Contemporary India-Pakistan Relations: a View From New Delhi

AIIA Policy Commentary

Published by the Australian Institute of International Affairs, June 2009

URL: http://www.aiia.asn.au/associations/8220/files/Complete_Pakistan.pdf

UPA’s Foreign Policy: A Critique

By Happymon Jacob, Kimberley Layton

Source: Economic & Political Weekly, June 20, 2009 vol xliv no 25

URL: http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/13631.pdf

Pakistan: need for smart diplomacy

Pakistan: need for smart diplomacy

Amitabh Mattoo & Happymon Jacob

India should be systematically working towards constructing a Pakistan that is at peace with itself and in harmony with the region.

It has been clear for some years now that there are few other states in the international system more troubled than Pakistan. And yet, tragically, the Indian debate — academic as well as at the policy-level — reflects neither an appreciation of the complexity of the situation nor a recognition that Pakistan needs to be dealt with at multiple levels, even (and especially) after the Mumbai attacks. Instead, we witness routinely (in the soundbyte-driven media di scussions and predictable seminars) knee-jerk responses — even from otherwise sage former diplomats and intelligence officers — which suggest that even after 61 years, the Indian policy establishment does not really understand Pakistan.

In this sense, the failure of Pakistan is as much the failure of India. Can the inability to stabilise a troubled neighbour inspire confidence outside the immediate landscape? Can India really become a great power when it cannot even influence, leave alone pacify, its own “backyard?” Should India not have a more nuanced and deeper understanding of the range of forces operating in the country? But can India really develop a thoughtful and comprehensive understanding of Pakistan when we have virtually no academic expert or policy analyst who can speak, say, Pashto or Balochi? And should India not be systematically working towards constructing a Pakistan that is at peace with itself and in harmony with the region? Mea culpa is, unfortunately, not a term that exists in the Indian diplomatic or academic dictionary.

The reality is that much of the contemporary Indian analysis of Pakistan is rooted in a blinkered, and often partial, and simplistic understanding of the country as it exists today, and drawn, often, from crude textbook readings of the realist discourse in international relations. Pakistan is not a rational, unitary and univocal actor capable of making coherent foreign and defence policy decisions, or of executing them in a predictable and reliable manner. It is this misconstruction of the nature of the Pakistani state and society that sadly informs the Indian policy, for instance, of nuclear deterrence, compellance, the fight against terrorism and even the composite dialogue. Not surprisingly then, the policy does not and will not work. Contemporary Pakistan is not just another country that can be dealt with by following the well-known axioms of international politics or bilateral diplomacy.

Pakistan’s potential futures

Given the many challenges that Pakistan faces today, we argue that it has at least four potential futures: Fractured Pakistan, Fascist-Islamist Pakistan, Failed Pakistan and, Friendly Pakistan.

The first image is of a Fractured Pakistan. This is the Pakistan the world is faced with today: a state that has been (for at least a couple of decades or more now) on a trajectory that is counter-productive and self-destructive. It is a Pakistan that runs with the hare and hunts with the hounds; creates Frankensteins that confront the maker; rides a tiger from which it is unable to dismount; and bleeds itself almost to death in an attempt to bleed its enemy through a thousand cuts. It is a state that is reaping what it has sown for several decades now. It fits every cliché on the dangers of being short-sighted, tactical and double-faced.

This is a Pakistan which is permanently on the edge of a precipice, with competing centres of power, and increasingly out of the control of even the strongest institution: the army. A Fractured Pakistan would maintain an unpleasant status quo with India and the region, even if it is hurting itself in the process. Elements within the state would fight the jihadis, on the one hand, and others would encourage them, on the other. The state would be in denial of any internal disequilibrium and its almost pathological hostility towards India would increasingly be the only glue that would seem to bind its fractured divisions. A Fractured Pakistan could well descend into a Fascist or Failed Pakistan.

A Fascist-Islamist Pakistan is the worst-case scenario projected by the Cassandras of the strategic community. A state that would be taken over by the jihadis, thanks to the material and ideological help provided by the Taliban, the al-Qaeda, and, to some extent, the rising prominence of the Pakistani army’s ‘Zia bhartis.’ A Fascist-Islamist Pakistan would not just be dangerous and unpredictable but could also become an exaggerated version of Afghanistan under Mullah Omar’s Taliban rule. It goes without saying that the security of India and the rest of the world would be seriously jeopardised if the jihadis were able to gain control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

A Failed Pakistan would be a state that would disintegrate and divide itself into multiple entities. Warlordism, civil war, huge refugee flows, a rise in crime, and the probable spread of a radical, violence-based sectarian ideology would be some of the markers of a failed Pakistan. India, all those who glee at the prospect of a Failed Pakistan should remember, would be a natural target for all the dangerous forces unleashed by Pakistan’s disintegration.

Finally, and unlikely as it seems today, there still exists a possibility of a Friendly Pakistan. It would be rooted in Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s original design for the state: Muslim, Moderate and Modern. It is this Pakistan that an Indian grand strategy must systematically work towards constructing.

Indian grand strategy

India’s grand strategy, we argue, should include a careful application of moral, political and soft power resources; multilayered employment of diplomacy, communication and smart power; and sophisticated coordination of global, regional, bilateral and domestic means to engage Pakistan.

Pakistan, as Richard Holbrooke’s visit reminded us, is no longer just a South Asian conundrum. We will continue to see ‘special envoys’ dispatched to the region with unprecedented frequency. New Delhi, instead of reacting uneasily to what it sees as unnecessary interference in its ‘sphere of influence’ should confidently join such initiatives. This would create the space in which it may become possible to build international and regional coalitions/consensus to help Pakistan move from being fractured to friendly.

But the most important part of this grand strategy is bilateral. Managing the bilateral segment of the grand strategy is perhaps our biggest challenge. India needs to use “smart diplomacy” to engage more than one internal actor in Pakistan, and at various levels. It must take imaginative unilateral steps to empower moderate voices and build real stakeholders. India’s vibrant civil society must be encouraged to engage with Pakistan. While Kashmir may need to be dealt with “symbolically,” it is on the issue of water that Pakistan and Pakistanis will need real reassurance and accommodation.

We should make much greater use of South Asia’s traditional liberal Islam to confront the radicalisation of Pakistan. But soft power has other uses as well. The acclaimed Pakistani novelist, Mohsin Hamid, was asked by Dawn: if he took a break from fiction to pen the script for a Punjabi blockbuster, how would the plot unfold? He responded: “In an operations centre, deep below Heera Mandi in Lahore, a fat man with a moustache receives his briefing. He is a secret agent, code-named Suth Panja, and his mission, if he chooses to accept it, is to infiltrate India and kidnap the one man who can revitalise Lollywood.” All this does not preclude what New Delhi may or may not do to confront those elements that are as much an enemy of moderate Pakistan as they are of India.

This grand strategic approach to dealing with Pakistan is in no way exhaustive, but we hope that it will be a step towards realising that complex problems can be addressed only in a comprehensive manner. Piecemeal and half-hearted approaches simply will not deliver.

(Amitabh Mattoo and Happymon Jacob are Professors at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.)

(Source: The Hindu, February 25, 2009. URL: http://www.thehindu.com/2009/02/25/stories/2009022555381000.htm )

Omar’s Tryst with Kashmir’s Destiny

Let’s see how it’s going to prove for Kashmiris

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

Yet another era in the politics of Jammu and Kashmir has begun, and begun with the right dose of fanfare, symbolism, and politically correct gestures by both the winning and the losing parties. Omar Abdullah has sent out portents of hope to one and all in the troubled state of Kashmir, á la Obama. The Muftis have promised to be a responsible and constructive opposition in the State Assembly; the dissidents have been mostly silent without knowing what to do and where to go; New Delhi thinks its job in Kashmir is over with the free and fair elections that it conducted; and the people of J&K are waiting, yet again, for the blue-eyed Abdullah scion to make their lives better.

Omar Abdullah is a well-meaning person, as well as being politically mature and unafraid of some administrative experimentation, but he still needs to clarify his vision for J&K’s future. He and his party have not progressed beyond basic ‘campaign utterances’ regarding their plans for the days ahead. Newspaper reports have indicated that the NC is working on a vision document which is likely to be released shortly. Omar should not however, in his youthful enthusiasm to get life back on track in Kashmir, attempt to plan for the state’s future all on his own. Kashmir’s mainstream politicians, of whom he is the torchbearer now, ought not try to appropriate the politically significant task of designing J&K’s path all by themselves. They must entice the major actors from the other side of the political divide, namely the dissident leadership, over into the political mainstream. Now is the ideal time for doing so for a number of significant reasons. 

First of all, dissent in Kashmir is no longer considered to be the politics of the outcast – it is fast becoming the politics of the politically aware. The contours of its symbolism are evolving into a more mature, more vital form of political activity. After all, shouldn’t a space for (constructive) political dissent be provided, and indeed dissent itself be considered sacrosanct, in a vibrant democracy like our own? Secondly, the azadi politics of the Kashmir valley have calmed somewhat and moderate actors there are now more willing to negotiate. It is true that there are extremists among the dissident groups. However, extremist politics are likely to be rendered redundant sooner rather than later if the radicals do not rethink the fundamentals of their political positions and demands. Thirdly, the ball is now firmly in the court of the mainstream actors. They are fresh with a popular mandate and can therefore negotiate with the dissidents from a position of strength. Finally, failing to make political inroads into the ‘enemy’ camp now risks worsening the political discontent in the Valley and will make the future pathway more difficult to tread. Omar should therefore use this historic juncture in the annals of Kashmir’s politics to preach peace to those not ‘converted’. 
The first step in strategizing such a plan of action could be initiating one-on-one ‘low key’ parleys with the more moderate leadership of the dissident movement. Considering the fact that much of their political platform is founded on the genuine aspirations of Kashmiris, the mainstream leadership should engage in an ongoing, yet ‘offbeat’, dialogue with the dissident leadership. Omar, with his youthful and marketable political stances, must take the lead. The second and perhaps the most important step, is to adopt some of the primary demands proposed by the dissident leaders in their own documents and plans. It is acceptable for the ruling party (National Conference) to have its own vision document for the state’s future, but the Chief Minister should not be bound by the party line.

Omar Abdullah can, and therefore should, think beyond partisan politics in terms of the larger issues and problems of the state. With decades of political career ahead of him, he has the time and, almost paradoxically, the youthful ingenuousness that just might be able to bridge the huge political gaps that exist in J&K. Omar has arrived at a time when he could very well save the state from its present state of hopelessness, or at least make some serious inroads. His recent announcement about the need to set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission is a concerted step in the right direction. However, Omar needs to recognize and appreciate the development of the idea of such a Commission; there are others, such as Sajad Lone, who have floated the concept prior to him.  Acknowledgement of the way other actors, from other sections of the political landscape of J&K, have made (and continue to make) valuable contributions to political activity within the state is imperative if the new Chief Minister is to bridge the gaps discussed above.    

What would Omar Abdullah’s comprehensive vision document look like? The document, as previously discussed, should adopt key demands from other actor’s proposals as well as ‘solutions’ suggested by the various mainstream and non-mainstream parties of J&K. It should address four key aspects: psychological, material, political and cross-LoC dynamics. The proposed Truth and Reconciliation Commission could be the first step in addressing the psychological needs of the Kashmiri people. Lone’s Achievable Nationhood has already comprehensively discussed possible strategies for addressing the socio-psychological wounds inflicted on the citizens of J&K.  Material aspects need no elaboration: the people overwhelmingly voted for a government that can cater to their bijli, sadak, paani issues. Omar now needs to force the administration of the second-most corrupt state in the country to help him deliver what he has promised to those voted him into office. 
The political dimension is arguably the most important aspect of all, and the most difficult to negotiate. However, on the positive side, there are some well thought-out blueprints for action on it. A plethora of ideas for creating a set of broad-based political options to resolve the Kashmir issue be drawn from projects such as Lone’s Achievable Nationhood, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq’s United States of Kashmir, the PDP’s Self Rule Proposal and NC’s own autonomy proposal, to name but a few.  Finally, peace and stability in J&K will be the product of cross-LoC connections. More than ever before the political parties in J&K, as well as the governments in India and Pakistan, are open and positive toward creating cross-LoC links, and better: they are talking about it. Omar should make use of the widespread goodwill that currently exists for this idea and take steps to direct the idea to fruition. 

The year 2008 has been both positive and negative for J&K: the people of the state made it clear to the leadership in Srinagar and New Delhi that they are still unafraid to take the streets when they feel marginalized and ignored. They are similarly unafraid to participate politically and to use what power they have in defiance of the many obstacles that confront them; Kashmiri’s lined up in huge numbers at polling booths to hammer home the message to the dissidents that there is no space for irresponsible politics in their lives. 2009 has dawned with a new leadership, new chances for constructive action, and a new sense of hope in Jammu and Kashmir. One hopes that this encouraging start is a sign that there are only good things to come in the future of the troubled state, and it is now up to Omar Abdullah to lead the way.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, January 23, 2009. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=21_1_2009&ItemID=21&cat=11 )

Responses to my article in the Hindu "26/11 and India’s Pakistan dilemma"

January 7, 2009, The Hindu

Opinion - Letters to the Editor    

Pakistan’s dilemma

Contrary to the claim that the Indian government handled the diplomatic aftermath of the Mumbai attacks in an inept manner (“26/11 and India’s Pakistan dilemma,” Jan. 5), I feel it was very tactful in dealing with Pakistan and mobilising international support for its cause. Never before has Pakistan been under such severe international pressure to bring the perpetrators of a terror attack to book. As for the change in the attitude of the Zardari government, it was because of the pressure from the Pakistan Army and the ISI which wield real power in Pakistan.

Peace with Pakistan is necessary but not at the cost of Indian lives. India should take concrete and offensive action, including military action if necessary, to rein in the unruly neighbour.

Anjan Kumar Sahu,

New Delhi

***

The real power in Pakistan lies with the Punjabi feudal class, Islamist militants and the military. The claim that the friendly Zardari regime backtracked because of India’s rhetoric is not true. It was the fear of the military which made it change its stance.

It is no use talking to Pakistan or helping it to stabilise. The psyche of Pakistan’s ruling class is to destroy India. Its military rulers want a common enemy to unite their divided country and India serves their purpose.

Johnson Mathai,

Indore

***

The way India handled the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks reflected its maturity. Rather than attacking Pakistan, it decided to launch a shaming campaign against it bringing it under insurmountable international pressure to dismantle the terror infrastructure on its territory.

Shivendra Srivastava,

Jamshedpur

***

The article is right is saying the Indian government handled the diplomatic aftermath of the 26/11 attacks in an inept manner. Aggressive diplomacy does not bear fruit in the long run, as seen in the case of Afghanistan and Israel.

At this point of time when the world is reeling under an economic recession, a war with Pakistan would amount to hara-kiri. We should continue with the peace process.

Y.V.K. Ravi Kumar,

Hyderabad

***

Diplomatic efforts to strengthen Pakistan’s civilian government appear to be a sane course as all steps taken so far have yielded no visible results. But a civilian government takes time to tackle well-entrenched interests, including fundamentalism.

Talking to the Pakistan government directly or through Track 2 diplomatic channels is a well-advised option.

M.B. Bhatt,

Chennai

(Source URL: http://www.hindu.com/2009/01/07/stories/2009010753871003.htm )

Responses to my article "26/11 and India’s Pakistan dilemma", published in The Hindu.

Opinion - Letters to the Editor    

Dilemma

The article “26/11 and India’s Pakistan dilemma” (Jan. 5) provides an analysed reasoning of why, from a purely strategic point of view, helping Pakistan resolve the issue of terrorism is in our national interest. It can also draw strength from the news that Pakistan’s civil society has urged its government to come out of its denial mode and address the problem of terrorism.

The one-upmanship displayed by the media on both sides should be addressed by responsible sections, reducing the war hysteria and attending to the dismantling of the terrorist structures. This should be pursued by enlisting the people’s support in both countries and the global community at large.

Kasim Sait,

Chennai

***

Both countries should make efforts to avert a war. A war, besides failing to eliminate terrorism, will lead to the creation of more terrorists.

It is a stable and democratic Pakistan that India should work for, not a ruined, distorted Pakistan.

M. Parul,

New Delhi

***

I agree that the Indian government handled the diplomatic aftermath of the Mumbai attacks in an “inept” manner. Rather than resorting to diplomacy, it should have done what the U.S. or Israel does in similar circumstances: bombed the hideouts and offices of LeT and other terrorist outfits. India would have then proved its mettle to the world. I also think that by involving the FBI in the investigations and by preparing a dossier on the terrorist attack for the U.S. State Department and the Pakistan Foreign Ministry, India has surrendered part of its sovereignty.

M. Riaz Hasan,

Hyderabad

(Source: The Hindu, January 6, 2009. URL: http://www.hindu.com/2009/01/06/stories/2009010654570803.htm )

26/11 and India’s Pakistan dilemma

26/11 and India’s Pakistan dilemma

Happymon Jacob

From a grand strategic point of view it is in India’s national interest to help Pakistan resolve its terrorism puzzle.

The diplomatic aftermath of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks is being handled by the Indian government in an inept manner. Purposefully addressing the issue of terrorism in the region, and working to halt attacks against India in particular, are clearly in the wider strategic interest of the country and ought to be what the nation should strive towards. At best, however, all that India has managed to do is throw together a muddled ‘shaming campaign’ against Pakistan. India has missed the forest for the trees, and the world has watched it do that yet again. Dealing with Pakistan and its myriad actors in times of tension and crisis demands a more superior level of political imagination and diplomatic manoeuvring than what the Government of India has demonstrated thus far.

Failure of diplomacy

India’s most prominent failure since the catastrophe of 26/11 has been that it has patently failed to make use of diplomacy to ensure that the perpetrators of terrorism in Pakistan are held responsible in an appropriately comprehensive manner. We have failed to de-hyphenate Pakistan from India. In doing so we have failed, once again, to negate the pervasive belief that all that we two neighbours can engage in is immature, tit-for-tat, counterblow relations. New Delhi should have sent high-ranking diplomats and Track 2 negotiators to Islamabad to engage the various actors there. If this were done quietly and deftly, it may have been possible for New Delhi’s mediators to reason with Islamabad and Rawalpindi and to gain acceptance for India’s core argument: that by failing to rein in the terrorists who operate from within its borders, Pakistan stands to lose, and lose much more conclusively than India.

With the friendly Asif Ali Zardari regime more than willing to engage India through multiple-level negotiations, it would have been possible to turn the events of 26/11 into an opportunity to make diplomatic inroads into the Pakistani establishment. That many of the current Pakistani decision-makers, including Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi and National Security Adviser Mahmud Ali Durrani, have in the past been part of Track 2 dialogues with India should have made New Delhi more open to using this technique. Track 2 diplomacy can work in times of emergency, not just in times of peace.

Instead, India chose to fall into its traditional role of disciplinarian, behaving in such a way as to feed Pakistan’s already significant inferiority complex by getting Mr. Zardari’s regime to back into a corner with its ill-thought-out rhetoric and cumbersome actions. Once on the backfoot, Mr. Zardari (fearing a domestic backlash) was forced to react to, rather than engage with, New Delhi.

Moreover, not recognising the importance of smart diplomacy, New Delhi chose to outsource its responsibility to others, apparently thinking that foreign leaders were willing to do India’s work for it. The current game of brinkmanship between India and Pakistan can only achieve petty point-scoring. Instead of contemplating the downgrading of the diplomatic engagement with Pakistan, India should be focussed on strenuously stepping it up.

Pulp patriotism

The failure of Indian diplomacy to move beyond tit-for-tat point-scoring saw a concurrent rise in media-generated pulp patriotism. Newspapers ran headlines such as “ISI chief summoned to India,” as though Pakistan were somehow at New Delhi’s beck and call. This prompted even the most liberal sections of Pakistani civil society and media to react with anger and in denial. Simultaneously, Mumbai morphed into a celebrity circus thanks to the banter of page-three ‘experts.’ Pop culture personalities and hawkish experts flashed across television screens egging on the Indian government to carry out ‘surgical,’ ‘preemptive’ strikes against Pakistan in order to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure there.

To do so would be to emulate the current disintegration in the Gaza Strip and give weight to the argument that Israel has ‘successfully’ protected itself against terrorism by using precisely such tactics. The reality, however, is that the anti-terror strategies Israel uses are inapt and unsuitable for India. We do not want to find ourselves in the situation that Israel finds itself in today: encircled by disgruntled neighbours whose obvious distaste for the Jewish state does not allow it to have any real sense of security. As a result of its constricted, meandering domestic policies and unstable relations with its neighbours, Israel has isolated itself in its own region. Little wonder, it feels alienated and insecure. Using Israel’s technologies to combat terror is one thing, but following its counter-terror policies and politics is another matter entirely.

Need for a grand strategy

India has not yet evolved a forward-looking grand strategic approach that effectively addresses the question of how to deal with Pakistan. Most of India’s Pakistan policies have been reactionary in nature and serve only to achieve tactical short-term gains. It is thanks to the absence of a grand strategy that during the ongoing India-Pakistan stand-off India has so easily fallen in line with the wishes of the terrorists. These terrorists desire the end of the India-Pakistan peace process, civil society cooperation and media freedom in both countries. Their goal is to increase anti-India feelings amidst the common people in Pakistan and vice versa, and their ultimate aspiration must surely be armed conflict between the two countries, in whatever form. With every passing day, the ringmasters of Pakistan’s terror networks edge closer to achieving these horrifying aims.

To ask an oft-repeated question: what kind of Pakistan does India really want? One that is on the brink of total collapse, split into multiple centres of power, where jihadi terrorism and religious fanaticism rule the roost? Or a stable, democratic and economically powerful Pakistan minus the influence of the military, the militants and the mullahs? For many in India the answer to this question is not as straightforward as it should be. The traditional delusion still exists amongst some that a final victory for India lies in the withering away of Pakistan. Little do they realise that having a nuclear Somalia for a neighbour, as Pakistani peace activist Pervez Hoodbhoy once put it, would not be the end of India’s Pakistan problem, but rather the beginning of India’s woes. India cannot simply attempt to fence its vast borders and hide inside, especially if Pakistan becomes a failed state.

Thus, from a grand strategic point of view it is in India’s national interest to help Pakistan resolve its terrorism puzzle. In order to do that, India needs to behave like a responsible, emergent power and prove that it has the diplomatic mettle to be a great power. Diplomacy is harder to sell in times of crisis than in times of war-mongering. The use of crisis diplomacy requires a strong state and stronger political will. India has to ‘sell’ the use of diplomacy and negotiations, not only to the Pakistani leadership but also to the domestic audience in India. This task is not an impossible one. Crises such as this are a test of India’s strength as a rising power.

Road ahead

Not all is lost yet. We cannot afford to abandon the relative peace and stability that we have achieved vis-À-vis Pakistan in the recent past because of the wounds inflicted by Mumbai. That 26/11 should serve as a reason for India to strengthen its diplomatic footing vis-À-vis Pakistan. India must use more sophisticated and nuanced multi-layered mediation to reach out to the people who matter in the Pakistani state, and the various states within that state. Imaginative, targeted and high-level diplomacy helps in times of crisis: history has proved that time and again. Diplomacy and dialogue may be the road less travelled between India and Pakistan, but now is the time to travel it. India must read the past to understand the future: it must learn to avoid the mistakes of the past when dealing with Pakistan in the present.

(Sourse: The Hindu, January 5, 2008. URL: http://www.thehindu.com/2009/01/05/stories/2009010555110800.htm )