MY TAKE ON DOMESTIC POLITICS, INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Tuesday, December 29, 2009
Thursday, November 5, 2009
The limits of coercive diplomacy
However, following mounting international pressure and an increasing number of jihadist attacks on its soil, including an audacious assault on the Army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi and a series of attacks on police installations in Lahore, Pakistan has urged a resumption of dialogue with India. Dr. Singh’s peace overture has come at a time when there is an urgent need to re-examine India’s policy of ‘no-dialogue’ with Pakistan.
Has it worked?
It is perhaps an opportune time to ask whether the Indian strategy of coercive diplomacy has worked against Pakistan. What has India gained by not talking to Pakistan for 11 months, and what more is India likely to gain if it continues along this path? Do New Delhi’s foreign policy mandarins think India profits strategically by refusing to engage Pakistan in discussion?
Do they assume that India can indefinitely retain the moral high ground it thought it had when it broke off relations with Pakistan last year? They seem to hold this assumption, erroneous though this might be. As a result, New Delhi is not only losing precious time by isolating itself from Pakistan, but is harming its own strategic interests.
India has achieved all it can hope to with its silence; there is nothing more it can reasonably hope to gain by refusing to restart the dialogue process. Pakistan has accepted that the perpetrators of 26/11 came from its territory and has, in principle at least, agreed to prosecute them. India also helped focus the attention of the international community on Pakistan post-26/11. However, New Delhi’s insistence that it will talk to Islamabad only after Jama’at-ud-Da’wah (JuD) chief Hafiz Mohammad Saeed is prosecuted may indeed be demanding too much. India should work with Pakistan to initiate Saeed’s prosecution rather than hounding Islamabad to go it alone: a strategy of pure coercion and compellence with no reasonable payoff is clearly counterproductive.
If New Delhi continues along this route, Pakistan may well up the ante against India (through border incursions, for example) in an attempt to bring India to the negotiating table: states have a tendency to behave irrationally when pushed to the corner. India’s strategy of compellence has never really worked against Pakistan. And it is unlikely to work in the future.
Counterproductive
Not only is a ‘no-dialogue’ policy towards Pakistan not useful, it is indeed counterproductive. Consider the following. First of all, the former Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, is increasingly becoming a ‘persona non-grata’ among the ruling elites of Pakistan — both civilian and military. There is an emerging tendency among many Pakistani politicians and retired generals who once worked under Gen. Musharraf, to feign ignorance of his statements and actions (especially vis-À-vis India) and to distance themselves from him.
In other words, there is today a clear unwillingness in Pakistan to own the political legacy of its former military dictator. It is now widely recognised that the 2004-2008 peace process — which was seriously considering out-of-the-box solutions to resolve outstanding rifts — not only had the full support of Dr. Singh and Gen. Musharraf but, through its back-channel route, had even prepared a tentative blueprint for peace. More precisely, it is believed that the bilateral back-channel negotiations had taken the peace process on Jammu and Kashmir to a new level. If the new government and the strategic community in Pakistan renege on Gen. Musharraf’s past promises, there will be serious implications for Indo-Pakistan relations, especially with respect to Kashmir.
Therefore, undoing Gen. Musharraf’s legacy will also mean undoing the Indo-Pakistan peace process and all that it may have achieved over time. If this process of demonising and demolishing Gen. Musharraf’s legacy is already under way in Pakistan, then India’s consistent refusal to engage Islamabad will only further contribute to the undoing of the gains of the Indo-Pakistan peace process. In other words, the Indian unwillingness to engage Pakistan will reverse the gains that India had made in recent years in resolving its conflicts with Pakistan.
Another emerging trend in Pakistan is to accuse India of sponsoring terrorism against Pakistan. Today many in the Pakistan establishment are making serious allegations that India supports the Baloch insurgents as well as some Pakistan Taliban groups. While such allegations may not be wholly new, what is perhaps new is the focussed and predetermined manner in which these accusations are being made today and the manner in which this argument is gaining currency within Pakistan’s strategic elite. Although this may be purely for domestic consumption — as the international audience is unlikely to buy this line of argument — a Pakistani population and civil society unfavourably disposed towards India is not something New Delhi should ignore. It will be genuinely counterproductive for Indian interests in the long term.
More so, this shows that there is a perceptible change in Pakistan’s attitude: from being defensive and cornered in the months immediately after 26/11, it is now on the offensive. To some extent this has been a result of India’s overuse of coercive diplomacy, which it continues to indulge in without properly weighing its options in a cost-effective manner. Quite apart from the fact that this approach has degraded relations between the two countries and made Pakistan feel more insecure (which in turn may prompt it to be more belligerent), it has led the international community to regard the two countries as part of the problem rather than as part of the solution. More so, the more time India spends refusing to have a dialogue with Pakistan, the more difficult it will be for the country to start talking if and when it decides to talk.
Status quo bias
New Delhi’s unwise handling of Pakistan is a result of a deep-seated status quo bias that permeates New Delhi’s policy towards Pakistan, terrorism, and even Kashmir which in many ways is the ‘ground zero’ of Indo-Pakistan relations and India’s struggle against terrorism. This status quo bias has manifestly narrowed the Indian government’s understanding and approach to terrorism in the region.
New Delhi sometimes appears to consider terrorism a problem that is unique to India, as though no other country has ever suffered its consequences. It therefore persists with its demand that others (that is, Pakistan) ‘fix’ the problem first before it (the perpetual victim) will discuss other political and security issues.
This head-in-the-sand approach ignores the reality that terrorism is a global/regional problem requiring a global/regional solution. This solution can only be achieved in a cooperative mode and by creating cooperative mechanisms to contain the menace of terror in the region. And India needs to take the lead in this process, however challenging and long-drawn-out it may turn out to be. It is imprudent to attempt to enact unilateral measures to ‘control’ terrorism, precisely because terrorists respect no borders and are by their very nature extremely difficult to control.
A status quo bias may ‘benefit’ the painfully slow-moving Indian political and bureaucratic apparatus, but it is not beneficial for a country that desires to become a great power in an age of fast-changing international politics. To start with, therefore, New Delhi needs to shed its status quo bias and restart the dialogue with Pakistan in its own long-term strategic interests.
(Source: The Hindu, November 4, 2009. URL: http://beta.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article42838.ece)
COMMENTS:
After all the dialogues we indulged with Pakistan since 1947 there has been no significant shift in policies or view points of both the countries.The best solution for India is to stop giving undue importance to Pakistan and focusing more on problems at home. Terrorism that has emerged in names of naxalites, Maoists and many other groups as a result of neglect and weak character of Indian governments has to be controlled first if India desires to achieve a Super Power status ever in future.I agree with the author in the matter that Indian government should stop whining about how Indians have been a victim of Pakistan sponsored Terrorism.We should rather focus on creating a feeling of security by improving the intelligence services and infrastructure for defense and paramilitary forces so that they can effectively counter the militias all over the country.Instead of a dialogue with Pakistan, India can gain more by initiating a dialogue with its own people who have taken up arms.
India needs to maintain current status of any talks with Pakistan. Why do we forget that the main culprit named by the arrested Terrorist, providing cogent evidence agaisnt him, is still at large enjoying official support. Evidence provided by India is being either denied or is being rated insufficient. The more we adopted soft diplomakcy to Pakistan the more terrorists landed in India, including Jammu and Kashmir. Government of India, for the first time, as taken right decision to ask Pakistan to first prosecute the main culprit roaming at large before sitting on the dialogue table. We should appreciate the Government's approach which is in overall National interest.
Wonderfully written!
The author makes some valid points, but looses sight of the larger goal. Talks will help when actions or agreements result. In the case of Pakistan, the main problem is that once the leadership changes (and this seems to happen a lot), the "Talks" have to start again from square one, with all the agreements already concluded deemed worthless. In the current scenario, it does not appear anyone is in control in Pakistan (so no actions possible either).
I have to disagree that India needs to pay its unruly neighbour so much attention. India must crush Pakistan's overtures by ignoring it as much as possible, not giving it the level playground it covertly seeks through terrorism.
I don't agree. India should continue to be firm in its position that there will be no talks until the 26/11 terrorists are prosecuted. If Pakistan is really sincere in improving its relations with India, it must do at least the one thing that India is asking for. If it cannot fulfill this one request, how can we be sure it will fulfill other requests made during any future talks? It is Pakistan's credibility at stake here, and there is no need for India to rush to restart talks. Restarting talks for talks sake is futile and everybody knows it. Let's be patient but firm and consistent in our position.
While there is no doubt that dialogue can sort out issues across the world, there is a worry India should have to start the same. As one should have noticed in the past, whenever there was an atmosphere created for dialogue, the terrorists had always made hurdles. So if India really want to start the dialogue, let it happen and if there is no agenda, then let it now happen. If one really wants to go and get the issues solved, both these countries should have an open and negotiation mind to start with. Because Paistan can't ask India to hand over entire Kashmir to them, India won't agree to it. Likewise, India should also not insist that we are going to resume the dialogue like our predecessors... If there is no solutions foreseen, then it is better not to have dialogue rather than a failed dialogue.
India Pakistan relations have always been governed by emotions and events, whether it is Plebscite offering by nehru, shimla agreement , nuclear bomb etc. Every single event or word spoken or action taken has become a cornerstone in deciding future course of action. To make coercive diplomacy successful again, India should talk really tough and not give in as it did at Sharm-el-Sheikh by admitting to look at Balooch accusations. Historical mistakes need not be repeated, else it will harm us in long term.
I agree with the assessment that coercive diplomacy has all but failed. The US only plays to its self-interest in any region. India has never really stood up to itself in its actions against Pakistan and is seen more as a whiner. The time when we make strong words supported by meaningful action, our aspiration for a super power will be realised. As to the specific re-engagement with Pakistan, it does India no harm in opening channels of back-door diplomacy. But it can be futile with an instable Pak Govt and insecure country.
I think that the author has been very right in his optimistic attitude for better India-Pak relations. But, i guess the author misses the point that if what is happening in Pakistan now-a-days persists sometime longer, there would be no Pakistan to talk about. The International community has changed their views towards Muslims, which is really a sad thing, people see them as terrorists, everyone and this is because some of them are doing it. I think India can't achieve the Super Power status until and unless it has its issues resolved with Pakistan. But again starting the peace process is not a solution.
Considering the status quo in Pakistan, Pakistan government and security agencies would be more concerned about their internal security. Mounting pressures to dismantle an entire terror infrastructure may not be a realistic approach from a neighbour like India at this juncture of affairs. It is also true that talks in the current situation may be futile, but being responsible power India needs to resume talks with Pakistan to ensure the state support. An instable Pakistan is a greater threat to India than to themselves.
The article could only be construed as a justifier and ground-maker for the to-be announced decision of the Government to carry on the composite dialogues with Pakistan. In the last 62 years, the CBMs ventured by India have only ended in leaving many Indians dead at the hands of terrorists and our intelligence and security forces weakend. India can start, and should, start dialogues only after either the Kashmir problem is solved or when there is a solid proof on the cessation of all terrorism activities that target India in Pakistan.
We cannot change our neighbours (neighbouring countries), we have to live with them. Brothers can quarrel sometimes and live apart, but somebody in the family stream should continue to work towards appeasement between the families for a breakthrough in rebuilding the relationship. The misunderstandings of 1947 between the families during our forefathers' period need not have to continue all the way through their grand children and great grand children. We need dialogies between these two great families (India and Pakistan) to come to some good understanding and rejoining. This is the wish of the great great grand children of these two families.
I disagree with the author. You cannot have friendly relations with a country which has throughout history proved to be a backstabber and says that the evidence to frame the terrorists provided by the GoI is not enough!! In the past 10 years itself we faced 3 major attacks by Pakistani terrorists- Kargil War, attack on the parliament and 26/11. I was specially appalled by the following line from the article- ''New Delhi sometimes appears to consider terrorism a problem that is unique to India, as though no other country has ever suffered its consequences.'' Let me point out here that India might not be the only country who had to face the consequences of terrorism but India is the only country who despite of n number of terrorists, anti-Indian elements surrounding the entire border, insurgents, has without a war, diplomatically handled the situation. USA also faced terrorism on it's soil and what did it do? Attack Afghanistan and crumble it to pieces. Instead of applauding the peaceful efforts of the government without waging a war, the author says that India has little to gain by stalling the dialogue process?! My question, what did we gain by resuming it in the first place in 2000? attack on parliament and 26/11..?
I agree with the author that a sensible dialogue is needed from/with Pakistan but NOW is not the time for that.India should wait till the dust settles down there and the signs for peace-making are clearly visible.
The broad goals of India's diplomacy should be clear enough: 1. Weaken elements in Pakistan that are violently anti-Indian. 2. Strengthen pro-India elements. The fact that not talking has not achieved this goal does not automatically imply that talking will achieve them. In fact, we could put ourselves in a worse situation by talking. I think both objectives can be achieved if India is able to identify a pro-India element in the Pakistani polity and supporting it consistently. Such element should not be identified with individual persons. India should instead promote concepts like "democracy", "rule of law" and "religious moderation" and be willing to backup any group in Pakistan that embraces these principles. There is no point talking to any government in Pakistan at this time because all of them are controlled by a power structure whose sole aim is to destabilize India. India should create and promote a more friendly atmosphere.
Coercive diplomacy is just one of the tools of diplomacy. India has used it with limited effect, getting Pakistan to arrest at least the lower level minions of the terrorist infrastructure that has been nurtured there over the past 60 years. It is too early to be called off. In fact, it is not clear that it should ever be called off though it can be re-calibrated. This is not to be confused with the notion that India isn't engaged in interacting with Pakistan. It simply means that sitting down with the Pakistani political leadership at this time would be a wasted effort. Events have proven beyond any doubt that the Pakistani leadership is far too weak to take on the military-bureaucratic establishment that dominates Pakistan. So it suites India to conduct diplomacy that cajoles and prods rather than sits and talks. If there is one important lesson to be learned from engagement with Pakistan, it is that the gains are only possible in conjunction with coercion and force, both diplomatic or military. The 1971 war, the Kargil war and Mumbai terror episode all bear testimony to that simple fact.
Tuesday, November 3, 2009
Manmohan should get a new speechwriter on Kashmir
New Delhi’s deep-seated status-quo bias permeates its policy towards Kashmir which, in many ways, is the ‘ground zero’ of Indo-Pak relations. This status-quo bias has manifestly narrowed the Indian government’s understanding and approach to resolving the problem and has prevented India from taking any radical steps. Although it may ‘benefit’ the painfully slow-moving Indian political and bureaucratic apparatuses, this approach is not beneficial for a country desirous of becoming a great power in an age of fast-changing international politics. The routine manner with which New Delhi approaches Kashmir is disturbing. By not being willing to take radical steps, and granting the state typical bureaucratic treatment, New Delhi is failing the Kashmiris. The PM’s speech in Srinagar shows a lamentable bankruptcy of ideas. Maybe it’s time that Manmohan Singh got a new speechwriter on Kashmir.
Take, for example, the recent visit of the Prime Minister and the Congress Chief to the Kashmir Valley. With the top man in the central government in the lead, the most powerful politician in the country backing him, a friendly and forthcoming state government under Chief Minister Omar Abdullah, and even the major opposition party in J&K, the PDP, welcoming the delegation from New Delhi, what did the recent visit of the Indian Prime Minister and his delegation achieve? Nothing new, nothing substantial. The PM and his delegation made the usual promises, expressed hope (as they always do), claimed there is normalcy in the state (which they have been doing for a very long time), talked about the inclusive dialogue process (that occurred in the UPA’s first term and achieved nothing); and, yes, inaugurated the 12km-long Anantnag-Qazigund railway line. The PM’s speech in Kashmir was a grim reminder of how unimaginative the government has become about conflict resolution in the state. New Delhi’s seasonal theatrics in Kashmir have become all too familiar and predictable in recent years: It’s the same old wine, in the same old bottle.
Home Minister Chidambaram claimed that New Delhi is contemplating the “withdrawal of some paramilitary battalions and vacation of occupied houses and land by the army and paramilitary”. These are the right words, said with the right sentiment, but we have heard similar statements from previous ministers. How are we to believe that this time things will be different and the Kashmiris will get their houses, orchids and schools back? However at least Chidambaram is willing to make such a bold claim; the PM stuck to the tried-and-tested, unwilling to go beyond his speechwriter’s unimaginative rendering of the situation.
Manmohan Singh is credited with making a peace overture to Pakistan from Kashmir that has been hailed as statesmanlike, and as a potential way forward toward reconciliation between India and Pakistan. The essence of what the PM said is that if Pakistan shows good faith and addresses the issue of terrorism, India will not be found wanting in its response. What is so new, different, radical, or statesmanlike in that? Was he not repeating a line that New Delhi has been reiterating for the past 11 months, since the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai? It would have been path-breaking and a real peace overture had the PM made an unconditional offer to talk to Pakistan. I am willing to accept the argument made by many analysts that the PM is serious about restarting the dialogue with Pakistan, but that does not excuse him for his genuinely unsubstantial response to Kashmir.
For many commentators it is politically correct to say that the issue of Kashmir is an issue that is between India and Kashmir and that Pakistan has nothing to do with it. The recently initiated ‘silent diplomacy’ with Kashmiris at the behest of Mr. Chidambaram and the other measures by New Delhi seem to be pointing towards such a direction. What is forgotten here is that there are two important dimensions to the Kashmir problem: the problem of Kashmir and the problem in Kashmir. ‘Silent diplomacy’ will be useful in resolving the problem in Kashmir: poor governance, fear of violence, lack of development, and the army’s occupation of private property, but there is also the problem of Kashmir. The problem of Kashmir exists between India and Pakistan and must also be resolved in order to achieve stability between the two countries, as well as sustainable peace in J&K. Pakistan has in the recent past been reasonable in its declared approaches to the problem of Kashmir. India could legitimately, if cautiously, talk with its neighbour about the issue, rather than consistently trying to isolate Pakistan.
In all of this, one wonders about the exact role that Omar Abdullah has been playing. It looks as though he is increasingly playing second fiddle to the Congress government and that he is endorsing the latter’s peace initiatives. Kashmir’s history bears witness to the fact that J&K chief ministers who have become too close to New Delhi have not excelled in the state. Omar has a mind of his own and should therefore design his own peace initiatives; something he seems hesitant to do thus far. Omar had a vision for Kashmir when he was in opposition that appears to be lacking today. If Omar Abdullah, fired by the enthusiasm of his late thirties, cannot take radical steps now he will never be able to do so, and waiting for New Delhi to do so is proving fruitless.
(Happymon Jacob teaches at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)
(Source: Greater Kashmir, November 3, 2009)
Monday, October 12, 2009
Talk time
Politics is a fast changing game; more so international politics. Though statesmen might want to control and constrain it, they may well be in for a few unpleasant surprises. Statesmen desire to maintain the status-quo if they feel it suits their interests. This often clouds their understanding of international politics, narrowing their perspectives and leaving them uninformed of contemporary realities. New Delhi has traditionally followed an unwise status-quo approach towards Pakistan in its reluctance to engage the country in effective dialogue. Do New Delhi’s foreign policy mandarins think that India profits strategically by refusing to engage Pakistan in discussion? Do they assume that by refusing to engage Islamabad, India can continue to hold the moral high ground it thought it had when it broke off relations post-26/11? They seem to, erroneous though this might be. New Delhi is not only losing precious time by isolating itself from Pakistan, but it is also harming its own strategic interests by doing so. A recent track-two meet in Bangkok between former officials of the countries (from ISI, R&AW, Foreign Ministries, and the Defence Forces) that this author had the chance to attend, exposed some interesting insights into the multifarious negative consequences of giving Pakistan the silent treatment.
First of all, former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraff is increasingly becoming a ‘persona non-grata’ among the ruling elites of Pakistan – both civilian and military. There is now an emerging tendency among many Pakistani politicians and retired generals, who once worked under Musharraff, to feign ignorance of his statements and actions (especially vis-à-vis India) and to distance themselves from him. In short, there is a clear unwillingness in Pakistan to own the political legacy of its former military dictator. This has very serious implications for Indo-Pak relations and the peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue. It is now widely recognized that the 2004-2008 peace process - which was seriously considering out-of-the-box solutions to resolve the outstanding problems between the two countries – not only had the full support of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and former president Musharraff but, through its back-channel route, had even prepared a tentative blueprint for peace. More precisely, it is believed that the bilateral back-channel negotiations had taken the peace process on J&K to a new level. There was only left to share the progress that had been made with the J&K leadership, both mainstream and dissident, many of whom had already welcomed the ‘Musharraff formula’ as a possible way forward. If the new government and the strategic community in Pakistan renege on Musharraff’s past promises, there will be serious implications for Indo-Pak relations, especially for Kashmir. In other words, undoing Musharraff’s legacy also means undoing the Indo-Pak peace process and all it may have achieved. If this process of demolishing Musharraff’s legacy is already underway in Pakistan, then India’s consistent refusal to engage Islamabad will only further contribute to the undoing of the gains of Indo-Pak peace process.
Another emergent trend in Pakistan is to accuse India of sponsoring terrorism there. The Pakistani government seems to be raising this charge against India in various domestic forums and the strategic community is also singing a similar tune in international meetings. While this may not be a wholly new phenomenon, what is perhaps new is the focused and predetermined manner in which these accusations are being made today. India has been accusing Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism for a long time, and now Islamabad is returning the dubious favour. This may be for purely domestic consumption, as the international audience is unlikely to buy this line of argument, however a Pakistani population unfavourably disposed towards India is not something New Delhi should ignore. It is surely counterproductive for Indian interests in the long term.
What precisely is India gaining by not talking to Pakistan? In my opinion, since severing dialogue with the country post-26/11, India has already achieved whatever it ‘possibly can’. Pakistan has accepted that the perpetrators of 26/11 came from its territory and has agreed to prosecute them. India also managed to turn the heat of the international community on to Pakistan post-26/11. There is nothing more that India can reasonably gain from the current scenario. Insisting that New Delhi will only talk to Pakistan after Jama'at-ud-Da'wah (JuD) chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed is prosecuted may be demanding too much. The Indian government should now work with Pakistan to get Sayeed prosecuted rather than trying to force Pakistan to do so alone; a strategy of pure coercion and compulsion with no reasonable payoff is clearly counterproductive. If New Delhi continues along this route, Pakistan may well up the ante against India (through border incursions, for example) in an attempt to bring the latter to the negotiating table. India’s strategy has never worked against Pakistan, and it is unlikely to work in future.
In international relations, ‘signaling’ is an important tactical measure used by countries to engage adversaries without explicitly stating a position. Such signals, unfortunately, frequently go unread. For example, many analysts asserted that the Pakistani army was sending positive signals to India when the ISI chief attended an Iftar celebration hosted by the Indian High Commission in Islamabad. Yet this was not taken seriously by New Delhi. Many in Pakistan’s strategic community today believe that New Delhi should try to engage the Pakistani army – perhaps the real centre of power – in order to resolve the outstanding issues between the two countries. Talking to the Pakistani army is something New Delhi has never considered, but it should now do so.
There is a perceptible change in Pakistan’s attitude: from being defensive and cornered in the months immediately after 26/11, the country today is on the offensive. This has partly been a result of India’s overuse of coercive diplomacy against Pakistan. Quite apart from the fact that it will worsen the relations between the two countries and make Pakistan feel more insecure (which will in turn prompt it to be more belligerent), it will also encourage the international community to continue to consider the two countries as part of the problem. More so, the more time India spends refusing dialogue with Pakistan, the more difficult it will be for the country to start talking as and when it so decides. International politics is a fast-changing game; and New Delhi must improve its strategy if it expects to be a serious and successful player.
(Happymon Jacob teaches at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)
Source: Greater Kashmir, October 13, 2009. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/today/full_story.asp?Date=13_10_2009&ItemID=45&cat=11
Opinion of Kashmir people has been swaying towards India even though our politicians had botched the policies in the past as result which terrorists, dissidents were deeply rooted in this area. Even though we are on the way to becoming global power, our foreign diplomacy had failed. India must encourage liberal society in the state and also look to the economic development of common people.