Friday, October 24, 2008

Kashmir’s failed uprising

Calls by the Prime Minister and the Hurriyat Conference chief for dialogue to resolve the Kashmir issue indicate that the recent uprising seems to have lost its momentum.

Photos: PTI, Nissar Ahmad 
 
Divergent opinion: Syed Ali Shah Geelani (Left) and Mirwaiz Umar Farooq have radically different views on what azadi entails.

Elections to the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly have been announced, and are scheduled to be held in seven phases spread over five weeks. The decision to go ahead with the elections on schedule was taken following intensive discussion, punctuated by numerous disagreements, from both the Election Commission and the mainstream political parties in J&K. The dissidents have made it clear that they will not only boycott the elections, but will also actively campaign against the electoral process itself.

Even as the debate about the political wisdom of conducting elections at this point in time rages on, now is an opportune moment to take a close look at the recent uprising in Kashmir, and ask why it has failed to achieve anything substantial. After almost four months of anti-India slogans and sustained agitation, and despite limited moves towards unity by the Srinagar-based dissident camp, the current uprising in Kashmir seems to have reached a dead-end. Calls by the Prime Minister and the Hurriyat Conference (Mirwaiz) chief for dialogue to resolve the Kashmir issue, indicate that the recent uprising, which garnered nationwide attention, seems to have lost its momentum.

Indeed, Kashmir’s latest experiment with dissidence did appear to have the right mix of all the necessary ingredients for success: mass participation, willingness to defy state crackdown, emotive slogans striking the right Kashmiri chords, timely political alliances and the ever-green romanticism of azadi. More importantly, unlike during the 1990s, the Indian intelligentsia was more sympathetic to the Kashmiri cause this time around, while militants kept away from the scene, not wanting to malign the mass movement. Yet the uprising seems to have fizzled out. It has quite obviously failed to reach any logical conclusion, although its reverberations will continue to impact on the state’s polity for a very long time to come.

What explains its failure?

What then explains its failure? Have dissenting Kashmiris grown disillusioned, sceptical as to the fruits of their struggle against the Indian state, and resigned themselves to submission? Or, can its failure be attributed to successful handling of the situation by the governments of New Delhi and Srinagar? Has the Indian state, after all, learned to contain dissidence in its frontiers? Not really.

An ex post facto analysis of the recent events in Kashmir reveals a clear set of factors responsible for the failure of the Valley’s latest uprising. First of all, the dissident leadership in the Valley did not have a common minimum programme. The lack of an understanding of their political endgame rendered them incapable of negotiating effectively with New Delhi.

Secondly, this lack of common understanding was augmented by acute dissent and leadership struggles within the dissident camp. Hardliner Syed Ali Shah Geelani’s claim to ‘sole leadership’ failed to resonate with the other leaders, who have since sought to distance themselves from him. Opposition became all the more serious when Mr. Geelani began questioning the credentials of other dissident leaders to lead the Kashmiris.

Many meanings of azadi

In addition to the aforementioned factors, differences of opinion within the dissident camp represent more than a mere leadership struggle. They stem from something fundamentally ideological: differing conceptions of the very meaning of azadi. That the camp did not have a commonly agreed upon programme, and was stalled by leadership quarrels, underscores the fact that there are many meanings of azadi in the Kashmir Valley. To the one extreme there are those who, like many of the mainstream parties within J&K (such as the National Conference), argue that the word points to greater autonomy and additional political rights. And to the other are those (represented by the JKLF and Mr. Geelani) who typically seek complete independence from India, and see azadi as embodying this desire. Somewhere between these two divergent views are those who argue that it is the Kashmiris’ demand for self-respect, dignity and their inalienable democratic rights, which constitute the true basis of azadi.

The two most important pro-azadi leaders in the Valley, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and Mr. Geelani, have radically different views as to what azadientails. Consider, for example, that Mirwaiz has been an important moderate voice, whereas Mr. Geelani harbours no such illusions of temperance. A close reading of Mirwaiz’s statements, taken at various points in time, makes clear that he is more pro-Kashmir than anti-India, willing to talk to and reason with New Delhi, and is flexible in relation to what self-determination entails; his ‘United States of Kashmir’ proposal does not seek complete independence for Kashmir. In other words, the Mirwaiz is willing to make adjustments and seek balance when talking to New Delhi. But Mr. Geelani has made it clear that the resolution to the Kashmir problem lies in nothing short of Kashmir’s merger with Pakistan, and rejects the need to converse with New Delhi.

Most importantly, however, azadi needs to be understood as the rallying cry of a large number of an aggrieved people. For them, the word means something more tangible, something that pertains to their daily lives, than anything so fundamentally ideological: it means freedom from the fear of militants and security forces, as well as dignity, and the absence of New Delhi’s political high-handedness. Moreover, one would have to concede that it is a question of the unresolved issue of sub-national aspirations, and its consequences within the Indian state.

Zardari’s Kashmir policy

The relative silence of Pakistan, and the pro-India statements of President Zardari, should be understood as the fourth reason for the failure of the dissident movement. That Zardari did not choose to lash out against India during the recent anti-India protests in Kashmir is significant. His assurances that there would soon be good news about Kashmir and that both the countries are working towards it show a desire to distance himself from Pakistan’s traditional stance on Kashmir. And more was to follow. Recently he branded Kashmiri militants as “terrorists” and claimed that India was important for Pakistan’s growth. Surprisingly, he received little rebuke for these comments from within his country. Pakistan’s desire to make peace with India, and to rid itself of extremism, also means that it many not continue to support the various dissident parties within Kashmir — as it has done in the past — at the expense of India and its fight with terrorism, though the Pakistani Army and the ISI may fail to demonstratively adhere to this new way of thinking.

Lastly, the anti-Kashmir agitations in Jammu dented the dissident cause. For the rest of the world, ‘Kashmir’s freedom struggle’ is now more nuanced, and Jammu has played an important part in highlighting the conflicts within the conflict. Agitations in Jammu made obvious to all what was already well known within J&K: Jammu and Leh have never been part of the struggle in Kashmir, and were always uneasy about the political supremacy of Kashmiris in the state. Kashmiris have always relied on their own centrality to tell the story of their struggle, yet the reorientation of focus towards the politics of the Kashmiri/Jammuite relationship, have complicated the equation. The introduction of the Jammu and, to a lesser extent, the Leh narratives have crowded the picture. A conflict-within-a-conflict has been unearthed, and it threatens to disrupt the over-simplified nature of the Kashmiri’s argument.

That said, much as New Delhi hopes that elections in the State will bring back normalcy, it needs to ensure that those elections are free and fair, lest the State fall back once more into instability. In other words, New Delhi, in its over-enthusiasm to stabilise the state, must not try to create a façade of normalcy by playing foul with elections. It must demonstrate what it has learnt since 2002, and let the electoral process answer questions it cannot.


(Source: The Hindu, October 25, 2008. URL: http://www.hindu.com/2008/10/25/stories/2008102556301100.htm )

Wednesday, October 15, 2008

Manmohan, Zardari, Train, Trade, and Kashmir

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

There is so much more happening in and around Kashmir these days than curfews and anti-India slogans. Some of these occurrences, if planned, managed and executed with political acumen and administrative imagination, could transform Kashmir for the better. Unfortunately, given the inherent difficulties, this is a scenario which may be unlikely to occur.  Zardari’s latest pronouncements on Kashmir and India, Manmohan Singh’s offer of dialogue and new sops for Kashmir, the AJK trade delegation’s visit to J&K, and the symbolism of the train to Kashmir have one thing in common: they have the potential, especially in combination with each other, to change the political climate in Kashmir. 

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s half-hearted invitation to Kashmiri separatists to come to the negotiating table at a time ‘to be decided in future’, may not mean much but for the fact that the separatist leadership too, has said that they are willing to talk to the government, though not in response to Dr. Singh’s invitation. While one would welcome Dr. Singh’s offer for talks, one, at the same time, also wonders about the sincerity and statesmanship in it. In other words, shouldn’t the Prime Minister be doing more than merely reciting a speech written by a nondescript speechwriter, especially in a state that has witnessed nothing but violence over the last two months? Yet the offer for dialogue may prove positive in and of itself, under the circumstances. 

President Zardari was much more forthcoming in New York, with his non-traditional comments on India, Kashmir and ‘freedom fighters’. Despite the otherwise inflammatory comments made by him in the US, such as branding the Kashmiri militants ‘terrorists’, and claiming that India was important for Pakistan’s growth, he did not (surprisingly) receive much flak from within Pakistan. Had a Pakistani leader made comments such as these a few years ago, he/she would have been virtually lynched by all sections of Pakistani society for being ‘anti-Pakistan’. Not this time. What this demonstrates is the deeper changes taking place in Pakistan, including its desire to make peace with India and to rid itself of extremism. It seems as though Pakistan is learning to be at ease with India. This is, perhaps, an indication of encouraging developments on the subcontinent and bodes well for the future of the region.  
The Kashmir Valley’s first train between the Budgam and Islamabad districts was inaugurated by Dr. Singh, even as there was a complete shut down in Srinagar. While the recent political overheating may have distracted attention from this historic event, and robbed it of some well-deserved fanfare, the train to Kashmir undoubtedly represents a new era in the politics and development of the Valley. Once operational, the many more promised trains from Kashmir to other parts of the country may well be seen as tangible evidence of development in a state with an otherwise depressing infrastructure, despite considerable financial investment by the Indian government.

The meetings held between the trade delegation from across the LoC and their counterparts in Srinagar and Jammu produced many encouraging and out-of-the-box plans, which if allowed to progress unhindered, may go a long way toward substantively addressing the Kashmir issue. Delegations from the Pakistan Administered Kashmir Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Kashmir Chamber of Commerce and Industry, have decided to recommend to their respective governments the implementation of some key measures. These include the formation of a joint business chamber, use of the dual currency of India and Pakistan for trade, and the opening of branches of their premium banks in one another’s regions in order to facilitate trade. Some of these measures are, in fact, only in keeping with those that had recently been under discussion by both the J&K Bank and the PDP. While the JK Bank had already mooted the idea of opening its branches in Pakistan, the PDP had pitched in for the use of dual currency within the state. The symbolic, as well as the concrete, impact of trade between the two sides of the erstwhile Princely State would be enormously beneficial for it, as well as for the region as a whole. 

Taken together, each of these four factors would have implications. Firstly, they would impact the pro-azadi movement in the state. The already faltering dissident movement for azadi may now run the risk of being overshadowed by the symbolism and political dynamics of these factors. While they alone would not result in the demise (even temporarily) of the azadi movement, they will, from now on, lessen its sheen somewhat. Secondly, these factors are also likely to overhaul the political discourse in Kashmir, with issues such as trade and economy becoming the mainstay of a new rhetoric. They are similarly likely to set in motion a process conducive for the ‘mainstreaming of the mainstream’ in Kashmir. The mainstream political parties that have been sidelined in the politics of Kashmir for the past few months now have a window of opportunity to return. Ultimately however, the biggest beneficiary of all of this is India-Pakistan relations. There is rapprochement in sight for Indo-Pak relations in general, and Kashmir in particular. A revival of back channel diplomacy between the two sides, equal to that which previously existed during the heyday of Musharraff and Manmohan Singh, is also likely in the months to follow. 

Having said this, it is important for New Delhi to keep in mind that economic packages are no substitute for political packages. What J&K needs is an imaginative political package and not economic largesse by Indian taxpayers.

(Source: Greater KAshmir, OCTOBER 16, 2008, Source: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=15_10_2008&ItemID=3&cat=11 )