Need to rethink our Kashmir policy

The turmoil in Jammu and Kashmir calls for the need to deal with the Kashmiri sentiments with more sympathy, patience and sophistication.

The ongoing turmoil in Jammu and Kashmir is unprecedented in its intensity and mass appeal, and has the potential to recast the State’s existing political realities as well as force a rethink of India’s traditional lines on the Kashmir problem and most certainly give way to newer political realities when all is said and done.

While comparisons are rightly made between the current turmoil in the State and the situation in the early 1990s (minus the militancy), what needs to be noted is that despite all the efforts by the Indian state (and use of all sorts of measures ranging from force to negotiations with the separatists) in the last two decades or so, the dislike, let us face it, that a large number of Kashmiris express for India is real and there for everybody to see. It doesn’t help any more to comfort ourselves by saying that this is only an urban phenomenon in downtown Srinagar and not all Kashmiris share this sentiment. The anti-India agitations in Kashmir have given us, as a nation, an opportunity to introspect on some of our policies towards Kashmir.

Underlying causes
In order to understand the underlying dynamics of the ongoing turmoil in Kashmir, it is necessary to understand what led to this state of affairs. While the otherwise innocuous Amarnath land transfer may have been a triggering point, there are more profound and serious causes to what is happening in the Valley today. An analysis of the recent political history of Kashmir proves one thing beyond any doubt: peace in Kashmir is too fragile to be taken for granted and a mistake was committed in taking it for granted.

In retrospect, despite all their promises to the Kashmiris, what have the governments in Srinagar and New Delhi done, in the last four years, to resolve the Kashmir problem to the satisfaction of Kashmiris? Almost nothing.

Reports forgotten
One might argue, as many political commentators are doing today, that so much money has been pumped into Kashmir. But political problems are not resolved by monetary measures alone.
The Prime Minister’s Round Table Conferences and the reports that were produced subsequently by various working groups have been neatly archived and forgotten about. The reports and the contents were indeed very encouraging and one had hoped that the governments would act on them helping, thereby, to improve the situation in the State. The government in Delhi did not bother to do that.

It has now become clear that New Delhi was sleeping through the various phases of peace in Kashmir (and the unprecedented groundswell of popular support for it), ignoring the daily demands and pleas from dissidents, activists, mainstream politicians and analysts to engage the State and the problems therein more proactively.

It was not just that there was unprecedented willingness on the part of dissidents and various sections of Kashmiris to look for a solution to the State’s problems. More importantly, many of the suggestions to conflict resolution were concrete and should have been taken into serious consideration. The government’s passive, if not dismissive, attitude towards such gestures and proposals has brought about the prevailing situation of political disconnect between the people and the State.

The implications
The most obvious implication of the current turmoil in Kashmir is the resounding return of the popular slogan of azadi to the streets of Srinagar. What started as a struggle for land grew in proportion when Jammuites economically blockaded Kashmir and is now rapidly spreading as a pro-azadi movement: land or the blockade are no longer issues in this movement. From what was widely termed as an ‘irreversible’ peace process between India and Pakistan as well as between Srinagar and New Delhi, things have changed so radically in about two months’ time that neither of the peace processes exists today.

That many years of negotiations with Kashmiris, the ‘special status’ and large amounts of economic aid have not been able to win the hearts and minds of the people of Kashmir has to make not only New Delhi but we as a nation sit up and rethink our traditional policies towards Kashmir and Kashmiris’ feelings towards the rest of us.

The ongoing struggle between Kashmir and Jammu has also witnessed the rise of Jammu as a political stakeholder in the State. Until a couple of months ago, Jammu and Kashmir meant Kashmir: Jammu felt politically, economically and developmentally sidelined and neglected, even as the facts do not bear out much of this perception of neglect. However, in politics, perceptions sometimes matter more than facts.

While the Sangh Parivar is quite obviously trying to get political mileage out of what is happening in Jammu, it needs to be pointed out that the struggle in Jammu is not merely religious and the issue, again, is not only about the land transfer: Jammu wants to be heard at the high table of J&K politics, and it is no more willing to accept a Kashmir-centred polity in the State.

While this is likely to further divide the two regions, it would also benefit the Hindutva forces in Jammu. From being on the margins of the political landscape in J&K, the Bharatiya Janata Party is now likely to emerge as a decisive force in the politics of the State thanks to the local discontentment against the policies of the National Conference, the People’s Democratic Party and the Congress during the ongoing crisis in Jammu.

The All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) that has been spearheading the Kashmiri agitation is also facing a political dilemma of how far to go and how much to ask from New Delhi. While the three APHC demands (opening the roads to Pakistan for trade, release of Kashmiri political prisoners and the non-application of the Armed Forces Special Powers’ Act in the State) are not akin to seeking azadi, the increasing popular support for azadi in the State would put the APHC in a tight spot: the APHC led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq may not be prepared to seek complete independence from India though Tehreek-i-Hurriyat chief Syed Ali Shah Geelani would press for it in the days to come. The question at this point of time is whether and how Mirwaiz can pacify the hard-line elements who will try to go beyond the brief of his moderate political agenda.

What lies ahead?
Even if New Delhi’s multi-faceted strategy to restore normality in Kashmir becomes fruitful in the days to come, the future of the State is likely to be characterised by some significant developments. First of all, the ongoing turmoil will convince New Delhi of the need to grant greater autonomy to J&K. Mere promises of “anything short of azadi” will not work now; they will need to be delivered on the ground. Thinking on the lines of greater autonomy to the State (along the line of an undiluted Article 370) is perhaps a way ahead. A close examination of the proposals put forth by most stakeholders in J&K points to such a consensual solution. In this process, it is now all the more important that the various regions within the State do not “feel” neglected.

Secondly, this spate of agitations is likely to be followed by fresh and committed attempts at establishing greater linkages and collaboration between the two sides of the erstwhile princely State of Jammu and Kashmir. Let us remember that such measures were under serious consideration long before the new spell of agitations began in the State. What peace could not achieve, conflict might.

Thirdly, and most importantly, the ongoing turmoil also calls for the need to deal with the Kashmiri sentiments with more sympathy, patience and sophistication. Considering the fact that one of the immediate causes of what is happening today was the arrogant and allegedly communal statements by the then Chief Executive Officer of the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board such as why “Muslim pollution is tolerable and not Hindu pollution” (pointing to the pollution caused to the Dal Lake, the Wular Lake, etc., by local residents), which he made while addressing a press conference in Srinagar before the agitations began.

Source: The Hindu, August 22, 2008.

URL: http://www.thehindu.com/2008/08/22/stories/2008082254791000.htm

What awaits Kashmir?

What awaits Kashmir?

J
ammu and Kashmir is witness-
ing a return to the early 1990s,
sans the militant attacks. The
ongoing struggle in both Jam-
mu as well as Kashmir does

not belong to a pre-scripted design fo...read more...

This marks the end of yet another peace process?

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

There appears to be an increasing possibility of history repeating itself yet again vis-à-vis the bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan: a long eventful history that has recorded relative clam and mutual animosity in succession. Even as the peace process is officially on, there does not seem to be much peace left in it. Events in the past months seem to have got the better off the four-year-old peace process and the five-year-old ceasefire. This comes at a time when yet another important peace process – between J&K and the Indian government – seems to be going down the drain. The internal peace process that had raised the hopes of many in the subcontinent now seems to be losing steam. Indeed, the relationship between New Delhi and Srinagar as well as Jammu and Srinagar seems to be worsening by the hour. While the two peace processes – India-Pakistan and New Delhi-Srinagar – are two sides of the same coin, they have different rationale, dynamics, pulls and pressures, and endgames.

The last few months have been eventful and testy for India-Pakistan relations and their peace initiatives. The recent history of India-Pakistan relationship was characterised by increasing infiltration from across the border, reported incidents of firing across the LoC which both countries chose to ignore until recently in order to continue the peace process, deadly attack on the Indian mission in Kabul which had clear ISI signature (say Indian and US intelligence agencies), and the serial bombings in Bangalore and Ahamadabad that pointed fingers towards Pakistan. After all of this, the Indian government decided that there was no way that the peace process could go on as if nothing had happened.

It was against this background that the foreign ministers and prime ministers of the two countries met in Colombo on the sidelines of the SAARC summit to discuss ways and means to salvage the peace process that was dying a sad and untimely death. However, not to the surprise of many analysts, nothing significant came out of this meeting. While the Indian government engaged in some plain speaking and hard diplomacy, Pakistani side was trying to save face (as the entire SAARC community seemed to be talking passionately about the need to contain terror in the region) by sounding conciliatory and pointing out the Pakistani decision to expand the positive list of items for import from India and to begin the process of inviting Indian firms to invest in Pakistan. This, however, did not seem to have cut much ice with the Indian side.

That said, let us go back a step further to seek answers and explanations for what is happening to the peace process. Despite the fact that there is widespread popular support for the peace process and that Indians and Pakistanis, in general, want to see that the two south Asian neighbours live in peace and harmony, the peace process is only going downhill. What explains this contradiction between popular desire and official actions? Furthermore, what explains the official lines and actual results?

First of all, there is some merit in the argument that the current crisis in India-Pakistan relations is part of the age-old diversionary war strategy, even as that alone cannot explain the present stalemate. As per this theory, a country adopts a belligerent posture vis-à-vis another country when faced with too many pressing domestic concerns, such as political turmoil, lack of legitimacy, economic decline, power struggles etc. There are elements of all of these in today’s Pakistan. The president who ruled the country for around 10 years is on the verge of an impeachment (one is unsure of what happens if he is impeached). The failed attempt at reigning in the ISI by trying to put it under civilian control has questioned the authority and power of the political bosses. No one is sure who controls the Pakistani state today: is it the army, is it Musharraf, it is Zardari, is it Prime Minister Gilani or is it sheer anarchy that is ruling Pakistan? The Pakistan army in tandem with the ISI could easily be making use of this political ambiguity at home to press their traditional lines on India and the political leadership in Pakistan (including the Prime Minister and his men) may have decided to be a silent spectator to let the domestic steam out on India.

There is also a widespread view today about Pakistan that it is proceeding towards state failure. While it is certainly not in India’s interest to see a balkanized Pakistan in its neighborhood, one cannot rule out symptoms of state failure in Pakistan. Look at the many regions in today’s Pakistan that are reeling under anarchy. There are varying but increasing degrees of violence, subversion and anarchy in many parts of Pakistan such as the North West Frontier Province, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Balochistan, to name a few. Incidents of violence in Pakistan have increased manifold during 2003 and 2007. Total number of killed in Pakistan (civilians, security force personnel and terrorists combined) was 189 in 2003, it increased to 863 in 2004, 1471 in 2006 and last year the figure stood at 3599.

Can a country that cannot hold itself together be expected to deliver on the peace process? In order to make sustainable progress on the peace process a country needs to have relative peace and stability at home, which Pakistan unfortunately lacks. This is what the Indian government needs to keep in mind when it demands the Pakistani establishment to deliver on its promises. The Indian government is likely to maintain an aggressive posture in the face of Pakistani inability to act, again, primarily due to domestic political pressures in India. In an election year the Indian government either needs to show that it has achieved a commendable lot on the Pakistan front or adopt a belligerent posture if there are no achievements to show. UPA’s Pakistan policy hasn’t achieved much, so it is unlikely to adopt a soft line now lest that be manipulated by the BJP.

Added to this is the problem that there is an unfortunate absence of any high-level diplomacy or chemistry between the leaders of the two countries: the meeting between Mr. Gilani and Dr. Singh in Colombo was at best cordial in nature, not fruitful. Personal diplomacy often works in international relations and can do wonders when combined with political will and domestic legitimacy. None of these is in existence between the leaders of India and Pakistan as of today.

The immediate future does not look promising unless, of course, the two countries are willing to take some radical steps towards peace. That can, under the circumstances, happen only if there are peace dividends for political use available for both the countries. This, again, seems to be lacking in the case of India and Pakistan. The UPA government, at this point of time, is unlikely to work towards a national consensus months before parliamentary elections and the BJP will not, even if approached, let that happen.

Source: Greater Kashmir, August 13, 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=13_8_2008&ItemID=2&cat=11

Who will douse the fire in Jammu?

The administration needs to wake up before things go out of control

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

Even after decades of dealing with insurgency and having been in the business of conflict resolution, the government, officials and the politicians in the state of Jammu and Kashmir still seem to be drawing a blank when it comes to practicing the basic lessons in conflict management and resolution. An agitation that should and could have been nipped in the bud is now quickly going out of control and there is as yet no consensus or even willingness to bring normalcy back to Jammu that has been witnessing protests and violence for weeks now. The currently raging unrest in Jammu province is brought about by a set of unfortunate factors: inept and clumsy administrative handling of the situation, lack of administrative imagination from the part of the state government, lack of courage from the state’s political leadership belonging to various political parties, and the inability of the civil society to engage the people in a meaningful manner.

Lack of Administrative Imagination

Jammu and Kashmir does not have a popular government at this point of time and so it is difficult to invoke the established practices and procedures of democratic conflict resolution. One understands that and would not therefore expect the governor-led state administrative machinery to fair extremely well. However, the government does not seem to be able to do anything at all to resolve the ongoing violence and protests in Jammu. The key functionaries of the government seem to be under the impression that this is merely a law and order problem which can be handled by the Divisional Commissioners and middle ranking police officers with some stern police action. The governor made a visit to Jammu and met leaders from various political parties, and has been making public appeals for calm through the media, but all in vain. What about the other time-tested measures that governments normally adopt in situations like this, such as multi-layered negotiations, reaching out to various political leaders, those leading the agitations, relatives of those killed and injured etc.? While the revocation of the transfer of land to the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board triggered the current spell of protests, Jammuites are also pouring out their unhappiness on a variety of issues on the streets that has been pent-up for a very long time: ranging from the question of delimitation of electoral constituencies in the state to repairing the transformer in the Gladni Grid Station (Jammu is reeling under severe power shortages for the last few weeks ever since the Gladni transformer has become dysfunctional). Resolving the administrative, developmental and governance issues is one of the important ways of addressing popular unrest. The administration needs to wake up from its slumber and act proactively or things can go out control, leading to polarization between Jammu and Kashmir and Jammu Hindus and Kashmiri Muslims. The state government has to appoint a high level team comprising of high ranking officials and civil society members to reach out to the protesting sections of the public and discuss ways and means of resolving their grievances.

Lack of Courage from the Political Leadership

While Jammu is burning and life has come to a standstill, where are all the political leaders of the state? From former chief ministers to party patrons to party presidents, all of the state’s many political parties are absent from ground zero. While it is true that except for the BJP, most parties run the risk of public wrath in today’s Jammu for right or wrong reasons, the point is that they should take this reasonable risk since they are in the profession called politics where the same people love you today and hate you tomorrow. Major political parties of the state have to take it upon themselves to meet the injured, relatives of the dead, and address the larger political concerns and get into the midst of the public discourse. If fear of public wrath is what is keeping them at a safe distance, how did they survive in the not-so-smooth politics of Jammu and Kashmir for so long? Or is it electoral calculations that are keeping them away from Jammu? If latter is the case, it is not enlightened politics. Reports of resignations of Jammu-based office bearers from major political parties are perhaps only a small indication of difficult times ahead for the political parties.

The defunct civil society

In situations like this, the local civil society normally steps into the scene to breathe an air of reason and calm. But the Jammu civil society, which is traditionally considered to be more robust than its counterpart in Srinagar, doesn’t seem to have achieved much. When many political leaders in Jammu are whipping up communal passions by asking Kashmiri Muslims to leave Jammu (in retaliation to Syed Ali Shah Geelani’s demand to oust all outside laborers from Kashmir), it becomes the responsibility of the civil society to counter this malicious tendency tooth and nail. In this process of threats and counter threats, it is the landless laborers and the poor families, both Muslim and Hindu, who suffer. Educational institutions, media, faith-based organizations and all such actors need to take up the responsibility to bring the society back to normalcy. The civil society needs to meaningfully engage those agitated as well as the victims by conducting visits to affected localities, taking out peace rallies etc. Jammu and Kashmir is once again on the verge of internal divisions and communal violence. If such communal passions and violence are allowed to flourish, all the intra-J&K peace and understanding that have been achieved in the past few years will be lost in a matter of weeks.

(The writer is Assistant Professor, Department of Strategic and Regional Studies, University of Jammu)

Source: Greater KAshmir, July 30, 2008. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=30_7_2008&ItemID=32&cat=11

Afghanistan and the Regional Geopolitics

A win-win game or zero-sum affair?

STATE CRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

THE TALIBAN were born in Pakistani refugee camps, educated in Pakistani madrasas and learnt their fighting skills from Mujaheddin Pushtuns based in Pakistan. Their families carried Pakistani identity cards”, wrote one of the leading experts on the Taliban and Afghanistan, Ahmed Rashid, in his celebrated book Taliban: The story of Afghan warlords. When the Frankenstein - the Taliban – came back to haunt the Pakistani state – its originator - in the recent past, Pakistan watchers began to believe that the Pakistani state will go all out against the remnant Taliban elements in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Pakistani state did so, but in parts and half-heartedly, which has gone on to further embolden the Taliban elements in the region.

It is now widely perceived that while most of those who run the political establishment in Pakistan want to see that the ongoing talibanisation process does not take further roots in the state and society of Pakistan, many disgruntled elements in the Pakistani armed forces and the all-powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), apart from the Islamic radical parties in Pakistan, continue to support the Taliban so that they can exert complete control on Kabul and bring about a ‘true Islamic’ state in Pakistan.

The new regional geo-politics in Afghanistan has been played out by a number of global and regional parties – the United States, NATO, Iran, Pakistan and India. While the United States and the NATO seem to be increasingly disinterested in continuing their engagement with Afghanistan, India and Pakistan seem to be clearly furthering their strategic interests in the war-torn nation.

Pakistan’s strategic interests in Afghanistan and its aggressive policies there, which date back to the 1970s, stem from both strategic necessity and geo-political greed. One of the primary reasons for its pro-active and aggressive Afghan policies is the successive Afghan governments’ firm refusal to accept the Durand Line which currently separates the two countries as a settled issue. Afghan Prime Minister, Mohammad Harkim Khan, declared as early as in 1947: “If an independent Pushtunistan cannot be set up, the frontier province should join Afghanistan. Our neighbour (Pakistan) will realise that our country with its population and trade, needs (an opening) to the sea”. Since then the Afghan irredentist tendency has only grown in intensity: various Afghan leaders such as President Nur Muhammad Taraki, Prime Minister Daud Khan, the Taliban leadership and now Hamid Karzai have all refused to accept the Durand Line as a settled issue.

Second is the issue of an independent Pushtunistan which many Afghan political leaders have fanned to the disquiet of the Pakistani leadership. When put together, Pushtun nationalism and Afghan irredentist tendencies have enough in them to give sleepless nights to Pakistan. Thirdly, many Pakistani strategic thinkers such as Pakistani General Aslam Beg have emphasized the need for Pakistan to have a strategic depth in Afghanistan. The question of strategic depth needs to be seen in the context of Pakistan’s access to energy-rich Central Asia.

Yet another Pakistani concern regarding Afghanistan is the latter’s traditionally close friendship with the former’s arch rival – India. The Indo-Afghan friendship had almost always flourished but for a brief interregnum during the Mujahideen war and the Taliban rule. The present Afghan leadership under Hamid Karzai has been proactively trying to enhance Afghan engagement with India which India is only glad to extend. India sees very tangible strategic results from a close relationship with Kabul: India is building parts of a highway from Chabahar (in Iran) through Afghanistan to Tajikistan (Chabahar-kabul-Kunduz-Badakhshan) which will enable India to have a transport corridor to the otherwise inaccessible Central Asian region. India’s goodwill in Kabul is a result of a variety of Indian initiatives: its liberal development aid to Kabul (as the fifth largest donor, it has already pledged more than $750 million to build roads, train teachers and bureaucrats, and putting in place the necessary infrastructure for the country), the large number of Indians (around 4,000) working in various developmental projects in Afghanistan, immediate steps towards reconstruction after the ouster of the Taliban in 2001 (helped reopen the Indira Gandhi Children’s Hospital in Kabul, sent medical missions to assist in humanitarian work, donated Airbuses to enable Ariana airlines to resume operations and started plying hundreds of city buses in Afghan cities for public transit facilities), and the traditional ties it has had with the war-torn state.

Hamid KArzai has visited India six times ever since 2001 and the recent visit of Afghan Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak to visit the headquarters of the army’s 15th corps in Srinagar J&K to see counter-insurgency operations raised quite a few eyebrows in Islamabad. More importantly, Pakistan thinks India fans insurgencies within Pakistan from its bases in Afghanistan.

While both Pakistan’s and India’s engagement in Afghanistan is to gain the much-needed diplomatic and strategic leverage in that strategically important location, Pakistan, unlike India, has been trying to influence the developments by sheer muscle power rather than soft power and deft diplomatic skills which the Afghans have come to strongly resent. While this has brought New Delhi and Kabul closer, this has not been to the liking of Islamabad which is now trying its best to spoil that.

Last week’s attack on the Indian Mission in Kabul was not the first of its kind – allegedly sponsored by ISI – against Indian engagement in Afghanistan. In 2007, the Indian Border Roads Organization reportedly came under 30 rocket attacks while it was constructing the 124-mile stretch of road across Nimroz Province.

Pakistan’s concerns, strategically speaking, are understandable: It does not afford to have enemies on both sides and be sandwiched between them. It has to preempt any such moves by India and Afghanistan. However, the Pakistani strategy in preempting that is only making its own position in Kabul more and more vulnerable. Pakistan needs to rethink its strategy in Afghanistan, and India and Afghanistan together could persuade Pakistan to get together for a tri-lateral regional initiative at countering extremism in the region and rebuilding Afghanistan making the geo-strategic game in Afghanistan a win-win one rather than a zero-sum one.

Source: Greater Kashmir, JULY 16, 2008 , URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=16_7_2008&ItemID=3&cat=11

Political chaos in J&K

Political chaos in J&K

By HAPPYMON JACOB

During the course of the last three weeks, many significant developments have taken place in Jammu and Kashmir and many of these will have long-lasting implications for the ongoing peace efforts in and on Kashmir. The Congress government in the state has resigned leading to the possibility of President’s rule in the state for the fourth time in the state’s history, seven people have so far died in the protests that rocked the valley in the past few weeks, the ruling coalition in the state - Congress and the People’s Democratic Party - has parted ways and the state continues to be in turmoil.

However, the most unwelcome result of all the political developments in the state is indeed the unprecedented communal polarisation that the state is witnessing today: there are threats of an economic blockade of Kashmir by some Hindu fundamentalist parties in Jammu and this has prompted many Kashmiris to ask Pakistan for help with essential commodities. There are also reports of communal clashes from many parts of the state.

It all started when the state government decided to allot 200 Kanals of forest land to Shri Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB), which led to the 10-day agitation in the Kashmir Valley spearheaded by the secessionist leaders such as Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and Yaseen Malik. Under pressure from widespread protests, the state government revoked the land grant order, which gave rise to protests in Jammu.

Kashmir, by all accounts, was limping back to normalcy in the last couple of years. Why then has this otherwise relatively minor act of land transfer and the controversy surrounding it, which, of course, could have been pre-empted by some deft handling by the government, taken the state by storm? What explains this sudden change of public mood on the streets of Srinagar? Why is peace in Kashmir so fragile?

A post-facto analysis of the situation in Kashmir proves one thing beyond any doubts: peace in Kashmir is too fragile to be taken for granted. Normalcy in Kashmir, to a great extent, did manage to veil the discontent, uneasiness and disapproval of the people at a lot of things that were happening in and on Kashmir. It is this pent-up anger and uneasiness that was vented out on the streets of Srinagar during the past few weeks.

T here are a number of underlying causes behind what is happening now and they call for some serious introspection on the part of the state and central governments.

Many analysts around the country tend to believe that the anger on the streets of Kashmir is essentially communal in nature and the Kashmiri dissidents who led these protests and a large number of common Kashmiris who participated in them are indulging in anti-Hindu politics.

The truth is far from that. While the immediate cause of these protests may be linked to the land transfer itself, there are other not-so-apparent and more substantive causes behind this. The recent spell of protests is the result of a series of fundamentally flawed policies in and on Jammu and Kashmir by the governments in Srinagar and New Delhi.

First of all, despite all their promises to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, what have the governments in Srinagar and New Delhi done to resolve the Kashmir issue to the satisfaction of the people of the state? Almost nothing. The Prime Minister’s round table conferences and the reports that were produced subsequently by various working groups have been neatly archived and forgotten about, as usual. The reports and the contents were indeed very encouraging and one had hoped that the governments would act on them helping, thereby, improve the situation in the state.

The change of guard in Srinagar in November 2005, when the People’s Democratic Party’s (PDP) Mufti Mohammad Sayyed was replaced by Congress party’s Ghulam Nabi Azad as the state’s Chief Minister, in retrospect, was a serious mistake committed by the Congress party: it suddenly brought to a grinding halt all the good work that the Mufti government was doing in the state even to the extent of being accused of as pro-militants by some. More importantly, the incoming political leadership lacked the political will and vision to implement the suggestions from the various working group reports. Even as PDP’s ‘healing touch’ was dismissed as mere rhetoric, it did have a great deal of symbolic effect. Therefore, one might say that the Mufti government would have organised the round tables better and diligently worked towards implementing the suggestions from the working groups.

Secondly, it is now apparent that the government was sleeping through the various phases of peace in Kashmir ignoring the daily demands and pleas from dissidents, activists, mainstream politicians and analysts to engage the state and the problems therein more proactively.

Not only that there was unprecedented willingness from the part of the dissidents and various sections of Kashmiris in looking for a solution to the state’s problems but more importantly many of these suggestions to conflict resolution were concrete and should have been taken into serious consideration. The governments’ dismissive attitude towards such gestures and proposals has brought about the prevailing situation of political disconnect between the people and the state in Jammu and Kashmir.

Giving the current spate of protests in Kashmir a religious colour is being simplistic and counter-productive. It is time we learnt to read the signs of political frustration of the people and act on them before it is too late. That said, it is necessary also to point out that the argument that the transfer of land to SASB is part of a well-thought out Indian conspiracy to settle non-local Hindus in the valley in order to turn Muslims to a minority in the state is far from the reality. It is also interesting to note the Pakistani reaction to the political developments in Kashmir.

Despite repeated pleas from the Kashmiri separatist leadership to get involved in the ongoing political turmoil in the state, Pakistani government is maintaining a studied silence on the issue and is seemingly unwilling to make loud statements about it.

Source: Sakaal Times, July 10, 2008.

New spell of violence

Kabul burns, Kashmir burns too

STATE CRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

Violence seems to be returning to the troubled and unstable region stretching from Kashmir to Kabul. The region is riddled by daily incidents of bomb blasts, clashes between security forces and militias (ranging from Hizbul Mujahidin to the resurgent Taliban) and killings of scores of non-combatants. While Afghanistan has almost always been in turmoil ever since the US takeover of that country in 2001, the ongoing peace process between India and Pakistan and the ‘stable‘ leadership of Pervez Musharraf had apparently been successful in controlling the spate of violent incidents in other parts of the region. Monday’s Indian embassy bombing in Kabul killing the Indian Counselor and the Military Attaché among many others, increasing levels of violence in almost all cities of Pakistan and the unrest in Kashmir (incomparable though they are) shows that there are much deeper and graver problems that we are faced with which require more than cosmetic treatment. Why is it that the four year old Indo-Pak peace process and the six year old Afghan reconstruction efforts don’t seem to be able to stabilize the region?

In seeking an answer for this important question, I do not intend to go into the history of the conflicts or the geopolitical dynamics in the region. Looking back at history and finding those responsible for in order to attach responsibility and blame would do no good. To say that the most significant contemporary reason for this spate of violence is the levels of political instability in the region would perhaps be begging the question. However, political instability, lack of strong leadership with popular support and an absence of political will, one could argue, have been contributing to the current spell of violence in the region.

Pakistan: who is in charge?

Pakistan, indeed, is at the centre of this violence-hit region stretching from Kashmir to Kabul. And so the severe political instability in that country seems to be responsible, to a great extent, for the increasing incidents of violence in the region. To say so is no Pakistan bashing, but, in fact, merely echoing what many responsible analysts in Pakistan are repeatedly saying today. When Gen. (retd.) Pervez Musharraf was in charge in Islamabad, there was in existence a political authority that was capable and willing to take on the perpetrators of violence in the region and talk to the leaders in the neighboring countries. One did hope that Pakistan’s not-so-smooth transition to democracy could bring peace into the region: today it so looks that it was a pipedream. While the political class in Pakistan is fighting among themselves, the Army and the ISI seem to be having different geopolitical designs vis-à-vis both India and Afghanistan. The man who had taken the peace process this far, Musharraff, seems not just powerless to do anything about it, but is counting his days as President. This has sent a message to the extremists in the country: make use of the prevailing political instability and strike at will. Various Pakistani provinces are simmering with discontent: NWFP, despite the election of Awami National Party (ANP), is still out of reach and riddled with violence. There are daily bomb blasts in Pakistani cities and Baloch rebels continue to resist the Punjabi rule: Nawab Khair Baksh Marri, the head of the largest Baloch tribe, the Marris, recently said in an interview “I can co-exist with a pig but not with a Punjabi”.

Afghanistan: a failing state?

There is no political stability in Afghanistan either – Karzai is not even able to control what happens in capital Kabul let alone rid the country of violence. The confused western strategies in Afghanistan and political anarchy in Pakistan explain, to a great extent, the persistence of violence in Afghanistan. Monday’s Indian embassy bombing needs to be seen in this context. I do not dismiss the claim about Pakistani involvement in this attack (because of the uneasiness that many sections of the Pakistani state has about the Indian influence in Afghanistan), but the Pakistani leadership could easily be unaware of what happened: let us face it, the use of violence in and by Pakistan is no more a state monopoly! Because many factors such as the absence of centralized political control, drug running militias, resurgent Taliban, Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan are responsible for the prevailing situation in Afghanistan, one variable alone cannot explain the state of affairs in that country.

Kashmir: Return of the 1990s?

Until a few months ago, no one would have imagined that the relative peace and stability that had returned to the violence-hit Jammu and Kashmir state would soon start disappearing. Today, apart from the disconnect that there exists between the people and the government, there is also an uncomfortable uneasiness between the various religious communities in the state. No leading politician of the state has till date tried to bring the communities together and create the conditions for peace; they are busy politicking in view of the impending state assembly elections in the state. Political instability and lack of credible and visionary political leadership are, again, giving rise to a condition that is conducive for violence and discontentment in the state.

While many in the Pakistani establishment might want to see an end to its misadventure in Kashmir, those promoting violence in Kashmir from Pakistan continue to do so because there are such deep divisions among the ruling elite in Pakistan on Kashmir today. While “one Pakistan” talks the language peace and genuinely wants to have peace with India, the “other Pakistan” does not want to have peace with India and works towards undermining the peace process. The good news is that the peace process seems to be retaining the ability and momentum to survive the sustained attacks from those who want to derail it; the bad news is that even though the governments in the region seems to be wanting to control violence in the region, they don’t seem to be able to do so.

(Happymon Jacob is Assistant Professor, Department of Strategic and Regional Studies, University of Jammu)

Source: Greater Kashmir, JULY 09, 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=9_7_2008&ItemID=13&cat=11