But then what is the use of conviction in politics if the content of conviction does not keep pace with changing social and political realities? Is that not another term for obscurantism?

That said, being (neo-)separatist becomes difficult for any political actor primarily because it needs to constantly avoid the political extremes – of being an independenist or extreme (pro-Indian) nationalist. It will have to disagree both with the BJP when it wants to forcibly hoist the flag in Lal Chawk on Republic Day and with the other extreme when they justify the hoisting of the Pakistani flag there. This also makes the separatist vulnerable to continuous onslaught from the extremes. One reason, apart from all the other equally competing ones, why the Congress chose National Conference (NC) over PDP as the coalition partner after the last State Assembly elections in the state was this: sidelining of the (neo-)separatists. This can, potentially, create a situation in which the (neo-)separatist always fears being an outcast.

Separatists may also find it hard to garner enough popular legitimacy and support. The separatists will have to fiercely fight for political space and are likely to be incapable of gaining much of it because political extremes are popularly considered to be more honorable and attractive than political moderation, especially in conflict situations. J&K is no exception. The independenists perhaps are more uneasy with PDP and Sajad Lone than with the NC and the Congress since the latter do not encroach into their traditional space. The mainstreamers will try to isolate and denigrate the (neo-)separatists because that keeps their space uncontested and undivided. For me, this, at least partly, explains the defeat of Lone in the last Parliamentary elections.

Eschatologically speaking, in situations where politics of attrition rules the roost, as is the case in Kashmir, (neo-)separatists may not be the ultimate winners. Politics of attrition sees no end to uncertainty that is all around. Where everyone is fighting everyone and waiting for the end (resolution of conflicts), when the end actually arrives whosoever remains will be the winner; it may not matter what principles one stood for. Political extremes, given the extreme definitiveness of political positions inherent in them, are the likely winners of a politics of attrition.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, March 6, 2011. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/Mar/6/the-difficulty-of-being-a-kashmiri-separatist-13.asp )

Cairo, Kashmir and the anatomy of post-modern resistance

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

Since a lot of people in Kashmir, ranging from Mehbooba Mufti to Ali Shah Geelani, have spoken in comparative terms about the unrest in Kashmir and the one we saw in Egypt, I wish to resist the temptation of wanting to do just that. I will, instead, try and draw some lessons from the revolution that the world witnessed in Cairo and put that in the larger political context of ‘post-modern resistance’ in order to understand the anatomy of tomorrow’s revolutions. Of course, some of my own observations here are reinforced by the insights I gained from the recent youth struggles in Kashmir.

Post-modern resistance is extensively characterized by its impressionist nature (as opposed to modernity’s essential preoccupation with ‘methodical’, ‘pure’ and ‘real’ forms of political engagements) and hence revels in its use of virtual space, activism, and politics. Post-modern resistance is not against individuals (policies or persons) but against the system as such because it has lost its faith in the system as a whole; hence post-modern revolutionaries would be unwilling to settle for anything less than systemic change, if not systematic. This form of resistance also attempts to demolish all ‘meta-narratives’ as is true of any post-modern project: state and its all-pervasive system is the meta-narrative here and hence they would be de-essentialised by the post-modern revolutionaries. Many of us might mistake them for anarchists because we think that post-modern politics is irresponsible politics.

Post-modern resistance is also intensely subjective and personal for, in a certain sense, it can be seen as the result of personal and existential angst and search for meaning by individuals in the era of faceless globalization, standardization and de-personalisation. The need and desire for meaning manifests itself in the political struggles for common causes, making such struggles both public and personal at the same time.

The politically conscious Gen-Y

There is a general perception that that the new generation, popularly called Generation-Y, is apolitical in nature and that they would not engage in anything other than personal endeavors, and that politics is certainly not one of them. Cairo and Kashmir have shown that we did not understand the Gen-Y. Gen-Y may not be political in the traditional sense of the term, that is, politics is not the only thing they engage in nor are they very persuaded by organized forms of political life which they tend to think is degraded. And yet they proved to be political animals, as Aristotle said, by their politics of fellowship albeit often in the virtual world. Didn’t we make the mistake of thinking that the young Egyptians and Kashmiris are not too bothered with politics and political struggles?

Beyond the ‘command and control state’

The post-modern form of resistance that Gen-Y engages in is not subservient to the grand narrative of the ‘command and control state’, which indeed is the traditional meaning and role of the state. They are neither hesitant nor unwilling to change the status-quo and question all authority figures because they view all authority figures with deep suspicion, and harbor even deeper hate for the arrogance of the state that they grew up seeing in everyday life. The system, for them, is not indispensable: systemic transformation is the motto. To me, this explains why the new forms of resistance, be it in Kashmir or in Cairo, are not cadre-based, centrally-directed, ideologically singular and not dependent on the whims and fancies of individual leaders many of whom are willing to be sold out for a price.

Redefining the meaning of politics

Politics is traditionally understood to be concerned about power; how power and resources are allocated, who wields power and how. Post-modern resistance seems to be demystifying this negative notion of politics: power, they seem to be saying, is not what is at the heart of politics: it’s empowerment that forms the inner core of politics. Power focuses on those who have it; empowerment, on the other hand, focuses on those who do not have power. The Kashmiri youth who take to streets in resistance seem to be saying more about who should not have power and much less about who should get it. They seem less motivated about the glories of power and much more about the need for empowerment. Gen-Y also does not consider empowerment to be an act of charity that comes from the bounty and large-heartedness of the state and the ruling elite.

Practicing new forms of patriotism

Patriotism can be an intensely troubling issue for a lot of youngsters and yet the new-age revolutionaries seem to be practicing a much more liberating and sophisticated understanding of patriotism and love for their nation. For long, many of us believed that patriotism is obedience towards the ruler, incumbent regime and the ruling elite. It was believed that protesting against the policies and personalities of the regime was unpatriotic. Kashmir and Cairo show that patriotism cannot justify misrule and mal-governance.

The return of romanticism in politics

Many of us also tended to dismiss resistance, radical change, and talks of revolution as mere “campus romanticism” bereft of any practical value and worldly wisdom. “They will change when they face the real world”, we commented when Gen-Y refused to shun their dreams of systemic change and revolution. The resistance and struggles in Kashmir and Cairo have managed to bring back the much-needed element of romanticism into our political vocabulary and vision for political change. University and college campuses in these resistance zones were full of romaticised versions of ‘liberation’, ‘azadi’, ‘change’ etc. which a lot of us thought was nothing but short-lived enthusiasm and that Gen-Y would soon lose interest in their pursuit of political goals: we were utterly wrong.

Let it be said that mature, serious and in-depth political analysis by political scientists and policy pundits will henceforth remain incomplete if it fails to appreciate the power and significance of romanticism in politics.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, February 20, 2011. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/Feb/20/anatomy-of-post-modern-resistance-6.asp )

What to expect from Indo-Pak parleys in Thimpu

From Daily Times, Pakistan. Sunday, February 06, 2011

Jinnah Institute seeks the opinion of leading policy makers from India and Pakistan on the strategic implications and possible outcomes of the meeting between the Indian and Pakistani foreign secretaries on the sidelines of the SAARC Summit in Thimphu, Bhutan.

The recent announcement of talks between Pakistan’s foreign secretary, Salman Bashir and his Indian counterpart, Nirupama Rao, has sparked hope that this interaction between India and Pakistan will lead to an outcome different from the public breakdown of talks between the foreign ministers of the two countries in Islamabad in July 2010. While the resumption of official talks is a positive sign for the peace process between India and Pakistan, analysts on both sides of the border remain cautious about their outcome. Nonetheless, both Indian and Pakistani analysts firmly believe that the only way forward for India and Pakistan is to resume the dialogue on a comprehensive range of bilateral issues which impact the relationship between the two neighbours.

Despite the announcement that talks between India and Pakistan have resumed, little has changed since July last year. India seeks decisive action from Pakistan on the issues of terrorism, particularly Mumbai. Pakistan has yet to deliver to India’s satisfaction. Pakistan seeks a peaceful resolution to the growing dispute and discontent in Kashmir. India remains secretive about its vision for the future of the troubled region. Without significant movement on critical bilateral stumbling blocks, both countries are waiting eagerly to see whether this interaction between the foreign secretaries will lead to a second wave of the “Thimphu Thaw”and pave the way for a higher level meeting between representatives of both countries.

On the sidelines of the Chaophraya Dialogue, a Track II meeting between leading experts from India and Pakistan, Jinnah Institute asked the experts gathered there for their opinions on the possible outcomes from the upcoming Thimphu talks.

* How can Thimpu be prevented from becoming an exercise in diplomatic attrition?

* What should be done to ensure sustainability of the dialogue? What three things can both sides to make dialogue resumption more effective in terms of moving from crisis management to building confidence and resolving disputes?

* How can the two countries work together to delegitimize the domestic rhetoric against the other country, which has led to the building up of enemy images against the other country?

Rifaat Hussain

Head of Department, Defence and Strategic Studies, QAU

* We should not pin too many hopes on the Thimpu

talks. These talks are meant to set the agenda for the FMs’meeting in New Delhi in March. If both sides can agree on a new framework for dialogue agenda, it would be a big step forward. In the absence of an agreed agenda for the FM talks, the Thimpu talks will be an exercise in futility.

* Have an agreed agenda for talks and the mechanism to monitor progress.

* Have a time-bound framework for resolving outstanding disputes.

* Address each other’s fears, apprehensions and concerns through a back channel consultative mechanism.

* Not lending official support to negative societal images of each other. By allowing free movement of people across border to dilute entrenched enemy images. By encouraging educational, cultural and media exchanges to dismantle enemy images.

Aziz A Khan

Former Pakistani Ambassador

* Thimpu is essentially about discussing the resumption of dialogue process. The two Foreign Secretaries need to work out an agreed format for the dialogue process, which can then be resumed in a meaningful manner paving the way for the forthcoming Foreign Minister-level talks in Delhi and eventually a summit in the near future.

* Whether it is crisis management, building confidence or dispute resolution, the two sides need to talk to each other through a sustained process. And to make it result-oriented, both sides need to sincerely commit themselves to address the issues of concern to the other. Terrorism and the resolution of Kashmir dispute are uppermost in the list of issues bedevilling relations.

* Better cooperation at governmental level, improved infrastructure for people-to- people contact, friendlier visa regime, cultural exchanges and extensive and intensive interaction among scholars, academics, students, media and tourism are some of the measures that would help eliminate rhetoric against each other and bring sanity to public discourse.

Sagarika Ghose

Senior Editor, CNN-IBN

* The Indian foreign secretary has said that dialogue is the most intelligent means of pursuing Indian interests in Pakistan. At Thimphu, there seems little doubt that the revelations on the Samjhauta blast probe will be brought into focus. If equivalence is drawn between Mumbai 26/11 and the Samjhauta blast of 18 February 2007, the Indian side must take a step forward and show demonstrable openness about the Samjhauta blast probe. It should assertthat those who have committed criminal acts of mass murder will be dealt with no other considerations but the provisions of the penal code. The Indian state will view every act of terrorism whether domestic or cross-border as acts of criminality in the same way. To delve into the semantics of scale and provenance of Samjhauta versus 26/11, or the definitional quagmire of “cross border”and “homegrown,”is counter-productive and would be an instance of diplomatic attrition. Instead, a common assertion of the rule of law and a commitment not to politicise terrorism would be valuable.

A blow out between Krishna and Qureshi must be avoidedat all costs. Care must be taken that conversations that should remain on the negotiating table do not become grist to the media mill, as there are enormous sensitivities at stake.Respect for mutual public opinion and respect for each other’s officials must be demonstrably conveyed. At the same time,the publicmust be kept accurately informed on the areas in which India and Pakistan have to continue to sort out differences.

A commitment to dialogue can be voiced not as high rhetoric but as sleeves rolled up, problem-solving, nuts and bolts exercise, constructively attentive to the details of each other’s concerns, rather than sounding-off rhetorically on tropes already voiced. A technocratic, sober, problem-oriented approach would be a positive stepping-stone for the future.

g Dialogue can become sustainable if it is seen as crucial to the self-interest of both nations.The hard work lies in creating a domestic constituency for talks at home. In India, talks must be sold as a way to secure our frontier with Pakistan, and as part of the agenda of a modern rational and aspirant nation anxious to create a better tomorrow for future generations.

Dialogue can become sustainable if:

n Pakistan provides a “deliverable”in terms of some action on 26/11, which the PM can show off as a positive result of the talks and engagement with Pakistan.

n If the hype and expectation around talks is lessened and a problem solving approach is adopted—in this an “educate the media”campaign could be considered where the dangers of television jingoism are highlighted to editors without in any way toning down the hard-headed need to criticise and differ.

n If industry, trade, cultural and student delegations are allowed to interact freely, a context is provided to the official and political relationship and slowly the climate of domestic opinion implacably opposed to talks is softened.

g The domestic rhetoric and the enemy images are a product of mutual ignorance. On our channel, we have established that “differences of opinion” are distinct from enmities and television debates are not about demonstrations of hostile nationalistic fervour but about serious differences in which issues are perceived.Indians and Pakistanis must not be afraid to criticise their own country in front of each other honestly and admit to pre-conceived notions. A new generation of Indians and Pakistanis perhaps do not carry the baggage of the past. They must be allowed tovisit each other’s countries and enjoy a climate of exchange of cultural products—books, music, fashion, art and films. There is no substitute for people-to-people contacts. Still, a Pakistani grand gesture on 26/11 would go a long way in assuaging tempers here. I also feel a more youthful representation in our Chaopharaya Dialogue would generate many new ideas to create change in our mentalities. The Twitter and Facebook-powered youth of Egypt and Tunisia have shown they can create a revolution: we seem to be missing out in harnessing the power of the “green”generation to take the India-Pakistan project forward.

Raja Menon

Former Assistant Chief of Naval Staff

* My impression is that what the military called “staff work”is deeply deficient prior to South Asian EAM’s meetings. It is impossible for two diplomatic establishments to permit their EAMs to meet when they have not worked out any prior list of minimum agreements. It is also impossible to imagine that there is no minimum agreed upon lists that cannot be put together by a determined staff that would at least save

face for the two ministers and the two countries. (This is) downright diplomatic incompetence.

* There is only one relationship that actually continues no matter how bad the crisis, which is the trading relationship. If it is going on why not talk about it? Why pretend we don’t have a booming trade relationship through Dubai. Is the Pakistani establishment involved in diverting trade through Dubai to make a clandestine profit?

g Frankly, I think we have to address the vernacular press, which is the main cause of the problem.

Moeed Yusuf

South Asian Advisor, USIP

* There is an increasing realization on both sides that the dialogue needs to be resumed. India, which had stalled the process post-Mumbai 2008, is revisiting its stance internally. It rightly realizes that law of diminishing returns has set in as far as its position of holding up dialogue is concerned. This implies that both sides will be predisposed to avoiding diplomatic attrition at Thimpu. That said, one should not expect any miracles - New Delhi will remain cautious and keep reminding Pakistan, as it should, of its commitment of doing more against the Mumbai perpetrators. The most we should be expecting is diplomatic niceties and hopefully more than just a vague promise of re initiating a dialogue.

* I think the prerequisites for a sustained dialogue are fairly obvious:

* Another Mumbai will stall the process for a long time. The onus is on Pakistan to ensure that militant groups are denied the opportunity to repeat the episode. A deeper requirement is for the two sides to work together on terrorism and to operationalize the Joint Mechanism in reality. I say this as terrorism is not a Pakistan-specific phenomena - a repeat of a Samjhota Express like episode is likely to irk Pakistan equally.

n India must seriously negotiate on Kashmir during the dialogue, both for Pakistan’s and its own sake. A solution to Kashmir is the ultimate guarantee of the anti-India militant groups losing space. On Kashmir, Pakistan needs to accept, at least privately, the Indian demand to restart the process from where the Aziz-Lambiah back-channel left it although there needs to be an equal emphasis on carrying the entire spectrum of political views along - much more so than the previous round did.

* Both sides need to commit, publicly, that the dialogue process will be isolated from exogenous events - read terrorist attacks. Otherwise, it only takes one successful attack by vested interests to put us back at square one.

* Counter-intuitive as it is, this is perhaps the most challenging period for both countries. The in-power regimes on both sides are not ones who have traditionally used belligerent rhetoric against the other to gain domestically. They require the opposition, BJP in India and the right wing

parties in Pakistan to accept the need to change their rhetoric. Seems to be a tough ask, given domestic challenges for both regimes. Notwithstanding, both would do well to launch a concerted media campaign to try and reverse the hostile public sentiment in the two countries. The focus should be to explain the logic of rapprochement and how this will help the respective countries. Let us not, however, hope for too much on this count.

Humayun Khan

Former Pakistani Ambassador

* Both sides should downscale their immediate objectives. At present, the vital thing is to restore the dialogue. India should not make Mumbaia brick wall that must first be removed. Pakistan should not insist that the dialogue must be “result oriented.”Once they start talking to each other again, these problems will have to be addressed.

* A firm commitment to keep talking no matter what discouraging signs appear every now and then.

* A conviction on the part of both sides that a cooperative relationship is in their mutual interest and the resolution of disputes in beneficial to both.

* A special effort on the part of India to convince a suspicious Pakistani establishment and public that India believes strongly that a stable and prosperous Pakistan is in India’s interest.

* Domestic rhetoric can be delegitimized through more joint declarations of both countries’commitment to friendship. By facilitating people to people contacts instead of making them increasingly difficult, India and Pakistan can work towards softening domestic discourse towards the other country.

Happymon Jacob

Assistant Professor of Diplomacy, School of International Studies, JNU

* India and Pakistan should not approach the Thimphu dialogue with inflexible diplomatic positions, they should be willing to accommodate and make concessions. They should also try and take one step at a time, rather than trying to talk and resolve all things at once. There should be considerable thinking on both sides as well as mutually about a potential roadmap to revive an IndiaPakistan peace process.

* Revive the momentum on resolving the Kashmir issue. Restart the dialogue on Kashmir without giving up on whatever has been achieved on it already.

* Increase contacts between two civil societies, industries, educations, institutions etc.

* Work together on issues of common concern, i.e., terrorism and extremism in the region, water problem, climate change, natural calamities etc.

* Media on both sides of the border should be educated to see the other country as just another country rather than as an enemy country.

* Educational and research institutions should be encouraged to cooperate, conduct joint research, and send students, researchers and teachers to visit the other country.

* Examine the school curricula of both the countries for embedded enemy images of each other and expunge the objectionable sections.

Gopalaswami Parthasarathy

Former Indian Ambassador

* Thimpu can be regarded as a success if rhetoric is avoided and an agreement is reached on resuming dialogue at a political level. Experience has shown that long joint press conferences after meetings end in disaster and should be avoided.

* This talk of moving from crisis management to confidence building and resolving disputes has become a cliché, which is best discarded. We had, in our dialogue, achieved progress through the back channel talks and in meetings at the political level to resolve differences over J&K.

The leadership in both countries acknowledged this; huge progress was achieved in promoting CBMs in Jammu and Kashmir. An agreement was reached on our respective nuclear arsenals being a factor for stability; new facilities were agreed on to promote people to people contacts. What more could one have asked for?

The most important thing is that successor governments should stand by understandings reached and commitments made by their predecessors. General Zia-ul-Haq wanted the Simla Agreement to be junked. General Kayani evidently wants the policies and initiatives of General Musharraf on Jammu and Kashmir junked. Responsible sovereign governments do not function in this manner. Finally, both countries have to ensure that non-state actors promoting terrorism with or without State support are put behind bars. Making various excuses on why this cannot be done is a sure way to ensure that the dialogue is derailed.

* The only way forward on this score is to ensure that non-state actors with or without state support cease to destabilize the relationship. Moreover, we have to ensure that we celebrate our successes together, promote economic cooperation that facilitates each other’s progress and stop gloating about the discomfiture or dilemmas of the other side.

Dipankar Banerjee

Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi

* We should not put too much faith or base our own expectations on a single sideline meeting. Sustained efforts are required to resume a continuing and uninterrupted dialogue. We should continue to focus on this.

* Sustained dialogue is assured through meaningful stepby-step problem solving approach towards furthering a cooperative relationship. This will need setting up working groups to address the issues. The three issues I recommend we focus on are: nuclear confidence-building measures, resolving the Jammu and Kashmir conundrum and addressing terrorism in South Asia.

* This will be a long-term agenda. I will recommend:

* Continuous and sustained civil society engagement

* Creating a constituency among moderate media to ensure a balanced and positive depiction of the other side’s views.

* Open up military to military relationships

* Initiate intelligence agency interactions

* Addressmilitary CBMs

* Jointly address terrorism in South Asia

Nasim Zehra

Director Current Affairs, Dunya TV

* Adequate preparatory work for Thimpu at the Foreign Secretary level should be done. The single objective of Thimpu meeting should be setting a date for the FM meeting in Delhi and forming a broad plan for resumption of bilateral dialogue. To ensure that the work done between the foreign secretaries is accurately put out in the public realm and also that no fauspax are committed while engaging with the media, the two foreign secretaries must agree on what would be said to the press, including the number of questions taken, etc.

* Top-level political commitment to the dialogue process alone can cushion it against the shocks of terrorist attacks, political statements and media-generated controversies. Three steps that could ensure the continuity of the dialogue would be:

* Establishing a simultaneous back-channel bilateral contact to ensure that any snags in the front channel can be removed without stalling the process.

* Agree on the structure and frequency of the bilateral dialogue, make it public and announce the establishment of working groups covering key areas of bilateral significance.

* Regular high-level interaction between the intelligence agencies of the two countries. The overarching requirement of any bilateral dialogue, especially one with a history of being almost non-productive and of frequent derailments, is ensuring its transparency. Transparency helps to frame the process as the principles seek it to be framed.

* Chronic and current factors flow into the making of enemy images. These include a habitual attachment to old framing, yet this attachment to the historic negativity tends to remain largely unquestioned against the backdrop of unresolved conflicts, derailment of dialogue processes, crisis-prone relations where terrorist attacks and oppression in Kashmir dominate popular discourse regarding each other. So a dialogue process, which remains uninterrupted, will help weaken the enemy rhetoric while still identifying outstanding problem areas. Additionally a conscious effort, through greater people-to-people interaction, which focuses on the advantages of cooperation, of conflict resolution, of continuous engagement, on the stakes the two countries have in cooperative peace and security, should also be injected into the popular discourse. Media and existing peace constituencies would be the prime partners in such an effort.

URL: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\02\06\story_6-2-2011_pg7_23

Joint Resolution - CHAOPHRAYA 6

Joint Resolution of the 6th Round of the CHAOPHRAYA India-Pakistan Track Two Dialogue that I attended early this week.

JOINT RESOLUTION

CHAOPHRAYA 6

India Pakistan Track Two Dialogue

27-28 January 2011, Bangkok

A group of senior opinion makers from India and Pakistan including retired ambassadors, foreign secretaries, intelligence chiefs, army chiefs, academics, political leaders and strategic policy journalists conducted a comprehensive two-day dialogue on a range of issues impacting the bilateral relationship. Terrorism, extremism, Jammu and Kashmir, nuclear stability, security, safety and crisis management were some of the issues discussed at the sixth round of the Chaophraya Dialogue in Bangkok, jointly organized by the Jinnah Institute, Islamabad and Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.

Participants from Pakistan included Sherry Rehman, President Jinnah Institute, General (retd.) Jehangir Karamat, Brig (retd.) Ambassador (retd.) Humayun Khan, Ambassador (retd.), AVM (retd.) Shahzad Chaudhry, Nasim Zehra, Dr. Rifaat Hussain, Moeed Yusuf, Brig (retd.) Feroz Khan and Sehar Tariq of the Jinnah Institute. Participants from India included Professor Amitabh Mattoo, Maj. General (retd.) Dipankar Banerjee, Dr. Sanjaya Baru, A.S. Dulat, Sagarika Ghose, Dr. Happymon Jacob, Admiral (retd.) Raja Menon, Ambassador (retd.) Parthasarthy and Siddharth Vardarajan.

They agreed on the following joint declaration.

· The absence of a formal and sustained engagement on the full range of issues confronting India and Pakistan is unhealthy, counterproductive and dangerous. We welcome the forthcoming meeting of foreign secretaries in Thimphu and hope that the two sides will be able to prepare the ground for the resumption of a comprehensive and sustained dialogue. We hope that this will lead to a productive summit.

· We agree with the broad vision of India Pakistan relations in which borders cannot change but can indeed be made irrelevant.

· We resolve that a dialogue between the two countries should include discussions on Jammu and Kashmir. The formal bilateral dialogue should be complemented by back-channel contacts. The people of J&K should be appropriately consulted in this process. We emphasize the need to prioritize the implementation of previously agreed upon CBMs, particularly on trade and travel.

· We note with disappointment the difficulty in people to people contact because of the increasingly restrictive visa regime. We urge the two governments to adopt a more rational visa policy that facilitates contacts, particularly between media practioners, academics, students and business people.

· We reiterate the need to initiate institutionalized and regular dialogue between the intelligence agencies of the two countries.

· We acknowledge the increasingly crucial role of the media on both sides of the border in shaping public perception. Therefore, we encourage the media to help strengthen the constituency for peace in both countries. We exhort the opening up of the air waves to each other’s television channels and other cultural products.

· We believe that South Asia is faced with serious challenges posed by extremism which undermine democratic and pluralistic societies. There is a special need to ensure that state institutions are not eroded and undermined by extremism

· Terrorism is of deep concern to both India and Pakistan. Indian concerns about the Mumbai attacks in 2008 have seriously affected the dialogue process. The perpetrators of the attack should be brought to justice at the earliest. Pakistan has deep concerns about the tragic loss of lives in the Samjhauta Express attack. India has to expeditiously prosecute those involved and keep Pakistan informed.

· It is imperative that the continuous exchange of information on incidents of terrorism takes place.

· We note with concern that China, India, and Pakistan are going against the global trend toward arms reduction and strategic build down. At the same time, it was noted that the region is endangered by the absence of robust crisis prevention and crisis Management mechanisms.

· We recommend that there should be uninterrupted and uninterruptable dialogue on issues of strategic stability. We endorse the idea of setting up of a bilateral study group for this purpose. This group should provide inputs into the policy formulation on these issues.

· We believe that it is essential to review the efficacy of existing CBMs between the two countries and explore additional declaratory, unilateral, and mutually agreed Nuclear Confidence Building Measures and Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures.

· We hope that India and Pakistan can work together to identify avenues for cooperation in the emerging nuclear and security architecture on the basis of non-discrimination.

· We emphasize the need for a discussion between China, India and Pakistan to promote strategic stability with a focus on the logic of sufficiency of arsenals.